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Abstract 
In 1981 the apartheid military initiated a chemical and biological warfare (CBW) 
programme (code-named Project Coast). The programme, terminated in 1993, was 
aimed at developing novel irritating and incapacitating agents for internal and external 
use, covert assassination weapons for use against apartheid opponents, and defensive 
equipment for use by South African Defence Force (SADF) troops in Angola. 
The CBW programme was driven by a single individual, Dr Wouter Basson, who reported 
to a military management committee (the Co-ordinating Management Committee) which 
comprised a select group of high ranking officers. Practical and financial oversight of the 
programme was weak which allowed both for the abuse of programme funds and for 
senior military officers to deny knowledge of aspects of the programme.  The biological 
component of Project Coast was conducted in violation of the commitments of the South 
African government to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC). While the 
state’s commitment to the BTWC was one of the factors considered when initiating the 
programme, it was not a sufficient constraint to prevent the development of the biological 
weapons programme, but rather influenced its structure such that the programme could 
avoid national and international detection. 
Despite efforts to conceal the military front companies where the chemical and biological 
warfare (CBW) research and development was undertaken, evidence presented in this 
thesis shows  that the United States had sufficient information about the programme to 
have been aware of its existence. Yet, it was only in 1993, on the eve of the democratic 
election in South Africa, that any attempt was made by the US administration to pressure 
the government to terminate the programme.  
This thesis considers the factors which influenced the decision to develop Project Coast; 
the structure and nature of the programme; the motivations of scientists to become 
involved in the programme and remain involved; the use of chemical and biological 
agents against opponents of the state, and the factors which influenced the termination of 
the programme on the eve of the first democratic elections in 1994. It also considers the 
nature and exent of international support, both tacit and overt, for the programme and 
argues that the failure of Western nations to call for the termination of the programme 
before the early 1990s was a function of political expediency and indicates a significant 
weakness in the ability of international agreements to constrain the development of such 
programmes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In 1997 I was an investigator for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
based in the Western Cape. Most of the files which filled my desk and fuelled my 
nightmares contained tales of horror visited upon black families in the Western Cape. 
Children who had disappeared without a trace, bodies burnt beyond recognition, 
torture at the hands of the infamous police Security Branch and the mysterious 
assassination of activists by their comrades. It was not until I happened upon the 
unusual amnesty application of Dr Jan Lourens, towards the end of 1997, that I 
became aware that the apartheid government had dabbled in chemical and biological 
weapons.  
Lourens, a scientist who applied for amnesty for his role in the development of 
assassination weapons for the chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programme, 
provided the first insight into the workings of this programme. From the start his story 
was as much about the functioning of a secret military programme as it was about 
self-enrichment, extravagant international travel, nepotism and betrayal. The making 
of Project Coast could not be separated from the close relationships between the 
young men who drove it.  
Lourens is a sophisticated, intelligent man and his motives in appearing before the 
TRC were self-serving and cynical as much as they were about seeking absolution. 
He knew that the secrets of Project Coast would not remain hidden forever. He also 
knew that if the details of the programme and his involvement in it were to be 
revealed, and he were to be implicated in the development of poison ‘’applicators’’, 
as he liked to call the assassination devices he designed, it would be impossible for 
him to work in a post-1994 South Africa. In addition, he would have had to live with 
the fear of exposure, which may have been followed by charges for his role in crimes 
which he believed had been carried out under the auspices of the secret CBW 
programme.  
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Many of the policemen who applied for amnesty to the TRC, and the handful of 
military operators who knew that the TRC would uncover their involvement in internal 
operations, chose their legal representatives from a small group of sympathetic, 
handpicked lawyers who profited handsomely from the process. Lourens broke the 
mould, cleverly choosing well-known and respected anti-apartheid lawyer, Brian 
Currin, whose credentials and easy manner  impressed the investigators and allowed 
them to develop sympathy for Lourens.  
Lourens’s comprehensive explanation of the way in which the chemical and 
biological warfare programme had been established and organised, provided 
sufficient detail for the investigators to begin unravelling the strands of the 
programme. Most importantly, he provided the names of his former colleagues and 
accomplices and described their role in the programme.  
Over the following six years (1998 – 2003) I conducted interviews with many of the 
scientists who had worked within the project, military managers who had served on 
the borders of the project and those who had found it repugnant. Through senior 
court reporter Marléne Burger’s lengthy daily reports about the criminal trial of Dr 
Wouter Basson, I examined the details of Project Coast which emerged. Each 
witness at the trial and every person interviewed, provided an insight into his or her 
life in Project Coast. The compartmentalized nature of the programme meant that few 
knew its full extent. These snapshots combined to present the view of a top secret 
military project which was poorly managed, achieved dubious goals and allowed its 
leader, Wouter Basson, an inordinate amount of freedom. None of the military 
leaders who were interviewed, nor the Surgeon General who was structurally 
responsible for the overall conduct of the programme, knew much about the details of 
the programme. Not even the successive heads of the Defence Force who were 
interviewed were able to provide a convincing explanation for the reason the 
programme was established and why it had focussed on the small-scale production 
of bizarre assassination weapons, large amounts of tear gas and street drugs. 
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Aim of the thesis 
This thesis presents detailed information about the South African chemical and 
biological warfare programme which was established in 1981 and finally closed down 
in 1995.  The thesis aims to: 
• Provide a detailed description of the nature and structure of the 
programme. 
• Analyse the political context in which the programme was initiated and 
which influenced the nature of the products of the programme. 
• Analyse the motivations of the political and military leaders who 
authorized and managed the programme. 
• Consider the significance of the role of Dr Wouter Basson in determining 
the nature and extent of the programme, and its structure. 
• Consider the motivations of the scientists who worked at the front 
companies which conducted the scientific research and development of 
the programme.  
• Present an analysis of the involvement of other countries in the chemical 
and biological warfare programme, and its closure.  
• Consider the reasons for, and the way in which, the programme was 
terminated.  
• Analyse the lessons which can be learnt about how and why countries 
seek to proliferate.  
Increasing our ability to understand the factors which influence states to make the 
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decision to develop chemical and biological weapons programmes will allow for the 
identification of appropriate measures to detect and deter their existence. 
In Chapter 2 I examine the experience South Africa gained through the production of 
chemical warfare agents for the Alllies during World War II; present information about 
the use of chemical and biological warfare agents during the liberation struggle in 
Rhodesia in the late 1970s and early 1980s; and, examine whether there were links 
between the use of chemical and biological agents in Rhodesia and the South 
African CBW programme. I analyse the changing political situation in South and 
southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s and the rise of the military under the 
leadership of PW Botha in order to assess the motivation for the establishment of 
Project Coast.  
Chapter 3 describes the establishment of Project Coast and the significant role that 
Dr Wouter Basson played in determining the nature and structure of the programme. 
In this chapter I examine the stated objectives of Project Coast and argue that the 
programme both failed to meet its objectives and, indeed, was cynically designed in 
order to fulfil the objectives of the individuals who were involved in the programme. 
Here I consider the structure and management of Project Coast and present reasons 
for the apparent failure of oversight over the programme.  
In Chapter 4 I consider the operation of Project Coast, the nature and functioning of 
the front companies and the relationship between the three primary front companies 
of the programme and the plethora of private companies that were established to 
support it. I consider the use of chemical and biological warfare weapons by the 
police and military and the unusually close relationship between this military project 
and certain members of the police force.  
In Chapter 5 the role which was played by other countries is examined and evidence 
presented to suggest that at least the United States had adequate information to 
have been able to detect the programme, yet failed to pressure the South African 
government to terminate the programme until it was clear that there was to be a 
transition to democracy.  
5 
Chapter 6 provides information about the functioning and closure of the programme 
in the early 1990s. In this chapter I discuss the changing political context in the 1990s 
and the role of President FW De Klerk in the closure of the programme. I consider 
the haste with which the programme was closed down and the way in which a few 
individuals benefited financially from the closure. In this chapter the implications of 
the inadequate oversight over the closure of the companies are examined.  
Chapter 7 provides information about the TRC investigation and hearing and the trial 
of Wouter Basson which followed a year later.  
Finally, in Chapter 8 I draw conclusions about the factors which played a role in the 
establishment and development of the programme, what motivated scientists to 
become involved and remain involved, and discuss the lessons which can be learned 
for disarmament. 
Assessment of sources 
In 1997 the Project Officer of Coast, Dr Wouter Basson, was arrested by the 
narcotics division of the South African Police Service (SAPS) on suspicion of dealing 
in the street drug Ecstasy (MDMA). Shortly after his arrest, trunks containing Project 
Coast documents were found at the home of one of his associates. These 
documents were seized by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and made 
available to the TRC, the office of the Attorney General and the Office for Serious 
Economic Offences (OESO). All three institutions pursued investigations into the 
activities of the Project and Basson.  
The TRC investigation, which began in January 1998, resulted in a public hearing in 
June that year. The TRC heard testimony from scientists who worked at the front 
companies, from the managing directors of these companies, from the Project 
Officer, and from the Project Manager, General Daniel Knobel, who was the SADF 
Surgeon General from 1988 – November 1997. This testimony, together with 
formerly top secret military documents made available to the TRC by Knobel and 
documents found in the trunks, were made public during the hearing. The documents 
which number 144, have been summarised in a relational database. Many have been 
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translated from their original Afrikaans into English and are available on the internet.1 
The documents fall into the following categories: 
• Minutes of meetings (of the Co-ordinating Management Committee and 
directorates of the front companies). 
• Reports to senior political leaders, including the president, about Project 
Coast. 
• Correspondence. 
• Technical research and production reports from the front companies, 
Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) and Delta G Scientific. 
The minutes of CMC meetings are short on detail and clearly only recorded decisions 
and discussion that the members believed was essential to demonstrate that they 
retained sufficient financial control over the programme. While these minutes are not 
an accurate or detailed record of CMC meetings they are an important record of what 
the CMC wished to record about the functioning of the body. The reports to senior 
political leaders about Project Coast are authored by Wouter Basson and varied only 
slightly, albeit significantly, in content over the years. These reports include the basis 
for a briefing on Project Coast for President FW De Klerk (1990), the Minister of 
Defence (1993), and President Nelson Mandela (1994). The documents offer an 
insight into the factors, presented by Basson to military leaders, in support of the 
argument that a CBW programme was necessary for South Africa’s defence in the 
late 1970s and early 198os. The language used in these, and other reports and 
correspondence, is often vague and in some cases ambiguous. The consistency of 
this tendency towards obscuring details in all the military documents indicates the 
likelihood that this was the intention of the author(s), to allow both author and 
recipient of the document to plausibly deny aspects of the programme were they to 
be revealed. 
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1 The documents can be found on the website of the International Security Network, Zurich, Switzerland, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/infoservice/secwatch/za_cbw/ 
 
The technical research reports from RRL and Delta G Scientific provide insight into 
the search for incapacitating and irritating agents, the obsession of scientists at RRL 
with finding chemical or biological agents which could be administered covertly and 
which would be untraceable post mortem. The collection of these reports, which have 
been made public, is incomplete, but together they provide a strong indication of the 
direction of research undertaken at the front companies. In addition, the reports are 
supplemented by lists of research projects at RRL during 1985 and 1986.  
The documents described above provided the basis for the collection of additional 
information and oral testimonies through interviews with the scientists and others 
associated with the programme. Over 50 interviews were conducted between 1997 
and 2003. All interviews were recorded and the notes from these discussions 
returned to the interviewees for verification. The notes from all interviews referred to 
in this text were verified by the interviewees and form part of the research record. 
Most interviews were conducted in face-to-face meetings, but some were conducted 
via e-mail or telephonically. Many of the scientists who were willing to speak about 
their experiences in Project Coast were interviewed repeatedly over a 5-year period. 
While it became clear that their recollections were tainted by the desire to present 
themselves in a particular light, through cross checking the information provided by 
one individual with that provided by others and referring back to the documents, it 
was possible to determine an accurate picture of the activities which took place in the 
front companies, the nature of the relationships between scientists, and between the 
scientists and Basson. Additional documents were made available by the scientists. I 
have maintained a personal archive of all documents collected during the research 
for this thesis.  A copy of this collection is held by the South African History Archive 
(SAHA) at the University of the Witwatersrand. 
The criminal case against Dr Wouter Basson began in the Pretoria High Court in 
October 1999. It was concluded on 11 April 2002 when Judge Hartzenberg found 
Basson not guilty of any of the charges against him. Evidence presented at the trial 
was an additional source of information. The trial was monitored on a daily basis by 
Marlene Burger who made reports of the testimony available to me. These reports 
formed the basis for weekly summaries of the trial which were widely distributed via 
the internet. The unpublished daily reports form part of the record of this research. In 
addition, the record of the trial includes a detailed forensic audit of the programme 
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and financial and military reports which were analysed and copies of which are both 
in my own collection and held by the SAHA at the University of the Witwatersrand. 
Review of literature  
South Africa’s chemical and biological warfare programme 
In 1975 James Finan submitted his thesis for a doctorate at the University of London2 
in which he examined the strategic possibilities for South Africa with regard to the 
use of chemical and biological weapons through a detailed examination of the 
qualities of known chemical and biological agents and the effect of these agents 
under different battle circumstances. He drew particular attention to the potentially 
high political cost to any chemical or biological weapons user. He argued that: 
International opprobrium would probably be severe if such armaments 
were dispersed without due regard for the antipathy which most of the 
international community holds towards chemical and biological 
weapons. Given [these] constraints, it is likely that chemical and 
biological armaments could be effective in disruptive strategies as a 
military option only if there was reasonable assurance that such activity 
would not attract undue international attention or if the use of chemical 
and biological weapons promised to deliver very rapid victory.3  
Finan argued that South Africa may have continued the production of chemical 
warfare agents after World War II. He based his assessment on the fact that South 
Africa had produced mustard gas during the Second World War and, therefore, had 
both the facilities and technical knowledge to continue its production. He wrote to 
South African government officials in an attempt to obtain answers about its chemical 
warfare production and received a refusal to provide any information. He concluded 
that,  
[W]hile the evidence collected is circumstantial, it is reasonable to 
conclude that unwillingness to discuss the issue of chemical weapons 
production and use strongly suggests that South Africa has plans to 
9
                                                
2 J.S. Finan, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Their Potential for Nations Outside the Principal 
Alliances, With Special Reference to the Possibilities Open to the Republic of South Africa Over the 
Next Ten Years”,  PhD Thesis, University of London, 1975. 
3 Ibid., p46. 
 
disperse these agents in certain contingencies and therefore has 
produced and stockpiled the agents necessary. 4
The evidence collected during the course of my own investigations and research 
suggests that while South Africa may indeed at that time have been considering the 
possibility of developing a chemical warfare capability, no production or stockpiling of 
agents (other than tear gas)  had taken place until the mid-1980s. Finan was 
unequivocal in his view that there was no similar basis on which to conclude that 
South Africa was producing biological warfare agents: “[T]here is no evidence to 
suggest that the Republic is engaged in the production of biological weapons for 
military use. Moreover, the acceptance of South Africa of the Geneva Convention 
prohibiting the use of biological weapons suggests that South Africa is not engaged 
in such work.” 5
One of the earliest published references to South Africa’s interest in chemical and 
biological warfare was made in 1989 when the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) reported incidents suggesting that South Africa may have 
developed a military chemical and biological capability. While the author fell short of 
stating that a CBW capacity actually existed, he analysed the South African evidence 
and concluded:  
Although fiction heavily outweighs the facts of the case… in the 
psychological climate in southern Africa, reflecting a growing 
polarization between black and white, there is apparently no limit as to 
what the South African regime is expected to do in order to preserve 
white supremacy.6  
By the time this was written the CBW programme in South Africa had been in 
existence for six years. Accurate about the programme, SIPRI also identified the 
motivation underpinning it – anything that would prop up the South African 
government of the day.  
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4 Ibid., p149. 
5 Ibid., p152. 
6 S. Landgren, Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa’s Military Industry, Chapter 11: “The CBW 
Industry”, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, p151  
 
Before Basson’s arrest in 1997, little detail was known publicly about the chemical 
and biological warfare programme either in South Africa or abroad. Investigative 
journalists had exposed the existence of the programme and details pertaining to the 
privatisation of its front companies which did the work of the project. However, little 
was known about the nature of the work undertaken by the progamme, its intentions 
or products. The public hearing of the TRC in 1998 into the chemical and biological 
warfare programme not only resulted in extensive press coverage about the nature of 
the programme, but placed many of the formerly top secret military documents about 
the programme in the public domain. This opened the way for a detailed examination 
of Project Coast. 
Between 2000 and 2004 I authored and co-authored several publications about the 
South African chemical and biological warfare programme.7 In 2002 the United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) published a monograph co-
authored by Professor Peter Folb and myself which provided details about the nature 
of the South African chemical and biological warfare programme, examined the 
motivations behind its establishment and described the products of the 12-year 
programme. This was followed by the publication of Secrets and Lies: Wouter 
Basson and South Africa’s chemical and biological warfare programme, co-authored 
by myself and journalist Marlene Burger. In this text Burger and I relate the stories 
which emerged during the testimony of witnesses at Basson’s criminal trial. The 
commercially published book was intended to provide the public with insight into the 
                                                
7 C. Gould and P. Folb, “The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview”, 
The Nonproliferation Review, 7 (3), Fall-Winter 2000, pp10 – 23. C. Gould, “More Questions than 
Answers: a Review of the Trial of Dr. Wouter Basson”, Disarmament Diplomacy, No 52, November 
2000.  C. Gould (ed), “Chemical and Biological Warfare, Non-Proliferation and the Ethics of Science”, 
Track Two, Vol 10, No 3, Centre for Conflict Resolution, December 2001. C. Gould and P. Folb, “The 
Role of Professionals in the South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme”, Minerva, 
Number 40, Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, pp 77 – 91. C. Gould, “Controversial Trial 
Examines South African CBW Activities”, BASIC Reports, Number 81, British American Security 
Information Council, May 2002. C. Gould and P. Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid’s Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Programme, Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002. C. 
Gould and M. Burger, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa’s Chemical and Biological 
Warfare Programme, Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2002. C. Gould, “South Africa’s Biological Warfare 
Programme: Lessons for Disarmament.” Presentation at the British Science and Society Trust meeting 
at the BA Festival of Science, Salford University, 9 September 2003.  
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programme as exposed during the trial. Both texts show that the chemical and 
biological warfare programme was initiated in response to an increased sense of 
threat in South Africa and the region, and argue that the programme was focused on 
providing the military with covert assassination weapons and crowd control agents, 
and did not seek to produce or develop weapons for large-scale conventional use. 
Folb and I argued that the programme, while well resourced, was unsophisticated 
and the science pedestrian. In this analysis we differed with American military 
researchers Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt.  
Burgess and Purkitt8 ascribe the establishment of the biological warfare component 
of Project Coast to the isolation of the apartheid state and the changing threat 
perceptions in the southern African region in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Their 
paper describes the programme as “sophisticated” and “secretive”, open to little 
outside scrutiny. They identify the BW programme as aimed at developing “[E]xotic 
means to neutralise domestic opponents”.9 In asserting that the programme was 
sophisticated they distinguish their own anaylsis from those analyses which have 
claimed that the programme was of little scientific value, a view held by the TRC and 
myself. Burgess and Purkitt provide little evidence that the programme was 
sophisticated. Indeed much of the information on which they base this assessment 
has subsequently been found to be unreliable, particularly the work of BCC journalist, 
Tom Mangold whose book Plague Wars provides a skewed and inaccurate picture of 
Project Coast.10  
Burgess and Purkitt intended to determine the factors which led to the closure of the 
programme in order to understand better the proliferation dynamic. They ascribe the 
closure of Coast to four key factors: (i) the extensive financial corruption of the 
programme’s directors, (ii) the changing threat assessment in southern Africa in the 
                                                
8 S. Burgess and H. Purkitt, “The Rollback of South Africa’s Biological Warfare Programme”, Institute for 
National Security Studies, Occasional Paper 37, Colorado, US Air Force Academy, February 2001. 
9 Ibid., p xi.  
10 T. Mangold and G. Goldberg, Plague Wars: A true story of biological warfare, London, Macmillan, 
1999. 
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late 1980s and early 1990s; (iii) PW Botha’s fall from power and De Klerk’s 
subsequent attempt to bring the security forces under civilian control, and (iv) the 
desire of the National Party government to ensure that the CBW programme did not 
fall into the hands of the ANC when they assumed power.11 I will argue that while 
these four factors did contribute to the motivation to close the programme, increased 
sensitivity to international pressure and opinion and the signing of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) also played a role in the decision to terminate Project 
Coast. 
In Plague Wars, Mangold and Goldberg provide an overview of the Japanese, 
Rhodesian, Soviet, South African and Iraqi CBW programmes. While the information 
presented about the Soviet and Iraqi programmes may be accurate, Mangold and 
Goldberg made numerous errors with regard to the South African programme. For 
example, they claim Project Coast scientists worked on “Hepatitis A, HIV, and the 
terrible Ebola and Marburg viruses.12 This is not correct. There were no scientists at 
RRL who were sufficiently qualified to undertake research on viruses. All the 
scientists I interviewed were emphatic that no work was done at RRL on viruses and 
none of the available documents show research projects of this nature. Other errors 
include the statement that Project Coast was the “world’s second largest offensive 
biological warfare programme”13 whereas both the Soviet and Japanese programmes 
were significantly larger than the South African one.14 Mangold and Goldberg also 
incorrectly record the names of the front companies and the programme itself, 
indicating that the information presented was inadequately checked. These and other 
errors disqualify Plague Wars as a reliable source of information. 
During 2004 the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Monterey Institute of International 
Studies published on the internet a number of papers which provide a detailed 
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chronology of South Africa’s chemical and biological warfare interests and 
programme.They draw heavily on the published work of Burgess and Purkitt and my 
own work.15   
Much has been written about the South African nuclear programme. While the 
nuclear programme differed from the CBW programme both in scale and in terms of 
its management, it was a product of the same political context. American academic, 
Peter Liberman16 notes that 
International ostracism of South Africa because of its policy of apartheid 
certainly exacerbated its insecurity, and isolated states are often prime 
candidates for nuclear acquisition. But South Africa remained militarily 
predominant in southern Africa, and Soviet or Soviet-backed aggression 
was a remote possibility. Moreover, nuclear weapons would have 
provided only a limited remedy to this threat, even if it had 
materialized.17  
However, he argues that military insecurity is not a sufficient explanation for the 
development of a nuclear programme. Liberman asserts that the fact that South 
Africa already had the technology and expertise necessary to develop civilian nuclear 
applications facilitated the decision to develop a military programme. In this regard 
parallels can be drawn with the CBW programme in that there were sufficient 
scientific expertise and knowledge as well as equipment and raw materials in South 
Africa already to run such a programme. Another similarity between the programmes 
is that in both cases the scientists were unclear about the political strategy behind the 
development of the unconventional weapons, but were motivated by interest in the 
science which led to their development.  
According to the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan (1980 – 1990), nuclear 
weapons would not have been used except in retaliation for a chemical or nuclear 
14
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attack on South Africa.18 However, if nuclear weapons were considered as a 
retaliatory measure against chemical attack then it negates the need for chemical 
weapons as a deterrent. As with the CBW programme, the utility of these weapons to 
meet the internal and regional threats faced by the South African military were limited 
at best. As Liberman puts it,   
South Africa developed a nuclear weapons option while it was very 
secure, but political intentions and steps towards actually building 
nuclear weapons followed closely the emergence of new threats. Yet 
the danger to the SA homeland of invasion or nuclear blackmail 
remained remote. More pressing was the threat to South Africa’s 
support of Angolan rebels and its long-standing occupation of 
Namibia…But the utility of nuclear weapons for meeting these threats, 
even if they had materialized, was borderline considering the diplomatic 
and security risks as well as the budgetary costs involved.19
Where the nuclear programme differed markedly from the CBW programme was that 
top military and political leaders appear to have believed that the nuclear programme 
would bring increased status and influence. The CBW programme had no such goal 
and was not perceived as a significant achievement, except by those directly 
involved, particularly Wouter Basson and the Surgeon General. 
With regard to the termination of the nuclear programme Liberman argues that the 
decision could be attributed more to De Kerk’s “anti-nuclear sentiments than to a 
change in the threat perceptions or any financial benefit that would derive from not 
spending money on the program.”20 The closure of the CBW programme too was 
partly a result of the liberalizing influence of De Klerk and the effect of the negotiated 
settlement which led the state to be more susceptible to pressure and sensitive to 
international conventions.  
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Other chemical and biological warfare programmes 
In 1972 the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) opened for 
signature, shortly after the Nixon Administration in the United States announced its 
intention to bring to an end its offensive biological weapons programme. While the 
US continued to develop chemical weapons thereafter, the BTWC signalled the 
intention of the West to reduce the threat of the development and use of biological 
weapons by states. The BTWC went further than the 1925 Geneva Protocol which 
had banned the use of biological weapons, by banning the production, development 
and stockpiling of biological warfare agents. Despite the Soviet Union having signed 
the BTWC, Dr Ken Alibek and others who were involved in the Russian BW 
programme revealed in the early 1990s that the Soviet offensive BW programme 
continued to develop and expand well after it had signed the agreement. 
The Soviet biological warfare programme differed markedly from the South African 
programme, both in nature and intent. There is no evidence to suggest that the 
apartheid government sought to develop biological weapons for large-scale 
application, whereas the Soviet programme did.21 However, there are important 
similarities between the two, both in terms of the way in which the programme was 
structured to avoid detection and in the way in which the scientists involved in it 
related to the work they were doing. Alibek states that the BW facility he worked in 
was “ostensibly operating as a civilian pharmaceutical enterprise” and as a result “the 
agency could engage in genetic research without arousing suspicions.” This also 
meant that the scientists could “participate in international conferences, interact with 
the world scientific community, and obtain disease strains from foreign microbe 
banks – all activities which would have been impossible for a military laboratory.”22 
These were the same reasons given by Basson for establishing the front companies 
RRL and Delta G Scientific as the operating facilities for the South African CBW 
programme. 
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In his autobiographical work, Alibek states that he believed that he would return to 
doing ‘pure’ science someday. This echoes what South African scientists have said 
in interviews, that they saw the CBW-related work which they did as a passing 
phase, something they were doing either in order to further their own careers or 
because it offered good financial rewards. South African CBW scientists also 
expressed the belief that they were in control of the work they did - a belief shared by 
the Russian scientists. When junior RRL scientist, Adriaan Botha, successfully 
genetically modified the Ecoli organism to express the highly toxic epsilon toxin of 
Clostridium Perfringens he was aware of the potential military application of his work, 
but felt confident that he could prevent his managers from demanding large-scale 
production. This was either an expression of the lack of control, or interest, of the 
SANDF in the BW programme or, more likely, an expression of Botha’s own naivety.  
Similiarities between the South African CBW program and the Japanese World War II 
biological warfare programme, as described by historian Sheldon Harris,23 are 
striking. While the Japanese programme was significantly larger than the South 
African one, and made extensive use of Chinese prisoners of war for horrific human 
experiments, the Japanese programme, like the South African one, was initiated and 
driven by a single motivated individual, Dr Ishii Shiro. Like Basson, the Japanese 
military “gave Ishii virtually carte blanche to begin his work”,24 and allowed him to 
travel extensively in the early stages of the programme’s conceptualization to collect 
information and determine the direction it would take. Like Basson, Ishii was admired 
by his colleagues for his ‘brilliance’, his photographic memory and his intense 
patriotism.25 In the same way that Basson motivated the initiation of the South 
African programme by claiming that other countries were developing a CBW 
capacity, the Japanese believed that “the Soviets were already engaged in extensive 
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BW research”26 and argued that mutual deterrence would increase Japanese 
security.  
The South African focus on the development of covert chemical and biological agents 
as assassination weapons was also not unique. Indeed, Basson’s thinking about 
such agents may have been influenced by programmes of the US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), particularly the clandestine Operation MKNAOMI initiated 
in 1967.27 A Select Committee of Congress, held during 1973, found that the 
American intelligence agency had developed a covert programme with the following 
objectives: 
To provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine operational 
requirements.  
To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific 
use of TSD (Technical Services Division). 
To maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for the 
dissemination of biological and chemical materials. 
To provide for the required surveillance, testing, upgrading, and 
evaluation of materials and items in order to assure absence of defects 
and complete predictability of results to be expected under operational 
conditions.28
The objectives of Project Coast, as articulated in a document authored by Basson 
and signed by the Chief of the Defence Force, General Jannie Gendenhuys, 
demonstrate remarkable similarities to those presented above: 
The goal of Project Coast is to, in a covert and clandestine matter, 
conduct research and development and to establish the production 
technology in the sensitive and critical areas of chemical and biological 
warfare to provide the South African Defence Force with a CBW 
capability in line with the CBW philosophy and strategy.29
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In the document Basson spelt out the goals of Project Coast in more detail, stating 
that these goals included the “support of CBW operations (offensive and defensive) 
carried out by security forces.” He explained that such operations fell into two 
categories: “conventional” and “covert”, the latter “provided to MD [Managing 
Director] Special Forces and his organizations, CSI [Chief of Staff Intelligence] and 
his organizations, the SAP and National Intelligence. This service includes the 
preparation of equipment, training in the use thereof, the transport thereof, as well as 
support during use.”30  
It is clear that the intention of Project Coast was to provide covert chemical and 
biological weapons for use by the intelligence services, much like the intention of the 
CIA’s covert programme of the 1960s. This CIA programme was publicly revealed in 
a series of Senate Committee hearings between 1975 and 1977  which sought to 
determine: (i) why the CIA developed quantities of lethal biological poisons, (ii) why 
these poisons were retained for five years after their destruction was ordered by 
President Nixon, and (iii) why their retention had remained undetected.31  The 
programme which was associated with the Special Operations Division of the Army 
Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick, had as its chief objectives the,  
[M]aintenance of a stockpile of temporary incapacitating and lethal 
agents in readiness for operational use; assessment and maintenance 
of biological and chemical dissemination systems for operational use; 
adaptation and testing of a non-discernable microbioinoculator – a dart 
device for clandestine and imperceptible inoculation with biological 
warfare of chemical warfare agents – for use with various materials and 
to assure that they microbioinoculator could not be easily detected by 
later examination of the target; and providing technical support and 
consultation on request for offensive and defensive biological warfare 
and chemical warfare.32
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The objectives of the CIA programme are strikingly similar to those of the South 
African CBW programme. It seems likely that Basson was influenced by the nature of 
the US programme in conceptualizing the function of the South African programme. 
However, it is also possible that the objectives of a clandestine CBW programme for 
special operations are likely to be the same anywhere. Many CBW programmes that 
were developed after the Second World War included at least a component which 
focused on the development of covert weapons, including that of the Soviet Union.33   
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CHAPTER 2 
The background to and context of the South 
African CBW Programme 
 
Chemical weapons in South Africa prior to Project Coast 
Project Coast, initiated in 1981, was not South Africa’s first experience of chemical 
warfare agent production. The country’s involvement dates back to World War II 
when the Smuts government agreed to assist Britain in the manufacture of mustard 
gas. According to a report authored by Lt. Col. DJC Wiseman in 1951, chemical 
warfare production in South Africa was carried out at two factories, one of which was 
“sent out from the United Kingdom”. Wiseman noted that, while the two facilities were 
established with the purpose of producing mustard gas they also had the capacity to 
produce phosphine. Wiseman said the intention was that the South African factories 
would produce a limited number of weapons so that, “had gas warfare started, and, 
particularly had we [the UK] been involved in a gas war simultaneously with both 
Germany and Japan, South Africa’s potential would have been a valuable reserve for 
supply to the Mediterranean or the Eastern and Australian theatres.”1  
The Head of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research’s (CSIR) Applied 
Chemistry Unit in the 1970s, Dr JP De Villiers, revealed that the one factory was 
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located at Chloorkop near Johannesburg and the second was in Firgrove in the 
Cape.2  According to Wiseman:  
The question of closing the mustard gas plants in South Africa had been 
considered in the summer of 1944, but it had been decided that ‘trickle’ 
production should be maintained until the close of the war in Europe as 
an alternative supply for the Far East and Australia in the event of the 
initiation of gas war in North West Europe. By the end of January, 1945, 
however, all available empty weapons and storage facilities in South 
Africa had been filled and it was agreed that production should cease 
and the plant be put to care and maintenance.” 3  
In July 1945 these plants were closed down. There is no evidence to suggest that 
South Africa was involved in the production of chemical warfare agents between 
1945 and 1960. However, in 1960 a company named Mechem was established as 
the Chemical Defence Unit of the CSIR under the Department of Trade and Industry. 
Mechem was contracted by the SADF to investigate chemical compounds and to 
monitor the chemical and biological warfare threat against the country. Dr Vernon 
Joynt, then a researcher at Mechem, claims that the CSIR policy of not working with 
lethal agents restricted their work to compounds such as teargas. They did, however, 
monitor international literature on lethal agents.4 The head of Mechem, Dr JP De 
Villiers, understood Mechem’s brief to include at least a degree of chemical warfare 
research.  In a speech he gave in May 1977 De Villiers introduced himself saying: 
I have now been associated with Defence work since 1962 and as I was 
originally an Organic Chemist, it is obvious that my brief includes 
Chemical Warfare. …at the CSIR there are two internal organisations 
devoted entirely to Defence Research and Development; the very large 
National Institute for Defence Research and the very small Chemical 
Defence Unit. I represent the latter. Incidentally, our major tasks are 
specialised mechanical engineering, and are only remotely chemical.5
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While De Villiers made it clear that no large scale production work was undertaken by 
the CSIR, this document, and others written by him, indicate that there was an 
interest in chemical warfare at the time, and that the role of his unit was to keep a 
watching brief over chemical weapons issues.  De Villiers mentioned on more than 
one occasion that while he doubted that South Africa was under threat of chemical 
warfare, chemical weapons could be tactically useful to the SADF.6 In 1971, the 
Chief of Defence Staff commissioned De Villiers and others to prepare a paper on 
the subject. De Villiers and his co-authors considered the potential that chemical 
agents could be used to poison water supplies and argued that flouroacetates are the 
“ideal poison for water supplies” and could be used by “terrorists”. They also noted 
that research was being done on these chemicals in the early fifties at Porton Down 
in Britain, particularly on their use for poisoning water supplies.7
It is possible that the first use of chemical agents by the South African military took 
place in 1972, before the establishment of Project Coast. This was revealed in 
testimony before the 1973 United States Subcommittee on Africa in the House of 
Representatives. The Committee considered testimony in relation to the 
implementation of the United States (US) arms embargo against Portugal and South 
Africa. Testimony was given about the sale of herbicides and aircraft to South Africa 
and Portugal in the light of a newspaper report in the British Sunday Times the 
previous year. In this report details were given of an operation undertaken by South 
African mercenaries and the Portuguese Air Force to spray defoliants over rebel-held 
areas in Mozambique.8 It would appear that the use of defoliants was restricted to 
this incident and the single use of a commercial herbicide, Hyvar X, in the Caprivi 
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Strip where the SADF believed guerrillas used the shelter of the thick plant growth to 
hide weapons-smuggling activities.9   
De Villiers and his team at the CSIR certainly did see utility for chemical agents in an 
unconventional war. In 1977 he wrote that: “The treatment of terrorist bases with a 
non-persistent, non-lethal agent just before a security force attack can affect both the 
terrorists’ ability to defend themselves and their ability to escape.”10 This shows at 
least an interest in the possible uses of chemical warfare agents in the South African 
context. 
A document titled “Current Anti-riot Chemicals,”11 written by De Villiers in September 
1976, states that O-Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile (CS) was used in South Africa 
for anti-riot purposes and that it was available in pyrotechnic smoke munitions, 
grenades and cartridges, and that equipment had been developed for dispersing it in 
powder form from aircraft. The document states that there were four chemicals which 
could be considered for use as anti-riot agents: Chloracetophenone, Phenacyl 
chloride(CN), O-Chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), Diphenylamine chlorasine, 
(Adamsite or DM) and Dibenzoxazepine (CR), all of which are standard anti-riot 
agents. At the time the Chemical Defence Unit (CDU) had in stock some 150kg of 
CN and 1.5kg of DM (Adamsite). CS was manufactured at the time by AECI for the 
Armament Corps, and CR had been manufactured in a very small quantity by the 
Chemical Defence Unit.12  Project Coast was later to engage in the large-scale 
production and weaponisation of CR. De Villiers and his team at the CSIR had begun 
to lay the basis for the initiation of a chemical warfare programme, although this may 
not have been their intention.  
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While the CSIR monitored developments in chemical warfare and commented from 
time to time on the status of the threat against South Africa, there is no indication that 
between the years 1961 and 1980 the state found it necessary to develop any agents 
on a large scale or to develop defences against the use of chemical warfare. There is 
also no record of the use of chemical agents apart from the reported use of 
herbicides in Mozambique and the use of CS against internal political opponents. 
According to General R Badenhorst, former Chief of Staff Intelligence in the SADF, 
there was a Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Defence school in Cape Town from 
1961, but training there was restricted to the use of teargas and gas masks, at least 
until the late 1980s.13  
By mid-1977 it would appear that there was an increased interest in chemical and 
biological warfare in the SADF. At this time De Villiers authored a chapter in the 
SADF’s “Manual for the SADF Command System, Vol I: National Security and Total 
War”14 in which he set out the various categories of chemical warfare agents and 
made a brief analysis of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. As in earlier writings, he 
concluded that while there was no threat of chemical warfare agents being used 
against South African troops,  the use of both lethal and irritating agents may be to 
the SADF’s advantage in certain circumstances when fighting its war against 
‘terrorists’. He pointed out that the Geneva Protocol did not forbid the use of such 
agents within a country and, therefore, South Africa would not be in violation of the 
Protocol if it used chemical agents in an internal war. On the other hand, De Villiers 
stated categorically that biological warfare was not a threat to South Africa and that 
no specific training in biological warfare was necessary.15
It is significant that three years before the initiation of Project Coast, De Villiers 
concluded that there was no threat of chemical weapons being used against South 
African soldiers, even though he recognised the usefulness of these weapons for the 
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Defence Force. Similarly, he saw a limited clandestine use for biological weapons but 
did not consider them a threat. It is, therefore, likely that the establishment of Project 
Coast was less a response to a direct and specific CBW threat, than it was a 
response to the general threat articulated through the policy Total Strategy, as 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Dr Vernon Joynt has claimed that the possibility of establishing a chemical warfare 
capability was on the minds of military leaders from the early 1970s. He recalls 
having been approached by Wouter Basson at that time: 
In the early 1970s a young medical major, Wouter Basson, approached 
me to do a threat assessment and make suggestions on what the 
implications for South Africa would be and what would have to be done 
if it was decided to start a chemical warfare industry. I wrote him a ten 
page report which he presented to the Surgeon General of the SADF. 
The most important point was that I judged that in the light of the Soviet 
CW capabilities we would have to spend about R500 million to develop 
a significant capability. 
Wouter left with the report. 
A few months later he approached me at home (early 1970s) and 
informed me that they were prepared to start such an industry and 
would I resign from the CSIR and start it. 
The best thing I did was not to tell my wife of the offer because as a 
number two in a unit of some five people I was earning the normal low 
CSIR researcher’s salary! 
I turned down the offer on the grounds that I considered a deterrent 
capability as a sterile component to the active war. At that point I was 
achieving some success in mine and countermine warfare and wanted 
to continue. A life of not being able to talk about your work did not 
appeal to me.16
It would appear that Joynt’s refusal to become involved resulted in the matter being 
put on hold for a few years. In the meantime, between 1978 and 1981 the war in 
Angola escalated, starting with a series of co-ordinated attacks on South West 
African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) bases in Cassinga, southern Angola.17 A 
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1976 CIA assessment noted a build-up of Soviet support in Angola during 1976, 
which may have fueled the escalation of conflict in the following years. According to 
the CIA estimate the value of the Soviet contribution to the war effort of the MPLA 
government in Angola in 1976 amounted to some US$88-million.18  This might 
explain the change in the threat analysis between 1977, when De Villiers wrote a 
chapter for the SADF manual, and 1981, when Project Coast began. A more cynical 
analysis may be that the escalation of the war in Angola merely provided an 
additional excuse when increasing internal pressure was a more important factor in 
the decision to initiate the programme than any conventional, external threat. 
The CSIR’s Chemical Defence Unit was an ideal recruiting ground for the Defence 
Force when the need for specialised services was identified. In the early 1970s Dr 
Jan Coetzee, head of the Chemical Defence Unit’s Department of Special 
Equipment, was personally recruited by the head of the SADF, General Magnus 
Malan,19 to lead the Defence Research Institute. Coetzee was instructed to develop 
special counter-intelligence equipment for the Special Operations Group of the 
SADF, the forerunner of Special Forces. After being recruited by Malan his job 
remained much the same, except that he now worked from Armscor premises and 
from the Armscor budget.20  
Eventually problems with procurement of materials and equipment led PW Botha to 
personally authorise the establishment of a new Armscor subsidiary named 
Elektronies, Meganies, Landbou en Chemies (EMLC), headed by Coetzee to 
represent the four components envisaged: Electronic, Mechanical, Agricultural and 
Chemical. According to Coetzee, EMLC never engaged in chemical synthesis or 
extraction, and his staff did not include scientists capable of advanced chemical 
work. Coetzee said that no production envisaged by the agricultural component of 
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EMLC took place. EMLC had a staff of two botanists and access to anthropologists 
and ethnologists who were responsible for identifying edible and poisonous plants 
during Special Forces survival courses. In August 1980 the company moved to the 
Special Forces headquarters, Speskop.21  
Coetzee was replaced by Sybrand Van der Spuy as head of the unit in November 
1981. (Much later Van der Spuy was to act as CEO of the chemical warfare facility, 
Delta G Scientific, during the process of its privatisation). While inspecting the 
premises before he was to take control, Van der Spuy came across a room which 
contained bulk chemicals and a carton of what appeared to be clothing. He said that 
as he moved across the room to inspect the clothing, one of his new employees 
warned him not to touch it. Asked why not, the employee told Van der Spuy: 
“Because those clothes are poisoned and if you put those underpants on, you’ll be 
dead by tonight.”22 Van der Spuy claims that he had the contents of the room 
destroyed immediately and could shed no light on the origin of the items. Coetzee 
could not explain their existence either. This raises the possibility that either the 
chemical division of EMLC was responsible for the contamination of the clothing or 
the clothing came to South Africa with members of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts 
who joined SADF. EMLC had employed a number of former Rhodesian security force 
members including an armourer Philip Morgan. Morgan later went on to do work for 
the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), manufacturing specialised items such as rings 
with compartments to hold poisons and screwdrivers which could inject liquids into a 
victim.23   
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South Africa and the region24
The history of colonialism and the resultant conflicts in Southern Africa from 1960 to 
1990 are complex and have been the subject of much analysis. There is no dispute 
that these conflicts played a central role in determining South Africa’s military 
strategy and the development of its unconventional arms programmes. Conflicts in 
the sub-region, including Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South 
Africa, were inextricably linked. For much of the 1970s the SADF was engaged in 
conflicts on four  fronts  - in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia (then South West Africa) 
and Rhodesia - which had a determining effect on the scale and duration of these 
wars.25  
The announcement on 18 July 1966 by the International Court of Justice that it could 
not rule on the disputed territory of South West Africa led to SWAPO making its 
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statement of war, the Dar es Salaam Declaration. Although a few battles took place 
between SADF soldiers and SWAPO fighters, the period 1970–74 saw the 
intensification of the political mobilisation of SWAPO members and their allies. In 
1972 the SADF was deployed in the northern areas of South West Africa on a large 
scale. Two years later, in 1974, the independence of Angola after a coup in Portugal 
by the Armed Forces Movement changed the face of the war in South West Africa. 
The guerrilla soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO’s 
armed wing, were able to move through Angola more easily to establish a permanent 
presence in that country.26  
In January 1979 the SAP responded by launching a new unit in Ovamboland, called 
Operasie Koevoet  [Operation Crowbar].  The unit adopted the modus operandi of 
the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. Eugene de Kock, a veteran of the Rhodesian war,27 
was assigned to the unit. He describes it in his book, A Long Night’s Damage: 
The Rhodesian Selous Scouts were based in essence on Orde 
Wingate’s Chindits and the American Green Berets: unconventional 
soldiers, able to move about and subsist as well as their opposition in 
hostile terrain, and used to pinpoint infiltration, unconventional warfare 
(poisoning food supplies, for example) and surprise attack. The 
Mozambican Renamo movement was based on using dissatisfied 
members of the population and the armed forces against the 
government of the country… Our idea in Ovamboland was to start a 
local force to fight against SWAPO, like Renamo, while a second group 
would operate more along the lines of the Selous Scouts.28
The unit was disbanded in 1989.  
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The importance of the SADF and police involvement in the Rhodesian war of 
independence should not be underestimated. It proved to be a training ground for 
South African Police (SAP) and Defence Force members in counter-insurgency 
techniques which they would put to use both in South West Africa and in South 
Africa. South African police units began training with the Rhodesian Light Infantry 
and Special Air Services from as early as 1968.29 Members of the Reconnaissance 
Unit of Special Forces began working with the Selous Scouts in 1976,30 and here 
they learnt the techniques known as pseudo operations: black operators, and white 
operators with blackened faces, would masquerade as guerrillas, making it possible 
for them to get close to guerrilla bases before launching an attack. Alternatively, this 
cover would provide them with opportunities to capture and ‘turn’ members of the 
‘enemy’. When the Rhodesian war ended in 1980 many of the former Rhodesian 
security force members came to South Africa where they joined the police and 
Defence Force. Many of the Selous Scouts, both black and white, who joined the 
SADF, became Special Forces operators, working within clandestine units. According 
to former Special Forces operators, their Rhodesian counterparts did not fit into the 
SADF milieu easily, nor were they adequately prepared for the conventional warfare 
situation in which they were to find themselves in Angola. Few remained in the SADF 
for long.  
Before 1974 the SADF had operated in Angola with the support of the CIA. By 1974 
overt assistance had been stopped and South Africa operated alone, although 
unopposed by the US.  In 1975 South Africa invaded Angola in an attempt to regain 
its influence, lost through the independence of that country. The conflict in Angola 
continued in the following years with South Africa arming and organising the National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in its war against the MPLA 
government. The Angolan war was fought in several conventional battles between 
the SADF and MPLA between 1980 and 1988.31 Allegations were made by both 
sides that chemical weapons had been used, although none of the allegations were 
ever proved. From 1986 claims were made by  Belgian academic Aubin Heyndrickx 
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that chemical weapons had been used by Angolan government forces against 
UNITA. Heyndrickx, who visited Angola in 1986 and again in 1988, received his 
briefings from UNITA. His reports, to UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, relate allegations 
of poisoning and conclude that chemical weapons were used against UNITA forces 
and civilians. In a 1988 report Heyndrickx claims that the  analysis of blood and urine 
samples collected from 8 patients on 16 February 1988 indicate that “nerve gases 
with a high probability (sic) have been used on them.” Heyndrickx also reported that 
a war gas identification kit given to him by Savimbi, allegedly confiscated from 
captured Cuban soldiers in Cuito Cuanavale, was of Russian origin. He stated that 
the kit was the same as those found in Afghanistan on Russian soldiers who were 
taken prisoner by the Mujahiddin.32  
Heyndrickx’s reports lack substance and his conclusions are based on questionable 
arguments.  Nonetheless it is probable that his reports would have been sent to the 
South African authorities, and that they would have provided the military with reason 
to believe that there was a threat of the use of chemical weapons in Angola during 
this period.  
The SADF did, however, have real reason for concern. Former Special Forces 
operator, Stuart Sterzel (a former Group Commander at 5 Reconnaisance Regiment 
who was a member of the Directorate of Special Tasks during the 1987 war), told me 
that,  
There was a concern prior to the outset of  the battle in the Lomba River 
Valley in 1987 that the Russian, Cuban and Angolan forces were armed 
with chemical weapons. In 1987 prior to the commencement of the war 
in Cuando Cubango province in Angola, my colleagues and I were 
informed that FAPLA had possibly brought chemical weapons with them 
for use in the coming battles. SADF intelligence and western intelligence 
agencies confirmed the possible threat analysis.  
During the battles which occurred in the Cuando Cubango province 
between the Lomba River Valley and the Cuanevale river, the SADF 
destroyed 12 brigades of FAPLA and Cuban forces, with Russian, East 
German and other Warsaw Pact elements. In my  opinion, the potential 
chemical weapons threat posed by Soviet and Soviet-aligned forces 
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definitely required the establishment of a deterrent – or the appearance 
of the existence of a deterrent - which would create the impression that 
South African forces could counter a chemical attack in kind. 33  
The war in Mozambique began shortly after the country won independence from 
Portugal in 1975. The Mozambican Liberation Front, Frelimo, which had gained 
political control of the country, aligned itself with the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, 
providing Zimbabwean guerrillas with refuge. The white Rhodesian government 
responded by supporting the Mozambican National Resistance, which later became 
known as Renamo, in its fight against the Frelimo government. When Zimbabwe 
gained independence in 1980, support for Renamo shifted from the Rhodesian to the 
South African military. Under the guidance of South African Military Intelligence, 
Renamo became a fighting force to be reckoned with, resulting in a conflict that, 
despite peace talks in 1984, continued until a cease-fire was signed between 
Mozambique and South Africa in October 1992.34  
These events all have to be understood in the context of Cold War politics. Between 
1970 and 1975 UNITA found support in South Africa and the United States, while the 
MPLA on the other hand found support in Cuba, the USSR and China. Minter argued 
that 
It was the US government which urged South Africa to send in its troops 
in 1975, and which sustained UNITA’s guerrilla campaign after South 
African supplies dwindled following the independence of Namibia in 
1990. The presence of Cuban troops in Angola evoked bitter 
antagonism to Havana in Washington policy-making circles. Angola 
might not have seen peace even without Washington’s unrelenting 
hostility and the military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba on 
the other side. But these factors surely had significant effects on the 
character and duration of the conflict.35  
Washington’s involvement in the conflict in Angola was limited to small-scale covert 
support, much to the annoyance of the South African military. General Constand 
Viljoen, head of the South African Defence Force in 1980, said that if the international 
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community had provided the South African government with the necessary 
information and protective gear and masks to protect its troops against the threat of 
chemical warfare, it would not have been necessary for South Africa to develop its 
own programme.36 He said it was difficult to understand why, after allegations of the 
use of chemical warfare agents by Cuban troops, Washington refused to assist South 
Africa in protecting its troops against this threat. Washington’s reluctance to assist 
the South African Defence Force might be explained by the fact that credible proof 
was never provided for the threat of chemical weapons in Angola. Yet, if Viljoen’s 
statement is correct, there is no explanation for the fact that defensive training and 
protective clothing was only available to the SADF in the later 1980s and by many 
accounts protective clothing never reached the fighting troops in Angola. Even if the 
clothing had reached the soldiers, it would have been of limited use due to the 
environmental conditions under which the troops were fighting, particularly the 
extreme heat.  
The South African government and military may have been additionally concerned in 
the early 1980s when the United States accused the Soviet Union of producing 
“chemical and biological weapons on a large scale”37 and when in 1982 chemical 
weapons were allegedly used by the Soviet-backed Ethiopian army against guerrilla 
forces in the lengthy war in that country.38 Claims that the Ethiopian army was 
stockpiling chemical weapons for use against the forces in favour of Eritrean 
independence were made as early as 1980 (the year in which Project Coast was 
launched). According to an appeal by the Eritrean Relief Agency, “the Ethiopean 
government is stockpiling lethal nerve gas (GA) and other deadly weapons in Asmara 
for use against Eritrean fighters and civilians…”39  While there is no conclusive 
evidence that chemical weapons were used or stockpiled in the Eritrean conflict, the 
reports would have concerned the SADF.  
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These factors, in combination with the massive build up in 1976 of Soviet and Cuban 
aid to the MPLA, 40 might have led the SADF to conclude that the best way to 
prevent Soviet use of chemical weapons in Angola, would be through the 
establishment of a chemical warfare programme which would, at least, create the 
impression that South Africa would be able to respond in kind to any use of chemical 
weapons. Such a deterrent may indeed have offered SADF troops better protection 
than NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) clothing.  
The Rhodesian CBW experience 
The Rhodesian war of independence in the late 1970s may have been one of the first 
instances in Africa where poisons were used as weapons of war.  Fragmented 
information about Rhodesia’s use of poison has been published in at least four 
books,41 but senior Rhodesian military personnel have never conceded what the late 
Ken Flower, Director General of the Central Intelligence Organisation, said in a 
paragraph in his book Serving Secretly42 - that poisons were used with devastating 
effect.  
By mid-1977, the small conventional multiracial Rhodesian security forces were 
engaged in a war they could not win,  a vicious war punctuated by acts of terrorism 
by all sides. The two organisations committed to liberating Rhodesia from minority 
white rule, the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU, and the Zimbabwe African 
Peoples Union, ZAPU (now the ruling ZANU-PF), both had military wings which 
operated from Zambia and Mozambique and inside Rhodesia. ZANU’s military wing 
was the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, ZANLA, and ZAPU’s was the 
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Zimbabwe African Peoples Revolutionary Army, ZIPRA. Although both liberation 
armies were feared by the Rhodesian forces, their greatest effort was put into attacks 
against ZANLA, as its operations had succeeded in clearing whites out of vast areas 
of the country along the border with Mozambique. ZANLA, less selective than ZIPRA 
about its victims, routinely committed acts of terrorism, mainly against black civilians.  
ZIPRA, on the other hand, with the exception of the downing of two civilian aircraft, 
was engaged in a more conventional war.  
From 1976 all normal mechanisms of justice were abandoned by the Rhodesian 
government. Special courts were gazetted which allowed captured guerrillas to be 
tried in situ, without referral to district courts or the Supreme Court. Defence for 
guerrillas was often provided by the Rhodesian security forces from legally trained 
conscripts. Some executions were carried out in situ, and no records were available 
of who was tried or when executions were carried out. A diesel powered crematorium 
was uncovered in the late 1980s in the bush near the maximum security prison at 
Chikurubi (near Harare) which had the capacity to incinerate four or five bodies at a 
time. 
By the late 1970s the Rhodesian security forces were involved in unconventional 
warfare and a number of devices were released into the civilian community, such as 
booby trapped radios. An armourer, Phil Morgan, who was later to work for Project 
Coast, was involved in the manufacture of these devices.43 Rhodesia’s amateurish 
and short foray into chemical and biological warfare made use of three substances: 
? Organophosphates, put onto clothes, especially onto parts of the 
fabric which would touch the soft parts of skin, under the arms and the 
groin areas.44 Organophosphates were also put into tinned food and 
drink or other materials to be ingested, such as aspirin.  
? Cholera, twice released into the Ruwenya River. 
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? Anthrax, deposited near Plumtree, inside the Botswana border.45  
Documents made available by Peter Stiff record the use of poisons by the Rhodesian 
Police’s Special Branch and the Selous Scouts. These documents indicate that the 
use of poisons began in 1977. Former Special Branch operatives have said they 
were aware of the use of poisons as early as 1973.46 One official document, dated 24 
June 1977, records 809 deaths resulting from poisoned items distributed by the 
Selous Scouts. Another document lists poisoned items showing where they were 
distributed, including 12 sets of clothing at Gwelo, 15 at Enkeldoorn, 34 at Mount 
Darwin as well as poisoned mieliemeal, tins of corned beef and sweets. A document 
dated August 1977 records that between August 8 and August 17 of that year, 59 
sets of poisoned clothing, two sets of poisoned cigarettes, one set of medical 
supplies and two sets of “assorted food and drink” resulted in three direct deaths and 
19 deaths of civilians killed by guerrillas who believed they had been responsible for 
the poisonings. The last report for November 1977 records that 79 “terrorists” were 
killed after more contaminated food and clothing had been distributed.47
MJ McGuinness, the man who facilitated the chemical programme at the Bindura 
Fort, as it was called, and the most senior Special Branch Officer seconded to the 
Central Intelligence Organisation who was afforded the title Officer Commanding 
Counter Terrorist Operations, said that about a dozen times during 1977, 25 gallon 
drums of foul-smelling liquid were delivered to the officer in charge at the Fort.48 The 
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chemicals were poured onto large sheets of tin and dried in the sun. When the liquid 
had dried, the resulting flakes were scooped up and pounded in a mortar with a 
pestle. That powder was then brushed onto clothes and also mixed into processed 
meat such as bully beef, and then re-packed into new tins. The poison was injected, 
using a micro needle, into bottles, most of them containing alcoholic drinks. 
McGuinness insisted that “every contaminated item that left the Bindura Fort, the only 
location at which they were being manufactured, had to be signed for and 
subsequently accounted for by the recipient.”49
According to McGuinness, the poisoned items were distributed by uniformed branch 
members who were co-opted by the provincial Special Branch officers for what was 
known as ‘Ground Coverage’, which involved gleaning low level intelligence and 
running sources in the rural areas. Each police officer involved in the distribution 
required the authority of his immediate commanding officer before being issued with 
the contaminated items.50  There was no way McGuinness could verify the number of 
people allegedly killed. In some instances he believed that one of the Special Branch 
men was falsifying deaths. Some of the bottles of alcohol were distributed by the 
Selous Scouts. In one case, near Rusape in Manicaland province, several guerrillas 
died after a furious fight among them following consumption of a bottle of liquor 
poisoned with pure alcohol. McGuinness told me that “the distribution of 
contaminated items, e.g. clothing and food, was not as a general rule carried out by 
the Scouts but by the Projects Section of the British South Africa Police (BSAP) 
Special Branch. Scouts in the field acted in a reconnaissance role, calling in strike 
forces to engage the enemy where this was feasible and only as a last resort 
compromising their true identity in any given area.”51
According to McGuinness, two unsuccessful attempts to infect the Ruwenya River in 
north-eastern Zimbabwe with cholera were carried out by members of the Selous 
Scouts.52 If the Selous Scouts were given cholera to put in a river to infect guerrillas, 
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they were misinformed about the nature of cholera, which cannot survive in a running 
river.  McGuinness recalled that he was surprised to learn from conversations with 
his colleagues that on one occasion anthrax had been deployed. He said the Selous 
Scouts had been asked to use anthrax, but their officer in charge, Lieutenant Colonel 
Ron Reid Daly, had refused because he believed this operation was too dangerous 
for his men. It was left to the Special Air Service to drop the anthrax from an aircraft 
(in an unknown form).53 The question of whether the anthrax outbreak in Zimbabwe 
between 1979 and 1980 was a natural occurrence or a deliberate act of biological 
warfare has been raised by, amongst others, Meryl Nass, who analysed the nature of 
the outbreak and concluded that a detailed investigation was necessary to reach a 
conclusion.54 Nass notes that the large area affected by anthrax during 1979 and 
1980 strongly suggests the deliberate  use of anthrax as a biological warfare agent. 
She said that anthrax was detected in the following areas:  
Nkai  (November 1978) 
Western Kwekwe (June 79) 
Lupane (October 1979) 
Essexvale (October 1979) 
Insiza/Filabusi (November 1979) 
Umzingwane (November  1979) 
Bubi (Bembezi) (November 1979) 
Plumtree (February 1980) 
Kezi (February 1980) 
Tjolotjo (March 1980) 
Nyamandlovu (March 1980) 
Gwanda (March 1980) 
Beitbridge (March 1980) 
Wankie (June 1980) 
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Matopos (June 1980) 
By October 1980, anthrax was present in all the districts of Matabeleland except 
Binga.55 Anthrax is, however, endemic in Zimbabwe and these outbreaks could have 
been naturally occurring, the result of particular weather conditions and the 
breakdown of veterinary services during the civil war. Even if the security forces had 
used anthrax, it was not within the scope of this thesis to determine whether the 
infections resulted from the deliberately spread anthrax spores or from natural 
sources. The information provided by McGuinness, however, confirms the need for a 
thorough investigation into the matter. All my attempts to locate SAS officers, or 
others who could confirm the use of anthrax have failed. Former SAS officers form a 
fiercely loyal, tight knit community and it is unlikely that any will speak out about the 
operations in which they are alleged to have been involved. In the absence of 
testimonial evidence about the form in which anthrax may have been used, and the 
areas in which it may have been used, it is impossible to draw a final conclusion 
about the nature of the Rhodesian anthrax operations.  Dr Stuart Hargreaves, head 
of veterinary services in both Rhodesia and post-independent Zimbabwe, ascribed 
the increase in anthrax cases to a breakdown of fences during the war and the 
halting of vaccination programmes. Journalist David Martin56 points out that there 
were no outbreaks of anthrax in the white commercial farming areas during the later 
stages of the war. This may be expIained by the fact that in those areas the fences 
were still in place and farmers could afford to pay for their animals to be vaccinated.  
In late 1977, when Commissioner of Police Peter Allum was told by a Medical Officer 
of Health (probably from the Manicaland Province) that there were indications that 
there were mysterious deaths of black people, he suspected chemical poisoning.57   
He immediately put out an order that it be stopped.  Allum was known to have tried 
hard to limit Rhodesian security force atrocities against the civilian population. His 
role in stopping the chemical warfare project is confirmed by himself and by several 
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key sources. He had not heard of any attempt to introduce cholera during the war 
and was astonished to learn that anthrax may also have been used. 
The line of command in the poison operations is not clear. Lieutenant Colonel Reid 
Daly surmised that Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) Director, Ken Flower, was 
in charge of the operation.58 Reid Daly confirmed he knew some of what had been 
going on. He said it was unlikely that the chemical project was discussed at the 
National Joint Operational Command. Lieutenant-General Peter Walls, Chief of 
Combined Operations, said he had no idea that either chemical or biological warfare 
agents had been used in 1977.59   
According to Stiff, Professor Robert Symington was the scientist behind the 
poisonings. Symington was employed in the Anatomy Department at the University of 
Rhodesia. In a book published in 1985, Stiff records a conversation in which 
Symington (who he calls Sam Roberts) offers an operator thallium with which to kill a 
man:  
It was said there were some months when Sam Roberts had killed more 
terrorists than the Rhodesian Light Infantry. In April 1978 a group of 17  
ZANLA terrorist guerrillas, who had been on operations ….. staggered 
across the Mozambique border to the safety of their protected rear 
bases. They were vomiting, defecating and writhing with pain.  
Transported to Beira where they were hospitalized, they died 
mysteriously, one by one, over a period of three days. The operator 
asked how this had happened and Symington replied: Special Branch 
knew where they were based. We doctored some sacks of mieliemeal 
with thallium and deposited them in a farm store they were going to raid 
for food. They did, naturally burning it down afterwards, as is their 
practice.60  
Symington later moved to South Africa where he worked as a lecturer at the 
University of Cape Town. He died some years ago. His laboratory assistant, Victor 
Noble, who worked at the University of Pietermaritzberg until his retirement, declined 
to speak to me and it is not known whether he knew about the poisons Symington 
provided to the operators, although it is likely that he would have.  
41
                                                
58 Peta Thornycroft telephonic discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Reid Daly, September 2000. 
59 Peta Thornycroft telephonic discussion with Peter Walls, September 2000. 
60  Stiff, See You in November, pp308-310. 
 
Martin tells how many guerrillas died of poisoning, particularly in neighbouring 
Mozambique.61  He recalls that an American doctor, Dr Paul Epstein, working in 
Mozambique in 1978, sent a sample of fat from one victim for analysis by a 
laboratory in South Africa. Warfarin, a rat poison was found in the fat sample. 
Warfarin causes internal haemorrhaging, symptoms apparently displayed by victims 
treated by Dr Epstein at Beira Hospital. 
There is documentary evidence that Rhodesian security forces used poisons to 
contaminate food and clothing which was distributed carelessly among civilians. If the 
documents recording the items poisoned and the number of deaths that resulted are 
correct, then at least 900 people died from ingesting poisoned food or wearing 
contaminated clothing. It is likely that the Rhodesian soldiers and policemen who 
came to South Africa after the war brought with them tales of the use of poisons 
which may have influenced the thinking of the South African military. However, I have 
found no link between the South African programme and the Rhodesian use of 
poisons, except for a single line in a 1977 report of the Officer in Charge of 
Operations to the Special Branch commanding officer. This states: “It will be noted 
that there is a considerable decrease in the quantity of materials directed into the 
field during the fortnight under review, this being due to (a) staff shortages in the field 
and subsequent inability to recruit contact men and (b) the shortage of necessary 
ingredients which are to be obtained from South Africa within the next two weeks.”62
The assimilation model analysis of the motivation for Project 
Coast 
Later in this chapter I consider the political and military context for the establishment 
of Project Coast. Before presenting evidence of the military mindset in South Africa 
during the 1980s and 1990s it is useful to consider the way in which various factors 
influence the decision to develop CBW programmes. According to the assimilation 
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model proposed by Dr Jean Pascal Zanders63 (see diagrammatic scheme below), a 
country’s decision to develop a CBW programme is a function of the interaction 
between a number of factors. At the simplest level the material base of a country – its 
geographical situation, territorial size, population size, the presence of natural 
resources and easy access to resources from elsewhere, will have an impact (albeit 
unconscious) on the decision by political and military leaders to develop a CBW 
programme, or not. If a decision is ultimately taken to develop chemical and 
biological weapons, these factors will also influence the nature and structure of the 
programme. Any one of these factors could act as an unpassable threshold to the 
assimilation of a CBW programme. If, for example, a country  which is considering 
the development of a chemical and biological weapons capacity has few natural 
resources, and limited access to resources from elsewhere, the development of a 
chemical and biological warfare programme may be too costly an undertaking or 
extremely difficult. The cost may outweigh the perceived benefit which may be 
derived from possessing such weapons. 
On the other hand, to a country like South Africa which has an abundance of natural 
resources, a reliable electricity supply, a cheap labour force and access to materials 
and equipment from abroad, the material base is not an inhibiting factor in the 
decision to develop a CBW programme, but rather an enabling factor. Playing an 
equally important role in the decision-making process are political factors, the level of 
education in society, the extent of the science and technology base and the level of 
economic and industrial development.  
By the late 1970s South Africa was highly industrialized, had an existing chemical 
industry, a strong educational system for whites, and a scientific community from 
which researchers for the CBW programme could be drawn. These factors 
contributed to lowering the threshold which had to be crossed in order to make the 
decision to develop the CBW programme.  It was also possible for the front 
companies to obtain equipment and raw materials relatively simply, either in South 
Africa or elsewhere. The fact that South Africa did have an established chemical 
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industry made it easy to purchase equipment under the guise of it being for 
commercial purposes.  
Had South Africa been entirely dependent on imports, or if scientific expertise had to 
be sought outside the borders, or if the equipment had to be imported, the cost of the 
project, not only in financial but also political terms, may have been too great. In the 
absence of serious deterrents at this level, the decision to develop a CBW 
programme was influenced by the level of threat South Africa was perceived to be 
subject to, and South Africa’s adherence, or not, to international norms as well as its 
security policies. 
By 1980 South Africa was politically and economically isolated, fighting a 
conventional threat in Angola and desperately holding back the forces of change 
internally. As far as the political and military leaders were concerned, South Africa 
was at war, a war which would have to be fought alone without external assistance. 
The country’s isolation and the high level of threat to the white minority government 
were strong motivating factors in the decision to develop a CBW programme.    
The South African military leadership was apparently led by Basson to believe that 
during the 1960s and 1970s, “[T]he United States of America, on the side of the 
West, produced chemical weapons and had stockpiled huge quantities of these. The 
USSR was responsible for the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons on 
the side of the Warsaw Treaty.” 64 Basson argued that the US and Soviet Union 
controlled CBW weapons and their production capacity strictly, resulting in a 
relatively stable global situation with regard to proliferation. He stated that: “[W]ithin 
this relatively stable milieu the SADF gradually phased out all CBW capacity. The 
USSR did not represent a direct threat to the RSA and all training and research were 
halted.”65 These statements were made by Basson in a document which was 
provided to President FW De Klerk in 1990. There are no documents dating to the 
initiation of Project Coast which provide a contemporaneous rationale for its initiation. 
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This situation, Basson argued, changed in the 1970s and early 1980s with changes 
in technology and the nature of chemical weapons. Despite Basson’s claims being 
false, his argument that chemical weapons were now more easily available may have 
influenced the military’s threat perception. The implication that other countries were 
not taking the ban on chemical or biological weapons seriously removed a further 
obstacle to the decision to develop a chemical weapons programme by providing a 
justification for South Africa not to adhere to its treaty commitments. Although in this 
document, no specific mention was made of the biological weapons threat, Basson 
conflates the two categories of weapons, referring to chemical and biological 
weapons at the same time while not being specific about the BW threat. At the time 
South Africa was a States Party to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention 
(BTWC) and had signed the Geneva Protocol.  
Basson’s argument that during the 1970s and 1980s the nature of chemical weapons 
began to change was based on incorrect assertions. Nevertheless, his argument was 
likely to have determined the focus of the programme on so-called “non-lethal” 
chemicals, chemical agents which would (in limited doses) have an irritating or 
incapacitating effect on subjects. Whilst implying that a number of countries did not 
regard the international norms against chemical and biological weapons as 
deterrents to their proliferation efforts, Basson also pointed out (again incorrectly) 
that the non-lethal weapons which were in favour at the time, were not discussed in 
any of the disarmament agreements, and concludes with the statement: “The USA 
conducts this research [into chemical weapons] in several clandestine and covert 
laboratories and they are doing a very good job of keeping it a secret.”66
It can be argued, therefore, that the international norms were not an inhibiting factor 
in the decision to develop the CBW programme, rather that justification was provided 
for the programme on the basis that the norms were not effective in deterring other 
countries from the development of similar weapons programmes. That Basson was 
mindful of the international agreements, making specific reference to the fact that 
they did not cover the development of incapacitants or irritants, may have been due 
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to the fact that his audience, President FW De Klerk, was more concerned about the 
contravention of such agreements than his predecessor had been.  
By the mid-1980s the internal threat to the apartheid government was increasing 
while the conventional threat in Angola and other neighbouring states was 
decreasing. In 1987 the SADF largely withdrew from Angola and the focus of South 
African security policies was on internal security. The threat was now posed by 
civilians inside South Africa and the liberation movements who were operating 
underground. The CBW programme’s focus on the production and development of 
crowd control agents and chemical and biological assassination weapons can be 
understood to have been a response to this changed threat.  
Another factor which may have influenced the decision to establish Project Coast 
was the success of the development of the arms industry in South Africa. The 
development of this industry started as early as 1968 with the establishment of the 
state-owned Armaments Development and Production Corporation (later the 
Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Armscor). Armscor’s growth had been given 
impetus by the Minister of Defence, PW Botha. By the time a mandatory arms 
embargo was imposed in 1977 by a decision of the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council, “the South African arms industry was already either producing, or in the 
process of acquiring, the knowledge to produce a wide spectrum of armaments.”67 
Batchelor and Willett have argued that:  
[T]he growing power and influence of the military, the South African 
Defence Force’s involvement in a number of regional conflicts, which 
required a guaranteed source of appropriate armaments and military 
equipment, and the imposition of a mandatory United Nations arms 
embargo in 1977 prompted the apartheid government to invest 
considerable national resources in developing a domestic arms industry 
with across-the-board capabilities. 68
By the late 1980s the arms industry had developed into one of the most significant 
sectors of the country’s industrial base. “The country had also become a major 
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developing-country arms producer and was actively engaged in the international 
arms trade. During its build-up from the mid-1970s onwards, the arms industry 
became a major site for Afrikaner political and economic empowerment.”69   
The threat perception of the apartheid government, combined with a strong material 
base and knowledge capable of developing and producing armaments necessary to 
counter both domestic resistance and external conventional threats, provided the 
context for the initiation of both a nuclear and chemical and a biological warfare 
programme. Despite the arms embargo, South Africa developed a strategic nuclear 
capability, and despite the country’s commitment to the BTWC, a chemical and 
biological warfare programme was established. 
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The Botha Regime and Total Strategy 
The appointment of PW Botha as Minister of Defence in South Africa in 1966 
signaled a change in the understanding of the security situation both in South Africa 
and in the southern African region. Instead of focusing on threats directed at South 
Africa, Botha espoused a broader vision of security, encompassing the East-West 
global ideological conflict and South Africa’s role in it. Three themes predominated in 
his speeches: that the West was threatened by Soviet expansionism, that South 
Africa was part of the West, and that Soviet strategy was to cut Europe off from 
South Africa’s essential raw materials.70 Seegers identifies this not as a departure 
from National Party thinking but a solidification of that thinking. Since 1958 the 
National Party had believed that “South Africa had an important role to play in the 
Cold War, both as a strategic geopolitical asset of the West (because of its position in 
terms of the Cape sea route), and as a provider of strategic assets such as minerals 
and labour. Their anti-communist theme was to remain in place well into the 
1980s.”71  
South Africa’s neighbouring states were important in Botha’s security thinking. They 
were South Africa’s first line of defence against Soviet expansionism. In the late 
1960s the South African government concluded security agreements with Portugal 
and Rhodesia, so that Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia became South Africa’s 
front line. Influenced by the findings of the Potgieter Commission of Inquiry, Botha 
drew no distinction between the external conflict on the country’s northern borders 
and the internal conflict. He argued that the external conflict was merely an extension 
of the internal war between his government and the South African liberation 
movements. The Commission had concluded that: “it is no secret that the enemies of 
the Republic are trying to attack in all fields”,72 and argued that South Africa was 
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faced by a “total onslaught” from beyond its borders, and recommended the adoption 
of a “total national strategy.”73 According to the 1975 Defence White Paper, the “total 
strategy” was to include “economic, ideological, technological, and even social 
matters,”74 in developing a defence against the threat.   
The theory of “total strategy”, originally put forward by the French general, André 
Beaufre, was based on his experiences of World War II and the Indo-China war.  
Beaufre saw a role for politicians in the development of military strategy. He argued 
that a war can be won through the effective co-ordination of all elements of the state 
with a single purpose – to engage the enemy on all fronts: military, economic, 
psychological and political. Beaufre’s thesis was considered so important in South 
Africa that it became the basis of lectures on strategy at the Joint Defence College.75 
The primary objective of “total strategy” was to ensure the survival of a society in 
which “the principle of the right of self determination of the white nation must not be 
regarded as being negotiable.”76  The South African government, its security forces 
and its electorate (most white South Africans) saw themselves as being at war with 
whoever opposed this “right”, that is, at war with the majority of South Africa’s 
population and most of the world. In the preface to his 1973 Defence White Paper 
Botha said:  
The Republic of South Africa is a target for international communism 
and its cohorts – leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, 
permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies. In addition, the 
RSA has been singled out as a special target for the by-products of their 
ideologies, such as black radicalism, exaggerated individual freedom, 
one-man-one-vote, and a host of other slogans employed against us on 
the basis of double standards … Because the RSA holds a position of 
strategic importance, these ideological attacks on the RSA are 
progressively being converted into more tangible action in the form of 
sanctions, boycotts, isolation, demonstrations and the like. This renders 
us – and the Free World – the more vulnerable to the indirect strategy 
applied by the radical powers in the form of undermining activities and 
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limited violence, whether employed openly or dissimulated behind 
ideological fronts.77
In September 1978, twelve years after being appointed minister of defence, PW 
Botha became prime minster and shortly thereafter elaborated on the concept of the 
total onslaught. The 1979 White Paper on Defence recorded “…increased political, 
economic and military pressure on South Africa” and expressed concern that “…the 
military threat against the RSA is intensifying at an alarming rate”. The idea that 
South Africa was “…Moscow’s stepping stone to world conquest”, became the 
departure point for security-related government policy.78  
This view was supported by the United States. In the mid-1970s CIA assessments of 
the situation in Angola noted that the Soviet Union had increased its material support 
for the MPLA’s armed wing, FAPLA, in Angola and had increased the number of 
Soviet advisors to FAPLA.79 A 1985 CIA assessment stated that: “[T]he continued 
build-up of Soviet-supplied arms in Angola will help further Moscow’s long-term 
objective of ensuring a Soviet role in southern Africa.”80  
In 1982 the Steyn Commission Report upheld and reinforced Botha’s view that the 
Soviet Union’s aim was world domination, stating that the Soviets’ methods included 
subversion, disinformation, psychological war, espionage, diplomatic negotiations, 
military and economic aid programmes, terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The Steyn 
Commission concluded that the ANC, SWAPO, the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) and “other related organisations” were Soviet surrogate forces.81 This 
thinking enabled Botha to present to his electorate and security forces the view that 
they were at war with their fellow citizens.  
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The SADF drew a distinction between terrorists and guerrillas,82 arguing that the 
former targeted civilians and the latter engaged unconventionally with military targets. 
The SADF viewed the liberation movements as terrorist organisations, which implied 
that every white South African was a potential target. Fear was instilled in ordinary 
white South Africans, reinforced by reports of ANC speeches in which members were 
called upon to arm themselves. Racism and appeals to whites’ fear of Africans 
became the basis of the total strategy mentality. This created an environment in 
which it was possible for the scientists who were to drive the chemical and biological 
warfare programme to justify their actions to themselves as being patriotic. 
An extract from a speech delivered by General Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence in 
1981, illustrates the government’s view: 
As a point of departure we have to accept that the onslaught here in 
Southern Africa is communist-inspired, communist-planned and 
communist-supported …Stalin said it for the first time in 1923 and 
Brezhnev subsequently reiterated quite a number of times what 
communism was striving for, was world domination. The onslaught is 
aimed at the prevailing State structure i.e. the present South African 
democratic (sic) way of life as represented and symbolized by 
Parliament…... the security of the Republic of South Africa must be 
maintained by every possible means at our disposal. Therefore, the 
Defence Force must be prepared to guarantee orderly government by 
maintaining law and order and securing the country’s borders…. owing 
to the communist threat and the instability which is increasing in 
Southern Africa, the Defence Force must also be prepared at all times 
to ensure the security of the territory of the Republic of South Africa by 
taking offensive pro-active steps.83
The military gathered more power than ever, and in the 1970s and 1980s many 
South Africans  lived in a state of fear. 
Botha’s ascent to power was followed by a massive shake-up in the civil service and 
in the way in which state structures interacted. He had already, as Minister of 
Defence, initiated structural changes in the SADF which led to, amongst other things,  
the scrapping of the position of Defence Secretary in 1973. This was a civilian, 
political position which acted as a check on the power and spending of the Defence 
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Force, and through which all acquisition by the military had to be approved. Up to this 
time the Defence Secretary had the same authority as the Commandant General 
(head of the Defence Force). After 1973, the position of Defence Secretary was 
scrapped and in its place the position of Comptroller General was created, a military 
position which fell just below the Chief of the Defence Force. This event signalled the 
loss of civilian control over the military.84  
During the early and mid-1970s most of the World War II veterans who were still 
serving in the SADF retired. There was a changing of the guard  which allowed for 
the rapid promotion of individuals who shared Botha’s views. Constand Viljoen, who 
was a Colonel in 1975, held the rank of General and Chief of the Defence Force 
some five years later. The border war had required a change in tactics, and the old 
ethos of the Defence Force vanished. There was, in short, a ‘tradition of no tradition’ 
from the mid-1970s.85
In the years preceding 1972/3 it would have been more difficult to launch a 
clandestine project such as Project Coast than it was thereafter. The Defence 
Secretary may have curbed the influence of the military in anything other than military 
operations. After 1973 the responsibility for these secret projects fell to the Chief of 
the Defence Force. The Defence Headquarters became a huge, powerful and 
centralised operation. PW Botha personally saw to it that General Magnus Malan, a 
close ally, was brought back from South West Africa, where he was serving as 
General Officer Commanding of South West Africa Command to take up the position 
of Chief of the Army. In 1975 Malan became Chief of the Defence Force.86 According 
to military analyst Willem Steenkamp, even before becoming Chief of the Defence 
Force, Malan’s relationship with Botha circumvented the Chief of the Defence Force, 
Admiral HH Biermann.87  
52
                                                
84 Chandré Gould interview with Willem Steenkamp, independent military analyst, 7 December 2000, 
Cape Town.  
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid. 
 
These personal relationships, which defied rank and authority, played an essential 
role in clandestine operations such as Project Coast. Former senior military officials 
concur that the military was run by powerful cabals, hidden by the formal, legal 
military structures. Magnus Malan was central to the establishment of these 
alternative power structures. His confidantes and supporters included General Jannie 
Geldenhuys (chief of the SADF during the 1980s) and General AJ (Kat) Liebenberg, 
Chief of Special Forces, later to become Chief of the Army and Chief of the SADF.88  
Military officers I interviewed repeatedly testified to the power of these invisible 
structures,89 confirming that anyone who questioned their ways of operating, or who 
questioned projects close to the sources of power, were immediately moved to 
positions where they could not act against the cabals, and often ultimately were 
forced to resign. General Pierre Steyn identified Liebenberg as a powerful member of 
the informal structures. It was Liebenberg’s practice to restrict the flow of information, 
by-pass normal chains of command and ensure that people in positions of power 
were those who toed the line.90 This modus operandi was similar to that of the secret 
Afrikaner organisation, the Broederbond, which was a powerful yet invisible force 
behind security thinking at the time and played a central role in determining defence 
policy and strategy.91  
The way in which the cabals acted to maintain their power was clearly demonstrated 
when in 1992 General Pierre Steyn was instructed by President FW De Klerk to 
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investigate the allegations of ‘third force’92 activities and the increased levels of 
political violence which accompanied negotiations between the liberation movements 
and the government.  Liebenberg reacted to Steyn’s appointment by warning him, 
“Don’t scratch where it does not itch”.93 Steyn was constantly harassed during the 
‘third force’ investigation. His house was broken into, his personal computer stolen, 
and he was kept under constant surveillance. A car was permanently parked outside 
his house. When Steyn challenged Liebenberg about the surveillance he was told, “I 
can watch anyone I want”; and Liebenberg commented, “You are messing with the 
system”.94 The cabals were ruthless with people they considered internal enemies or 
traitors. 
In December 1992, when Steyn reported verbally to De Klerk, his report was based 
on investigations conducted by members of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). 
The written report upon which he based his verbal report, revealed that a few 
members of the SADF, some in high ranking positions, were involved in illegal 
activities, either with criminal intent, or with intent to disrupt the negotiations towards 
democracy.95 Due to the intense rivalry which existed between the NIS and the 
military, and the complex nature of the incidents which were recorded in the report, it 
is impossible to determine with any degree of certainty, whether the individuals 
named in the report were truly involved in the alleged activities or whether the report 
was constructed by the NIS to put the Intelligence Service in a favourable light during 
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the transition period in South Africa. It is likely that the report contains some valuable 
information and some which is elaborated. 
The relationship between Botha, Malan and Liebenberg was to become important to 
the growth of Wouter Basson’s personal power. Throughout his tenure as Project 
Officer of Project Coast, Basson reported to Liebenberg as Chief of Special Forces. 
The direct reporting continued when Liebenberg was Chief of the Army, and, in the 
final stages of Project Coast, Chief of the Defence Force. When Malan was Minister 
of Defence and Liebenberg Chief of Special Forces, it is likely that this special 
relationship would have circumvented Chief of the Defence Force, Constand Viljoen, 
(although Viljoen did authorize the establishment of the chemical and biological 
warfare programme). Basson, who reported to Liebenberg on operational matters, 
would, therefore, have had a direct line to the Minister of Defence96 and to the State 
President.  
The structural changes in the state machinery took place at a time of rising political 
pressures inside South Africa and in the region. The fall of the Portuguese 
government in April 1974 and the consequent rise to power of revolutionary 
governments in Angola and Mozambique, combined with the struggle for liberation in 
Rhodesia, “traumatised the apartheid regime in Pretoria”.97  
In explaining the context in which the nuclear programme was born, Fig argues that 
the regional changes:  
precipitated a renewed rise of social struggle, typified by the events of 
June 1976 in Soweto, the emergence of the Black Consciousness 
Movement and a stronger ANC underground … [the] state responded 
with intensified domestic repression and external aggression. Not only 
had the front line moved closer, it had taken shape in the dusty streets 
of South Africa’s townships. The decision to build nuclear weapons 
[taken in 1974] arose in this atmosphere, during the paranoia about 
external attack and internal subversion, and as a part of a growing move 
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to create a ‘total strategy’ against the ‘total onslaught’ of apartheid’s 
enemies.98  
There was an increased level of internal resistance to apartheid following the 
massacre of school children in Soweto in 1976, the murder of Steve Biko in 1977, 
and increased levels of conflict in Angola and northern Namibia. There was 
consequently, a need perceived by the SADF leadership to research and develop 
crowd control agents. The search for chemical agents which could effectively be 
used against crowds coincided with the Soweto massacre in 1976.  Both former 
South African Police Forensics chief, General Lothar Neethling, and General 
Constand Viljoen, have recalled the military’s interest in finding agents that would 
calm a crowd. As Neethling stated to the Truth Commission: 
When the riots started in 1976, the South African Police were caught 
unawares.  They had nothing apart from guns, shotguns, and sharp 
point ammunition.  Nobody wanted to use that and that’s why there was 
a surge for various techniques to be applied …I went overseas three 
times to Germany, England, Israel, America to find the best techniques 
available.99
Viljoen concurred with Neethling, saying that the purpose of the chemical warfare 
programme was, on the one hand, to provide SADF troops with protection against 
the use of chemical weapons, and on the other hand to seek other forms of crowd 
control which would give the police an alternative to live ammunition.100  
Viljoen explained to me that the killing of school pupils in Soweto in June 1976, after 
the police had opened fire on a student protest gathering, had resulted in a 
diplomatic setback for the South African government. The incident focused the 
attention of the military on the need to develop alternative crowd control agents. A 
situation such as that in Soweto had to be prevented in the future, not only because it 
was morally unacceptable, but “because it was bad for internal relations and because 
of the effect it had on South Africa’s international relations.”101 Viljoen said that the 
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focus of the programme was, therefore, initially on the development of agents to be 
used inside South Africa for purposes of riot control and on “the development of 
defensive measures and tactical doctrine in defending and protecting [our] own 
troops”.102  
Viljoen’s statements appear, however, to be concealing other motives since the 
chemical company, AE&CI (later renamed AECI) had been producing CS teargas for 
riot control purposes since the early 1960s.103 The CS gas had been used to fill 
grenades by Swartklip products under the code-name Project Liomar. The police did, 
therefore, have stocks of CS available for use, but chose instead to use live 
ammunition to quell the 1976 riots. Viljoen’s assertion, in the press, that the SADF 
sought a riot control agent which would calm a crowd does not explain Project 
Coast’s focus on CR, a more irritant form of teargas. It was only after the 
establishment of Project Coast that any attempts were made to find alternatives to 
the CS gas. When confronted with the evidence that a calming agent was not 
weaponized, former Chief of the Defence Force (1985 – 1990), General Jannie 
Geldenhuys, said that he was surprised to hear that CR was not a calming agent. 
Chandré Gould: Can you please explain to me why it was that CR or 
New Generation Teargas was decided on. What was wrong with CS? 
Keeping in mind that you were looking for a calming agent and CR is 
more irritating than CS and is certainly not a calming agent.  
Jannie Geldenhuys: It is not? It was my understanding that it was more 
calming. That is what Liebenberg told me. It was the intention to mix the 
MDMA [‘Ecstasy”] with the teargas. 
Chandré Gould: I have not seen any evidence to suggest that the 
MDMA was weaponised and certainly no evidence that the MDMA was 
going to be mixed with CR. Swartklip Products said that they had never 
done any weaponisation of MDMA and they were the people 
responsible for the weaponisation of CR.  
Jannie Geldenhuys: That was at the end of my tenure. When the issue 
of a calming gas became prominent Kat [Liebenberg] told me that they 
were doing that – making a calming teargas. It was what had been 
ordered and what was going to be produced. 104   
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CHAPTER 3  
Project Coast 
Overview of Project Coast: Motivations and Intentions 
During the 1970s and 1980s South Africa’s white minority regime felt threatened from 
within and outside its borders. The survival of the state was paramount in the minds 
of politicians and the military. Politicians and military leaders shared a common belief 
that the country was at war, a total war which required a total response. It was 
partially for this reason that a nuclear programme was initiated in the 1970s and the 
arms industry grew to considerable size.1 The chemical and biological warfare (CBW) 
programme was a product of the same era.  
The chronology leading to the initiation of Project Coast in 1981 can be summarised 
as follows: 
1972 South Africa becomes a State Party to the BTWC. 
 
Between 1975 and 
19802  
(date unspecified) 
Wouter Basson, under authorisation of the Surgeon General,3 
approaches CSIR employee Vernon Joynt to prepare an 
assessment of the threat of use of chemical weapons against 
South African troops. Joynt concludes the cost of developing a 
chemical warfare capability is comparable to that of the Soviet 
Union will be R500 million. 
 
 Wouter Basson reports back to the Surgeon General and returns 
to Joynt with an offer to head the establishment of a chemical 
warfare programme. Joynt refuses. At this time there is no 
mention of biological weapons. 
 
1976 Uprisings by schoolchildren in Soweto against the use of 
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Afrikaans as the compulsory medium of education. The police 
suppress the uprisings using live ammunition which results in the 
death of students. Vocal international opposition to the incident 
increases pressure on Pretoria. 
 
1977 JP De Villiers (head of the Applied Chemistry Unit of the CSIR) 
prepares a chapter on chemical and biological warfare for 
inclusion in a handbook for military commanders. He concludes 
that there is no immediate threat of chemical weapons being used 
against SADF troops, but asserts that chemical weapons could 
have tactical utility in the fight against terrorism. He states that 
biological weapons too could have utility in clandestine military 
operations. 
 
In September black consciousness leader, Steve Biko, is killed in 
detention. 
 
In November the United Nations Security Council adopts 
Resolution 418, instituting a mandatory arms embargo against 
South Africa.4
 
1978 – 1980 Escalation of conflict between the SADF and MPLA forces which 
have Soviet and Cuban support in Angola. 
 
1981 Meeting of the Minister of Defence and military leaders to assess 
the threat of chemical weapons being used against SADF 
soldiers in Angola. The conclusion is reached that the threat is 
imminent and Basson is authorized to collect information 
internationally about chemical and biological warfare programmes 
to inform a South African approach to the problem. In August 
SADF funds are allocated for the completion of a feasibility study 
into the establishment of a chemical and biological warfare 
programme for South Africa. 
 
Towards the end of the year the Minister of Defence authorizes 
the establishment of Project Coast and allocates additional funds 
for this purpose. 
 
 
The idea that chemical and biological weapons would have tactical utility in the 
apartheid government’s effort to maintain white rule was established by De Villiers in 
1977. At the same time the South African government (i) faced increased 
international pressure to end apartheid discrimination; (ii) was  isolated by the 
imposition of a United Nations Security Council arms embargo; (iii) faced increased 
internal resistance to apartheid; (iv) as a result of the international pressure and 
attention focused on the activities of the security forces, had to find alternative ways 
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of suppressing the growing internal resistance to apartheid policies; (v) experienced 
an increase in the escalation of conflict in Angola and assessed that chemical 
weapons may be used by the MPLA.  
The decision in late 1981 to establish Project Coast was influenced by these factors 
which also informed the focus of the programme on: crowd control agents, covert 
assassination weapons and protective clothing for troops. The official documentation 
of Project Coast summarises the objectives of the CBW programme as follows: 
? To develop chemical warfare agents that could be used by security 
forces to control crowds. 
? To do research into offensive and defensive chemical and biological 
warfare. 
? To develop offensive chemical and biological weapons for operational 
use. 
? To develop defensive training programmes for troops. 
? To develop and manufacture protective clothing.5 
The South African Defence Force philosophy with regard to chemical warfare 
included “the right to reactively use non-lethal chemical warfare”, “the integration of 
chemical warfare into all conventional actions”, and “the acceptance of the use of 
chemical warfare on a proactive basis to ensure the survival of the state, for 
example, in controlling the massive violence in the current revolutionary situation”.6  
The stated objectives of the programme reveal that chemical warfare operations 
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were envisaged which would have included the use of CW agents inside the country 
and imply that external use was also considered.7  
Very few military documents exist in the public domain which date to the initiation of 
the CBW programme and none which provide a contemporaneous explanation of 
what motivated those who set it up. Such documentation as is available, together 
with testimony from those involved in the decision-making process leaves little doubt 
that the principal motivation was the need to provide SADF troops fighting in Angola 
with protection against chemical weapons. A subsidiary goal was the provision of 
novel crowd control agents to the SAP.8 Neither of these aims, however, provides 
any persuasive reason for establishing the biological component of the programme.   
While the need for chemical defence equipment and crowd control agents would 
explain the existence of a largely defensive programme and small offensive one (for 
producing tear gas munitions supposedly only for internal use), the biological 
component is less easily explained. Documents assessing the threat to South Africa 
in the late 1970s specifically note that there is no immediate, or envisaged threat 
from biological warfare,9 despite recognizing that biological weapons could be 
utilized for clandestine operations. The BW programme itself appears to have had 
only a limited defensive component, most of the evidence suggests that the aim was 
offence. Some military officials have argued that the primary reason behind the 
development of the biological warfare facility at the Roodeplaat Research 
Laboratories (RRL), was to provide an animal testing facility for chemical agents 
developed at the sister company, Delta G Scientific.  
Both RRL and Delta G Scientific were military front companies, established to 
conduct research, and to both develop and produce products for Project Coast. In the 
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event of detection the front companies were meant to shield the CBW programme 
and disguise its military connections. They also made it easier to import dual-use 
equipment and other items which may have raised alarms had it been known that 
they were destined for a military organisation.10 There is certainly documentary 
evidence that chemical agents were tested on animals at RRL. As for the BW 
programme, however, the scientists involved claim that it was intended to supply the 
military and police with covert assassination weapons for use against individuals 
regarded as a threat to the apartheid government.11  
No publicly available document about Project Coast provides a clear indication of 
either the extent or nature of the biological programme. The emphasis is rather on 
the perceived chemical threat to South African forces fighting in Angola and the need 
to defend them, as well as developing agents to control internal opposition to 
apartheid.12 In many of the documents the two categories of weapons (chemical and 
biological) are conflated. Documents which do reveal the motivation behind the BW 
programme and its development are retrospective. In addition, these documents 
were prepared for the Minister of Defence, Eugene Louw, and the President, FW De 
Klerk, in the early 1990s. Both men needed to be seen to be making a break with the 
past,13 and it is likely that the briefings they received would have deliberately 
obscured aspects of the programme which might cause discomfort. Unlike his 
predecessor, PW Botha, De Klerk was not a militarist and soon after becoming 
president replaced General Magnus Malan with a civilian minister of defence. Many 
members of the Defence Force felt threatened by the changes and it is unlikely that 
De Klerk would have been told about the more sinister aspects of the CBW 
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programme, particularly since the development of BW assassination weapons which 
were a part of it put South Africa on the wrong side of the BTWC.  
De Klerk’s 1990 briefing paper refers to the BW programme in two short paragraphs 
stating: 
It is not possible to describe the current biological threat to the world 
because of the speedy development of techniques to produce new 
bacteria as well as other organisms. Our biological capacity is focused on 
staying up to date with the changing threat. To do this we are constantly 
producing new organisms in order to develop a preventative capacity as 
well as treatment.14  
On the objectives of the CBW programme the briefing is obscure: 
The aim of Project Coast is that of covert research and development of 
CBW and the establishment of production technology in the sensitive and 
critical areas of chemical and biological warfare to provide the South 
African security forces with a CBW capacity following the CBW philosophy 
and strategy.15
Neither the so-called CBW philosophy nor the strategy are explained. With regard to 
BW the objective of Project Coast was to, “[E]stablish a research, production and 
development capacity with regard to biological warfare”.16
In 1990 Basson presented a document outlining the proposed philosophy with regard 
to chemical warfare to the Reduced Defence Command Council; no corresponding 
document on biological warfare has been made public. It is far from clear whether a 
philosophy was ever outlined on biological warfare and it is unlikely that a document 
describing it exists. Basson provides some insight into why this may have been the 
case, noting: 
This philosophy does not cover any aspects of Biological Warfare (sic). 
Because of the more controlled nature of Biological Warfare there are 
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many more international control measures. The production of Biological 
Weapons is not allowed anywhere in the world.17
This suggests that there may have been a policy with regard to the development of 
biological weapons, but that given the nature of the ban on these weapons, the policy 
remained unwritten.  
The initiation of Project Coast and the role of Wouter Basson 
In early 1981 the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, met with the Chief of the 
SADF, General Constand Viljoen, and members of the Defence Command Council to 
discuss the threat of chemical weapons being used by Cuban forces in Angola. 
Viljoen was convinced that there was a strong chance that the Soviet-backed forces 
both had access to chemical weapons and would use them. He convinced Malan 
who instructed the SADF to find a solution to the problem. A young military doctor, 
Wouter Basson, was ordered to travel abroad to collect, covertly, information about 
the chemical and biological warfare programmes of the West and to use these 
models as the basis for developing a blueprint for a South African programme. 
Basson was also instructed to make contact with organisations which might provide 
information about the CBW capabilities of Eastern bloc countries.18  
Basson joined the SADF as a medical officer in January 1979, the year after PW 
Botha became prime minister. He held the rank of lieutenant, and worked at 1 Military 
Hospital until February 1981. If Joynt is correct in his claim that Basson approached 
him in the mid-1970s on behalf of the Surgeon General, it would indicate that Basson 
had a relationship with the military, and particularly the Surgeon General, before 
1979. If this is true, Basson would have indicated his interest in CBW matters before 
he officially joined the military. Between 1979 and February 1981 Basson completed 
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various courses and became a specialist in internal medicine with a military rank of 
substantive commander.19 He must have caught his commanders’ eye, because from 
March 1981 he served as a specialist adviser at defence headquarters and as 
Project Officer for the Special Projects of the Surgeon General.  He was under the 
operational command of the Commanding Officer Special Forces of the Defence 
Force at the time he was appointed Project Officer of Project Coast.   
Basson’s rise was meteoric. In January 1985 he obtained the rank of colonel and 
became head of a new division, the 7th Medical Battalion, which provided medical 
support to Special Forces, the Parachute Division, the SAP and the NIS. In this 
capacity he underwent various courses and became a Brigadier in 1988 at the same 
time as becoming the head of Medical Staff Operations.20 He remained in this 
position for nine months until the Surgeon General, Knobel, appointed him Head of 
Research and Development in the South African Medical Services (SAMS). At the 
same time as becoming head of Medical Staff Operations and Head of Research and 
Development in SAMS, Basson was head of Project Coast. It is unlikely that he 
would have been able to perform all these functions simultaneously which raises the 
possibility that some of these positions were held in name only. His rapid rise in rank 
and status in the military would seem to support the contention that he had a 
relationship with the Surgeon General before joining the military. 
Knobel summed up the position of Basson in Project Coast in his testimony to the 
TRC: 
…here is a man who became a brigadier at a very young age just 
before I became Surgeon General. He obviously had the trust of the 
entire Defence Force and of the Cabinet because that type of 
appointment is approved at that kind of level. He had the total support of 
my predecessor. The system that was created to run this project and the 
way that he had operated was then running already for 8 years when I 
took over. It is quite impossible to then begin to question the way that he 
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carries out his dealings. His word was accepted. I say that and it is 
true.21  
Knobel told the TRC that, “Clearly the person you wanted to be the ideal Project 
Officer would have to be a person with detailed knowledge of chemistry and certainly 
would have to be also partly a person with a higher degree in medicine.  These 
qualities (sic) is what Dr Basson had and I take it that that was exactly why he was 
chosen.”22 Knobel believed he had a very close, fatherly relationship with Basson; he 
spoke of Basson being like a son in his house and trusted Basson completely.  
In August 1981 funds were allocated by Constand Viljoen to complete a feasibility 
study for the establishment of a CBW programme in South Africa. Towards the end of 
that year the Minister of Defence officially approved the establishment of Project 
Coast and funds were made available for the purpose.23 According to a retrospective 
report by Knobel and Basson, it was initially envisaged that the parastatal arms 
manufacturer, Armscor, would assist the SADF in developing the CBW programme.24 
In a meeting with the Surgeon General at the time, General NJ Nieuwoudt, Armscor 
officials apparently said that it would be too sensitive a task for them. It was therefore 
decided that the SADF would be solely responsible for the project. Knobel reported in 
his briefing to the Minister of Defence that Nieuwoudt and Basson met with Piet 
Marais and Fred Bell of Armscor, who said they would not be in a position to recruit 
or maintain the scientists necessary for the programme as they had too much work 
already.25 This was an incongruous position since Armscor was responsible for 
procurement for the nuclear programme. A senior Armscor official has stated that it 
was more likely that Armscor’s decision not to host the CBW programme related to 
issues of power and control: Armscor would not have taken on the responsibility for a 
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programme over which it did not have full control  and for which it would not get full 
credit. It is equally unlikely that Basson and Nieuwoudt would have wanted to hand 
over a project which they had invented, and for which they could gain the favour of 
the Minister of Defence and State President. 
In 1981 the Minister of Defence approved the establishment of Project Coast under 
the sole auspices of the SADF and, at the same time, approved the establishment of 
its management committee.  This committee, known as the Co-ordinating 
Management Committee (CMC), included the Chief of the SADF, the Surgeon 
General, the Chief of Staff Finances, the Chief of Staff Intelligence and other co-
opted members.26  
When Basson returned from his information-gathering trip in 1981 to the United 
States, England and Taiwan, he reported back to the Defence Command Council.27 
He told them that CBW programmes elsewhere in the world used civilian front 
companies to conduct all offensive research and development to the point of 
weaponization.28 In fact, this was not the way the Russian, American or British 
programmes were structured. Yet on the basis of this information, it was decided that 
front companies would be used, as opposed to structures within the Defence Force. 
These front companies were to become an important component of the labyrinthine 
arrangements of the CBW programme. 
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Basson also reported that in the late 1970s and early 1980s the emphasis of the USA 
and USSR chemical weapons programmes shifted to the weaponization of non-lethal 
chemical warfare agents.29  Presumably this was to support the position that South 
Africa should pursue the development of non-lethal agents. In fact, the US wrote its 
first paper on incapacitating agents in 1949 and had incapacitant programmes 
running during the 1950s under the concept of "the bloodless war" which developed 
after the bombing experiences of the Second World War. Indeed it was under this 
banner that the US military lobbied Congress to increase their CBW budget. The 
incapacitant programme was then stopped, but resurfaced in the US in the form of 
two programmes: one called Advanced Riot Control Agent Technology (ARCAT) and 
the other Advanced Riot Control Agent Device (ARCAD).30 Basson’s statement to his 
superior officers was incorrect in claiming that US chemical weapons programmes 
had shifted to focus on non-lethal weapons in the 1970s and 1980s, both because 
the work on non-lethal agents began much earlier and because the US was at that 
time doing work on lethal nerve agents through the binary chemical weapons 
programme. 
Assessing the threat 
None of the publicly available SADF documents provide a clear and explicit threat 
analysis at the time of the initiation of Project Coast. Most of the documents dealing 
with the threat and consequent programme are authored by Basson. They tend to 
focus on international trends in chemical warfare and on broad statements about the 
Angolan threat. Little detail is provided about the internal political situation, although it 
was a time of extreme state violence and growing resistance.   
The international context for establishing Project Coast was set out in a briefing that 
Wouter Basson gave to a meeting of the Reduced Defence Command Council, which 
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included the Chief of the Defence Force and other top ranking officers. While the 
basis for many of Basson’s statements were false, the enormous amount of trust 
which senior military officers placed in him, and his reputation as a brilliant scientist, 
meant they did not question his claims. The fact that Basson motivated for the CBW 
programme with such ardour indicates his own desire for the programme to be 
established.  
Basson claimed that during the 1960s and 1970s South Africa had been dependent 
on the US and UK and “various NATO committees”31 for its approach to chemical 
defence, although this is unlikely and no evidence has been found to support the 
claim. He also claimed that during the 1970s and 1980s developments in the 
European chemical industry resulted in the production of chemical warfare agents in 
Europe. This, he said, led to an increased availability of the agents and resulted in 
Iraq, Iran  Egypt, Syria, North Korea, Cuba and Libya “acquiring the ability to produce 
chemical weapons which upset the power balance of the earlier years”.32  Based on 
these factors, Basson concluded that, “The threat now lay in the existence of a large 
number of potentially undisciplined distributors of chemical weapons, who would 
make them available to anyone with money or the correct ideology - potential 
chemical chaos.”33 He added that the US and the Soviet Union had shifted their 
emphasis from lethal agents to non-lethal agents in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
because  the use of lethal agents on the battlefield and resultant loss of life would be 
‘unacceptable’, given the increased consciousness of social responsibility in the West 
in these years.34 In fact it was precisely at that time that the United States 
Department of Defence (DOD) was seeking approval from Congress to lift the 
moratorium on up-grading its stockpile of lethal chemical weapons.35 According to an 
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article in the journal Science published in 1979: “[The] DOD wants to build a plant for 
arming 155 millimetre artillery shells with binary nerve gas projectiles.”36 By 1982 the 
Pentagon was asking chemical firms in the US to manufacture the intermediates for 
nerve gas.37  
Basson, nevertheless, argued that the increased availability of chemical warfare 
agents, and the international tendency towards the development of non-lethal agents 
would lead to CW being an integral part of conventional warfare. As far as he was 
concerned, an appropriate response would have been to develop effective protective 
clothing and training for troops and to include non-lethal chemical weapons in the 
Defence Force’s arsenal. At the same meeting Basson explained that the SADF’s 
operational philosophy included the “right to reactively use non-lethal chemical 
weapons” and “the integration of chemical warfare related actions in all conventional 
actions”. Indeed the philosophy of the SADF included also the “acceptance of the use 
of chemical weapons on a pro-active basis to ensure the survival of the state, for 
example in the prevention of the massive violence in the current revolutionary 
situation.” 38 So while  pointing to external factors forcing the initiation of a 
programme, this statement is an admission that the need for a CW programme was 
directly related to the need to suppress internal opposition to apartheid. Basson, 
however, also referred to the conventional battleground threat. Having established in 
the minds of the generals that Cuban soldiers had access to chemical weapons, he 
implied that these weapons could be used at any time in the Angolan war.  
In 1993 the Minister of Defence, Eugene Louw, was briefed on the background to the 
1981 initiation of Project Coast. This briefing was more specific about the threat in 
Angola.  The Surgeon General, Knobel, informed the Minister that in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s there was a concern that CW agents could be used in the Angolan 
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war, and that the build-up of Russian and Cuban forces in Angola, with access to 
chemical weapons, presented a threat to South Africa.  He argued that these forces 
could attack South Africa by moving through Namibia, and that if they were to use 
chemical weapons, South Africa would not have been able to defend itself.39  
More recently, Knobel told the Pretoria High Court40 that during the height of the 
Angolan war between 1975 and 1980, South African troops confiscated vehicles from 
Cuban soldiers deployed there. These vehicles were taken to a South African military 
base in Namibia and were found to be fitted with air filters. Knobel told the court that 
he had personally inspected the confiscated medical bags and found them to contain 
nerve gas antidotes and gas masks. This, Knobel claimed, led the SADF to believe 
that there was an intention by Cuban troops to make use of chemical agents.41 The 
South African military may or may not have known that the USSR standard vehicle 
units, including armoured personnel carriers, would routinely have been fitted with 
these features. Helmoed Heitman, a soldier in the SADF during Operation Protea in 
Angola in the early 1980s, has stated that he was present when a vehicle was 
captured from Cuban troops which was believed to have been a decontamination 
truck. Heitman claims it was this truck which caused consternation in SADF ranks 
and convinced the SADF that there was a real threat of chemical warfare being used 
during the conflict. On closer examination of the truck Heitman realized that it was an 
embalming vehicle, although this does not seem to have been conveyed to senior 
military officers.42
The real threat of CW use seems to have come much later, after the establishment of 
Project Coast. There were allegations, repeated in SADF briefing documents, that in 
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the late 1980s the MPLA used chemical weapons against UNITA  troops, this caused 
havoc in the UNITA camps. Soldiers were afraid of any battleground smoke and were 
demoralized.43 However, many SADF witnesses for the prosecution in the Basson 
trial stated that they had no knowledge of any incidents of chemical attacks during 
the Angolan war, despite having spent years at the front.  
The alleged chemical attacks against UNITA soldiers were never proven. It is 
possible that the reaction of UNITA soldiers was the result of the claims made by 
Professor Aubin Heyndrickx that chemical weapons had been used between 1986 
and 1992 in Angola. It is clear that the SADF accepted Heyndrickx’s findings, since 
official documentation cites the discovery of shrapnel (by Heyndrickx) in 1986 in 
Angola which tested positive for a CW agent (Adamsite) as evidence of a chemical 
warfare threat on the South African border.44 Dr Johan Koekemoer, an organic 
chemist at the chemical warfare facility, Delta G Scientific, was responsible for 
analysing the shrapnel and allegedly did find traces of the incapacitant.   
In October 1990, when Basson spelled out the SADF’s philosophy on chemical 
warfare to the generals, he also claimed that modified weapons had been used 
against UNITA soldiers in Angola:  
Developments in the field of applied toxicology have been successfully 
incorporated by the USSR in conventional ammunition. Through 
changes in the composition and proportions of the components of 
conventional smoke screen ammunition and light giving flares, this 
ammunition is changed into deadly chemical weapons. This ammunition 
can practically be used at will, seeing that it would be very difficult to 
control it through the Conventions. This ammunition can even be 
explained away as factory faults. In two types of this ammunition that 
has been used against UNITA, it was found that the normal content of 
the projectiles had been adapted. In the one type, Strontium metal 
(which is normally found in small amounts in weapons) was found in 
concentrations of up to 50 times the normal concentration. A certain 
nylon type was used for bonding. The burning of the impure ‘nylon’ 
causes saltpetre and cyanide to be released in the smoke.  
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The second type of projectile which to our knowledge has been used 
against UNITA makes use of a similar mechanism. In this case the 
normal metals of the light giving flares are bound by a ‘PVC’ which uses 
an abnormally high percentage of tricresolphosphate as a softener (up 
to 5 - 10kg tricresolphosphate per bomb). Ignition of this flare releases 
tricresolphosphate as well as a very poisonous gas, phosphine, along 
with metal phosphides which can poison soil (and water) for a long time. 
It is this last mentioned bombs with their peri peri smell which causes 
the paralysis that we have seen in hundreds of UNITA soldiers.45  
This statement too appears to rely heavily on the reports generated by Heyndrickx 
and was intended to highlight the threat of chemical warfare agents being used 
against South African and UNITA soldiers. Heyndrickx adopted a definition of 
chemical weapon which is much broader than the conventional definition. As far as 
he was concerned, any artillery that released any chemical agent during detonation 
was a chemical weapon.  
If the South African Defence Force had a justifiable concern about the use of 
chemical agents in the conflict in Angola, it would have been expected that the focus 
of Project Coast would have been on the purchase and manufacture of protective 
clothing for soldiers and on the training of fighting troops, or the creation of a 
plausible deterrent. But this did not happen. The focus on the development and 
manufacture of protective clothing, training of troops, and physiological research, 
only began to take place in the programme after 1986.46 According to Dr Brian 
Davey, the scientist responsible for developing training programmes and the 
defensive CBW philosophy for the SADF, the training of troops in defensive 
responses to chemical weapons only began in 1988.47 Willem Steenkamp, a former 
citizen force member and defence analyst, has stated that he was called up in the 
late 1980s to a Defence Force training camp where lectures were given on chemical 
weapons and nuclear fall-out. At the lectures those in attendance tried on NBC suits. 
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They found that after  five minutes in the suits,  in the African summer,   they would 
collapse from heat exhaustion. After the course Steenkamp was told by a highly 
placed source that the lecture was a propaganda exercise, with the intention that 
news of the course would spread and if the war in Angola accelerated there would be 
an impression that the SADF was well prepared.48  
Certainly the SADF response to the alleged conventional threat seems to indicate 
that they did not take the threat very seriously. A national serviceman who worked 
with Brian Davey,  Danie Du Toit, said that chemical protection courses were only 
offered to select groups, not the SADF in general. Du Toit was in Angola in 1987 as a 
member of the SADF’s 7 Medical Battalion during Operation Modular. He claimed 
that there were no NBC suits available for troops in the field. They were briefed that 
in the event of a suspected chemical attack, they were to “dig foxholes, crawl in and 
cover themselves with their standard-issue ponchos”. Du Toit acknowledged that this 
was by no means the ideal solution, “but it was all we had”. According to Du Toit, 
even the 7 Medical Battalion Specialist Group had only between 10 and 20 NBC suits 
available.49  
The internal threat was far more definable for the SADF. There was no doubt that the 
South African government considered itself in a state of war against its own citizens 
from the late 1970s until the early 1990s. Basson’s assertion that chemical weapons 
would be an appropriate way of fighting this war would have had credence. 
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Table 1. Projects and operations associated with the CBW programme 
Name of Project/Operation  Purpose Dates 
Project Coast Chemical and biological 
warfare programme. 
1981 – 1992 
Project Jota (the code-name 
Coast was changed to Jota for 
security reasons in 1992) 
Chemical and biological 
warfare programme. 
1992 – 1995 
Operation Spyker Military Intelligence operation 
to supply UNITA with 
ammunition from Armscor 
factories or from SADF 
ammunition depots. 
Unknown 
Project Muly/Keyboard/Koma/ 
Kea 
SADF and Armscor project to 
develop a limited offensive 
CW capacity for the SADF. 
The Surgeon General 
decided on CR as the fill 
substance for ammunition.50 
The names of the project 
changed successively as 
indicated.  
1985 – 1993/4 
(Project Keyboard 
was officially closed 
down during 
1993/4)51
Operations Hooper, Packer and 
Modular 
An SADF operation in 
Angola. The SADF was 
responding to a call for help 
from UNITA leader, Jonas 
Savimbi, who was under 
attack from FAPLA forces. 
The name of the operation 
changed when the SADF 
forces changed.52  
June 1987 – April 
1988 
Project Academic Project Academic was an 
SADF/Armscor procurement 
project which involved the 
procurement of CBW 
defensive capabilities for the 
SADF. Academic was started 
as a project study in 1986/7 
and during operations 
Hooper, Packer and Modular 
shifted to an extraordinary 
acquisition phase due to the 
perceived CW threat.53
 
                                                
50Chandré Gould electronic communication with Rudolph Louw, former Project Officer of Project 
Keyboard, 21 August 2001 
51 Ibid.  
52 Chandré Gould telephonic discussion with General Jan Breytenbach, 21 August 2001.  
53 Gould electronic communication with Louw , 21 August 2001. 
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 Project Galvanise A broad Armscor research 
and development project 
which included a sub-project 
to research and develop 
chemical and biological 
warfare defensive 
equipment.54
 
Project Fargo When the chemical and 
biological warfare defence 
research and development 
sub-project of Project 
Galvanise grew and 
expanded it was made a 
separate project with the 
name Fargo. Protechnik 
Laboratories was the primary 
contractor to Armscor in this 
regard.55
 
 
Structure and management of Project Coast 
Wouter Basson was given an extraordinary amount of freedom to conduct the 
business of Project Coast. He reported not to the formal military chain of command, 
but rather to informal structures that explicitly by-passed the chain of command. The 
multiplicity of reporting channels were to provide the justification for those who bore 
ultimate political responsibility for the programme to claim, after 1994, that they had 
no knowledge of the aberrant aspects of Project Coast. This section of the thesis 
considers the nature of the decision-making in Project Coast and examines the 
consequences of poor management and control over the top secret project. 
None of the documents, or evidence presented during the testimony of those 
associated with the CBW programme, provide any indication of the extent to which 
PW Botha himself had knowledge of the programme. While Botha would certainly 
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have been informed about Project Coast, and would have been involved in the 
decision to establish Coast, the documents which are currently available do not 
reveal the extent of his involvement. According to the documents, political decision-
making was the responsibility of the Minister of Defence, who for most of the duration 
of Project Coast was General Magnus Malan (from October 1980 – August 1991). 
The Chief of the Defence Force reported to the Minister, and the heads of the 
branches of the military reported to the Chief of the Defence Force.56 An intermediary 
structure between the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force, the 
Defence Command Council, was the most senior military decision-making body. The 
nature of top secret  projects such as the nuclear programme, the CBW programme, 
and the covert units of Special Forces, was such that a minimum number of people 
were made aware of their existence. For this reason the Defence Command Council, 
did not, as a whole, discuss top secret projects. A “Reduced Defence Command 
Council” consisting only of those people who had a “need to know” met after the 
Defence Command Council meetings to be briefed by Basson and to take decisions 
about SADF philosophy with regard to the use of chemical weapons. These meetings 
were chaired by the Chief of the Defence Force and usually excluded the Chiefs of 
the Air Force and Navy.57
Project Coast was managed by a committee appointed by the Minister of Defence. 
This committee, the Co-ordinating Management Committee (CMC), was under the 
chairmanship of the Chief of the Defence Force. Although the committee was 
responsible for the project, it was never fully informed of the details. Nevertheless it 
was the committee’s responsibility to ensure that the project was run efficiently, 
accountably and according to plan. The CMC included the Surgeon General, the 
Chief of Staff Finance, the Chief of Staff Intelligence and other co-opted members 
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who became permanent members: the Chief of the Army, the Commanding Officer of 
Special Forces, and the Chief of the Air Force.58  
Members of Armscor and at some stages, representatives of the Auditor General 
also took part in meetings.59 As Project Officer, Basson (succeeded in 1993 by 
Colonel Ben Steyn) acted as Secretary to the Co-ordinating Management 
Committee. In that role Basson was responsible for all the documentation of the CMC 
and was the direct link to the front companies. 
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Project Coast structures of command and control60  
 Project Officer
Project Manager - Surgeon General
Gen N Nieuwoudt ( - 1988)
Gen Dp Knobel (1988 - 1998)
Head of Special Forces
Chief of the Army
Co-ordinating Management Committee
Defence Command Council and
Reduced Defence Command Council
Chief of the SADF
Minister of Defence
Magnus Malan (1980 - 1991)
 
According to Knobel,61 Basson reported back to the CMC about the achievements of 
Coast objectives only in broad terms. Knobel justified this to the TRC by saying that 
the members of the committee did not have either the scientific knowledge or 
background to deal with the detail of projects. Again, an indication that Basson’s 
status as a scientist gave him special standing and credibility in the eyes of senior 
military officers. Knobel claimed that: “[T]here was never an opportunity to really 
discuss in detail what particular experiments were carried out about the very vast 
numbers of chemicals that had to be studied.”62 In fact, the technical reports from the 
front companies contradict this assertion and indicate that there were few chemicals 
considered for weaponization.  
Knobel explained the process of authorization for Coast activities as follows:  
                                                
60 Testimony of General DP Knobel at the TRC hearing into chemical and biological warfare, 11 June 
1998. 
61 Ibid., 12 June 1998. 
62 Ibid. 
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The CMC would approve a study of chemical agents, as a broad guideline. 
The Project Officer would then say: “We are now embarking on the 
classical lethal chemical weapons.  We’re going to study 500 different 
chemicals”. The CMC would then say: “What sort of requirements do you 
need to be able to fulfil that objective, namely to look at all the classical 
lethal chemical weapons?” The Technical Work Group would then do an 
estimate of what experimentation would be required, what kind of staff 
would be required to do that work, what kind of laboratory, etc. They would 
translate it into budget terms and would come back to the CMC and say: 
“If we want to do this during this year, we are going to require these 
resources...”63
Knobel, therefore, passed responsibility for the details of the project to the Technical 
Working Group which supposedly included the Project Officer, the Managing 
Directors of the front companies, and a select group of scientists within those 
companies. The task of the Technical Working Group was to plan the research for 
each company.64 However, this group was a fluid concept at best. The only constant 
member of this committee was Basson himself.  Other members of the Technical 
Working Group varied from one meeting to the next, depending on the scientists 
involved. According to Knobel, the reason for this loose arrangement was that 
scientists working on one sub-project were not supposed to know what their 
colleagues were researching. In theory, the Technical Working Group involved a 
meeting between Basson, a scientist with a specific need, and usually the Managing 
Director of the front company concerned. The information prepared by the Group was 
to be taken to the CMC by Basson, for approval of expenditure. In reality, scientists 
at RRL told me, meetings with Basson seldom took place,65 and many of the 
scientists testifying in the case against Basson said they had never even known of 
the existence of the Technical Working Group. One can conclude that such a 
structure existed only in name and concept, providing a cover for the less formal 
structures of command and control.  
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Apart from the Technical Working group, the CMC had two other sub-committees:66 a 
General Administration and Financial Committee and a Security Committee. The 
General Administration and Financial Committee was under the control of the Project 
Manager (the Surgeon General) who was assisted by the Chief of Staff Finance and 
the Project Officer. This Committee was responsible for broad budgetary planning on 
behalf of the CMC. After 1990 the financial and budgetary planning was done at the 
CMC itself so this sub-committee fell away. The Security Committee was officially 
responsible for the security aspects of the project. The Chief of Staff Intelligence, the 
Surgeon General and the Project Officer were supposedly members of this 
committee, which was responsible for ensuring that the project remained secret. 
However, It is likely that this committee too existed only in name. General R. (Witkop) 
Badenhorst claimed he never attended any meetings of the committee.67 Badenhorst 
was head of Military Intelligence at the time when the front companies were 
privatised and were, therefore, vulnerable to breaches of security. The fact that he 
was never involved in meetings of the Security Committee indicates that security 
decisions must have been made elsewhere. Testimony in the Basson trial indicates 
that Basson himself was responsible for making decisions pertaining to the security 
of the Project.68
The CMC was an ineffective mechanism for maintaining control. Its members knew 
very few details about the project, and the committee usually only met on an annual 
basis. In fact, according to Knobel, after 1981 the CMC only met for budgetary 
purposes. Instead, Basson was expected to brief the Chief of the Defence Force, 
Chief of Staff Finance, Chief of Staff Intelligence and the Surgeon General on a more 
regular basis, although the frequency and detail of these meetings is unknown. 
Basson stated during his application for bail that there would often be two or three 
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months when he would not see Knobel at all and would take orders from the Chief of 
Staff Intelligence or the Commander of Special Forces.69  
None of the witnesses who testified at the TRC hearing claimed to know where 
ultimate control of the project lay. General Knobel, the official Project Manager, said 
repeatedly that he relied solely on Basson for all his knowledge of the programme. 
He denied having had any real authority. Control over Project Coast and Basson was 
further clouded by the fact that Basson could take orders from any branch of the 
security forces without the knowledge of Knobel or the Chief of the Defence Force.  
After his appointment as Project Officer in 1981, Basson was under the command of 
the Surgeon General and had to report to him on all medical and related activities. 
He was also under the operational control of the Commanding Officer Special Forces 
from March 1981 and all his military activities were authorised from that office. To 
complicate matters further, the products delivered by Project Coast were determined 
by the end-user, and instructions given directly to Basson by the end-user. This could 
have been the Minister of Defence, the Head of the Defence Force, the Commanding 
Officer Special Forces, the Chief of Staff Information, the Commissioner of the SAP, 
the Commanding General of the SAP, the Director General of the NIS, or the Chief of 
the Army.70  
The precedent for this unusual arrangement was set in 1987 at a National Security 
Management System (NSMS) meeting, attended by Magnus Malan - Minister of 
Defence,  Adriaan Vlok – Minister of Law and Order, Police Commissioner Johan 
Coetzee, Security Police chief Johan van der Merwe, National Intelligence Service 
director-general Niel Barnard, and SADF Chief of Staff Operations, General van 
Loggerenberg. Although Knobel was not yet Surgeon General, he represented the 
Surgeon General, General Nieuwoudt, at the meeting. He was “extremely surprised” 
when Malan told the meeting that Wouter Basson was to brief them on potential riot 
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control methods and the new generation teargas. Project Coast was such a closely 
guarded secret at the time, said Knobel, that he believed no other state department 
knew of its existence. Even more disturbing for Knobel was Malan’s instruction to the 
meeting that should any branch of the security forces need the product (CR), they 
should contact Basson directly. He would also be able to advise them on the most 
effective use of the new generation teargas (NGT) and about protective measures to 
be taken. This “worried” Knobel a great deal - in his mind it exposed Basson on too 
broad a front. However, when he raised his objections with Nieuwoudt, he was told 
the Defence Minister had made his decision. This shows that even the Minister of 
Defence apparently showed scant regard for structures of command and control 
which could ensure accountability and was prepared to grant Basson special status.  
To make matters more obscure, Basson’s defence team told the court during the 
cross-examination of Knobel, that General AJ (Kat) Liebenberg, erstwhile Special 
Forces commander and Chief of the Army, had paid little regard to the SADF chain of 
command and that on becoming Chief of the SADF, Liebenberg had used Basson as 
his personal soldier. At times, Knobel admitted, while Liebenberg was chairman of 
the CMC, he would adjourn meetings to hold private conversations with Basson.71
In his testimony to the TRC and in Basson’s trial, Knobel said this multiplicity of 
reporting structures was the reason he knew nothing of the assassination weapons 
developed. A claim which is unlikely to be true since Jan Lourens told the TRC that 
he had informed Knobel about the production of assassination weapons in 1993:  
Just before I left the organisation (Protechnik), I made an appointment to 
see General Knobel.  I just felt that the project was going wrong, it was 
going to strange directions.  … I said [to him] do you bear knowledge of 
these chemical weapons, these applicators as you call them, that we have 
been manufacturing?… General Knobel replied to me, he said I had to 
bear in mind that as far as the offensive is concerned he bore no 
knowledge of it, it’s not his project.  Wouter had another reporting line.72
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The chain of events which followed this meeting reveals that Liebenberg may have 
had more insight into and control over the programme than Knobel. Lourens 
attempted to relate his concerns directly to the Minister of Defence, Roelf Meyer. 
Meyer refused to see him but discussed the matter with Lourens’ attorney, an old 
school friend, and instructed Lourens to speak to the Surgeon General that same 
afternoon. Knobel too refused to see Lourens again saying, “I am not going to talk to 
you, you are going to have to see General Kat Liebenberg.” When they arrived at 
Liebenberg’s office he told them there was no story to be told, his words were: “You 
must remember those toys are mine, I want them back.”73 Lourens knew that 
Liebenberg was referring to the assassination weapons. Instead of handing the 
weapons back to Liebenberg, Lourens buried them on his farmland. In 1997 they 
were dug up under the supervision of the Attorney General who was investigating the 
case against Basson. It was clear to Lourens that Liebenberg knew about the 
production of assassination weapons and the process had met with his approval. 
They were apparently never discussed at any meeting of the CMC or the Reduced 
Defence Council.  
Badenhorst (Chief of Staff Intelligence from 1989 – 1991) discounted the possibility 
that Knobel would not have known what was going on in a project which he 
managed.74 Yet the nature of the reporting structures of Project Coast meant that 
Knobel could plausibly deny responsibility for certain aspects of the programme.  
Both managerial and financial control were poorly exercised over Basson and Project 
Coast. Evidence presented at the TRC and at the Basson trial by Knobel and project 
auditor, Pierre Theron, suggests that Basson’s word on financial matters was 
accepted as truth by his superior officers and indeed by the auditor. They imply that 
Basson was ultimately in control of all aspects of the Project and that the CMC and 
the financial auditors relied on him for their understanding of the programme. An 
inverted command system was in place.  
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Financial Management 
The secrecy of the programme and the steps taken to ensure that no aspect of the 
programme which could result in international embarassment, if revealed, could be 
traced back to the SADF ensured that Basson’s authority was never questioned. This 
was particularly true of the financial arrangements of the programme. Basson 
explained the process of financial control to the TRC in the following way:  
The basic process of financial control in the South African Defence Force 
and specifically Project Coast, worked as follows. Annually there was a 
budget meeting and during this budget meeting certain goals and 
objectives were approved and specific amounts of money were allocated 
to them.   After these amounts were allocated, the projects for the year 
were then further implemented.   When the money was needed for a 
specific goal, the CMC  or the financial management work group got 
together and if the amount was above a certain level, I can’t remember the 
level, then approval was once again given that this amount of money be 
spent.   Now if this amount had to be spent, General Knobel wrote an 
authorisation where he authorises the spending of the amount of money.   
If the spending of that money was authorised, then I could have taken that 
authorisation to the financial official of the project, and then he could get 
the funds to flow.   I had no signing authorisation, there was no way for me 
to control it.   If there were transfers to abroad, then we received 
authorisation from the South African Reserve Bank.   The CMC went to the 
South African Reserve Bank to explain to the officials why the money was 
needed, in broad terms of course with regards to the secrecy, and to make 
sure that it’s an official state transfer through the proper channels.   After 
this was done, the financial official then went back and the funds were 
then spent.    
Once again I’d like to say I did not have control over millions of dollars, I 
couldn’t pick up the phone and do transfers or arrange transfers, I couldn’t 
just phone people and give them codes, there was quite an integrated 
approval process.   I concede that at certain times when certain 
operational decisions were made quickly, I did have some discretion, but 
those discretions was (sic) not unapproved, and if I used my own 
discretion, it was approved de facto.75
Badenhorst explained the situation differently. He said that when he took over the 
position of Chief of Staff Intelligence in April 1989 he found that  Military Intelligence 
was responsible for controlling the budgets of secret projects. Military Intelligence 
paid the annual budgets for these projects  to the  project officers who would spend it 
at their discretion. In the case of Project Coast, millions of rand from the secret 
defence account were transferred to foreign bank accounts by a junior officer on the 
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strength of Knobel or Basson’s signatures.76 Instructions for transfers, Badenhorst 
said, contained no more information than an order to transfer a specific amount to a 
designated foreign bank account. There was no motivation for the expenditure and 
Military Intelligence could not control what happened to the funds after transfer.  
This was not acceptable to Badenhorst who introduced a system which required 
project officers to motivate all expenditure in detail for his authorisation. At the same 
time, the three members of the Auditor-General’s staff permanently allocated to 
Military Intelligence were given free access to all secret defence account 
expenditure. Full audits were to be conducted on all classified projects run by Military 
Intelligence.77 However, because Project Coast was a SAMS (South African Medical 
Services) project, Badenhorst was unable to enforce this system. Project Coast was 
untouchable. In 1989 he requested the Chief of the Defence Force, Jannie 
Geldenhuys, to transfer financial control of Project Coast to the Chief of Staff 
Finance. Badenhorst said he was not prepared to accept responsibility for 
expenditure when he had no way of knowing what happened to the money.78 In June 
1990 Geldenhuys instructed the Chief of Staff Finance to assume control of Project 
Coast’s budget, and Vice-Admiral Murray took over the problem when he assumed 
the position of Chief of Staff Finance in 1990. Interestingly, Badenhorst never 
attended a CMC meeting during his tenure at Military Intelligence, despite being an 
official member of the committee. He explained this by saying that he had been 
instructed to investigate the operations of the CCB and had been too busy to attend 
meetings.79  
When Murray took over he became aware of the ineffective management of Project 
Coast funds. On July 2, 1992, he wrote to Knobel seeking details of past expenditure. 
He was unhappy with the way Coast had been financially managed.  The Project 
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Coast files at the office of the Chief of Staff Finances did not contain any contracts for 
acquisitions by the CBW programme, whereas all contracts entered into on behalf of 
the SADF should have been signed by the Chief of Staff Finance. Murray’s 
department was expected to make payments for Project Coast’s contracts for which 
there were no record.  
Murray requested the contracts from Knobel,80 but received a response from Basson, 
listing outstanding contracts such as those for research and protective clothing and 
equipment. This did not satisfy Murray, who wanted the actual contracts, or at the 
very least, copies of them. He went back to the Surgeon General with his request, 
but still did not receive copies of any Project Coast contracts. Various excuses were 
offered such as: the contracts were locked up in a safe “somewhere”; the only person 
with access to the contracts was abroad; the contracts had been preserved in a safe 
place and were not readily available.81
Murray said it was clear to him that the correct procedures had not been followed 
regarding Coast expenditure. Again he wrote to Knobel, on September 24, 1992, 
demanding copies of the contracts and minutes of the CMC meetings at which the 
contracts were approved. By this time he had received a letter from the Auditor-
General’s office expressing concern over the project’s finances.82 Murray said none 
of Knobel’s responses were satisfactory.83 This led to a meeting, in 1992, at the 
Military Intelligence training college, during which Knobel was closely questioned by 
the Head of the SADF, the Chief of Staff Finances and the Chief of Staff 
Intelligence.84 Murray claims that by the time the meeting took place, no one involved 
in the control of SADF finances was satisfied with the way in which Project Coast had 
been managed. The Auditor-General’s office too had tried, and failed, to obtain 
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minutes of the CMC meetings. This raised the possibility that CMC minutes may have 
been destroyed to cover up mismanagement, or that the minutes did not exist at all. 
But, a letter to Murray from Knobel dated November 10, 1992, claimed that CMC 
minutes did exist. The letter, written by Basson, and signed by Knobel,  stated that 
the “CMC meets two or three times a year to approve the broad guidelines of the 
project in relation to the budget approved by the Chief of the SADF, Chief of Staff 
Finances and the Surgeon General.  There would thus be no point to perusing the 
CMC minutes”. Basson referred Murray to the project budget and the audit reports.85 
Basson claimed that the CMC did meet before 1992 and there were minutes to prove 
it. Yet it was impossible for anyone, even the Chief of Staff Finance, to get copies of 
these minutes. Whether the CMC did or did not meet in the years preceding 1992 
cannot be verified. It is possible that no such meetings were held, which would 
confirm that the SADF had handed de facto control of the Project to Basson alone.  
On the basis of evidence before the court during Basson’s trial, Badenhorst and 
Murrays’ fears about the lack of control were justified. Major Hercules Orffer, who 
served in Military Intelligence from 1987 to 1990, and who was responsible for 
making the foreign fund transfers on Basson’s orders, explained to the court how 
funds were moved in such a way that they could not be traced back to the SADF.86 
The process was as follows: Basson would call Orffer from his car phone and tell him 
he was on the way to Military Intelligence headquarters. Orffer would wait for Basson 
outside the Military Intelligence offices in Vermeulen Street, Pretoria. When Basson 
pulled up in his car, he would hand Orffer a brown envelope, and drive away.87 Inside 
the envelope Orffer would find the necessary instructions and authorisation for 
foreign transfers.  
Basson’s signature alone was sufficient to facilitate the transfer of millions - his bona 
fides was accepted by Military Intelligence without question, and no one, not even 
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General Knobel, was required to co-sign the request for fund transfers or confirm the 
usually sparse details of the purpose.88 This contradicts Basson’s testimony at the 
TRC hearing, quoted earlier in this chapter. All further arrangements were made by 
Military Intelligence through the Reserve Bank. Various accounts were used by 
Military Intelligence to launder funds. “Executive Services”, “Karko” and “Herpeco” 
were the most frequently used accounts, while other accounts such as “Global 
Capital Investments” and “Dynamic Services” were used less frequently.89 Orffer 
accepted the explanations for expenditure at face value because of the need-to-know 
principle, which again provided ample cover for poor control.  
Brigadier Hein Pfeil of Military Intelligence was responsible for the internal audits of 
the project. He served as internal auditor on secret projects with Military Intelligence 
from 1984 to 1988.90 He told the court that he reported verbally to General Knobel 
about once every three months on the matter of Project Coast finances. His reports 
were based on audits confined to the paperwork for transfer of project funds abroad. 
Like Orffer, Pfeil’s mandate was merely to ensure that the correct signatures were on 
the authorisation documents. He never knew what the reason for the expenditure 
was, beyond the vague and fairly general descriptions given on the fund transfer 
requests by the Project Officer. This process applied to all top secret projects, and 
was not unique to Project Coast. 
Pfeil never saw, nor did Military Intelligence receive, any proof of payment or invoices 
to show that the equipment ordered had been received. Once funds had been placed 
in foreign accounts, Military Intelligence had no further control over them. Since Pfeil 
never knew exactly what equipment was being purchased, or where it would be 
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deployed, there was no way he could check that the SADF received what it paid 
for.91
When questioned in court, Pfeil could not remember if he was ever requested by the 
SADF Inspector-General to submit a report on Project Coast finances. He was asked 
once by external auditor Pierre Theron to provide a reconciliation statement, but this 
showed only expenditure to date against annual budget. Pfeil also audited two of the 
front companies of Project Coast: Infladel and RRL and the CCB. In none of these 
audits was a physical stocktaking done. All that was checked was that the paperwork 
was in order, and that budgets were not exceeded. At Infladel, RRL and the CCB, he 
checked the cash book entries.92   
His reports to Knobel contained nothing more than assurances that Project Coast 
was operating within its budget in any given period. He did check that office 
equipment in the Infladel offices tallied with the SADF records. At RRL no stocktaking 
of scientific equipment or CBW agents was carried out.93 Although his job was to 
audit the Project Coast budget, Pfeil never saw a breakdown of the funds allocated 
from the secret defence account. He knew only the total figure.  The CMC; therefore, 
had no way of ensuring that Project Coast funds were spent as authorised, and none 
of them ever visited the front companies or verified that the equipment Basson 
bought actually existed. Knobel stated that he visited Delta G Scientific only once, on 
a Sunday, and he made only two after-hours visits to RRL.94 Basson’s word was the 
CMC’s only assurance that procurements had been made. The appointment of an 
internal and an external auditor made little difference. External auditor Petro Theron, 
appointed by the auditor-general, said he and Basson saw Knobel annually to assure 
him that everything regarding the project’s finances was in order. Internal audits were 
in the hands of D John Truter and later, at the suggestion of Chief of Staff Finance, 
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André Bezuidenhout.95 Theron confirmed in the Basson trial that during the course of 
his audits he never carried out a physical inspection of Project Coast facilities. He 
relied entirely on the documentation sometimes produced and kept by Basson or 
Military Intelligence, and on Basson’s word. Since the documents Theron was shown 
were signed by Knobel, he had no reason to doubt their veracity.  
Theron relied entirely upon Basson for the justification of expenditure. He told the 
court that in clandestine deals, the responsible project officer must be above 
reproach, since his word alone is usually all an auditor has to work with.96 Knobel 
testified that on one occasion97 when the SADF Inspector-General requested an 
independent audit of the Project Coast books, Basson advised the CMC that this was 
not a good idea, citing the possible security problems. The need-to-know principle 
prevailed. According to Knobel and Theron, therefore, the financial affairs of the 
project were in the hands of Basson alone.  
Knobel justified this by arguing that the international sanctions against South Africa 
during the 1980s, and the need for the project to procure equipment and substances,  
meant that extraordinary measures had to be taken to ensure that the origins of 
project funds in foreign accounts were not detected, otherwise banks could have 
frozen or seized the funds. Military Intelligence channels had to be protected. Knobel 
said that the CMC did not want to know which individuals or countries Basson dealt 
with, or what foreign bank accounts were used. The important thing was that foreign 
agents and suppliers were never to know the SADF was involved.98 Foreign 
intelligence services would have been able to make the link between a huge outflow 
of money from South Africa and a specific supplier, unless the deals were well 
disguised. Knobel acknowledged that the SADF, like the South African Police and 
other state departments, routinely used bank accounts in the names of friendly 
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foreign nationals for secret projects. He admitted that the entire procurement 
process, including the moving of funds, was largely left to Basson, provided he 
operated within the broad guidelines laid down by the CMC. In effect, Knobel 
admitted, Basson was told “here’s the project money, get us the results we want”. 
The end justified the means, and if this meant that Basson had to lie, steal, or bribe 
people, his measures were condoned by the SADF.99 The CMC appears to have laid 
down few guidelines. One exception was that Basson was not allowed to transport 
chemicals on commercial airlines because of the potential hazards.100  
The Judge in the Basson trial accepted Knobel’s assertions and found that,  
[T]he accused had to take decisions about procurement. The handling 
of threats to security were left up to him. The suppliers were not to know 
that they were delivering to the SADF. The SADF did also not want to 
know who the suppliers were. The CMC did not want to know the detail. 
The broad guidelines were the following. It did not concern the CMC 
what happened outside of South Africa. There was not allowed to be 
self-enrichment. A reasonable summary of the situation was: ‘We give 
the money. You bring the product. It does not matter where you get it. 
You can buy it on the black market, or through bribery, and if you must, 
you can steal it.”101
Security of Project Coast 
It would appear that the security measures of Coast were as ineffective as the 
financial accounting measures. Lieutenant-General Dirk Verbeek, SADF Chief of 
Staff Intelligence from October 1994 to June 1998, was the Chief Director: Counter-
Intelligence from January 1988 to the beginning of 1993. In this capacity, he was in 
charge of SADF and Armscor security, both physical and personnel clearance, as 
well as anti-espionage measures. 
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Verbeek testified during the Basson trial that Project Coast first came to his attention 
in 1987, when he was in charge of personnel clearance. Security, he said, was of 
prime concern to Project Coast, due to the danger of exposure through espionage.102 
Verbeek knew that Basson and Knobel were the key people in the project and knew 
about Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, Delta G Scientific, Medchem and 
Aeromed, but he was uncertain about the precise relationships of some of the 
companies associated with the project.  
Normally, clandestine SADF projects had a designated security officer or security 
working committee attached to them.103 If no front companies were involved, the 
security officer would be a serving SADF officer. When front companies were used, 
the security officer would assume a civilian identity. The nuclear weapon project had 
SADF security officers, while Verbeek said Coast was served in this capacity by 
Charl Jackson (specifically at RRL), Jan Marais and Johan Theron (all of whom first 
resigned from the SADF) - and by Carel Koen.104
A project security officer’s tasks included personnel clearance, access control, 
physical security of equipment and materials, correct classification and handling of 
documents, control over unauthorized copying of documents, travel and 
accommodation arrangements and advice on the best channels for payments that 
could not be traced back to the SADF. In order to carry out his tasks, a security 
officer had to know who was involved in deals and transactions conducted by the 
project, and would have to have access to all facets of the project. The need-to-know 
principle, as applied to the security officer, would demand that he needed to know 
everything about the project. Access to information by others would normally be 
determined by the project leader, the project officer and the security officer 
together.105 The Project Coast security officer should have known the names of all 
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decision-makers in the project, including directors of foreign companies through 
which project funds were channeled, details of all foreign bank accounts used for 
Coast funds, the signatories to such accounts, details of safe houses used by project 
employees, all companies linked to the project, and contact between the project 
officer and anyone else.106  
However, Johan Theron, senior intelligence officer for Project Coast, testified that he 
was denied access to any transaction conducted by Basson.107 Basson’s legal team 
countered Verbeek’s testimony saying it appeared that there was never a need for 
Verbeek to know the details of any Coast transactions, since the line functions were 
that the security officer reported to the Project Officer, who reported to the project 
leader, who reported direct to the SADF Chief.108 Because the security officer 
reported to the project officer, the usefulness of his appointment as a check on the 
Project Officer was negated. This apparently left the way clear for Basson to conduct 
business as he chose. 
Project Coast thus appeared to evade both the normal financial accounting systems 
of the Defence Force as well as the standard security checks which secret projects 
should have been subjected to. It is unlikely that Basson alone would have been able 
to manipulate the structures in this way. It is more likely that there was agreement 
from his superiors, including the Minister of Defence, who was ultimately responsible 
for the financial accounting of the project, that Coast should operate with minimum 
checks and balances. It is probable that the intention was to ensure plausible 
deniability for those in positions of authority, including the Surgeon General, the Chief 
of the Defence Force, the Minister of Defence, and the State President. 
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The phases of Project Coast’s development  
After approval of the chemical and biological warfare programme by the Minister of 
Defence in 1981, Basson began recruiting scientists to lead the front companies. 
According to one of the first scientists to be recruited to Delta G Scientific, work at the 
front company started as early as 1982 from laboratories at Special Forces 
Headquarters.109 The earliest document from Roodeplaat Research Laboratories is 
dated November 1983. It is a list of income and expenditure which shows that the 
company was in the process of being established. Minutes of directors meetings in 
1984 reveal that the recruitment of staff was underway.110  
Both companies expanded and developed throughout the mid-80s under the 
leadership of veterinarian Dr Daan Goosen at RRL and former chemistry lecturer Dr 
Willie Basson, at Delta G Scientific.  Both companies underwent changes between 
1987 and 1988 when their managing directors were replaced by former Special 
Forces colleagues of Basson. Special Forces dentist and hospital administrator, Dr 
Wynand Swanepoel, took over as Managing Director of RRL, and a medical doctor, 
Philip Mijburgh, replaced Willie Basson as Managing Director of Delta G Scientific. 
The timing of the change in leadership is significant since the period March 1988 – 
April 1990 was the “commercialisation phase” of the programme.111 Both men were 
close associates of Basson and had interests in companies that provided services to 
Project Coast. Both were to benefit financially from the privatization of the 
companies. 
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Official Project Coast documents112 (written towards the end of the programme) set 
out the phases of the programme as follows: 
Phase 1: the Establishment Phase (April 1982 – March 1988). 
During this phase the front companies and production facilities: Delta G Scientific, 
Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and Infladel were established. Also during this 
period some 20 tons of CR were produced by Delta G Scientific of which 10 tons 
were used by the army and the South African Police for weapon production.113
Phase 2: The Commercialisation Phase (March 1988 – April 1990) 
During this phase representations were made to the CMC regarding the privatisation 
of the front companies. After this the front companies were prepared for privatisation. 
The companies’ balance sheets were restructured to create manageable commercial 
packages. This is said to have been completed by September 1988.114 During this 
period RRL was producing a range of assassination weapons.115 It was also during 
this period that the defensive component of the CBW project was moved to fall under 
Armscor’s authority.  
Phase 3: The Privatisation Phase (April 1990 – September 1991) 
This phase saw the cancellation of all research contracts with the two front 
companies. From August 1991 the companies were ‘sold’ to the management and 
workers. In September 1991 a submission regarding the privatisation was made to 
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the parliamentary committee which dealt with all sensitive state projects. The 
Committee included Finance Minister, Barend du Plessis; Minister of Justice, Kobie 
Coetzee; Minister of Trade and Tourism, Dawie de Villiers; and Minister of 
Constitutional Development, Gerrit Viljoen.116 Military analysts Willem Steenkamp 
and Paul Grobbelaar claimed that this committee was unlikely to have been much 
more than window dressing because the people involved in the committee were not 
close to PW Botha and it was unlikely that Botha would have allowed them to make 
important decisions.117  
Phase 4: The Normalisation Phase (September 1991 – 1993) 
This phase saw the completion of the production of two “new crowd control 
incapacitants” which were in fact MDMA and methaqualone. After privatisation Delta 
G Scientific produced almost a ton of MDMA, and continued work on the 
weaponisation of CR. South Africa signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 14 
January 1993. 
Project Coast was officially closed at a meeting of the Cordinating Management 
Committee in January 1995.118  
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Table 2 Membership of the CMC and Reduced Defence Command Council119
Structure Date Member’s name Designation 
Reduced 
Defence 
Council 
25 October 
1990 
Lieutenant General AJ 
(Kat) Liebenberg 
Chief Defence Staff 
  Vice-Admiral MA 
Bekker 
Chief of Staff Finance 
  Lieutenant General 
DP Knobel 
Surgeon General 
  Lieutenant General GL 
Meiring 
Chief of the Army 
  Lieutenant General 
KM Pickersgill 
Chief of Staff Army 
  Lieutenant General 
AJS van der Lith 
Chief of Staff Planning 
  Vice-Admiral P Murray Deputy Chief of Staff Finance 
  Major General PD 
Steyn  
Deputy Chief of Staff 
Operations 
  Brigadier W Basson Project Officer: Coast 
  Colonel D Metaxas Project Officer: Keyboard (the 
project to arm the ammunition 
with CR)120  
  Brigadier WA Kempen 
(Secretary) 
Department of Planning 
Co-ordinating 
Management 
Committee 
29 January 
1993 
General AJ (Kat) 
Liebenberg 
Chief of the Defence Force 
  Lieutenant General G 
Meiring 
Chief of the Army 
  Lieutenant General Chief of the Airforce 
                                                
119 This information is derived from selected minutes of meetings of the CMC. The dates provided 
correspond with dates of the meetings: “Verkleinde Verdedigingsbevelraad: Notule van Vergadering 
gehou om 07h30 op 25 Oktober 1990 te Samik”, SADF documents HS Plan/DP/302/6/COAST and HS 
PLAN/Dp/302/6/KEYBOARD. “Notule van die vergadering van die Beheerkomitee van Projek  Jota 
gehou op 31 Maart 1993 in die HF Verwoerdgebou, Kaapstad”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5. 
“Notule van 'n Spesiale KBK Vergadering wat gehou is op 2 Desember 1994 in die kantoor van HNW”, 
SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J1282. “Notule van die Beheerkomitee van Projek Jota wat gehou is op 
29 Maart 1994 by die Kantoor van HSAW”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J1282. “Notule van die 
vergadering van die Beheerkomitee van Projek Jota gehou op 24 Januarie 1994 in die kantoor van 
HSAW”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J282. “Notule van die vergadering van die Beheerkomitee van 
Projek Jota wat gehou is op 9 Januarie 1995 by die Kantoor van HNW”, SADF document 
G/UG/302/6/J1282. “Notule van die vergadering van die beheerkomitee van Projek Jota gehou op 29 
Jan 1993 in die HF Verwoerd gebou, Kaapstad’, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5. 
120 Testimony of Floris Laubscher in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, Transvaal 
Division, 7 June 2000.  
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James Kriel 
  Lieutenant General 
DP Knobel 
Surgeon General 
  Brigadier G Sonnekus Personal Staff Officer to the 
Chief of the Defence Force 
  Brigadier W Basson Outgoing Project Officer 
  Colonel BP Steyn Newly appointed Project Officer 
    
Co-ordinating 
Management 
Committee 
31 March 
1993 
General AJ (Kat) 
Liebenberg 
Chief of the Defence Force 
  Lieutenant General 
DP Knobel 
Surgeon General 
  Vice-Admiral A 
Malherbe 
Chief of Staff of the Army 
  Vice-Admiral P Murray Chief of Staff Finances 
  Major General 
Hamman 
Deputy Chief of the Army 
  Major General Dirk 
Verbeek 
Head of Department Counter 
Intelligence 
  Brigadier G Sonnekus Personal Staff Officer to the 
Chief of the Defence Force 
  Brigadier W  Basson Outgoing Project Officer 
  Mr W van Heerden Representative of the Auditor 
General 
  Colonel BP Steyn 
(secretary) 
Present project Officer 
Co-ordinating 
Management 
Committee 
24 January 
1994 
General GL Meiring Chief of the Defence Force 
  Lieutenant General 
Pretorius 
Chief of the Army 
  Lieutenant General 
DP Knobel 
Surgeon General 
  Vice-Admiral A 
Malherbe 
Chief of Staff Army 
  Lieutenant General B 
Raubenheimer 
Chief of Staff Finances 
  Mr W Van Heerden Representative of the Auditor 
General 
  Colonel BP Steyn Project Officer 
Co-ordinating 
Management 
Committee 
29 March 
1994 
General GL Meiring Chief of the Defence Force 
  Lieutenant General 
DP Knobel 
Surgeon General 
  Vice-Admiral A 
Malherbe 
Chief of Staff of the Army 
  Lieutenant General B 
Raubenheimer 
Chief of Staff Finances 
  General Maj Verbeek Acting Chief of Staff Intelligence
  Colonel BP Steyn Project Officer 
Co-ordinating 
Management 
Committee 
2 December 
1994 
General GL Meiring Chief of the National Defence 
Force 
  Lieutenant General 
DP Knobel 
Surgeon General 
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  Lieutenant General D 
Verbeek 
Chief of Staff Intelligence 
  General Maj CL 
Bröcker 
Acting Chief of Staff Finance 
  Brigadier GJ Coertzen Department of Finances 
  Brigadier W Basson No designation 
  Colonel BP Steyn Project Officer 
Co-ordinating 
Management 
Committee 
9 January 
1995 
General GL Meiring Chief of the National Defence 
Force 
  Lieutenant General 
DP Knobel 
Surgeon General 
  Vice-Admiral A 
Malherbe 
Chief of Staff Army 
  Lieutenant General B 
Raubenheimer 
Chief of Staff Finances 
  Major General 
Erasmus 
Deputy Chief of Staff 
Intelligence 
  Brigadier W Basson No designation 
  Colonel BP Steyn Project Officer, Project Jota (by 
this time Coast was referred to 
as Jota) 
 
100 
CHAPTER 4 
The operation of Project Coast 
Introduction 
Like the programmes of the Soviet Union, Iraq, Iran and Libya, the South African 
programme was run through companies which on the surface appeared to be civilian 
research and production facilities, while in fact their central purpose was to research, 
develop and produce chemical and biological warfare agents and weapons for the 
military. Also like the CBW programmes of other countries the suitability of biological 
and chemical weapons for covert military operations resulted in their development for 
use by intelligence agencies and special forces.1 In the case of South Africa this 
meant that there was a close relationship between the covert operational units of the 
police and military, and the chemical and biological warfare programme. The need for 
secrecy meant that this relationship was clear only to a few individuals and a handful 
of senior managers.  
While the most obvious advantage of utilising front companies was that they hid the 
military’s involvement in chemical and biological warfare and prevented detection of 
the programme, they offered additional advantages. Front companies were able to 
procure equipment and substances more easily than official military structures, an 
appealing feature in the light of economic sanctions against South Africa. The use of 
front companies also allowed the scientists access to the international scientific 
community2 and scientists could be attracted by the higher salaries offered at these 
institutions; salaries which were far higher than could have been offered to military 
personnel within the strict military hierarchy. Koblentz has argued that the inherent 
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dual-use nature of biotechnology makes for the easy concealment of military 
programmes in apparently civilian companies.3 This certainly was the case with 
regard to Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, the biological warfare facility. The 
Soviet Union made use of apparently civilian companies for the conduct of their 
biological warfare programme for much the same reasons. Former deputy director of 
Biopreparat, the Soviet BW research institute argued that, “[O]sensibly operating as a 
civilian pharmaceutical enterprise, the agency could engage in genetic research 
without arousing suspicion. It could participate in international conferences, interact 
with the world scientific community, and obtain disease strains from foreign microbe 
banks – all activities which would have been impossible for a military laboratory.”4
The focus of the military work at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) was on 
the production and development of biological weapons for use in covert operations. 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, scientists at RRL sought to identify and 
develop chemical and biological substances which could be used to kill individuals 
while leaving no trace. In this regard, as noted by Koblentz, the South African 
programme was typical in that almost all biological warfare programmes have had an 
association with intelligence agencies and other organisations interested in 
clandestine means of assassination and sabotage. Japan used biological weapons 
against Chinese forces for the purpose of sabotage or counterinsurgency. The Iraqi 
biological weapon programme was started in the 1970s by the intelligence service for 
the development of clandestine weapons for use against internal enemies. The 
Soviet biological weapons programme was initially administered by the internal 
security services which retained an interest in developing biological and toxin agents 
for assassination purposes, and the CIA was both a sponsor and customer of 
American biological weapons research. In addition, most of the biological munitions 
stockpiled by the United States in 1969 were designed for use by the Army’s special 
forces behind enemy lines.5
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This chapter describes the establishment of both the officially approved front 
companies of Project Coast, and the private companies which were established to 
provide services to the programme. It considers the process of recruitment of 
scientists to the companies and their motivations for joining. The effects of secrecy 
on the quality of the work conducted and on the generation of a moral economy 
which allowed the scientists to justify unethical behaviour, are considered and 
described. The chapter also reveals the nature of the relationship between the CBW 
programme and the covert units of the police and military and the use to which 
chemical and biological agents and weapons were put by these units. 
Getting down to business 
Front companies had to be authorised by the Minister of Defence. In the case of 
Project Coast the Minister approved the formation of three companies: Delta G 
Scientific, the chemical warfare facility; Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, the 
biological warfare facility and evaluation and testing facility for the chemical agents 
produced at Delta G Scientific; and Infladel6, the administrative and finance 
company. 
Initially Delta G Scientific and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories were the only two 
facilities where research and production of chemical and biological agents was 
carried out. Later the private company, Protechnik would produce small amounts of 
agents to test protective clothing. Infladel, was responsible for the technical 
information system,7 operational coordination of the programme, and the security 
and safety systems of the other two companies. This company was used to channel 
funds from the SADF’s Secret Defence Fund to RRL and Delta G Scientific. In 1990 
Infladel ceased to exist and its tasks were assumed by Sefmed Information Services, 
which served until 1994 as the information front of the project. The financial and 
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administrative aspects of Infladel’s work after 1990 were contracted out to D John 
Truter Financial Consultants8 and two other companies were formed to own the 
properties where Delta G Scientific and RRL were situated.9.
Although Delta G, RRL and Infladel were the only official front companies of the 
project, a number of other “private” companies were associated with the programme. 
Knobel outlined the relationship of the official front companies and these other 
companies as follows: Delta G’s task was offensive chemical research, while RRL 
was responsible for the defensive biological programme. Tests were carried out on 
their behalf by a “private company”, Protechnik Laboratories. Another “private” 
company, Lifestyle Management, was contracted to do the physiological research.10 
Another company, Technotek, was contracted in 1986 to do research to find suitable 
protective clothing materials. The SADF was, therefore, the chief client of Protechnik, 
Lifestyle Management and Technotek.  While these companies relied on SADF 
contracts for their existence, they were not official front companies authorised by the 
Co-ordinating Management Committee.11  Most of the men who came to hold senior 
positions in these companies started as members of the Special Operations Unit, 
which provided medical assistance to Special Forces operators and of which Basson 
was the Commanding Officer. While this arrangement ensured that knowledge of the 
programme (both offensive and defensive) remained within a small group of like-
minded individuals, it also meant that close associates of Basson benefited 
financially from the programme. Self-enrichment was to become the defining feature 
of the programme towards the end.  
Dr Hennie Jordaan, a senior organic chemist at Delta G Scientific, told me that on a 
visit to the home of Philip Mijburgh, a member of this unit who was later appointed 
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Managing Director of Delta G,12 he was struck by a photograph on the wall. Pictured 
is a group of macho young men posing in two rows in the style of a team photograph 
in the setting of an army camp. The men are bare-chested, wear army boots and 
boxer shorts and most are holding heavy firearms. All were linked to Project Coast: 
Wouter Basson, Philip Mijburgh, Wynand Swanepoel, Jan Lourens and others - all 
had gone on to run the front companies of Project Coast or the companies which 
relied solely, or partly, on lucrative military contracts for their existence.13 Since 
Basson had been given the single authority to recruit all Project Coast staff and to 
ensure that the programme was operational he had the freedom to appoint his close 
associates and friends to positions where they (and he) could benefit from the 
programme.  
Jan Lourens who applied to the TRC for amnesty for his involvement in Project Coast 
had a unique position in the system. He was Project Manager responsible for 
overseeing the construction of the Delta G research and production facility in Midrand 
and he interacted with RRL scientists and provided them with specialised equipment. 
He was also successively the Managing Director of three service companies of 
Coast: Systems Research and Design (SRD), Protechnik and Hazmat. Lourens also 
oversaw the manufacture of highly specialized assassination weapons. For the first 
five years he had a very close relationship with Mijburgh and Basson and was 
married to Antoinette Lourens, the librarian at Infladel. This close relationship meant 
that he was one of the few people who had knowledge of most parts of the project.  
After completing a BSc Engineering in Physical Metallurgy at the University of the 
Witwatersrand in 1982/3 Lourens joined the Air Force and was based at 1 Air Depot, 
in the Chemical and Metallurgical Laboratories. These laboratories serviced the 
manufacturing department of the Air Force; Lourens’s activities focussed on the 
testing of fuels and metals. During this time he completed an MSc in Industrial 
Engineering. Whilst working for the Air Force, he was approached by Philip Mijburgh, 
an old school friend, and now a member of the Special Operations unit for assistance 
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with a pistol modification, and Lourens obliged. Mijburgh suggested to Lourens that 
he join Special Forces and at the same time further his studies in Biomedical 
Engineering. About a month after being approached by Mijburgh, Lourens met 
Wouter Basson, Mijburgh’s commanding officer. Basson offered Lourens a position 
at Special Operations which included a programme for him to finish his studies.14  
The Special Operations Unit which later became known as 7 Medical Battalion was a 
structure in which rank was not tied to salary or levels of responsibility. Seldom, 
unless operationally deployed, were the members of the unit required to wear 
uniforms. According to Lourens, Special Operations’ conventional functions — to act 
as medical back-up to special forces operatives — melted into other functions. 
Lourens’ role in the unit was to provide technical support to the doctors of Special 
Operations. He was responsible, for example, for modifiying firearms to include 
special features, such as a gun with a fold-away barrel that could fit easily into a 
doctor’s bag, or silencers for pistols. As Lourens’s relationship with Basson 
developed, these skills were extended to the production of covert chemical and 
biological assassination weapons.15 From his position at Special Operations Lourens 
moved on to successively own two companies closely linked to Project Coast. His 
colleagues in Special Operations also moved into positions of influence. Mijiburgh 
was to become Managing Director of Delta G Scientific (and a number of other 
companies established by himself and Basson), Wynand Swanepoel became 
Managing Director of RRL and Brian Davey was set up by Basson as owner of 
Lifesyle Management.  
Establishment of Delta G Scientific 
When Wouter Basson was tasked with recruiting a scientist to establish and direct 
Delta G Scientific he approached the most obvious candidate – the head of the 
Chemistry Department at his alma mater, the University of Pretoria – Professor Willie 
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Basson.16 According to Willie Basson, Wouter spoke “vaguely” about the threat of 
chemical weapons being used against South Africans and claimed that chemical 
stockpiles had been found in Mozambique and Angola.17 The two men held several 
meetings after which Wouter asked the academic to develop a proposal to establish 
a chemical defence facility. Soon afterwards the Surgeon General, Dr Nico 
Nieuwoudt, approached the Rector of Pretoria University and asked his permission 
for Basson to conduct the work required. Permission was granted and soon Basson 
had three young scientists working with him in developing a model for a chemical 
defence unit, and a brief to recruit more. Initially Basson remained at the University of 
Pretoria while some of the scientists worked from basic laboratories at Special 
Forces Headquarters in Pretoria where a process was developed for the manufacture 
of the tear gas CR and a decontaminant. From April to September 1982 the facility 
moved to a house in Brooklyn near to the university whereafter offices were rented in 
an office block in a Pretoria suburb called Val de Grace.18 When Lourens joined the 
unit in 1983 he shared a laboratory with Delta G staff. He assisted in the 
development of plans for an up-graded research and production facility and oversaw 
its construction. In early 1985 the new facility, situated at Midrand, between Pretoria 
and Johannesburg, was ready. A substantially larger Delta G moved into its new 
premises.19
In the early stages of Delta G’s existence Willie Basson had monthly meetings with 
Wouter and the Surgeon General to discuss the direction and intention of research 
and development at the company. However, a few years into the process Willie 
Basson became uncomfortable with the situation he found himself in. He had lost 
contact with the Surgeon General, whom he had admired, and experienced a change 
of attitude in Wouter.20 In 1985 work that Willie Basson had been conducting for a 
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private company, Protea chemicals, throughout his time as head of Delta G and of 
which he had informed Wouter, became the basis for an apparently trumped-up 
allegation of fraud.21 Willie Basson left the company and claimed later that he had 
had misgivings about the direction which the programme was taking for some time 
before he left but, did not say why.22 Basson was immediately replaced by Philip 
Mijburgh, a close friend and associate of Wouter Basson and nephew of the Minister 
of Defence, Magnus Malan. This process was to be repeated at RRL with the 
replacement of Dr Daan Goosen by Special Operations Unit member and Basson-
associate, Dr Wynand Swanepoel in 1986. By the end of 1985 most of the Delta G 
staff were based at the substantial Midrand factory with its four laboratories and three 
production plants.  
Chemical Production at Delta G Scientific 
The SADF’s philosophy with regard to chemical and biological warfare included the 
“right to reactively use non-lethal chemical warfare”, the “integration of chemical 
warfare into all conventional actions”, and “the acceptance of the use of chemical 
warfare on a pro-active basis to ensure the survival of the state, for example, in 
controlling the massive violence in the current revolutionary situation.” 23  Indeed the 
objectives of the programme make it clear that military operations were envisaged 
which would have included the use of chemical weapons agents inside the country.24 
The search for chemical agents which could effectively be used against crowds 
began as early as 1976. Both former South African Police Forensics chief, General 
Lothar Neethling and former Chief of the Defence Force, General Constand Viljoen, 
stressed the interest in finding agents that would calm a crowd. Neethling explained 
to the Truth Commission that, 
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When the riots started in 1976, the South African Police were caught 
unawares.  They had nothing apart from guns, shotguns, and sharp point 
ammunition.  Nobody wanted to use that and that's why there was a surge 
for various techniques to be applied …I went overseas three times to 
Germany, England, Israel, America to find the best techniques available.25
Despite the early interest in the development of such agents it was only 3 years later, 
after the establishment of Project Coast that any serious attempts were made to find 
alternatives to traditional CS gas which was produced in South Africa and used by 
Swartklip products to fill munitions. In 1983 the Commissioner of Police, General 
Johan Coetzee; the Surgeon General, General Nico Nieuwoudt; and, the Minister of 
Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, held a meeting to which they invited Neethling. The 
meeting determined that Neetling was to assist Basson by providing him with drugs 
confiscated by the SAP’s Narcotics Bureau to be used for research purposes by 
Delta G Scientific. Neethling explained that they were of the view that “under certain 
circumstances one could provide or use sleeping drugs which could possibly 
decrease the anger of the crowds so that the principle of minimum violence could be 
used maximally.”26 Three conventional street drugs were identified for further 
research with a view to using them in this way, drugs that Neethling, as head of the 
police Forensic Laboratory would have had easy access to: methaqualone, lysergic 
acid (LSD) and cannabis. It is interesting to note that whilst other drugs such as 
valium and dystopian were available, only these three street drugs were identified for 
possible conversion into chemical weapons agents.  
Dr. Klaus Psotta a conscript who was assigned to work with Neethling and who later 
was employed at both RRL and Delta G Scientific, was instructed to extract the 
active ingredient from bags of cannabis provided by Neethling. Psotta was supposed 
to find a formulation of cannabis that could be used in grenades or as a powder. His 
work was taken over by organic chemist, Dr Johan Koekemoer and fellow scientist, 
Rl Thompson who proposed the synthesis of cannabis analogues in 1989.27 Some 
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experiments were even done on the combination of cannabis and methaqualone, a 
mix which was common on the streets. Despite the work done on cannabinoids at 
Delta G Scientific in the six years between 1983 and 1989, by the closure of the 
programme in 1993 no cannabinoid formulation had been produced for 
weaponization.  
Confiscated mandrax tablets were also made available to Delta G Scientific 
researchers. According to Neethling, the research established that methaqualone 
was inefficient in a pyrotechnic formulation. Nevertheless, methaqualone was 
weaponized and in 1987, the Surgeon General authorised tests to determine the 
possibility of using methaqualone as a crowd control agent. Knobel told the TRC 
hearing that although he was not Surgeon General in 1987 (having only taken up that 
position in March 1988) he believed that volunteers from Special Forces and 7 
Medical battalion took part simulation exercises: “in which they tested these few 
mortars to see what the effect would be on humans within battle conditions.“28 It was 
found that those exposed to the substance in the field experienced swelling, stress 
and severe tension, the substance took a long time to be effective and had little if any 
effect on the test subjects. This, claimed Knobel, led to a search for more effective 
analogues,29 rather than the abandonment of this particular project. 
Despite its drawbacks as a crowd control agent, Delta G Scientific manufactured at 
least 1000kg of methaqualone, and production reports indicate that the manufacture 
of methaqualone was still taking place in August 198830 although Knobel was 
convinced that Delta G was producing superior analogues at this time, under 
authorisation by the Co-ordinating Management Committee. The raw materials for 
this purpose were imported by the procurement front company, Organochem. 
Interviews conducted with employees of Delta G indicate that the recipe for the 
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methaqualone was handed to them by the Managing Director of Delta G, Dr. Philip 
Mijburgh.  
Doubts remain about whether methaqualone was only intended for use as a crowd 
control agent since evidence emerged in the TRC investigation and subsequently in 
the Basson trial that the methaqualone was made into tablets. The further particulars 
to the charges against Basson refer to Basson having ordered Steven Beukes (a 
young pharamacist who was doing his national service) to establish a pill 
manufacturing plant at the Head Quarters of Special Forces at Speskop, near 
Pretoria, in 1985. The prosecutors alleged that Basson gave Beukes the money to 
purchase the necessary equipment for the manufacture and packaging of the tablets. 
Basson also gave Beukes the substance from which the tablets were to be 
manufactured and a stamp that would mark the tablets with an MX on the one side 
and RL on the other (for Roussel Laboratories, legal manufacturers of Mandrax). 
Once the tablets had been manufactured they were handed back to Basson. 
According to the document this took place over a period of 3 months during 1985.31 
Beukes’s testimony during the trial confirmed these allegations.32 Basson’s defence 
counsel, on the other hand, claimed that it was possible that Beukes had 
manufactured placebos for use by Special Forces to infiltrate ANC trading routes. 
Other evidence suggests that the purpose of producing the tablets was bribery or 
self-enrichment. Former Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) Counter Intelligence head, 
Danie Phaal, claimed that almost two years after the disbanding of the covert unit, in 
1992, Basson offered him 100 000 mandrax tablets to sell for personal gain.33 Also in 
1992 Basson was tasked by the CMC to purchase 500kg of methaqualone, from 
Croatia. Knobel told the TRC that the reason for this purchase was that the 
substance that could be obtained from this source was purer than could be 
manufactured in South Africa.  This deal is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  
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The reason for the production of the methaqualone tablets will remain a matter of 
speculation. There are at least three plausible explanations: the sale of the mandrax 
tablets could have generated funds for covert operations or for personal gain; the 
tablets could have been infiltrated into ANC trade routes to compromise ANC 
members and so to win them over as sources for the security forces; or a third, and 
far more sinister possibility is that these tablets could have been used to undermine 
communities, particularly in the Western Cape where mandrax addiction is common.  
The production of MDMA at Delta G raises just as many questions. On 30 July 1992, 
Dr. Philip Mijburgh, Managing Director of Delta G Scientific, wrote a letter to Basson 
in which he quoted for the production of 1000kg of MDMA (also known as the rave 
drug ecstasy). The total cost of the production was quoted as being R840 000. The 
letter states that the delivery of the product could take place some 6–8 weeks after 
production.34 About a week later the Surgeon General confirmed the order in writing 
and provided Mijburgh with provisional immunity against prosecution for the 
production of the drug.35  Between February 1992 and January 1993 Ecstasy was 
produced at Delta G Scientific under the code-name  BAXIL36 or ADAM. While the 
SADF, and the Surgeon General consistently claimed that the MDMA produced at 
Delta G was intended for use as a crowd control agent, the organic chemist tasked 
with its manufacture, Dr. Johan Koekemoer, doubted its efficacy for this purpose and 
was concerned that there were other motives behind its production. Ultimately 912kg 
of 90-95,5% pure MDMA in crystalline form was produced by the end of the 
programme. The MDMA was made in Plant 3 at the Midrand Delta G factory and 
after production was packed into plastic bags in white metal drums – between 30 and 
40kg per drum – which were double sealed. Koekemoer was instructed by Basson to 
personally deliver the drums to a basement room below the offices of Medchem 
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Consolidated Investments37 in Centurion.38 From there, at least a portion of the 
amount produced was taken to pharmacist Steven Beukes for encapsulation. Beukes 
estimated that in total, he made one million capsules on Basson's orders, some of 
which were confiscated by the police during a raid on Delta G in 1997.39  
On the 9 November 1992, Basson wrote a letter which was signed by Knobel stating 
that the SADF had 1000kg of product B (BZ); 500kg of product M (methaqualone) 
and 30kg of product C (cocaine) in its stores and that these products would be used 
during the 1993/4 financial year. According to a briefing document prepared for the 
Minister of Defence in 1993,40 1000kg of a locally produced BZ varient was 
manufactured and intended for weaponisation in that year. Basson’s defence counsel 
stated in court that large quantities of BZ (between 3 and 4 tons) were purchased as 
a precursor to the Croatian methaqualone deal in 1992 (see Chapter 5 for further 
details). Knobel seems to have understood the BZ and other incapacitating agents 
would be used for crowd control purposes in the run-up to the first democratic 
election in 1994. He told the TRC,   
We were involved in - or we were very much aware of mass action and riot 
control and emergency situations which were declared by the President, 
and the emphasis then turned to what we called "dual use" chemical 
agents. CR was already available as an outstanding anti-riot agent, but 
also as an alternative to a retaliatory agent which could be used on the 
battlefield. The battlefield threat was diminishing, the riot situation was 
increasing. That is why the emphasis fell onto the incapacitating agents 
and the four varieties that were investigated. 41
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The four varieties mentioned included an irritant in the form of CR and three 
incapacitating agents: BZ, a methaqualone derivative and a MDMA.42
CR, manufacture, weaponization and use 
Interviews with scientists from Delta G Scientific indicate that research work and 
small-scale production of CR began in the early 1980s in the laboratories at Special 
Forces Headquarters. However, it was only in 1986, after the establishment of the 
Delta G Scientific production facility in Midrand that the process for the large-scale 
production of a “new generation tear gas” (NGT) was developed. Weaponisation of 
the NGT began in the same year.43 Biochemist and former Delta G employee, Jan 
van Jaarsveld, said that at the height of production, Delta G supplied Basson with a 
ton of CR on a monthly basis.44 By 1989 20 tons of CR had been produced of which 
10 tons had been used by the army and the SAP for weapon production.45  
Gerald Cadwell was a long-serving employee of Project Coast having joined Delta G 
Scientific in 1983. Although he had spent his working life as a chemist, he had no 
formal qualifications in this field. His function in the company was to develop scale-up 
processes for products developed in the laboratories.46 His first task was to produce 
the new generation teargas. The project was given the code FP003. Hennie Jordaan 
described this early attempt at CR production as “a horror show” for its 
incompetence. After an accident in which a 50-litre flask cracked, spilling CR over the 
floor of the Val de Grace offices, Delta G management realised the laboratory used 
by Cadwell was too small for the task. The project moved to a laboratory at the 
Special Forces Headquarters, Speskop. After a second accident the project moved to 
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its own laboratory building, known as the Pilot Plant, which was connected to the 
main Speskop building by a tunnel. In December 1984, during the clean-up of the 
second CR accident, a fire broke out in the laboratory adding urgency to the need to 
move the operation.  
In addition to the conventional production of CR in powder form, Basson instructed 
Cadwell to dissolve CR in methanol. A “couple of hundred” litres of which were 
prepared for testing. By the time the entire operation had moved to Delta G 
Scientific’s Midrand plant in August 1985, Cadwell estimated that only about 50kg of 
CR had been produced.47 Once in the Midrand facility the production rate increased 
dramatically. Cadwell estimated that 24 tons of CR was manufactured between mid-
1985 and late 1986/early 1987 for which both a 250-litre reactor and a 1 000-litre 
reactor were used.48 The production of CR continued, even after the privatisation of 
the company. According to Jordaan, one of the post-1991 Delta G research contracts 
was for the synthesis of analogues of CR. One of the variations (a compound which 
had a pyridine moiety in place of one of the benzene rings of FP003) caused severe 
blisters on the skin. Jordaan said he was sure that this compound was never made 
on a large (kilogram) scale at Delta G.49  
The idea of making a binary50 dibenzoxazepine was discussed informally between 
researchers Gert Lourens, Johan Koekemoer and Jordaan, but was never 
demonstrated on any practical scale. Jordaan was adamant in interviews that any 
claim that substances other than CR were developed to the stage of weaponization 
had no basis in fact.51 Basson, on the other hand, claimed repeatedly throughout his 
trial that the weaponisation process developed to the point that there were prototypes 
of weapons filled with methaqualone and weapons filled with a mixture of a BZ 
116
                                                
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Electronic communication between Hennie Jordaan and Chandré Gould on 12  March 2001.  
50 CR which would be produced through the mixing of two chemical compounds in a munition. 
51 Ibid. 
 
variant and cocaine.52  This raised the question of whether facilities, other than Delta 
G, could have been used to fill munitions with chemical agents, a question which 
remains unanswered as it has proved impossible to independently verify Basson’s 
claim.  
Floris Laubscher, a qualified chemist, physicist and 22-year veteran of pyrotechnic 
projects at Denel subsidiary, Swartklip Products, was in charge of CR weaponisation 
from 1987 to 1994. According to Laubscher, Armscor supplied Swartklip with CR 
powder to load into 11 966 hand grenades, rifle grenades, 81mm mortar bombs and 
1 373 155mm G5 projectiles. The powder was transported from 91 Ammunition 
Depot at Naboomspruit in the Northern Province to Swartklip's factory at Phillippi on 
the Cape Flats at regular intervals. Hand and rifle grenades were routinely filled by 
Swartklip and the CR weapons were created from their own stock. The mortar shells 
were provided by Armscor and 155mm projectiles normally loaded with smoke by 
Swartklip were used.53 The project to arm the ammunition with CR was variously 
referred to as Newly, Keyboard and Cargo.54
Whilst the hand grenades and small calibre ammunition may have been intended for 
use by security forces for crowd control, the arming of G5 ammunition clearly 
indicates an intention to use the agent in conventional warfare. The 155mm 
projectiles would have a range of up to 40km. Basson has claimed that 120mm 
mortars filled with CR were authorised for shipment to UNITA on the instruction of 
General AJ (Kat) Liebenberg.55 Again, this has proved extremely difficult to 
independently verify. 
The CR was regarded by the military as South Africa’s most effective weapon against 
mass action. In 1993 Knobel told the Minister of Defence that if South Africa were to 
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declare its stocks of CR immediately after the signing of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), in January of that year, “those responsible for mass action would 
have the opportunity to get tips about defences against the NGT from their 
international advisors”, if defences were obtained “the most effective weapons which 
the SA Army possesses to handle internal unrest could be neutralised.”56 The 
military’s intention to keep the CR a secret and, therefore, to prevent affected people 
from knowing what agents were used against them, was a clear violation of human 
rights. Perhaps even worse was the intention to use incapacitating agents in the 
same way. Knobel was clearly aware of the dangers of the use of the highly irritating 
CR when he told the Minister of Defence that,  
the SADF has two incapacitating agents which would be weaponised in 
1993. These substances work on the brain functions of the target 
people and cause a change in their emotions, in this case both 
substances are strong calming agents. These substances offer certain 
advantages over the NGT [new generation tear gas] in that the NGT, if 
used incorrectly in big crowds can cause panic and in restricted areas 
such as in a big city, this could lead to damage to people and facilities. 
These substances will not have this effect and will in fact make the 
crowd easier to handle.57
Aside from the production of the incapacitating and irritating agents, Delta G 
scientists dabbled in the isolation of the lethal ricin toxin from castor beans and the 
development of an assay process, in the early days of the company’s operation. 
According to both Jordaan and Candy, the project ‘appealed to the James Bond 
elements of the programme’ but was totally unsuccessful and ultimately 
abandoned.58 There was a small scale-up plant available where larger quantities 
could have been produced but, according to all the scientists interviewed, no scale-
ups were ever done for lethal agents. Jordaan said in interviews that his position in 
the company was such that he was aware of all the chemical products of both a 
commercial and military nature that were produced on larger than laboratory scale at 
Delta G. He told me that the products made for the military included:59
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? Approximately 20 tons of CR and its intermediate precursor. 
? Approximately 1 ton of CS (a milder crowd control agent) which had 
previously been made by AECI. 
? Approximately 1 ton of Methaqualone (mandrax), made by Gert 
Lourens and codenamed MosRefCat (Mossgas Refinery Catalyst). 
This name gave it a plausible cover in case there were questions from 
the process operators on the plant. 
? Just under a ton of MDMA60 made under the personal supervision of 
Johan Koekemoer. 
Delta G’s procurement needs were met by an in-house procurement officer, Johan 
van der Westhuizen, whose task it was to procure equipment and chemicals. Delta G 
also made use of a procurement company called Organochem, established by 
Wouter Basson and headed by Armscor “sanctions-buster” Jerry Brandt. The 
experience gained by such procurement agents in international black market deals, 
and the use of false-end-user certificates in order to circumvent sanctions was 
valuable to Project Coast, however, it was not without risk. During a procurement trip 
in 1990 Brandt and his colleague, Grant Wentzel, were arrested in the United States 
for trying to export ion implanters, used for making microchips, to Hungary. Brandt 
was also accused of trying to buy a calibration handbook for missile guidance 
systems. The US prosecutor allowed the two men, who pleaded guilty, to return to 
South Africa, on condition that they returned to the US a year later for sentencing. 
Wouter Basson paid Brandt’s airfare and accompanied him to the US attorney’s 
office and to court where he was sentenced.61 Why Basson did this, despite the fact 
that it may have resulted in a breach of security is not clear, although Wentzel was 
later to be implicated in drugs deals allegedly orchestrated by Basson. 
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According to the forensic audit of Project Coast, in 1992 Organochem was paid  
R600,000 from Project funds. No earlier or later payments are recorded.62 
Organochem was known to have been requested to purchase PMK,  
(piperonylmethylketone, a starting material used in the preparation of MDMA) for 
Delta G when the company was planning for the production of Ecstasy. Instead, 
testimony in the Basson trial revealed that the PMK was produced in the garage of 
Delta G’s marketing manager, Barry Pithey63 who was assisted by Hennie Jordaan 
and Johan Koekemoer, at the request of Jerry Brandt who could not find PMK for 
purchase through his procurement network. According to Jordaan the scientists were 
hoping to make some money on the side.64 The process failed when a fire broke out, 
nearly destroying Pithey’s home. Pithey was reprimanded by Mijburgh who accused 
him of threatening the security of the project. Although a small quantity of MDMA was 
manufactured from the PMK, Koekemoer found a more efficient route to manufacture 
just under a ton of the street drug.65  
Management and reporting at Delta G 
Basson himself seldom visited Delta G. When on the few occasions, the scientists 
reported to him it was at the offices of the private company, Medchem, whose 
directors were Basson himself and Philip Mijburgh.66 One of the scientists at Delta G, 
Dr Lucia Steenkamp, explained to me how she had reported to Basson. Steenkamp’s 
PhD research was on “The synthesis of peptides and peptide-conjugates and the 
evaluation of their binding to CD4 receptors”. She said that in 1989 she was 
instructed to get reports on her AIDS research ready for Basson. Her first report-back 
to him took place in the Medchem offices in Centurion. She thought that there may 
be some link between Medchem and the military, because she had heard that 
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Mijburgh was Magnus Malan’s nephew. But she was not aware of Basson’s link to 
the SADF, nor that Delta G Scientific was a military front company. She was under 
the impression that Basson was a client of Delta G. He had been introduced to her as 
a representative from Armscor. She reported to him every four months. She said that 
in all the meetings she held with him, he made very little comment and was cold and 
intimidating. Steenkamp did not question why Armscor had an interest in AIDS 
research. She was of the impression that her PhD was paid for by Armscor and that 
the arms manufacturer had classified her work. She believed it was still classified ten 
years later.67 Steenkamp’s naïveté demonstrates that staff at the front companies 
may have remained unaware of the links between the company they were working 
for and the military. Certainly junior scientists like Steenkamp who enjoyed the 
opportunity to do work that interested them at state-of-the-art facilities did not ask 
awkward questions about the military links to the programme.  
During Mijburgh’s management Jordaan and other scientists at the company were 
struck by the lavish scale of entertainment and general extravagance displayed by 
senior Delta G employees. Business lunches and dinners were frequent, directors 
and higher officials lived the life of successful businessmen with all the appropriate 
trappings.68 There was a private box at the Loftus rugby ground in Pretoria, a lodge 
at the exclusive Fancourt golf estate in George and frequent overseas trips.  In his 
analysis of the effects of secrecy in the obstruction of civilian oversight of biological 
warfare programmes, Koblentz has argued that the experiences of South Africa, 
Japan and the Soviet Union in the conduct of such programmes demonstrates that 
the requirement for secrecy is both inimical to effective oversight, but more 
importantly, allows BW organisations to achieve a significant degree of autonomy 
which increases the risk of corruption, insubordination, and proliferation.69 None of 
the senior military managers of Project Coast were aware of the numerous 
companies which Basson and his close associates established, nor their personal 
financial interests in these companies. Indeed, although while he was Surgeon 
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General, Knobel authorised the production of MDMA and was aware of the 
production of methaqualone, he relied solely on Basson’s word that these products 
would be used to develop incapacitating agents for use by the military, and never 
ascertained that the products were in fact made available to the military. Oversight of 
the activities of Basson and others in managerial positions in the programme was 
sorely lacking, the result of which was that individuals were able to use the 
programme to amass huge personal wealth. The forensic auditor put the total cost of 
Delta G to Project Coast at R127,467,406, of which some R40 million went into the 
fixed assets of the company and R50,467,406 for running costs. The cost of 
privatisation to the state was R37 million.70  
A quarterly report for the second quarter of 1987 put the number of staff employed by 
Delta G at 165, as follows: 102 permanent white employees; 14 temporary white 
employees and 49 permanent black employees (the number of black employees had 
been reduced from 55 to 49 after ‘problems’ had been experienced with the Chemical 
Workers Union. It was decided that more whites would be employed).71 Racism 
underlay every aspect of the project. Of the 165 people employed by the company, it 
is estimated that 20 were scientists involved in research, development and 
production. 
In 1989 Delta G was taken over by Medchem Consolidated Investments. A year later 
the company was privatised and some staff were given shares72 in the newly private 
company. The final SADF contracts were completed in March 1993.73 At the time of 
privatisation, Delta G had a staff complement of about 200 (including non-scientific 
staff). Mijburgh, a director of Delta G and Medchem, gained enormously from the 
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privatisation of the Delta G, making a profit of about R15 million.74 A company 
directed by Basson, WPW Investments Inc, based in the Cayman Islands, had a 50% 
interest in Medchem Consolidated Investments,75 which suggests that Basson also 
benefited from the sale of the company. 
The establishment of RRL 
In 1975 Daan Goosen qualified as a veterinarian at the University of Pretoria. Three 
years later he obtained an Honours degree in clinical pathology, toxicology and 
pharmacology and joined the lecturing staff at Pretoria University’s veterinary faculty. 
Soon afterwards he was appointed director of the HA Grové Animal Research Centre 
attached to HF Verwoerd Hospital (now called Pretoria Academic Hospital). As 
indicated by the name of the institute, the chief function of the research facility was to 
develop animal models for testing purposes. Research animals at the centre included 
mice, hamsters, beagle dogs, pigs and primates (chiefly baboons and vervet 
monkeys). This experience was to qualify him to head the biological warfare facility. 
One of the research projects carried out by the HA Grové Institute on behalf of the 
SADF dealt with the treatment of trauma. The research was led by a Professor 
Schlag, of Vienna. Extensive research was done on primates regarding trauma 
treatment with civilian interest being in the trauma treatment of vehicle accident 
victims.76
Some time during 1982, Goosen was approached by scientists from Delta G 
Scientific for guidance on the use of animals for experiments with the “household 
chemicals” they were manufacturing – “like swimming pool acid”. This was certainly a 
cover story. He advised them on the basics of dealing with laboratory animals. Later 
that year he met Basson when giving a presentation to the Surgeon General about 
the trauma project and how it could benefit victims of landmine explosions. Testifying 
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in the Basson trial, Goosen said that from early 1983, he and Basson frequently 
discussed the use of chemical substances in a war situation. They wrote reports 
together about the threat of chemical attack on the SADF, about biological warfare 
agents, and about the use of rats as landmine detectors. Goosen and Basson talked 
about sensitive matters and had to trust one another implicitly.77 So close was their 
relationship that in 1983 Basson had no qualms about asking Goosen to provide him 
with a black mamba and its venom. Goosen claimed that Basson told him “they” had 
access to a State enemy who would be offered a few drinks while in a remote setting 
and would be then injected with the venom. The snake would be killed, and its fangs 
pressed into the dead man’s flesh to indicate a bite. The cause of death would be 
recorded as a snakebite.78 This was the first indication that the front company which 
Goosen was to establish (RRL) would be used to develop assassination weapons.  
Goosen established the size of a lethal dosage of mamba venom for a baboon and 
before dawn one morning he, Basson and Dr James Davies (a member of Special 
Forces and thus not considered a security risk) injected a baboon with the venom. 
Within a minute the baboon was dead. Goosen gave Basson the rest of the venom 
and a “huge” mamba.79 If Goosen’s version is correct, the clandestine manner in 
which this incident took place shows that those involved were aware that what they 
were doing was both dangerous and illegal. It set a precedent for future activities at 
RRL. A few months later Philip Mijburgh brought the snake which had been nick-
named “Fielies”, back to RRL.80 He said it had served its purpose and could be 
destroyed.  
In his criminal trial Basson was charged with the conspiracy to murder Roland 
Hunter, an SADF conscript who had been passing information about the SADF’s 
support to Renamo in Mozambique to the ANC. The state charged that the mamba 
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was intended to be used to kill Hunter.81 Fortunately for Hunter he was arrested by 
the security police before the plan could be executed.  It was not proved in the trial 
that Basson had sought the snake from Goosen for this purpose. However, what it 
demonstrated was Goosen’s willingness to please Basson even if that required his 
complicity in murder. 
Having proved his willingness to respond to unusual and dangerous requests, in mid-
1983, Goosen was asked to establish a military facility where chemical substances 
could be tested on animals. Originally only an evaluation centre for outside products 
(envisaged as coming from Delta G) was proposed, this idea expanded to a full 
biological research and development centre. Jan Lourens designed equipment for 
the company which in time included a perspex restraining chair for primates; a gas 
chamber which could accommodate the restraint chair; a filtration system, and a 
primate semen extractor to be used in virility tests.82  
Basson delegated the task of recruiting RRL staff to Goosen who began drawing in 
colleagues he knew and trusted, including veterinarians Dr André Immelman, Dr 
James Davies and microbiologist Dr Mike Odendaal. Dawid Spamer was appointed 
director of the company in charge of all administration. Dr Schalk van Rensburg, 
recruited from the South African Medical Research Council (MRC) by Basson 
himself, was one of the directors. The company’s chief client was the SADF. Equal 
share certificates were issued to the directors - Goosen, David Spamer, André 
Immelman and Schalk van Rensburg. Simultaneously, they had to sign undated and 
blank share transfer forms. None of them was expecting to reap any personal benefit 
from their shareholding. It was clearly understood that this was a state-funded 
facility.83  
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The company, then known as Interlaboratories, started out as a few offices in a 
shopping centre in Sinoville, north of Pretoria. Shortly thereafter a 350ha piece of 
land was bought north of the peaceful Roodeplaat Dam outside Pretoria and building 
began in earnest. In order not to draw attention to the construction of a high-tech 
facility just outside Pretoria, RRL was built in phases - the animal centre first, then 
the basic laboratories. Five research laboratories were shared by microbiology and 
reproductive physiology. The laboratories were fully operational from 1985 (in the 
same year that Delta G Scientific moved to its new production facility). Before the 
construction of the laboratories, the existing farmhouse on the property was the 
centre of operations, housing the administration. Close by, small buildings each 
containing up to five laboratories were erected where chemical substances were 
synthesised and some microbiological work took place. A Containment Laboratory, 
planned by Immelman, worked specifically on lethal chemical agents including Sarin, 
Tabun and VX. Security at this laboratory was extremely high and access restricted. 
The laboratory was visible through a large glass window from an adjoining room. 
Scientists would don protective suits with independent air supply before entering. A 
qualified nursing sister was on duty in case of accidents while the laboratory was in 
use.84 This was a bio-safety level 3 (P3) facility.  
Immelman headed the chemical and pharmacological departments. His staff included 
scientists Klaus Psotta, Johan Schreuder, and Johan Niewenhuis, with James Davies 
in charge of toxicology. Schalk van Rensburg ran the animal research laboratory with 
staff including Mike Odendaal, Dr Woody Meltzer and Dr Riana Bornman. Dr 
Bornman was in charge of reproductive physiology. Later Odendaal headed a 
separate department of Microbiology.85
As was the case with Delta G, Goosen was replaced as managing director just as the 
facility was about to go into full production in 1986. He was accused of having 
breached security by talking recklessly at a scientific conference held in the Kruger 
Park, having received a subsidy from the company to which he was not entitled and 
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having misused funds allocated to the building of RRL facilities.86 Both Goosen and 
the state prosecutor believed that he was set up to lose his job so that he could be 
replaced by Special Forces dentist Wynand Swanepoel, who had a close relationship 
with Basson, and suspect that Goosen was given a psychotropic drug at the 
conference.87 After losing his job at RRL, Goosen became head of Roodeplaat 
Breeding Enterprises, a facility established on the same property as RRL, which bred 
dogs for the security forces.  
Roodeplaat Research Laboratories’ (RRL) cover story was that it was a contract 
research facility in the pharmacological, agricultural, biological, veterinary and 
medical fields. Covert projects undertaken by the company on behalf of the military or 
the police were initially classified as H projects, or hard projects, a coding later 
changed to R. According to Schalk van Rensburg, RRL’s head of laboratory services, 
commercial projects represented 5% in the early stage of operations and gradually 
grew to about 30%; he claimed that the costs of these projects did not account for 
more than 10% of the budget.88 Good Laboratory Practices were not introduced at 
RRL until just before privatisation in 199189 which was a hindrance to effective 
marketing.   
Goosen said, in his testimony during the Basson trial, that of the 203 project files 
found in Basson’s trunks after his arrest in 1997, 177 dealt with biological weapons. 
The other 26 related to “soft” or commercial projects. Of the 177, 34 dealt with 
antidotes and treatment for biological agents and of these, only three were final 
reports. This surprised Goosen, since by his reckoning, there should have been 76 
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final reports,90 which raises a question about whether, when the company was 
privatised, the scientists retained their final research reports. During the height of its 
operation it is estimated that 31 technical professionals were employed at RRL. 
According to one of the directors, there were 11 graduates and 20 technicians in the 
6 departments at the facility. Each department having had one expert.91
Chemical and biological warfare agent production at RRL 
While Goosen was at HA Grové, he and Basson had discussed substances that 
could be used as biological weapons. The trauma research conducted at the Centre 
had shown that if Clostridium Perfringens was injected into a healthy primate, it 
would suffer identical symptoms to those of post-traumatic shock, specifically with 
regard to lung function. Within 24 to 36 hours the primate would develop violent 
pneumonia which could lead to death. The use of Clostridium Perfringens was 
debated by Goosen and Basson as a biological weapon. A small amount was made 
by RRL microbiologist, Dr Mike Odendaal. Goosen testified that he knew that the 
company he was to head was intended to develop biological weapons92 and to do 
animal tests of chemical substances. The evidence certainly shows that RRL’s 
primary focus was research and development of lethal chemical and biological 
agents which were untraceable post mortem. Testimony from scientists showed that 
they believed that the substances were to be used in covert operations to 
assassinate individuals.  
Goosen claimed that he and his colleagues agreed very early that they never wanted 
details about how the substances they produced were to be used. When asked to 
supply a substance, all they needed or wanted to know were the circumstances 
under which it would be administered, as this could influence the dosage required. 
The advantage of this decision was that the scientists were not directly compromised. 
But it also meant they never had precise data for the weight of the target, or the 
climate in which the substance was to be used, both factors which influence the 
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effectiveness of chemical and toxic agents. Goosen said he and Basson agreed on 
this arm’s-length way of operating, and it was also discussed with former Surgeon 
General General Nicol Nieuwoudt and Knobel. They all agreed the need-to-know 
principle would be strictly applied.93 Despite this, the RRL directors were still worried 
about the selection of targets. Goosen said he spoke to Basson seeking reassurance 
that they were “legitimate targets”. Goosen regarded legitimate targets as those who 
threatened the security of the apartheid state. In contradiction to the claims made by 
Goosen, Basson said that he was never asked to supply toxins to anyone, nor would 
he have done so if asked. Basson denied Goosen’s allegations and although the 
state prosecutors were unable to prove in court that Basson himself had authorised 
and was aware of the production of chemical and biological agents for 
assassinations, the documents and testimony of the scientists tell a different tale.  
Goosen was adamant that he was party to discussions about chemical and biological 
assassination weapons94 which concluded that the ideal substance would be an 
organophosphate which research had shown to be effectively absorbed through the 
skin. DMSO - dimethylsulphoxide - was selected as the most suitable carrier for the 
poison, because it was quickly absorbed through the skin in liquid form.95 Paraoxon 
was believed to be the best organophosphate for the intended purpose. It was 
synthesised from Parathion, a potent poison widely used in agriculture which has 
been responsible for the deaths of both animals and humans on farms. According to 
Goosen, the objective was to develop the ultimate murder weapon - a lethal poison 
that could not be traced during an autopsy (or, if traced, could not be traced back to 
RRL or the military).96  
Some RRL research reports appear to support Goosen’s claim that RRL was single-
minded in this objective. The reports demonstrate an obsession with finding 
substances that would be impossible to trace post-mortem. A report headed: 
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“Product information about botulinum toxin” informs the reader that the toxin is 
soluble in tap water, dam water, milk, beer and wine and warns that mixing the toxin 
with strongly alcoholic substances such as whisky and gin should be avoided.97 
Research done into ionophore antibiotics98 showed that RRL was investigating the 
substances for clandestine use, ”because the advantage is that if it can cause acute 
or sub-acute heart failure, the ionophore will not be traceable”.99 Overdoses of 
antibiotics were also investigated through animal experiments. Overdoses of the 
veterinary antibiotic monensin was known to attack the heart muscles in 
ruminants.100 A horse used for an RRL experiment had nearly died of heart failure. 
These findings, according to the report, had led RRL to investigate the possibility of 
using the drugs for covert operations against human beings. To this end, tests had 
been done on baboons. When mixed with alcohol and administered intravenously, 
the antibiotics killed the baboons within six hours. No damage to the heart muscle 
could be found during autopsy, and the substance was undetectable in the post-
mortem toxicology results. 
Goosen recalled how during an informal discussion about organophosphates there 
was discussion about how effective they would be in assassinations. African National 
Congress leaders and “Communists” were mentioned as suitable targets for 
elimination. There was some talk about how hard, for example, it would be to get to 
SACP leader Joe Slovo, and what substances could be used if an assassin had only 
one minute in which to use it. Nelson Mandela, too, was discussed - if he could 
somehow get cancer before being released from prison, his release would present 
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less of a political problem.101 Mike Odendaal recalled being asked for Salmonella by 
André Immelman, to be told that it would be used to poison ANC members at a 
meeting which he thought was in Soweto. Odendaal heard subsequently that the 
ANC members had become very ill, but had not died.102 Such people were 
considered legitimate targets by the scientists. 
The synthesis of paraoxon was an ongoing project and there was always “plenty” 
available.103 RRL synthesised paraoxon because it was “reasonably easy” to make 
and required a fatal dose of only 1mg per kilogram of body weight. It was quickly 
absorbed. If detected post-mortem, death could always be attributed to the common 
agricultural organophosphate parathion. Research into paraoxon also offered an 
ideal cover for establishing the laboratory in which research would be done on the 
nerve agents Sarin, Tabun and VX, since the same stringent biosafety standards 
applied.104 Immelman believed the parathion research could result in a new way of 
treating people with organophosphate poisoning and a biochemistry project was 
registered for this purpose.105 This was one of the few research projects that could 
be classified being for defensive purposes. On the other hand, paraoxon was added 
to lip balm, shampoo and roll-on deodorant. Scientist, Kobus Niewenhuisen was 
involved in the toiletries project while Klaus Psotta (his predecessor as head of the 
chemical department) carried out research on paraoxon mixed with tobacco. And 
alcoholic beverages.106
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Psotta was an organic chemist who worked at both Delta G Scientific and 
Roodeplaat Research Laboratories. He refused to talk to me, though he did testify in 
the trial against Basson. Psotta was employed by the CSIR when he was  recruited 
to Delta G in 1982. He worked in the synthesis department of Delta G until he was 
transferred to RRL in February 1984, where he continued to synthesise chemical 
compounds. At RRL Psotta synthesised the chemical agents paraoxon, tabun, and 
monensin. The synthesis of the lethal chemical warfare agent VX was a complicated 
and difficult process and he progressed only as far as the first two or three steps. A 
file shown to Psotta during his testimony in the Basson trial contained the test results 
of a project he carried out from 22 August 1985 to 26 September 1986 on the stability 
of paraoxon in nicotine.107 A month after being mixed with nicotine, Psotta’s research 
showed 24% of the paraoxon was still left. At the end of the 13-month experiment, 
his conclusion was that paraoxon remained extremely stable in nicotine. The 
paraoxon research then progressed to animal testing. An experiment was conducted 
by Dr James Davies, under the direction of André Immelman, to determine the 
effects of the paraoxon/nicotine combination in dogs. Nine adult beagles were to be 
orally dosed, three with paraoxon, three with nicotine and three with a 
combination.108 No documents which showing the results of these experiments were 
retrieved from the trunks. Psotta was also instructed to test the stability of paraoxon 
in water, cooking oil and petroleum jelly (Vaseline). He found that when heated, 
paraoxon remained potent in water. It did not mix well with cooking oil and Vaseline. 
Results of his experiments on paraoxon mixed with alcohol, specifically whisky and 
gin, were given to Dr James Davies and the Austrian researcher, Dr Schreuder (who 
was based at RRL doing research into organophosphates used in the farming 
industry.)109 Psotta was asked during the Basson trial if, while engaged in this work, 
he ever envisaged the use of paraoxon against enemies of the state. He replied that 
given the political climate at the time, it would have been almost impossible to 
envisage any other purpose for paraoxon mixed with whisky, gin, and in cigarettes. 
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He added that, in principle, he had no qualms about the use of paraoxon against “the 
enemy”.  
Human and Animal Experimentation 
Testing of organophosphates on animals was extensive. Research reports revealing 
the use of dogs and primates as test subjects were found in the trunks discovered 
shortly after Basson’s arrest in January 1997. These reports showed that 
organophosphates were tested on large numbers of primates while little concern was 
shown for the well-being of the animals. Other tests included the effect of 
brodifacoum on rats, a poison that causes death by blood loss and brain 
haemorrhage.110 Far more horrific was evidence presented in court by Barnacle and 
CCB111 operator Danie Phaal which suggests that brodifacoum may also have been 
tested on a prisoner of war in Namibia112 and demonstrates the close relationship 
between the CBW programme and operational units of the SADF.  
According to Phaal, Basson met him at the Waterkloof Airbase early one morning 
and gave him a small bottle - the size of a bottle of eye drops - containing a liquid 
which he was told to mix with orange juice and give to the victim. As soon as the man 
showed signs of illness, Phaal was to transport him to 1 Military Hospital on the first 
available flight. He claimed to have been told by Basson that it was an experiment.113  
Phaal presented himself at Ondangwa as a doctor and was taken to the detention 
cells by the intelligence officer. The SWAPO soldier he saw was in good health. After 
talking to him, Phaal offered him orange juice, with which he mixed, out of sight, the 
contents of the bottle from Basson. The following day, Phaal was summoned urgently 
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by the intelligence officer, who told him something was wrong. When he got to the 
cell, it was obvious the man had suffered extensive blood loss. There was blood on 
his calves, on the toilet bowl and on the cell floor.114 Phaal arranged for the detainee 
to be flown to Grootfontein on the first available transport aircraft and from there, to 
be flown to Pretoria. On arrival at Waterkloof air base that evening, an ambulance 
was waiting to take the man to 1 Military Hospital. During the flight, he had injected 
the victim with “something” he was given by a doctor at Grootfontein. Some time 
afterwards, Phaal was told by Basson that the man had died.115 While Basson denied 
having giving Phaal any substance or having been involved in such an experiment 
and the court found that Phaal’s testimony was motivated by a desire to obtain 
indemnity for his role in murder which had caused him to implicate Basson,116 neither 
the judge nor Basson could deny that the incident had taken place. Indeed, while 
Basson’s personal role in the incident could not be verified by the court, the fact that 
the incident took place, and was almost certainly a horrific human experiment was 
not disputed.  
Also during the trial, a medical doctor, Kobus Bothma recalled how he had carried 
out a gruesome human experiment with a member of the Special Operations Unit. 
One day in the mid-1980s,117 he said, he was told that orders had been issued for 
three people to be killed in an operation that would involve him and Special Forces 
operator, Johan Theron. Bothma claimed that Basson gave him a bottle containing a 
jelly-like substance and told him to smear some of it on the victims and observe the 
results.118  According to Bothma and Theron, the next day they left for Dukuduku, a 
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remote SADF training camp in KwaZulu Natal, in Theron’s vehicle. Somewhere 
outside Pretoria, they were met by men with a minibus. Three young black men in 
their 20s were being held in the bus. Theron told Bothma to sedate them. Having 
been told by Basson to use Medazolam (a sedative sold commercially as 
Dormicum119) Bothma injected the substance into cans of cold drink given to him by 
Theron. The three victims, bound hand and foot, drank the cold drink and fell 
asleep.120  
On arrival at the Dukuduku military base, Theron shackled the three men to trees 
overnight. The next morning, Bothma and Theron went to the men. One of them had 
almost sawed through the branch to which he was handcuffed in an attempt to get 
free. Although the three men were conscious, Bothma claimed that he did not think 
they realised what was happening.121 Bothma donned a surgical glove and smeared 
some of the jelly onto the upper arm of one man. He and Theron waited a while to 
see if the victim showed a reaction. When he did not, Theron told Bothma: “It’s time 
for these three to say goodbye”. Bothma said he knew Theron meant the three men 
had to be killed. It is at this point that the testimonies of Theron and Bothma differed. 
Bothma claimed that he could not stomach the thought of murdering the men so he 
walked away while Theron administered the lethal doses of muscle relaxants. Theron 
claimed the two men took turns to inject their victims. The men’s bodies were loaded 
into an aircraft and flown out over the sea where the bodies were thrown from the 
aircraft. Bothma said he reported back to Basson, saying the jelly had no effect on 
the victims. He told the court that he had been traumatised by the incident, and had 
135
                                                
119 Dormicum is the trade name for the well known benzodiazepine  midazolam. More than 20 of these 
agents are on the market of which Valium (diazepam) and Ativan (lorazepam) are well known 
representatives. The benzodiazepines are primarily indicated for the treatment of anxiety states and as 
hypnotics (sleeping pills). They are relatively safe in overdose, but intravenous administration may 
cause respiratory arrest. Midazolam is a short acting benzodiazepine. It is effective for the induction of 
general anaesthesia  and as an agent to induce sleep before minor, non-painful and short surgical 
procedures. For the above indications it is given intravenously.  
120 Bothma in The State vs Wouter Basson, 12 – 13 June 2000.  
121 Ibid. Testimony of Johan Theron in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 3 – 8 May 2000.  
 
been through “20 years of hell” since it happened.122 Bothma is now practicing as a 
medical doctor in Richards Bay in KwaZulu Natal.  
Judge Hartzenberg found Bothma and Theron to have been poor witnesses. He said 
that testimony of the two men had been contradictory and that Bothma’s reasons for 
having accompanied Theron on the operation were hard to understand. Bothma said 
that he had needed to sedate the victims, something which Theron could have done 
himself. He said that he had to test the effect of the ointment, which Theron could 
also have done, and lastly he said that he had to certify the men dead, a claim which 
the judge found absurd. Basson denied having given Bothma the order to 
accompany Theron, or having given Bothma the ointment. The judge found that 
because the two witnesses’ versions of events were contradictory it was impossible 
to find that Basson could be involved in the incident.123 Again, despite the difficulty of 
proving the involvement of Basson in the incident, it is certain that it took place and 
that the intention was to test the efficacy of chemical agents on human subjects. 
Neither Bothma nor Theron would have had any reason to fabricate their involvement 
in an incident such as this. 
Interaction between the front companies 
While there was a need for compartmentalisation within Project Coast in order to 
maintain secrecy, and certainly many of the junior staff at both institutions were 
unaware of the work being done outside of their own facility, there was some 
interaction between the two companies. Delta G undertook some of RRL’s 
biochemistry projects and RRL conducted animal tests of Delta G products. One 
example of this interaction involved anti-fertility work. According to documents from 
RRL, the facility had a number of registered projects aimed at developing an anti-
fertility vaccine.124 This was a personal project of Goosen who had done research 
into embryo transplants. Goosen told the TRC that he and Basson had discussed the 
136
                                                
122 Ibid. 
123 Judgement in The State vs Wouter Basson, paragraphs 1990 – 1993. 
124 Researchers at the facility were required to submit research proposals to the managers, projects that 
were authorised were registered internally.  
 
possibility of developing an anti-fertility vaccine which could be selectively 
administered – without the knowledge of the recipient. The intention, he said, was to 
administer it to black South African women without their knowledge. This was 
confirmed by Dr Schalk Van Rensburg who oversaw the fertility project. The chief 
researcher on this project, Dr Riana Bornman, denied that she was aware that this 
was the project’s intention125 or that it was a military project. Many projects were 
registered at RRL to investigate the production of a male and female anti-fertility 
vaccine, but ultimately it was never produced because of the technical complexities 
involved.126 Peptide synthesis was initially undertaken for this purpose. The 
researchers thought that if the formation of HCG in women shortly after conception 
could be prevented, the result would be effective contraception. To this end Delta G 
purchased a peptide synthesiser127 and assisted RRL in this aspect of the research 
project. 
Van Rensburg, who oversaw the fertility project, told the TRC that “fertility and fertility 
control studies comprised 18 percent of all projects.”128 Van Rensburg said he had 
received the initial instruction to conduct the anti-fertility work from Basson. He had 
been told that the purpose was to prepare a contraceptive that could be given to 
women soldiers of UNITA. Although van Rensburg was sceptical of the reasons 
given by Basson, he was aware that the World Health Organization (WHO) 
supported research into contraceptives and that there was a possibility of the project 
making money for RRL. He estimated that there was little chance of the research 
producing positive results for at least 10 years and; therefore, it was unlikely to be 
abused by the military in the short term. Press reports at the time of the TRC hearing 
stated incorrectly that an anti-fertility vaccine that would only work on black women 
had been produced. By the time RRL was privatized, the research had not yielded a 
usable end product. Van Rensburg’s belief that he, rather than the military, was in 
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control of the fertility research was not unique. Other scientists interviewed 
expressed similar views, saying they would not have made certain aspects of their 
work available to the military for offensive application.  
Work done at RRL for Delta G included a study of the toxicity of phenylsilitrane.129 
Little is known of this substance. Dr James Davies and Dr André Immelman, who 
were responsible for most of the military work for RRL, conducted tests on rats to 
determine the toxicity of the substance. Twenty-five rats were used in the 
experiment, in groups of five. Each group was given different doses. The experiment 
was unsuccessful because, although many of the rats died, the rats in different 
groups died in no particular pattern.130 The state prosecutors in the Basson trial 
believed this poison may have been intended for use in covert assassinations. Tests 
were conducted on three baboons with phenylsilitrane. The RRL report notes that all 
the baboons suffered muscle spasms and disorientation after five minutes. After 
twelve minutes they still showed signs of muscle spasms along with difficulty in 
breathing. All died from suffocation within fifteen minutes.131 Further research 
showed that the substance was not stable in solution.  Throughout 1987, Davies and 
Immelman sought to determine the LD50 (toxicity) of the substance. It was made into 
various formulations and tested on the skin of laboratory pigs but no absorption was 
found to have taken place. 
Chemical and biological agents for covert use 
In 1997, shortly after the arrest of Wouter Basson, trunks containing documents were 
found at the home of his associate, Samuel Bosch. The documents included 
research at RRL and Delta G Scientific, some personal documents, and documents 
relating to various companies associated with Project Coast. One of the documents 
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found in a trunk was a list of poisons RRL had for sale. This list, the Verkope (Sales) 
list was compiled by head of research at RRL, Dr André Immelman, who testified in 
the Basson trial that the document was a list of items he gave to people introduced to 
him by Basson. They included members of the SAP, a medical doctor linked to the 
CCB, and a psychologist, Johnny Koortzen.132  In his testimony, Basson said that he 
had been instructed by the Chief of the SADF to assist the Security Police, who were 
experiencing ‘problems in relation to incapacitants’. Basson said he decided to 
introduce three Security Police members – Chris (Smit), Gert (Otto) and Manie (Van 
Staden) – to Immelman, since Immelman had access to all the substances tested for 
Delta G, and knew the properties of each. Basson said he was personally too busy to 
deal with the Security Police, but for security reasons, arranged that Immelman 
should meet with the three men in his office in future. However, Basson claimed, he 
was never told what Immelman gave them, or what the intended use was. Basson 
also said he did not know of the existence of the Sales List, and never saw it before 
being confronted with it during his bail application. He could not comment on the 
contents of the list, except to say that the items against his own name would have 
been needed either for personal research, or for training purposes.133 Throughout the 
trial it was clear that Basson had ensured that plausible deniability was built into the 
management system. The Verkope List nevertheless, provides a unique insight into 
the covert work of scientists at RRL. The following are (in alphabetical order) the 
items that Immelman made available to security force operators134: 
Aldicarb is a pesticide. Its white crystals have a slightly sulphurous odour. It is toxic. 
The probable oral lethal dose for humans is less than 5mg/kg (1/15th of a teaspoon 
for a 70kg person). It is poisonous by ingestion and skin contact. Death is caused by 
muscle weakness, accumulation of fluids in the lungs, respiratory and heart failure, 
epileptic fits and coma. RRL offered aldicarb dissolved in orange juice. 
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Anthrax/Bacillus anthracis is a highly infectious and virulent micro organism. Human 
infection in the natural state is usually through the skin but also follows after 
inhalation or ingestion. Inhaling B. anthracis spores (dormant form) may result in 
pulmonary anthrax, which is often fatal. Anthrax of the lungs follows 2 – 5 days after 
exposure and is characterized by a mild initial phase of fever and malaise followed by 
sudden onset of severe acute illness with high fever. The lymph nodes in the chest 
become swollen and ulcerate, and these festering, bleeding ulcerations spread to 
other important organs in the chest. Respiratory distress develops, followed by 
cyanosis, shock, coma and death. Dr Mike Odendaal told the TRC and the court that 
he had put anthrax spores on cigarettes and on the gum of an envelope. 
Azide (sodium azide, hydrazoic acid) salts are used industrially in the manufacture of 
explosives and preservatives. It is a cell poison causing death by a mechanism 
similar to that of cyanide. Sodium azide crystals are colourless and odourless. Azide 
is poisonous by ingestion, inhalation and skin contact. According to Dr G Muller, the 
medical expert who testified in the Basson trial, an individual who ingested 700-
800mg (1/6th of a teaspoon) died three days later as a result of failure to breathe.  
Death is caused by a fall in body temperature and blood pressure, respiratory failure, 
epileptic fits and coma. RRL offered 3 doses of 1,5g of this substance mixed in 
whisky - well over a fatal dose. RRL research reports relate that this poison was 
tested on dogs, pigs and baboons.135
Botulinum is a nerve poison produced by the micro organism Clostridium botulinum. 
It is the most poisonous biological toxin known, about 1 million times more poisonous 
than arsenic. Ingestion in food causes progressive paralysis of nerves and voluntary 
muscles (from half an hour to several days after ingestion) resulting in respiratory 
failure and death. (RRL offered 4 beer bottles contaminated with botulinum). 
Brodifacoum is classified as a superwarfarin. It prevents the clotting of blood and is 
used in rat poison. It is an off-white powder. Poisonous by ingestion, it blocks the 
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blood clotting cascade, causing bleeding for weeks to months. Bleeding starts 36 – 
48 hours after ingestion. Death is caused by blood loss and brain haemorrhage. 
According to an RRL report prepared by James Davies and André Immelman, this 
substance was tested on 8 blue-apes, who all bled to death, starting with their gums, 
over a 24 hour period. The researchers suggested that a larger group of primates be 
tested and other species be included in the experiment.136 RRL offered two 
peppermint chocolates contaminated with brodifacoum. 
The pathogenic micro organism B. melitensis causes the disease known as 
brucellosis (Malta Fever). This infectious disease is characterized by an acute fever 
stage and a chronic stage with relapses of fever, weakness, sweats and vague aches 
and pains recurring over months or years. A single dose is listed as having been 
given to a security force operator in October 1989.137
Cantharidine is a biological poison derived from blister beetle (Spanish fly).  The 
crystals are colourless and odourless.  As little as 10mg of this toxin has been fatal. 
Systemic poisoning can develop after ingestion or by skin contact. Physical contact 
causes potent skin and mucous membrane irritation and blistering. Oral poisonous 
doses cause extensive organ damage characterized by a burning sensation of the 
mouth and throat, followed eventually by kidney and respiratory failure, shock and 
coma (Immelman gave 70mg,enough to kill 7 people, to a policeman in 1989).138
Colchicine is an anti-inflammatory agent used in the management of severe gouty 
arthritis. It is a pale yellow nearly odourless substance which darkens on exposure to 
light. As little as 7mg can cause death. Symptoms and signs of poisoning, 2 to 12 
hours after ingestion, include severe nausea and vomiting, bleeding from the gut, and 
shock. This progresses to multiple organ failure, especially heart and respiratory 
failure, and bleeding tendencies. Death, which may occur 7–36 hours after ingestion, 
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is usually due to respiratory failure and cardiovascular collapse. Immelman gave 
75mg of colchicine, enough to kill 10 people, in whisky, to a policeman, in September 
1989.  
Digoxin is a well-known drug classified as a cardiac glycoside. It is commonly used in 
the management of heart failure and abnormalities in heart rhythm. Digoxin powder is 
composed of odourless, white crystals. The therapeutic dose is close to the lethal 
dose. The usual therapeutic dose ranges from 0.125 to 0.25mg per day. Adult 
patients with normal hearts (those not on digoxin) rarely develop life threatening 
poisoning with less than 5mg in an acute ingestion. However, acute ingestion of 2mg 
in patients on long term digoxin therapy may result in potentially serious poisoning. 
Acute digoxin poisoning usually presents with nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, 
abdominal pain, fatigue, delirium, hallucination and seizures. Death is caused by 
severe heart rhythm disturbances, resulting in heart failure and cardiac arrest. 
Immelman gave 5mg away. The state prosecutors alleged that the intention was to 
use this to poison ANC leader Dullah Omar.139 Basson was acquitted on the charge 
of having been involved in this incident.  
The mamba is a dangerously venomous snake. The venom is a neurotoxin. 
Prodomal symptoms of neurotoxicity, including drowsiness, vomiting, hyper-
salivation, increased sweating, trembling, skeletal muscle fasciculation and 
circumoral sensation of pins and needles may appear within 5 – 10 minutes. More 
specific and classical neurotoxic symptoms and signs, which may develop within 30 – 
120 minutes, include: blurred speech and difficulty in swallowing. Progressive 
respiratory muscle paralysis, leading to respiratory failure, is the most serious 
neurotoxic effect, usually developing within one to three hours and is usually the 
cause of death. Immelman gave away an unspecified amount of mamba toxin.140
Mercuric oxycyanide is a white crystalline powder. It contains both mercury and 
cyanide. The clinical picture of acute organic mercury poisoning includes vomiting, a 
bloody diarrhoea, a profound circulatory collapse (shock) and kidney failure within 24 
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hours. Immelman gave the policeman identified only as “Koos” four grams of this 
poison.141
Methanol (wood alcohol) is a poisonous alcohol. It is an inherent cell poison. At room 
temperature it is a colourless liquid with a slight alcoholic odour. Methanol is 
converted in the human liver to formaldehyde and then to formic acid. It is these two 
metabolites, rather than the methanol, that are highly poisonous. If untreated, 
methanol poisoning can lead to visual changes, severe acidosis, kidney failure, coma 
and finally respiratory or heart failure and arrest. Three doses of 30ml are recorded 
on the RRL “Sales” List.  
Paraoxon is an organophosphate pesticide. It is a potent nerve poison which is 
poisonous by ingestion, by mucous membrane as well as skin contact. The probable 
oral lethal dose for humans may be as low as 1/50th of a teaspoon for a 70kg 
person. One drop in the eye may be fatal. Death is caused by muscle weakness, 
accumulation of fluids in the lungs, respiratory and heart failure, epileptic fits and 
coma. Ten doses of 2ml, far more than what is needed to kill one adult, were made 
available by Immelman.142
Paraquat is a domestic and commercial herbicide. It is a potent cell poison causing 
multi-system organ failure and lung damage in fatal cases. Paraquat is a colourless 
to yellow salt and may have a mild ammonia smell. An estimated lethal dose of the 
concentrated solution is 10 – 15ml, and 1 – 2g of the salt. Ingestion causes chemical 
burning of the mouth and throat with ulceration. Paraquat poisoning may result in 
severe toxicity and death within 24 hours as a result of lung, heart, liver and kidney 
damage. Survivors usually develop progressive fibrosis (scarring) of the lung within 5 
– 10 days after exposure. Patients eventually die of respiratory failure. Paraquat 
poisoning is almost always fatal. RRL offered 75ml of this poison in whisky, enough 
to kill 5 people. 
                                                
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.  
143 
Phencyclidine (PCP) (also known as Angel Dust) has been a drug of abuse since the 
1970s. It is a standardised chemical warfare agent known as agent SN. It can be 
described as a psychedelic agent. It was originally developed as a general 
anaesthetic agent and its effects are similar to those of ketamine. It is a white 
crystalline powder, readily soluble in water and alcohol, with a bitter taste. Catatonic 
posturing is produced, resembling that of schizophrenia. Abusers may appear to be 
reacting to hallucinations and exhibit hostile or dissociative behaviour. Severe 
psychological disturbance can be produced by toxic doses. Immelman gave 5 doses 
of 100mg to psychologist Johnny Koortzen in 1989.143  
Salmonella typhimurium and S. typhi are pathogenic micro-organisms which can 
cause various disease states, e.g. food poisoning and typhoid fever. Salmonella 
typhimurium patients usually present with vomiting, severe watery diarrhoea, colicky 
stomach pains, blood in the stools. Duration varies from 1 or 2 days to weeks or 
longer. RRL offered 3 bottles of deodorant contaminated with this pathogen. 
Salmonella typhi is the cause of typhoid fever. The incubation period (3 – 25 days) is 
related directly to the number of organisms ingested. Typhoid fever is a generalized 
infection causing fever, headache, chills, backache and nose bleeds. Stomach pains 
dominate, heart rate slows down and diarrhoea occurs late. Delirium and confusion 
are common. Complications include bleeding from the bowels. Bowel perforation is 
the most frequent fatal complication.  
Sodium cyanide is a white solid which may be powder, granular, egg shaped or flake 
form. It is odourless when dry but may have the characteristic bitter almond odour 
when wet. The ability to detect this odour is genetically determined and most people 
are unable to detect its presence. The fatal dose of cyanide salts is estimated at 200-
300mg for an adult (1/25th of a teaspoon). Cyanide is absorbed by ingestion, 
inhalation, through eye and intact skin. Sodium cyanide exposure may produce death 
within minutes. Exposure to smaller amounts may produce nausea, vomiting, 
palpitations, confusion, rapid breathing, vertigo and dizziness. Fatal doses rapidly 
progress to agitation, seizures, accumulation of fluid in lungs, coma, respiratory 
arrest and death. The “Sales” list records 50 capsules having been given to “Koos” in 
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August 1989. In addition, three peppermint chocolates contaminated with cyanide 
were offered by RRL.144
Thallium acetate is a thallium salt, used as an insecticides and rodenticide. Due to 
the toxicity of thallium salts these have been banned in many countries. Thallium is a 
cellular toxin causing cell death. It is colourless, odourless and tasteless and 
extremely toxic. The lethal dose is 12mg/kg of body weight based on animal data. 
Thallium salts are well absorbed after ingestion, inhalation or skin contact. Symptoms 
of acute poisoning are usually delayed for 12 to 24 hours and may only reach their 
peak effect in the second or third week after exposure. This may lead to complete 
paralysis and death. Nerve damage may be permanent in survivors. One gram of the 
substance was offered by RRL – enough to kill a large person. 145   
Vibrio cholerae is the causative organism of the cholera. Cholera is an acute infection 
involving the entire bowel. It is characterized by profuse watery diarrhoea, vomiting, 
muscular cramps, dehydration, kidney failure and collapse. Cholera can be a 
fulminant, rapidly lethal disease. The incubation period is 1 – 3 days. Children and 
the elderly are the first and most severely affected in a cholera outbreak. Thirty-two 
bottles were offered by RRL – enough to affect the health of more than one 
community.  
Vitamin D (cholecalciferol) is one of the fat soluble vitamins and is used as a 
rodenticide. It is a white, odourless crystalline salt. Daily ingestions in excess of 
2000IU in children or 1,88mg in adults may produce toxic symptoms within weeks or 
months. Most of the acute toxic effects of Vitamin D overdose are due to a rise in 
blood calcium. In acute overdose, patients may present with nausea, vomiting, 
diarrhoea, headache, itching, weakness, peripheral nerve damage, depression, 
confusion, heart rhythm disturbances and myocardial infraction. Four grams were 
offered by RRL.146
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Other substances investigated at RRL, not on the Sales List, but allegedly used by 
the operators in some cases include: 
Ketalar or Ketamine which can be classified as a general anaesthetic. It is also a 
potent analgesic (pain reliever). It is commercially available as a solution, under the 
trade name Ketalar. Because ketamine can be given intramuscularly, it is relatively 
easy for a lay person to administer the drug. General anaesthesia is induced within 
four minutes after injection. Bothma testified that he gave Theron Ketalar with which 
to anaesthetise the three men at Dukuduku before injecting them with muscle 
relaxants.147 Theron testified to having used it more than once under similar 
circumstances.148
Aluminium phosphide or Phosphine is used as a fumigant/rodenticide (for rats and 
moles). Upon contact with moisture, the pellets release the poisonous gas 
phosphine. If ingested, phosphine is released from aluminium phosphide by action of 
the stomach fluids. Pure aluminium phosphide is a grey or yellowish salt. Phosphine 
is a colourless, flammable gas with a decaying fish or garlic-like odour. It is highly 
toxic. The normal lethal dose in a 70kg person is reported to be less than 500mg. All 
patients who died had consumed 3 or more aluminium phosphide tablets. Inhalation 
of phosphine causes severe irritation of the airways, with cough, headache, tightness 
of the chest, coma, epileptic fits, heart failure and fluid on the lungs. Death can occur 
within 24 hours.  
BZ (α-hydroxy-α-phenylbenzeneacetic acid, 1-azabicyclo[2.2.2]oct-3-yl ester, 3-
quinuclidinyl benzilate). BZ is an incapacitating agent. Approximately 30 minutes 
after exposure to BZ aerosol, symptoms appear such as disorientation with visual 
and auditory hallucinations. The symptoms peak in four to eight hours, and may take 
up to four days to pass. Other symptoms can include distended pupils, dry mouth, 
and increased body temperature. The action of BZ on the central and peripheral 
                                                
147 Bothma in The State vs Wouter Basson, 12 June 1999.  
148 Theron in The State vs Wouter Basson, 8 May 2000. 
146 
nervous systems resembles that of atropine. Like atropine, BZ binds to muscarinic 
acetylcholine receptors.149
RRL microbiologist, Adriaan Botha claimed that he worked with the additional 
following organisms, which were part of the RRL culture collection (maintained by 
Odendaal and Botha).150
Escherichia coli. This was used in the cloning of the Clostridium perfringens epsilon 
toxin gene for vaccine development purposes. Although Botha’s intention was to 
produce a vaccine as a result of this work, he was aware of its potential military 
application. If the cloned gene could be placed in E. coli it would have been able to 
produce the deadly toxin at a far higher rate than the Clostridium would have been 
able to do.151
Clostridium perfringens. The cloning of the epsilon toxin gene for introduction into 
Escherichia coli for vaccine development purposes.152
Flavobacterium sp and Pseudomonas sp. Both used in the development of a method 
for detoxification of organophosphorus compounds for both defensive and 
commercial purposes.153
Hormoconis resinae. This organism can grow in diesel and aviation fuel leading to 
problems such as engine problems in tanks and ships as a result of clogged fuel 
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lines. It is suspected that this organism had caused several airplane crashes. Botha 
was investigating this organism for both defensive and offensive purposes.154
Included in the RRL culture collection were the following micro organisms: 
? Shigella flexneri 
? Salmonella typhimurium 
? Salmonella typhi 
? Yersinia enterocolitica  
? Escherichia coli H157 
? Vibrio parahaemolyticus 
? Escherichia coli EP 
? Brucella melitensis 
? Brucella abortus (terminates pregnancy in cows) 
? Bacillus anthracis 
The above pathogens were listed in a document which described the RRL culture 
collection, the organisms were grown and freeze dried in 10ml and 25ml quantities 
which contained a high concentration of the organisms.155
Table 3. Dosage and suspected use of RRL products offered on the 
“Verkope” list156
Item Number of doses offered Evidence of use 
Chemical agents   
                                                
154 Ibid. 
155 M.W. Odendaal, RRL research document, 6 February 1989. 
156 Immelman, “Verkope”. 
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Phencyclidine 5 x 100mg doses No information available 
Alidcarb 6 x 200mg doses in orange 
juice and 3 peppermint 
chocolates contaminated. 
No information available 
Azide 3 x 1,5g doses in whisky and 
4g.  
No information available 
Paraoxon 10 x 2ml doses No information available. 
Evidence before the court in 
The State vs Wouter Basson 
suggested that Reverend 
Frank Chikane may have 
suffered from paraoxon 
poisoning but this was not 
proved. 157  
Vitamin D 2 doses of 2grams each No information available.  
Thallium acetate 1g – sufficient for a fatal dose 
for two small people or one 
large person. Five bottles of 
beer were contaminated with 
thallium.  
No information available. 
Aluminium phosphide 30 tablets No information available. 
Sodium cyanide 64 capsules and three 
peppermint chocolates. 
No information available.  
Paraquat 1 x 75ml dose in whisky No information available.  
Mercuric oxycyanide 4g No information available 
Digoxin 1 x 5mg dose According to the evidence of 
CCB operator Abram (Slang) 
Van Zyl it was the intention of 
the CCB to murder ANC 
leader, Dullah Omar by 
tampering with his heart 
medication.158 It was not 
proved that the digoxin on 
the Sales List was used for 
this purpose.  
Colchicine 75mg – 10 fatal doses No information available. 
Cantharadine 170mg – enough for fatal 
doses for 17 people and 
three peppermint chocolates 
contaminated.  
No information available.  
                                                
157 Summary of the evidence used in the State’s argument against the acquittal of Dr Basson on the 
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Division, 12 May 2000.  
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 Biological agents   
Anthrax 1 envelope, the gum of which 
was contaminated with 
anthrax spores, 5 cigarettes 
contaminated, 5 coffee 
chocolates contaminated. 
(An unknown number flasks 
in 10ml and  25ml volumes 
containing freeze-dried 
anthrax spores were 
prepared and stored at RRL.) 
No information available. 
Botulinum 4 bottles of beer 
contaminated with botulinum 
toxin and five coffee 
chocolates were 
contaminated.  
No information available.  
Salmonella typhimurium 200g of sugar contaminated 
with salmonella. Two bottles 
of deodorant contaminated 
with Salmonella typhimurium. 
Dr Mike Odendaal testified 
that he was responsible for 
the contamination of the 
sugar with salmonella. He 
had been told that the sugar 
had been used at an ANC 
meeting in Soweto and that 
people attending the meeting 
had subsequently become 
ill.159 It was not proved that 
this was in fact the case. No 
information is available 
regarding the use of the 
deodorant.  
Vibrio cholera 32 bottles. According to the evidence of 
CCB operator, Pieter Botes, 
a bottle of Vibrio cholera was 
given to him. He instructed 
one of the officers under his 
command to contaminate the 
water supply of a SWAPO 
camp in 1989. The water was 
chlorinated and the cholera 
150 
had no effect on the 
residents of the camp.160 No 
information is available 
regarding the use of the 
remaining 31 bottles.  
B. melitensis Two doses.  No information available. 
 
Scaling-up and closing down 
Four years after starting work, in 1987, the senior management at RRL 
commissioned engineering firm Foster Wheeler (FW)161 to draw plans for an up-
graded facility which would include freeze-drying and storage facilities and a P4 
laboratory for dealing with highly virulent strains. Several laboratories were planned 
to deal with, inter alia, toxins, industrial chemicals and nerve agents. Odendaal, who 
was involved in the planning process, said the intention was to produce aflatoxins, T2 
toxin, anthrax, Brucella, Salmonella, botulinum and tetanus toxins.162 He was 
convinced that the purpose of the new facility was to allow RRL to move into large-
scale BW production, “[A]t the end of the programme we were planning a multi-
million rand containment facility, the plans had been drawn up and it was going to be 
built. This was going to be a state-of-the-art, large-scale production facility - we were 
going to make big quantities… that was why we wanted large volumes.”163 What is 
not clear is how or where these biological agents would have been used. As far as 
                                                                                                                                         
159 Testimony of Dr Mike Odendaal in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, Transvaal 
Division, 24 May 2000.  
160 Testimony of Pieter Botes in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, Transvaal 
Division, 15 May 2000.  
161 “Conceptual Design of New Virulent Strain Centre and Fermentation/Mycology Research 
Laboratories”, (for RRL prepared by Foster Wheeler South Africa, Pty Ltd, July 1988. Contract No 1-
1600-25112). Document held by the author.  
162 C.Gould and P. Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002, p99 
163 Chandré Gould interview  with Dr Mike Odendaal, Onderstepoort, 6 October 1999. 
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can be established from the documentation available, no military doctrine or strategy 
was developed to encompass the use of biological weapons. In addition, contracting 
international consultants to draw up the plans for the high containment facilities, the 
intention of which must have been clear to the consults since reference is made in 
the plans to “Group 3 pathogenic organisms” and “nerve agents,”164 would surely 
have raised concern about exposure of the programme. According to the plans 
developed by Foster Wheeler the total cost of the up-grade would have been some 
R6.1million.165 The fact that the consultants were not required to alert the British 
government to plans for such a facility in South Africa represents a failure of 
international oversight and detection systems. 
However, two years after the decision to develop plans for the new facility Swanepoel 
changed his mind and decided166 that the planned upgrade would not go ahead since 
there were insufficient funds available. Why a need had been seen for this new 
facility at this late stage of the programme, when the military products developed by 
RRL up to that point had been almost exclusively chemicals and biological agents 
which could be used for individual assassinations, remains unclear and is more 
puzzling in the light of the high cost of the new facilities. Basson was never called to 
testify about the plans, neither was Knobel, and Basson refused to grant me an 
opportunity to interview him. As a result it will remain uncertain whether the upgrade 
was authorised by military leaders, or was an expression of the unbridled ambitions 
of the senior scientists at the facility.  
All the evidence indicates that the scientific management of RRL under Wynand 
Swanepoel was weak. The organisation began to experience problems related to bad 
inter-personal relations and the scientists lacked direction. Swanepoel a former 
member of the Special Operations Unit and a dentist by profession, told the TRC that 
he had no knowledge of the scientific work conducted at the front company and 
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concerned himself only with administrative tasks.167 Scientists who worked there 
were under the impression that Swanepoel was more concerned about the interior 
decoration of his office than he was about the work done. Scientists at RRL agreed 
during interviews that from the time Swanepoel became managing director, they 
ceased to be given any clear guidelines on what they were expected to do. In the 
absence of a scientific compass, they simply began working on projects that 
interested them personally, but did not necessarily have any military value. The 
microbiologists motivated their research to management by appending the phrase 
“has military application” to their proposals to ensure they would be approved. This 
was how Botha, under Odendaal’s supervision perfected the genetic modification of 
the Ecoli bacteria. Adriaan Botha’s objective was to develop a vaccine that would 
protect sheep against one of the lethal toxins expressed by the Clostridium 
Perfringens bacteria. Ecoli can produce far larger quantities of the toxin, so the idea 
was to modify Ecoli to express the Clostridium toxin. While Botha was clear about his 
intention to develop a harmless vaccine, he was fully conscious that his work could 
also lead to development of a dangerous and frightening biological warfare agent. 
Management of RRL was so lax at that stage that that Botha and Odendaal - who 
directed his work – believed they were in full control of the research they were doing. 
Whether or not this was naïve was never put to the test, and Botha was never asked 
to apply his process to development of a bio-weapon.168
In 1991 Roodeplaat Research Laboratories was privatized through an arrangement 
that saw RRL’s top management receiving generous payouts. Swanepoel admitted to 
the TRC that for an investment of R50 000 in RRL shares around 1989, he had 
received a payment of R4 million for his shares when the company was privatised.169  
The total cost of RRL to Project Coast, as audited, amounted to R98 432 657. This 
figure includes the cost of building the facility, total running costs and the payment 
made by the SADF when it was privatised. The only annual figures available show 
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the running costs of the company for the financial years 1987/8 and 1988/9. In the 
financial year 1987/8 about R3 million was spent. The following year the costs had 
more than tripled to R11 million.170
Table 4. Chronology of the front companies of Project Coast 
1982 Ministerial approval granted for the establishment of Delta G Scientific. The 
company starts with a staff of 25 at the Special Forces Headquarters. Delta 
G staff approach Daan Goosen at the HA Grové Institute for advise about 
animal experimentation. 
1983 Jan Lourens joins 7 Medical Battalion. 
Daan Goosen and Wouter Basson develop a relationship and prepare 
papers about BW agents. 
Daan Goosen gives Basson, at his request, a black mamba and a quantity 
of its poison. 
Goosen is recruited to start RRL. 
1985 The new research, design and production facility for Delta G Scientific in 
Midrand is completed. 
The RRL facility is fully operational. 
1986 Basson establishes a group of companies in the Cayman Islands called 
WPW Investments. 
Lourens starts Systems Research and Design (80% share is owned by 
WPW Investments) 
Rudolf Louw establishes Project Academic 
Willie Basson is replaced by Philip Mijburgh as head of Delta G Scientific 
Daan Goosen is replaced by Wynand Swanepoel as head of Roodeplaat 
Research Laboratories. 
1987 QB Laboratories (a division of SRD) begins the production of assassination 
weapons. 
Koortzen takes over QB Labs (but not the development of assassination 
weapons). 
Protechnik is established by Jan Lourens. 
A major upgrade is planned for RRL and consultants are contracted to 
develop plans for new laboratories. 
1988 Lourens delivers an assassination weapon to a military operator in London. 
The relationship between Basson and Lourens sours. 
1989 Medchem Consolidated Investments gains a 75% share in Delta G 
Scientific. Medchem is directed by Philip Mijburgh. 
RRL scientist, André Immelman provides military and police operators with 
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chemical and biological agents and toxins. 
Swanepoel decides not to go ahead with the planned upgrade of RRL citing 
insufficient funds. Swanepoel makes a personal investment of R50 000 in 
RRL shares. 
1990 Delta G Scientific staff are given shares in the company during privatisation. 
1991 RRL is privatized. Swanepoel is paid out R4 million for his shares. 
1993 In March the military contracts with Delta G Scientific are completed. 
Protechnik is sold to Charles Van Remoortrere. 
1994 Protechnik is sold to Armscor by Van Remoortrere.  
Lifestyle Management is established. 
  
 
The nature and effect of secrecy at RRL and Delta G Scientific 
The need to maintain the secrecy of Project Coast had implications for the way in 
which science was conducted, the construction of the facilities, the relationships 
between scientists in the facilities and between themselves and their colleagues in 
the national and international community. Certainly the moral opprobrium which 
chemical and biological weapons carry provided cause for the scientists themselves 
to seek to hide their own role in their production and, as became clear at the TRC 
hearing in 1998, many of them had never spoken to their closest family members 
about the nature of the work they undertook. However, the closed community in 
which the scientists operated also allowed for the development of a moral economy 
in which it was conceivable for them to weigh the production of assassination 
weapons against the development and production of animal vaccines and come to 
the conclusion that the harm caused by providing weapons for use against enemies 
of the state was morally countered by the ‘good’ of protecting animals against 
disease.171 Their consciences, therefore, remained clear. Basson too played a role in 
ensuring that the scientists who experienced moral dilemmas about the production of 
chemical and biological weapons resolved these by transferring responsibility to the 
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users of the weapons, as will be demonstrated through the interactions described 
below.  
The planning of both the RRL and Delta G facilities included consideration of the 
need to ensure that the true nature of the companies remained secret. It was for this 
reason that RRL was located close to other commercial agricultural facilities and 
Delta G was located in the heart of the industrial chemical area in Midrand, to add 
credibility to their claim of being private companies. However, in both cases care had 
to be taken to ensure that the waste products were carefully disposed of so as not to 
arouse suspicion. In the case of Delta G this referred to chemical wastes, whereas 
the clandestine disposal of animal carcasses was the chief concern for RRL. An 
incinerator was built close to the RRL animal experimentation laboratories so that 
any observers (including satellite) would not be able to detect the large number of 
animal carcasses which were disposed of after testing, certainly a higher number 
than would have been disposed of by a conventional commercial facility. At Delta G 
one of the plants was originally designed as a waste treatment facility, but according 
to Jordaan, this plant was seldom used172 as ultimately the waste generated by Delta 
G was relatively innocuous. All wastes were dealt with by a commercial waste 
disposal company: Waste-Tec. The waste treatment plant was later turned into a 
production plant for Bromoxinyl, a herbicide used in sugar cane cultivation, and one 
of the commercial projects taken on in order to maintain the company’s cover. 
As mentioned previously, most of the scientists working within the front companies of 
the chemical and biological warfare programme retained their associations with their 
colleagues, mainly at the University of Pretoria, Rand Afrikaans University, the 
University of the Orange Free State and particularly at the Onderstepoort Veterinary 
Faculty of the University of Pretoria and its institutes. Scientists at Roodeplaat 
Research Laboratories also retained contact with colleagues at the National Institute 
of Virology (NIV). Although the NIV was the only facility in South Africa which had 
laboratories with the necessary bio-safety levels, and sufficiently trained staff to work 
with viruses, there is no evidence to suggest that the NIV was involved in doing work 
for the biological warfare programme. Within the Pretoria-based scientific community 
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Delta G was referred to jokingly as “the secretive organisation” (die geheimsinnige 
organisasie)173 indicating that within this community there was at least a suspicion 
that the company was not what it appeared to be, however, given the level of fear 
and secrecy that prevailed at all levels of society during the apartheid years, this did 
not result in uncomfortable questions being asked about the nature of work at the 
company.  
Not all those recruited were aware of the role of the front companies in developing a 
chemical and biological warfare capability. All scientists were required to sign 
documents swearing them to secrecy and were subject to extensive security 
clearance procedures which would at least have alerted them to the connection with 
the military. Most senior Delta G Scientific staff were aware that they were working 
for a military front company and that that their responsibilities included research and 
the development of crowd control agents and chemical warfare defence, though 
junior staff remained often unaware of this. Delta G scientists concurred in interviews 
that open forums for discussion of technical aspects and the general business of the 
company did not exist. Secrecy and “security” were much in evidence. Filing cabinets 
were kept under lock and key. Offices were required to be elaborately locked even if 
the occupant was going for a walk down the hallway, though gossip and tearoom 
discussions ensured that most staff knew what was being researched most of the 
time. Once on the payroll, scientists were subject to stringent security in the 
workplace, barred from discussing their work with colleagues who were not part of 
their specific research teams. Some scientists believe that their homes might even 
have been secretly monitored. Returning home one evening after a frustrating day in 
the laboratories, one of the Delta G scientists complained to his wife of tensions at 
work, only to find himself answering to his boss for his indiscretion the following day. 
Warnings like this kept the scientists in line, made them afraid to challenge the 
system and powerless to change the course of the programme they found 
themselves involved with.174
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Production was also secretive at Delta G. Raw materials delivered to the plant were 
immediately stripped of all identifying marks and given code-names. Final products 
were also coded. The production manager, Corrie Botha, was never told what 
substances the plant was producing.175 He was merely given instructions as to the 
process to follow, provided with the raw materials and told to deposit the final product 
in the appropriate warehouse. Nevertheless, he was often able to work out what the 
substances were. Industrial safety precautions did not appear to be a major concern 
of management.  
According to Immelman, some time after the mid-80s, he began to question the 
legitimacy of the work being done by RRL. He voiced his doubts to Basson, and was 
assured that all projects had the approval of the State Security Council (SSC). Even 
though Immelman had no idea who or what the SSC was, he accepted Basson’s 
word.176 When Wynand Swanepoel became managing director of RRL, he frequently 
reminded Immelman of the importance of maintaining good relations with Basson; 
clearly this contained an implicit threat against antagonising Basson. Immelman also 
recalled that Basson frequently told the scientists that it is not the arms dealer who 
will be held accountable for the “irresponsible” use of a firearm, but the person who 
uses it.177 Immelman began to realise that the toxins he supplied were probably 
being used to kill people, and said he became resigned to the fact.178  
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All the scientists who testified at the TRC hearing referred to the secrecy surrounding 
their work and the need-to-know basis on which business was conducted. Some 
scientists in RRL had no knowledge of what a scientist in the next room was doing. 
Although most of the scientists talked to each other and had, at least, a general 
understanding of what others were doing. One of the scientists admitted to being 
afraid to leave the company for fear of his life, saying that he had been told by 
Basson that speaking out against the company or leaving could have life threatening 
implications.179  
The secrecy which governed scientific work at both Delta G and RRL had a profound 
influence on the ethics of the work done. Testifying at the TRC hearing, Schalk van 
Rensburg, who was also chair of the Animal Ethics Committee at RRL, stated that 
although he was required to review research proposals submitted by his colleagues 
before any animal experiments were conducted, he was denied access to the 
laboratory where these experiments took place. Koblentz described the effects of 
secrecy: 
The high degree of compartamentalisation of the programme allowed 
Basson to circumvent the usual organisational and procedural checks 
and balances of secret military programmes. As a result, Basson was 
able to control the entire programme and manipulate his overseers as 
desired. Basson was in charge of personnel decisions, the programmes 
research agenda, budgetary matters, as well as overt and black market 
procurement. Basson would eventually exploit the secrecy and 
autonomy of his programme to abuse all of these responsibilities. The 
investigation of the TRC as well as Basson’s two and a half-year trial 
revealed how excessive secrecy, compartamentalisation, and lax 
oversight resulted in a programme that was both mediocre and 
murderous as well as highly corrupt and at great risk of proliferating 
biological weapons materials and know-how to states and terrorists.”180
The private companies 
The replacement of Willie Basson and Daan Goosen with Philip Mijburgh and 
Wynand Swanepoel at Delta G Scientific and RRL, was the first of a series of 
changes made by Basson in the mid-1980s to the structure of Project Coast. This 
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significant change, in which his close associates took over management of the front 
companies, was followed almost immediately by the establishment of a number of 
companies run by former Special Operation Unit members to provide services to the 
chemical and biological warfare programme. None of the companies established in 
this way were official front companies of the military, however, they relied almost 
solely on military contracts for their income. While the advantage to the military was 
that these companies did not require military management, this argument was 
apparently never put forward as Basson failed to consult with Knobel, Liebenberg or 
any other senior military officer about the broad restructuring. Had he done so some 
consideration may have been given to the potential proliferation risk posed by private 
companies which had both the capacity and technical knowledge to undertake the 
development of chemical weapons and which would be prepared to sell chemical 
weapons to individuals or countries seeking to proliferate. A number of the key 
companies associated with Project Coast are discussed below. 
Systems Research and Development 
In 1986 Jan Lourens left the Special Operations Unit to start a private company 
called Systems Research and Development. The company started in Lourens’ 
garage and only later moved to its own site. SRD had four components:181  
? Phoenix Service Station, a garage near the Special Forces 
Headquarters that could service the Nissan Skylines which Lourens 
had modified when he was a member of Special Operations. They 
had been modified to make them faster and to include specialised 
radio equipment.182  
? SRD Electronics, was a laboratory that took on chemical defence 
projects and which provided Basson with an electronic surveillance 
and counter-surveillance capacity, at his request.183  
160
                                                
181 Gould and Chaskalson interview with Lourens, 22 – 23 January 1998 
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
 
? QB Labs, which undertook mechanical work. The company’s main 
product was the packing of new generation teargas into hand-held 
spray devices for the South African Police. Bart Hettema, formerly of 
the Netherlands, was in charge of the aerosol programme and liased 
closely with Lothar Neethling in this regard.184 
? SRD, which undertook quality control and assurance of materials used 
in the manufacture of protective clothing and which did research into 
the development of detection technologies.185   
A year after its establishment, in 1987, QB Labs began producing covert 
assassination weapons with the assistance of former Rhodesian and ex-EMLC 
machinist, Philip Morgan. Morgan manufactured the assassination weapons 
designed by Lourens.186 The weapons included. 
? Signet rings topped with a coin, covering a small chamber which could 
contain a powder.187  
? Spoon-like blades that would contain a chemical in a cavity. One was 
a cigarette box from which a sharpened spoon would spring. The 
spoon contained poison which would enter the victim’s body. These 
spoon weapons were intended for use in prisons where spoon 
stabbings are commonplace. About seven were manufactured at QB 
Labs. The intention was that a fight would be provoked, a prisoner 
would be stabbed, and it would appear as if the fatal injury was the 
result of a prison brawl.188 
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? Screwdrivers with a syringe-like mechanism in the handle. A stab with 
the screwdriver would cause a liquid poison to be ejected. Between 30 
and 40 of these were made.189 
? Needled units operating on the same principle as the screwdrivers. 
Needles would emerge from the front of a tube. This mechanism was 
apparently not successful because it was too slow.190 
? Needled unit in bicycle pump191 
? Umbrellas and walking sticks. These devices shot out a 3mm 
diameter polycarbonate ball. Holes in the ball were intended to be 
filled with a poison. When the ball was shot into the victim’s leg, it 
would cause a stinging sensation like a bee sting. The autopsy would 
not reveal the cause of death since polycarbonate is not revealed on 
X-rays. These were intended for assassinations in Europe or the UK. 
Lourens purchased the walking sticks and the umbrellas during one of 
his trips abroad. He speculated that the balls could have been packed 
with chemicals at Delta G or at RRL.192   
Lourens told me that in 1988 or 1989, as a favour to Basson he undertook a trip to 
England to hand over an umbrella weapon and poison to CCB agent Trevor Floyd. 
Lourens was given two glass ampoules of colourless, watery liquid by Philip Mijburgh 
which he wrapped in tissue paper and sealed plastic bags.193 He testified in the 
Basson trial that he met Floyd as arranged, at a railway station in Ascot, and they 
proceeded to a cottage in Warfield, owned by Basson and his associates. While 
demonstrating the operation of the screwdriver to Floyd, Lourens got a minute 
amount of the poison on his hand and without thinking, wiped his lips. When he 
tasted a bitter taste, he realised what had happened. He could not remember much 
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about what happened next, but said he suffered vision impairment, began shivering 
and briefly lost consciousness. He drank some milk and Dettol which he found in the 
bathroom, and went to lie down. After about two hours he recovered. The 
prosecutors in the Basson trial believed that the poison may have been phenyl 
silitrane.  
Floyd’s targets were high ranking ANC members in exile, Ronnie Kasrils and Pallo 
Jordan.194  Lourens said that he and Basson discussed the special apparatuses 
made by SRD more than once; the last time while they were travelling in a British 
train together. Lourens was wrestling with his own conscience about the morality of 
the work he was engaged in. He told Basson of his concerns, who responded “sort it 
out with your God - I have”.195 In 1988 the relationship between Basson and Lourens 
broke down.196 Evidence presented in the Basson trial showed that Lourens’s wife 
Antoinette, who worked for Infladel, travelled frequently with Basson and was named 
as director of some companies in which Basson is said to have had an interest. 
Lourens suspected that his wife was romantically involved with Basson. Lourens and 
his wife divorced and she later married Deon Erasmus, an ex- member of the Special 
Operations Unit.  
In 1987 Johnny Koortzen, a psychologist working with Basson at 7 Medical Battalion, 
took over the running of QB Labs, SRD Electronics, and Phoenix Service Station.197 
Lourens maintained his relationship with Morgan and continued to oversee the 
production and design of assassination weapons, but expanded the defensive 
research and development component of SRD turning it into a new company called 
Protechnik which took on military contracts to test and develop defensive equipment. 
Before Koortzen took over the management of SRD, Lourens had owned 20% of the 
shares. The other 80% was owned by a company called WPW Investments. Lourens 
had been told by Basson that WPW were foreign investors whose local 
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representative was Wynand Swanepoel. Basson allegedly also told Lourens that 
WPW was owned by a German businessman, Hubert Blücher. Evidence gathered by 
forensic auditor, Hennie Bruwer, and supported by the testimony of US attorney, 
David Webster, during Basson’s trial, show that in fact Basson was the sole owner of 
this group of companies, established in the Cayman Islands in 1986.198 Basson 
contested this, stating in court that WPW was owned by his foreign principals. He 
named Blücher as one of these principals.199 The state’s case rested on the court 
accepting the evidence that Basson was the beneficial owner of the WPW group of 
companies. Many of the fraud charges against Basson were, however, dropped 
when the judge found the testimony of Webster to be unreliable and found that the 
WPW Group of companies had operated to the benefit of the Defence Force.200 
However, what remains undisputed is that Basson did restructure the companies 
associated with the CBW project, placing his inner circle of friends and trusted 
associates in positions where they could benefit from lucrative military contracts. 
Protechnik 
A number of the scientists that had started working at Delta G Scientific later joined 
Jan Lourens at Protechnik to continue work on the development and testing of 
defensive equipment and materials for the SADF. The company expanded rapidly 
and by 1998 moved to a new, well equipped facility outside of Pretoria.201 Initially 
research at Protechnik was financed by the South African Medical Services and later 
by Armscor.202 Ironically, while Protechnik was focused almost entirely on developing 
defences against the use of chemical weapons, it was this company that presented 
the most serious proliferation danger. In order to test defensive equipment purchased 
by the military, scientists at Protechnik manufactured small amounts of conventional 
warfare chemicals. This meant that when, during the mid-1980s, Lourens was 
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approached by a foreigner seeking assistance in the development of chemical 
munitions the company had the technical knowledge and facilities to oblige. The 
absence of any military control over the activities at the company meant there was 
nothing stopping Lourens from agreeing despite the clear proliferation dangers such 
activities posed. Lourens explained his interaction with the Israeli arms dealer and 
others as follows: 
I interfaced on three occasions with weapons systems or potential 
weapons systems for foreign entities, individuals.  The first case it was 
my partner at the time in Protechnik, Charles Van Remoortrere, had a 
potential customer.  I knew him as Mr Mombar and he wanted a binary 
weapon developed. A binary weapon is a weapon with two chemicals 
that would be separated … once you fire this, the two chemicals would 
mix by whatever mechanism … and as the shell explodes it delivers the 
toxic substance.  So we worked on this concept in actually developing 
the shell and the two chemicals, it’s a substance called VX,  a nerve 
agent.  It’s a binary nerve agent.  The unit was given to Charles, I left, 
and as far as I know the programme never went anywhere.203   
It is likely that the person Lourens dealt with was convicted chemical arms dealer 
Nahum Manbar. In 1999 Manbar was found guilty by a Tel Aviv district court of 
“aiding an enemy state with intent to harm Israel’s security, by having sold chemical 
weapons-related materials to Iran”.  The 80-page judgement says: “He played a 
double game, supplying the Iranians with components for weapons of mass 
destruction, while deliberately misleading the Shin Bet regarding his business 
deals”.204 Manbar appealed against his 16-year jail sentence but details of the appeal 
were not available at the time of writing.205 Lourens said that the weapon was never 
delivered, although the dealer was shown the prototype. He also said he had never 
reported the discussion to any military structures because this was a ”difficult and 
confusing” time for him. 206
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Like SRD, Protechnik shareholders also included foreigners. Lourens owned 
between 20 and 25% of the shares in Protechnik whilst Charburn (a Luxembourg 
based company), owned the balance. Charburn sold some of its shares to Medchem 
– a company  owned by Philip Mijburgh. Two Belgian citizens, Charles Van 
Remoortrere, who resided in South Africa, and Bernard Zimmer, who resided in 
Luxembourg, owned Charburn. These two men and their companies, ABC Import, 
YCVM cc; Technotech, Charburn and Hazmat,207 played an important role in the 
development of protective clothing for the SADF. They also made foreign bank 
accounts available to Basson for the covert transfer of funds.208
In March 1993 Lourens left Protechnik and Van Remoortrere was informed that 
Medchem, the holding company of Protechnik, intended selling the company. Van 
Remoortrere owned two companies involved in the trade and testing of protective 
clothing, both of which were dependent on Protechnik for contracts. In order to 
protect his financial interests he either had to purchase Protechnik himself or stand to 
lose a great deal of money. However, he was aware that the credibility of the testing 
process could be called into question if the same person owned the company which 
provided the protective clothing and the company which tested it. He also believed it 
was inappropriate for a foreigner to control the manufacture of defensive items for the 
South African military, a fact which appeared not to have concerned Basson or 
Knobel. Van Remoortrere approached both Knobel and Armscor,  requesting that the 
military purchase the company. When no immediate answer was forthcoming, he 
went ahead with the purchase. He then began lobbying the Surgeon General again. 
In September 1994, a year later, the facility was purchased by Armscor.209  
Between 1988 and 1993 Protechnik’s SADF contracts, paid from Project Coast 
funds, amounted to just over R10 million.210 Protechnik is still classified as the only 
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South African single small scale facility under the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
and is therefore subject to regular international inspections by the Organisation for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).211   
Lifestyle Management 
In 1986 medical doctor, Dr Brian Davey was conscripted to the Defence Force. He 
joined 7 Medical Battalion under Basson’s command. Soon afterwards he was 
instructed by Basson to develop chemical defence procedures to be followed in the 
event of a chemical attack. He was also instructed to design training courses for 
medical staff and soldiers. Before Davey set these up in 1988 (the research and 
development process having taken two years), the Defence Force had no detailed 
procedures or doctrines for CBW defence.212  
During the process of investigating these defensive strategies, Davey realised the 
protective suits designed for use in the cooler northern hemisphere were 
inappropriate for use in African conditions. Until 1988 he had conducted his research 
work on the ergonomic problems of protective clothing at the CSIR. At 7 Medical 
Battalion he realised that he needed more extensive facilities, where multidisciplinary 
physiological testing could be conducted. He discussed the matter with Basson who 
agreed that upgraded facilities were necessary. He told Davey that he doubted if the 
SADF would establish such a facility itself, but would be prepared to contract to a 
financially independent company. He put Davey in touch with his finance company, 
WPW, represented by accountant Tjaard Viljoen.  
Davey, Koortzen and Deon Erasmus (also from 7 Medical Battalion) drew up a 
business plan and received SADF contracts. This was how Lifestyle Management 
came into being and began testing the suitability of NBC protective clothing in 
Southern African conditions. In the non-military field, the company was active in the 
area of occupational health and fitness promotion.  
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Forensic auditor Hennie Bruwer said his investigations revealed that in 1990 
Medchem Consolidated Investments was a 50% shareholder in Lifestyle 
Management and wholly owned the property where the company operated. The 
percentage of Medchem’s interest in the company changed over time. Through 
Medchem, WPW also had an interest in the company. The auditor’s report also 
shows that Lifestyle Management’s SADF contracts, paid from Project Coast funds, 
amounted to some R8 million between 1989 and 1993.213
By the early 1990s, South African involvement in the war in Angola had diminished, 
and so the amount of work being contracted in the protective clothing field 
significantly decreased. As Lifestyle Management had identified organisational health 
as its strategic business direction, Davey resigned from the company in 1992 to 
pursue his personal interests in chemical defence and disarmament, as an 
independent consultant to the Surgeon General, government ministries, and 
companies involved in that field.214  
Technotech, Hazmat and other companies associated with Coast 
Charles Van Remoortrere came to South Africa in 1983 to set up a factory for the 
Belgian company Syntex, near Port Elizabeth. The company was to produce a 
plastic-coated fabric. Van Remoortrere and his Belgian associate, Jean Pierre 
Seynaeve, agreed that he should try to sell other Syntex products to the South 
African military, including NBC protective clothing.215  To this end Van Remoortrere 
met with Lothar Neethling of the police and visited the Department of Special 
Requirements at Armscor.216 Initially he met with little success in trying to sell his 
products until Basson arrived at the factory and expressed an interest. Bason 
explained to Van Remoortrere that “the Russians were using Angola as a live testing 
ground.” Van Remoortrere, concerned about associating himself with what he 
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expected may have been an offensive programme, consulted his associate in 
Belgium and his father who had been a colonel in the Belgian army. He also spoke to 
the Surgeon General who assured him that the project he would be supplying was 
only defensive in nature.217 To convince Van Remoortrere that the threat against 
South African troops was real, Basson and Neethling took him and Seynaeve to 
Jamba in Angola where they were shown UNITA patients in a hospital and were told 
that these were the victims of chemical attacks. Van Remoortrere and Seynaeve 
established a good relationship with both Basson and Neethling. Neethling shared 
Seynaeve’s interest in weapons and they went on hunting trips to South West Africa 
together.218  
The relationship between Basson and Van Remoortrere was to prove profitable to 
both men. Van Remoortrere expanded his business interests into other companies 
which provided services to the military. He established Technotech in November 
1988 the main function of which was to provide the SADF with protective clothing for 
the CBW programme which it manufactured from material purchased from Syntex.219 
Between 1990 and 1993 Technotech received just over R49 million for NBC suits 
from Project Coast funds. According to Bruwer’s report, Technotech was equally 
owned by Zimmer, Van Remoortrere and WPW Investments.220 As mentioned 
previously, he also had shares in Protechnik and owned that company for a year. For 
Basson, their relationship led to others which provided him with the means to move 
funds internationally. Van Remoortrere introduced Basson to his Luxembourg-based 
friend, Bernard Zimmer, a management and financial consultant soon after their 
relationship developed into a friendship. Van Remoortrere already had a personal 
bank account in Luxembourg (opened May 1979) which was managed by Zimmer. In 
1986, soon after their first meeting, Basson asked if he could use Van Remoortrere’s 
account claiming he needed the ability to pay for goods and services outside of 
South Africa and Zimmer was granted signing powers on it from December of that 
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year.221 This account, known as the “Barcelona account”, became increasingly active 
after this date, with all transactions through it being initiated by Basson. Van 
Remoortrere played no further role in the running of the account and all instructions 
regarding it were issued to Zimmer by Basson. Zimmer ran the account exclusively 
on Basson’s behalf and made no payments from it without his prior instructions. At 
the same time, Basson instructed Zimmer to set up another holding company, Luft,  
registered in Luxembourg. Subsidiary companies followed - Biskara, registered in 
England as a “trading” company (according to Zimmer, it did very little business); 
General Golf Investments, which was to invest in golf resorts; and Genavco, set up in 
December 1993 with the sole purpose of buying and running the Jetstar aircraft 
Basson was to purchase.222  
Another private company established to provide services to Project Coast was 
Intramex. This company was wholly owned by WPW Investments Inc based in the 
Cayman Islands.223 This was one of the companies which drew the attention of the 
Office for Serious Economic Offences (OSEO) in 1992. Seeking answers about the 
relationship between this and other companies and Project Coast the OSEO asked 
Knobel to explain the purpose of the companies. It was clear from his response that 
he had failed to exercise any managerial authority over Basson’s activities and 
indeed did not know the answers to many of the questions. He turned to Basson who 
provided a convoluted answer which revealed how the secrecy surrounding Project 
Coast had provided the opportunity to establish these private companies:  
With the escalation of the war in Angola in 1987 and the accompanying 
threat there was a need in the SA Army for certain offensive and 
defensive equipment.  At this stage the technology and products were 
only available from companies that had been or were fronts (e.g. Delta 
G Scientific) or private companies that developed specific technology for 
Project Coast. With regard to companies in both these categories there 
was a clear order from the CMC that these sources of technology could 
not be made known. It was therefore decided that the above mentioned 
products (in the case of Delta G – new generation teargas) would be 
bought by the Army through Armscor which would receive money for 
this purpose from the Army. Project Coast finances were not used for 
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this production. Seeing that Armscor was not meant to have known 
about the source of the new generation teargas, a front company was 
established which would purchase this substance from Delta G and sell 
it to Armscor. Only costs relating to the running of the front and the 
physical handling of the substance delivered were added to the price at 
which Delta G delivered it.224  
Basson went on to explain that the CMC had authorised Tjaard Viljoen to manage 
the company.225 Viljoen’s wife and Patricia Leeson (Lothar Neethling’s niece) had 
worked for the company. Basson himself took over directorship of the company in 
early 1990 after Viljoen became ill and was hospitalized.226 His explanations implied 
that it was not possible for the one arm of the military to supply another arm of the 
same military with necessary substances, clearly an implausible argument.  
The cost of Project Coast  
Bruwer found that from 1 April 1983 to 28 February 1992 (the operational period of 
the CBW project) R418.2-million of military funds were allocated to Project Coast. 
From 1 March 1987 to 28 February 1993, the period during which it was alleged that 
Basson had perpetrated enormous fraud, the project had access to R340.9-m, of 
which, Bruwer believed some R37-m had been misappropriated. 227   
The bulk of Coast funding was spent on the establishment and privatisation of Delta 
G Scientific (R127.4-m) and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (R98.4-m) while 
R66-m was spent on NBC suits, money which came from the Special Defence 
Account. Other expenditure was: R10.6-m to Protechnik (March 1988-February 
1993), R8-m to Lifestyle Management (March 1989-February 1993), R1.4-m to Data 
Image (March 1991-February 1993) and R634 383 to Organochem (March 1992-
February 1993). In the 1992/93 financial year, R1.9-m was paid to Aeromed for 
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charter flights.228 WPW or Medchem Consolidated Investments, companies in which 
Basson was listed as a director, had interests in all the service companies.   
The budgets of Project Coast present an interesting picture of a project concerned 
with offensive development late into the 1990s. The approved annual budget for the 
period April 1991 to March 1992 is for an amount of R65 815 550. This included an 
amount of R14 000 000 for chemical research, R10 538 440 for biological research  
and R4 750 092 for defensive and material research. A total of R27 115 500 was 
budgeted for defensive equipment (gas masks and protective clothing) and R1 000 
000 for “own CBW operations”.229 The budget for the period April 1992 to March 
1993 is some R20 million less. In this budget a total of R7.75 million is made 
available for research, most of which is dedicated to defensive and material research 
and physiological research. R2.05 million is made available for “own CBW 
operations” which remain undefined.230   
The relationship between the CBW programme and the police 
and operational units of the military  
Since Project Coast was, at least in part, established to address the PW Botha 
government’s need to suppress internal political opposition it was essential for the 
Project Officer, or more generally, project management to have a channel of 
communication with the police who were responsible for suppressing civilian 
resistance. Basson’s personal relationship with the SAP forensic chief, General 
Lothar Neethling, was one such channel. Daan Goosen claimed to have introduced 
the two men. Goosen was, at that stage, married to Neethling’s niece. Basson and 
Neethling immediately got on well and became personal friends.231 Their relationship 
went well beyond their professional contact. Testifying in the Basson trial, Niel 
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Kirstein, the property developer in some of Basson’s enterprises, said that Basson 
and Neethling owned adjacent properties in Pretoria and that they intended 
purchasing the adjoining properties with the view to development.232 Kirstein also told 
the court about a Sunday flight to Walvis Bay with Basson and Neethling, who had 
“an appointment” in the enclave. According to Basson’s defence advocate, Jaap 
Cilliers, Basson and Neethling were on official duty all day, meeting representatives 
of UNITA, Germany and Portugal. No explanation was given as to what this meeting 
was about or who the foreign representatives were.  Basson testified that he and 
Neethling had been responsible for jointly developing the “recipe” for the CR fill for 
“projectiles”, of which he said thousands were made.233  
During Basson’s trial and the earlier TRC hearings, it emerged that during the early 
years of Project Coast Neethling visited  Roodeplaat Research Laboratories234 as 
well as the laboratories at the Special Forces headquarters235 which were used by 
Basson. Knobel expressed surprise at the extent of the contact between the two men 
when he was questioned during the trial. He claimed to have been unaware of their 
relationship, and particularly of Neethling’s involvement in Project Coast,236 although, 
as manager of Project Coast he should have been aware of the formal co-operation 
between the police and the Project Officer. His ignorance reinforces the contention 
that Knobel failed to execute his managerial responsibilities and that the managerial 
oversight of Basson, and the project more broadly, was weak. 
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Van Remoortrere also testified about the relationship between the two men.237 
Neethling was the first person he approached when trying to market CW protective 
clothing to the South African security forces during the early 1980s. Van Remoortrere 
said Neethling proved to be well-informed on the subject of chemical protection, and 
asked many questions regarding not only the suits, but the accessories - gloves, 
boots, masks and air filters.238 In 1984 or 1985, Neethling introduced Van 
Remoortrere and Basson to one another. In 1986 the three men travelled together to 
Belgium to meet with Jean-Pierre Seynaeve, managing director of Seyntex, near 
Ghent. According to Van Remoortrere, Neethling’s role on the European trip was that 
of technical adviser to Basson, as Neethling allegedly had a “vast” knowledge of 
CBW.239 In 1984, Basson and Neethling had attended a conference hosted by Aubin 
Heyndrickx in Belgium, Basson masquerading as a policeman. There they met 
German industrialist Hubert Blücher, who, Basson testified, knew or was soon made 
aware that Basson was engaged in sanctions-busting for the South African security 
forces.  
In a document authored by Lieutenant General J.P. Van der Westhuizen,240 former 
head of Military Counter-intelligence, Neethling is mentioned as having been a 
sounding board for Basson on Project Coast matters.  When the document was 
shown to Neethling during the TRC hearings he denied the allegation. However, 
despite his denials it is clear that the relationship between Basson and Neethling was 
close and Neethling had first-hand knowledge of a number of key issues pertaining to 
the chemical and biological warfare programme. It was to Neethling that Johan 
Koekemoer, an organic chemist at Delta G Scientific, turned when he had concerns 
about the production of the rave drug MDMA for crowd control purposes in the early 
1990s. He told Neethling that he had been instructed by Basson to produce a ton of 
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the drug. Neethling showed no surprise, as if he already knew of the plan, and he 
debated the various methods of production with Koekemoer.241  
Neethling also knew about the production of CR for crowd control. According to his 
evidence before the TRC, CR was used on at least two occasions by the police to 
control crowds. Anti-apartheid activists in Gauteng believe that it may have been 
used in Phola Park, a township outside Johannesburg, in 1992.242 Badenhorst said 
that it was standard practice for Defence Force soldiers doing township patrols to be 
issued with CR between 1986 and 1987. At that stage Badenhorst controlled the CR 
stores.243 There are no publicly available records to show when or how often CR was 
used internally, although there is a perception amongst anti-apartheid activists that 
there was a point during the 1980s when the teargas the police were using became 
more potent. It is likely that that this perception was based on CR replacing the more 
commonly used CS.  
The link between the police and the chemical and biological warfare programme may 
have extended beyond the use of teargas to the more sinister aspects of the 
programme. The state’s case against Basson with regard to the charges involving 
alleged human rights abuses, rested on the court accepting that pathogens and 
poisons produced at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories were given to members of 
the police and operators of the military’s Special Forces to be used to harm 
individuals who posed a threat to state security. The state called witnesses from the 
front company, operators and policemen in order to establish a chain of evidence 
which they believed implicated Basson in authorizing the use of chemical and 
biological agents in covert weapons. Whilst the judge accepted that the operators did 
indeed kill, or attempt to kill their chosen ‘targets’ in the ways they described, he 
rejected their testimony implicating Basson in the conspiracy. He said that the 
operators had testified under duress and had implicated Basson in the deeds in order 
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to save themselves from prosecution.244 The judgement, while finding that it was 
possible that poisons were used by operators and policemen, did not find the 
testimony linking the chemical and biological warfare programme to the specific 
incidents for which Basson was charged convincing.  
It remains unknown, for example, whether the three police officers who were the 
alleged recipients of organophosphates possibly responsible for the poisoning of well 
known anti-apartheid leader Reverend Frank Chikane in 1989 had in fact received 
the organophosphate, paraoxon from RRL researcher Dr André Immelman and 
whether they used it to contaminate Chikane’s underwear, as argued by the state.245 
The court accepted Basson’s testimony that he had introduced the three police 
officers to Immelman on the order of Liebenberg (Head of Special Forces) and that 
he believed Immelman would supply the three men with drugs which could quickly 
incapacitate people who they wished to arrest, or for unspecified use in cross border 
raids.246 The court also accepted Basson’s denial that he was aware that Immelman 
had made poisons available to the police officers, such as organophosphates.  
Basson’s position as head of the CBW programme, under the management of the 
Surgeon General would not, under normal military chains of command and control, 
have resulted in him having a relationship with operators. Basson’s position was 
however unique. While he was Project Officer for Project Coast, Basson was based 
at Special Forces Headquarters and received operational commands from the 
Commanding Officer of Special Forces.247 In addition, as head of a Special 
Operations Unit known from 1985 as Seven Medical Battalion which provided 
medical support to operational units of the security forces, Basson was responsible 
for ensuring that doctors accompanied operators on operations where it was possible 
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they would need medical support . Members of the Special Operations Unit were 
mostly medical doctors many of whom received Special Forces training. 
The state argued in the Basson trial that the close relationship between Special 
Forces and Special Operations extended to a relationship between the CBW 
programme and the covert units of Special Forces, in particular the ‘hit-squad’ unit, 
the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB). The state also argued that Basson, and other 
doctors from his unit had provided drugs for use in assassinations to the earlier 
incarnation of the Civil Co-operation Bureau, known as Barnacle. This SADF unit was 
established in 1979 as a covert operational division of Special Forces.  Initially code-
named D40, it soon changed its name to Barnacle. The primary objective of the unit 
was to “eliminate” (murder) enemies of the state, particularly leaders and key people 
identified as targets, including members of the SADF who threatened to expose 
secret information or otherwise posed a security threat.248  
The secrecy of Barnacle was of such paramount importance that any operator who 
posed a security threat was identified as a target for elimination. Whilst operators of 
the unit, including the units’ first commander, identified only as Mr K in the trial,249 
alleged that Basson was the main conduit of toxicants from the laboratories at 
Special Forces headquarters to the operators of Barnacle and the CCB, Basson 
denied the allegation and the court found that the allegations were not believable. 
Judge Hartzenberg found the operators to have given reliable testimony about their 
own involvement in murders, but he said that their allegations about Basson’s 
involvement were made in an attempt to save themselves from prosecution.250 Mr K 
told the Pretoria High Court in May 2000 that he had served in the Rhodesian army 
until 1978.  In February 1979 he joined the SADF’s Special Forces, based first at the 
Bluff in Durban as group commander of One Reconnaissance Regiment. Shortly 
afterwards, he was called to Pretoria by Major General Fritz Loots, commander of 
Special Forces, and together they went to see the Minister of Defence, Magnus 
Malan. Mr K was instructed to establish a front company to carry out clandestine 
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operations, and to teach South African forces methods used in Rhodesia.251  
Documents handed into the court provide details about the structure and objectives 
of the unit. A document dated 12 December 1980 states that the purpose of Barnacle 
was: 
(a) Eliminations. 
(b) Ambushes against strategic personnel. 
(c) The collection of information in support of relevant operations. 
(d) The collection of information where other sources in Special Forces 
cannot be used. 
(e) Conducting chemical operations. 
(f) Conducting certain special security tasks for Special Forces for 
example assessment of sources/agents and security spot checks of 
Special Forces personnel.252
The aims of the unit are reiterated in a document signed by Loots, in January 1981. 
The only difference was that in the later document “conducting chemical operations” 
is replaced by “conducting super sensitive operations as instructed.”253
According to the testimony of Mr K, orders and authorisation for eliminations were 
always verbal, from Loots to Mr K. The documents relating to Barnacle specifically 
state that the Director had no authority to make decisions on the elimination of 
targets, which was the sole province of the Commanding Officer of Special Forces. 
Elimination decisions were never questioned by the operators and the need-to-know 
principle was strictly enforced.254 When a task had been identified and a team 
appointed, the rest of the unit personnel knew nothing about it.  
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The unit was self-sufficient in respect of technical and logistical support, but funded 
by the SADF. In order to establish a cover for Barnacle, Mr K and a colleague, Johan 
Möller, established an estate agency, NKJM, as a front company. But they were 
unable to conduct any “legitimate” property deals because they did not know how. 
The name of the company was then changed to NKTF Security Consultants. The 
purchase of a smallholding near Broederstroom, from which Barnacle operated, was 
authorised by Defence Minister Magnus Malan and paid for with SADF funds.255
During 1979 and early 1980, Mr K recruited “experienced” soldiers from both the 
Rhodesian and South African forces.  These included Trevor Floyd, a Regimental 
Sergeant Major of One Reconnaissance at the time. Another Rhodesian, Gray 
Branfield (Special Branch), joined in mid-1979 and Danie Steyn, former Selous 
Scouts quartermaster, in 1980. Johan Theron was recruited as the security officer of 
the unit. Danie Phaal and armourer Phil Morgan also joined the unit. Colonel Ben 
Raubenheimer was appointed as the Chief Executive Officer of the front company to 
handle finances and administration. In time, the unit had between 30 and 40 
operators, of whom two-thirds were black. Their names remain unknown.256
Mr K testified that during the first few months of 1980, he and Trevor Floyd spent 
three weeks in trucks driving from Broederstroom to Rhodesia to bring back 
“everything” that had been supplied to the Rhodesian forces by Special Forces, 
including “special equipment.” What exactly was brought to South Africa from 
Rhodesia is unknown257 but may have included the poisoned clothing used by the 
Rhodesian security forces and later seen at the EMLC facility.  
Initially operations were confined to deep penetration reconnaissance. In time, the 
identification of external targets who had to be eliminated was added to the unit’s 
tasks. Mr K told the Pretoria High Court that when Reconnaissance commanders and 
SAP members involved in pseudo operations in Namibia began to experience 
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“problems” with certain “turned terrorists”,258 it was decided they should be quietly 
disposed of. At that point Barnacle, and particularly Johan Theron, Mr K and pilot 
Martin van der Linde, became involved in disposing of the bodies of SWAPO 
prisoners of war and own forces identified for ‘elimination’.259
According to Mr K’s logbook, the first time he was involved in dumping what he 
assumed were SWAPO members into the sea from an aircraft was July 7, 1979. He 
took part in at least seven operations, piloting the aircraft to remote and desolate 
airfields in the bush or the Namibian desert. Corpses in body bags or semi-comatose 
individuals would be transported and handed over.260 According to Burgess and 
Purkitt the SADF may have learned this modus operandi from the Portuguese in 
Angola: 
The Portuguese military were the first to use chemical and biological 
warfare for counter-insurgency warfare in Africa. Portuguese troops 
poisoned wells and threw prisoners out of aircraft. South African military 
officers were dispatched to Portuguese Army units in Angola to gain 
experience in counter-insurgency warfare. In general, South African 
military personnel were not impressed with the overall effectiveness of 
Portuguese counter-insurgency programs. However, officers who 
worked in Angola did learn first-hand how the Portuguese military used 
defoliants and napalm, mined trails, and poisoned water holes as tactics 
to counter their guerrilla enemies without having to engage in direct 
combat.261
Theron testified that Fort Rev in Ondangwa, Namibia, was the forward operational 
base for the Reconnaissance Unit and the base from which pseudo operations were 
conducted. SWAPO prisoners were detained in large detention barracks with 
interrogation rooms attached. According to Theron, the detention barracks were 
overcrowded and a decision was made to kill detainees identified by the 
Commanding Officer of the base and the South African Police commander in 
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Namibia.262 He also said that some SWAPO members captured during pseudo 
operations were “turned”. Others provided information and then were no longer “of 
any use”. Theron said “once they had served their purpose they were a problem.” 
The prisoners of war could not be detained because they could compromise the 
pseudo operations if they identified the operators after their release. Loots and 
Theron agreed that killing them and dumping the bodies in the sea would be the most 
effective way of dealing with “the problem”.263 Loots was not called as a witness and 
his version of these discussions was therefore not heard. 
Theron and Mr K both expressed moral reservations about throwing their victims 
from the aircraft without first making sure that they were dead, but they did not want 
to shoot the victims in case the bodies made their way to the shore. For the first trip, 
on July 11, 1979 involving a single SWAPO detainee, Theron obtained a tranquilizer 
dart, of the type used on wild animals, from EMLC. He was told by his EMLC contact, 
Jan Coetzee, that the dosage in the dart would kill a man.264 With Mr K at the 
controls, Theron picked up the victim from two SAP officers, a captain and a 
lieutenant, at a rendezvous in the Etosha Game Reserve. Once airborne, he plunged 
the dart into the man’s buttock but it had no effect. The man put up a struggle as 
Theron tried to subdue him, with Mr K shouting from the front of the aircraft “Just 
don’t shoot him”. He tried first, unsuccessfully, to strangle the man with his bare 
hands, then used a length of the “strong” self-tying plastic (for binding victim’s hands) 
around the man’s neck. Theron used a pair of pliers to tighten the plastic noose but 
even so, the man “would not die”. It took about 15 minutes before the victim stopped 
kicking, thrashing about and wetting himself. Theron could find no pulse. The rest of 
the flight was “uneventful” reported Theron, except that when they landed to strip the 
body, the plastic was “deeply embedded” in the neck and he had “quite a problem” 
removing it before the body was dumped.265  
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Theron was upset by the incident and turned to Loots for a solution. Theron claimed 
in his testimony that Loots consulted Basson in seeking a solution to the problem. 
According to Theron’s evidence, Basson gave him supplies of the muscle relaxants 
Tubarine and Scoline with which to inject the victims before disposing of the 
corpses.266 According to Theron in many cases the victims were first sedated with 
Vesperax (a sleeping tablet no longer on the market) or were injected with the 
anaesthetic Ketalar. The effect of the drugs was to paralyse the victim, including the 
respiratory muscles. Unless first injected with an anaesthetic, the victims silently 
suffocated to death whilst their minds remained alert. Basson denied these 
allegations, saying that he did not give the drugs to Theron, nor did he meet with 
Loots. The court found that while Theron was “certainly a strange man” whose idea it 
was to eliminate people who posed a security risk, his testimony implicating Basson 
could not be believed. The court also found that the meeting involving Loots, Theron 
and Basson had not taken place as claimed by Theron.267 It, therefore, remained 
unproved that there was a relationship between the chemical and biological warfare 
programme and the murder of SWAPO victims, it was not however in dispute that the 
operators had used the drugs in question to murder their victims. 
Barnacle was succeeded by the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), also known as ‘the 
Organisation’ in military circles. The functions of the CCB differed only slightly from 
those of Barnacle and included an emphasis on the collection of information about 
people, facilities and organisations regarded as enemies of the state. Target 
organisations of the CCB included the United Democratic Front and the South 
African Council of Churches.268 Unlike Barnacle, the huge CCB structure also 
included police officers.  
Secrecy shrouded the CCB. Any links to the state had to be well hidden. It operated 
on a cell structure and on a strict need-to-know basis. Members operated with 
pseudonyms and each member was financed to establish his own business as a 
cover for his activities. Some of the CCB members were military officers, others were 
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recruited from the police.269 The CCB was made up of an inner circle and an outer 
circle.270 The outer circle was made up of individuals who did not know they were 
working for the state. The organisation was divided into regions of operation, each 
with a co-ordinator and manager. Members of one region would not know who the 
members of any of the other regions were. The regional managers reported to the 
Managing Director, Joe Verster, who in turn reported to the Chairman, the 
Commanding Officer of Special Forces (from 1985 to 1989 General A.J.M. Joubert 
and from 1989 General E. Webb), and the Chief of the Defence Force.  There was a 
direct operational line of command from the Commanding Officer of Special Forces 
to the Project Officer of the CBW programme, which would suggest that there was a 
direct line of command from the CCB to Wouter Basson.271 The state argued that the 
CCB made use of substances provided by Basson, or on his authority, to murder 
Gibson Mondlane in Mozambique, Enoch Dhlamini in Swaziland, and to attempt to 
murder ANC leaders Pallo Jordan and Ronnie Kasrils in London, and Dullah Omar in 
Cape Town.272
Although Basson was not tried for the murders of Gibson Mondlane and Enoch 
Dhlamini, following a ruling by Hartzenberg that murders which took place outside the 
borders of South Africa were not within the court’s jurisdiction and he could not make 
a finding on these charges, testimony relating to the incidents was allowed.   In both 
the case of Gibson Mondlane and Enoch Dhlamini, the state attempted to prove that 
poisoned beer, obtained from RRL had been used to murder the ANC members. 
Operators testified that they had obtained poisoned beer,273 and RRL scientists 
testified that cans had been injected with poisons and the holes soldered shut at the 
front company. While the state was unable to prove Basson’s role in facilitating or 
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ordering the interactions there was no doubt that the toxicants produced by RRL 
were used by members of the police and defence force.  
The murder of individuals who posed an apparent threat to the security of the 
apartheid government was one of the primary goals of the CCB and Barnacle. This 
was not restricted to opponents of apartheid but extended to SADF members who 
were seen as a threat to the secrecy of SADF operations. Indeed the judge accepted 
the testimony of CCB witnesses and found that “their aim was to identify the enemies 
of the state and to ensure maximum disruption of the enemies of the state. In the 
process murder could have been committed, even through the use of poison. Their 
activities came to an end in September 1989.” 274
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CHAPTER 5 
International links 
The extent to which the development and maintenance of the CBW programme 
required and received international assistance is essential to consider and analyse if 
the intention is to draw lessons from this experience for disarmament. This chapter 
discusses Basson’s international travel and the relationships he developed with 
individuals and government officials and considers whether the South African 
programme received assistance from other countries; whether the programme was 
detected by foreign intelligence agencies and, what the response was from countries 
which may have been aware of the existence of the programme. I will argue that 
there is evidence to indicate that the intelligence agencies of at least the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Switzerland were aware of the SADF’s interest in 
chemical and biological warfare and were aware of Basson’s role in the programme 
from the early 1980s. Despite being states parties to the Biological and Toxins 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) these states chose not to confront the apartheid 
government with their suspicions about treaty violation until shortly before the 1994 
elections because they were neither threatened by the programme nor had much to 
gain politically from calling Pretoria to account. Indeed, it can be argued that the most 
significant contribution of other states to Project Coast was their silence. 
No evidence was presented during the TRC hearings or the Basson trial to indicate 
that there was any official foreign government support for the South African CBW 
programme. Returning to the assimilation analysis described in Chapter 1, the fact 
that (i) the products sought by the military from Project Cast were modest in scientific 
terms, (ii) there was a pool of skilled technicians who required no tutelage to find 
ways of meeting the needs of the military, (iii) the equipment and raw materials were 
either commercially available in South Africa or could be fairly easily purchased 
elsewhere (despite the economic sanctions against the country); there was little need 
for close international co-operation  - a factor which certainly lowered the threshold to 
making the decision to initiate the programme. Project Coast and the military did, 
however, need access to information about other programmes, scientific 
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developments and advances in the defence against CBW. In addition, the evidence 
would suggest that at least once an attempt was made by Basson to procure 
chemical substances from a foreign country.  
During his trial it was his role as intelligence agent that Basson played-up to present 
a picture of an international dealmaker who manipulated foreign intelligence agents 
to further the ends of Project Coast. What is equally as likely is that from the mid-
1980s Basson’s international financial dealings were aimed at self-enrichment rather 
than at serving the needs of the military. Basson certainly travelled extensively, 
interacted with foreign intelligence agents and even attracted their attention, at least 
in the early 1990s. Extensive reference to his alleged contact with foreign intelligence 
agents was made by his legal representatives during his trial who sought to prove 
that Basson had established an international network of intelligence agents who 
served his interests and those of the apartheid government. These included 
reference to his close relationship with Yusaf Murgham, who the defence lawyers 
claimed was an important Libyan intelligence agent. Unfortunately, the most detailed 
descriptions of Basson’s international network of contacts is contained in the 
transcript of a bail hearing on the charges of fraud brought against Basson, and 
public access to this transcript is prohibited by an in camera ruling.  
Basson certainly convinced his military managers of his success in gaining 
intelligence about the CBW programmes of other states. Knobel believed that 
Basson had ‘penetrated’ the chemical and biological weapons programmes of at 
least Russia and Iraq.1 Basson’s role as intelligence agent is, however, another 
indication of the tremendous freedom which he was accorded by senior military 
officers since intelligence gathering was usually the exclusive domain of the 
specialist intelligence officers of Military Intelligence. During the TRC hearing in 1998 
Knobel proudly told the commission that at the outset of the programme Basson 
“went on a world tour, he penetrated many different countries’ programmes and 
came back with that information.” He added that when the Minister of Defence 
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authorised initiation of the programme he gave a strict guideline that “no official co-
operation was to take place with any other country or organisation.”2
For his part Basson told the Commission that he had no problem obtaining 
information from scientists abroad. He said that all his intelligence gathering was 
done openly using his own name. Basson claimed that:  
The assistance I obtained was direct and indirect. Some of the scientists 
were really worried about what the Eastern Bloc countries were doing.   
Some of the scientists were more worried about what was happening in 
their own countries. Much of the information I gathered came from 
Physicians for Human Rights…they watched their governments so 
carefully to make sure that nothing would happen and they used the 
democratic systems in their own countries to obtain information and to 
force information from the government, and then they don't sell it, but 
they tell it to everybody else.3  
Basson also said that some western countries were interested in sharing the 
information which he came by, especially with regard to the capabilities of the 
Eastern bloc countries. This was the reason he gave for having “good access to 
senior government officials”.4 The claim that Western intelligence agencies were 
interested in South African intelligence was supported by a Swiss parliamentary 
delegation report which investigated the relationship between the Swiss Intelligence 
Unit and South Africa. The report states:  
With regard to the significance of contacts with South Africa, General Regli 
[Chief of the Swiss Intelligence Unit] pointed out … that an intelligence 
service needs information from different sources (including, therefore, from 
counterparts in other services) in order to be able to provide its own 
military and political authorities with reliable and corroborated analyses.  
During the cold war, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries 
represented the main threat for Switzerland.  Any information on these 
countries was of great importance. At this time, South Africa …. was 
engaged in a war in Angola against communist forces equipped with 
Soviet matériel. Any information gleaned from this war was of vital 
importance for the Swiss intelligence service. None of Switzerland’s 
neighbours in Europe had a comparable experience from which it could 
benefit.  Furthermore, the communist secret services were also very active 
in the African continent.  For this reason too the Swiss intelligence service 
was very interested in maintaining contacts with the South African secret 
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services.  It should be stressed, however, that it was the Swiss intelligence 
service which benefited from South Africa, rather than vice versa.5  
The battleground intelligence gathered by the South African military as a result of 
their involvement in the war in Angola was a strong currency during the Cold War 
and one of the reasons why Western nations may have been reluctant to alienate the 
apartheid government. However, the trade in intelligence is a specialized field and 
Basson had no training in this regard. Former Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, 
General Chris Thirion said he had been disturbed by the fact that Basson was given 
top security access to Military Intelligence headquarters and apparent free range to 
conduct intelligence gathering operations.6 Basson did not report back to Military 
Intelligence about his intelligence operations or contacts, nor did he consult with 
Military Intelligence prior to travelling. His independent dealings with foreign 
intelligence agents could have put sensitive Military Intelligence contacts at risk. 
Thirion could not explain why Basson was given this level of freedom, but thought 
that it had to do both with the significance of the task which Basson had to perform 
and Basson’s ability to manipulate people.  
I had an uneasy feeling about Wouter Basson in that he had a serious 
task to perform and of course that meant good access to the top 
hierarchy, even to the Minister. I think that he manipulated himself into 
that situation and manipulated the situation once he was there. He was 
no longer reporting to an official chain of command and he by-passed 
General Knobel who was in the formal chain of command. Basson 
would arrive at Waterkloof airbase when the Minister was there, flying 
somewhere, and would come to talk personally to the Minister. I didn’t 
like it. He was no threat to me, no bad blood, but I was under the 
impression that he was manipulating the situation in that he was allowed 
the scope to talk to the Minister.7
Basson, while head of Project Coast and a Brigadier, was nonetheless a middle-level 
manager in the military. This kind of access to the Minister of Defence was unusual. 
The products of Project Coast were not of such a nature that they could have made a 
significant difference to South Africa’s military position externally, nor could the use of 
CR as opposed to CS gas, or even the use of BW assassination weapons, have 
changed the course of the internal battle against opponents of apartheid. The facts, 
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therefore, indicate that there was some other benefit of Basson’s activities accrued 
by decision-makers at senior government level.  
Initial information gathering  
The first recorded international trip by Basson took place in 1981, shortly after the 
CBW programme had received authorization to proceed from the Minister of 
Defence. During this trip Basson attended a conference in San Antonio, Texas 
followed by a visit to the Chinese Army Chemical School in Taiwan. His notes from 
the San Antonio conference claim that he was well received by US military officers 
who, he said, shared information with him about chemical and biological warfare. 
One of the people he met was Dr William Augerson, who presented a paper at the 
conference. At the time Augerson was the deputy assistant Secretary of Defence for 
health resources and programmes.8 Basson’s notes include reference to Augerson’s 
statements indicating that the USA “does in fact do offensive research/have and 
offensive research capacity” and that “he [Augerson] states that any country with a 
chemical industry should be able to produce offensive chemicals.” Basson also 
credits Augerson with the opinion that, “chemical attack is an ideal tactical weapon 
against terrorist organisations”.9 He wrote that Augerson was “very concerned” about 
the “possibilities of biological warfare in the African theatre.”  
In a newspaper article that appeared in the Los Angeles Times following the TRC 
hearing in 1998, Augerson disputed Basson’s claims saying that   
In 1981 at the meeting of the Aerospace Medical Association I gave an 
open talk on chemical protection. Some remarks attributed to me 
appear to be lifted from that talk ….  After the panel meeting a South 
African physician who said he worked for South African Airlines 
(probably Dr Basson) asked if we could talk privately, which we did. He 
indicated that during his reserve medical service he encountered 
indications of chemical and biological warfare capability in Soviet allied 
forces in Angola. He told me some stories, I asked questions. I gave no 
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advice or suggestions. I did not speculate about Soviet BW activities in 
Viet Nam (sic). People like me do not speculate on such matters with 
foreign strangers- weather, sports, music, yes, BW no. The South 
African indicated he would be back in the US later and that he had more 
information. I indicated interest but never saw or heard from him again. I 
reported our conversation to the appropriate organization but was never 
contacted about it. I, and others responsible for the defence of US 
forces were obligated to learn all we could about the capabilities and 
threats from our major adversaries of that period. None of us would 
however have considered ‘paying’ for such information by assisting 
South Africa in developing chemical or biological weapons. One can 
only speculate on what Dr Basson was doing with his trip notes - 
impressing his superiors with his access to senior officials? Putting his 
ideas in the mouth of others to enhance his credibility?   They were not 
in any case a fair representation of my views or our conversation.10  
Augerson told me that he filed a report with the US Military Medical Intelligence and 
Information Agency (USMMIIA) at Fort Detrick, and perhaps also the Defence 
Intelligence Agency about his discussion with Basson. He tried contacting Basson 
after the meeting, indicating an interest in talking further, but never heard from him 
again. Augerson said it did occur to him that one reason for his inability to contact 
Basson might have been that an intelligence organisation had established contact to 
manage an interesting source. Augerson also said that although US Health Affairs 
had intelligence interests it was not set-up to manage any complex intelligence 
activity. Augerson wrote, “Basson probably looked like a messenger from South 
Africa who was offering information in exchange for what? You can assume that 
others would have been interested in information about Soviet threats, and there 
might even have been some willingness to assist in defensive efforts, but I cannot 
imagine anyone at the time knowingly contributing to an offensive programme.”11
Aside from calling into question Basson’s claims of assistance from US military 
officers, Augerson’s response shows that US intelligence agencies were alerted to 
Basson’s interest in chemical and biological warfare at the time that South Africa was 
initiating its programme. Thirion confirmed that the US Intelligence services were 
aware of Basson’s activities. He told me that, “in about 1985/6 a man from the CIA 
asked me if he could ask me a question but said that I did not have to give an 
answer. He asked me if Wouter Basson had taken over from Lothar Neethling – is he 
now the main brain in CBW? I answered that Wouter Basson was involved in CBW 
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counter measures and was therefore bound to rub shoulders with Lothar 
Neethling.”12
Augerson confirmed that Basson had offered him information about Soviet biological 
warfare training, information Basson claimed to have obtained from Cuban soldiers in 
Angola. However, it is extremely unlikely that Cuban soldiers in Angola would have 
had access to sensitive information about Soviet BW capabilities, especially since 
they only received defensive CBW training.13 Whether Basson had information of 
value to share or not, it is of significance that in the very early stages of Project 
Coast, US intelligence was aware of South African interest in chemical and biological 
warfare.  
Directly after the meeting in San Antonio Basson travelled to Taiwan to visit the 
Chinese Army Chemical School. Documents from this trip show that Basson was 
given a briefing by senior officers at the school who informed him both about the 
nature of NBC defensive training at the School and the structure of the chemical 
defence unit.14 Basson was never called to testify about this trip since it was not the 
subject of any of the charges against him, nor was there any indication that 
information about chemical weapons development was shared by the Chinese and 
thus it remained outside the interests of the Truth Commission. What is significant is 
that the Chinese allowed the visit by Basson who was clearly identified as a South 
African military officer, despite the fact that they were providing support to the African 
National Congress (ANC). One can only speculate as to why this may have been the 
case. Perhaps, as was the case with the Americans, the Chinese hoped to gain 
intelligence about the activities of South Africa and its Western Allies during the Cold 
War. 
Basson was not the only person associated with Project Coast who travelled and 
developed contacts internationally. During the early 1980s RRL Director, Daan 
Goosen also visited the US several times. Goosen claimed he had visited 
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laboratories where primates were exposed to nerve gas and that he had been frank 
about his intentions to gain knowledge about biological weapons. He said he had not 
hidden his relationship with the South African CBW program during discussions.15 
Goosen said he even gave the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) plans of RRL in 
1984/5 and discussed the possibility of RRL doing research into antidotes for nerve 
agents.16  This appears to support the contention that US intelligence agencies knew 
about South Africa’s interest in chemical warfare and possibly biological warfare and 
had good reason to make more detailed enquiries. Other events in the mid-1990s 
appear to confirm that they were monitoring the activities of Basson. 
The mid-1980s: building the international web of deceit 
As described in Chapter 4, Basson fostered a close relationship with Belgians, 
Charles Van Remoortrere and Bernard Zimmer, who benefited from military contracts 
awarded to their companies, and assisted him in developing financial mechanisms to 
facilitate international deals. The US lawyer David Webster and Swiss 
pharmacologist David Chu17 also formed part of the complex web of contacts Basson 
developed during the mid-1980s. Webster was responsible for setting up three 
holding companies in the Cayman Islands on behalf of Basson.18 All of these people 
visited the CBW facilities, yet all, except Van Remoortere, claim to have believed that 
Basson was merely a businessman who may have had contacts with the military. All 
say they never provided Basson with assistance in procuring any equipment or 
substances for the programme, claims the judge found to be unbelievable, saying in 
judgement that they were aware of the fact that they had assisted Basson in 
sanctions busting to the benefit of Project Coast. Whichever version is true, these 
peoples’ interest in Basson and Project Coast are more likely to have been motivated 
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by the possibility of self-enrichment than a desire to play a role in the development of 
chemical or biological weapons.  
Many of the fraud charges against Basson rested on the court accepting that the 
funds spent in the name of Project Coast by Basson, were not used to purchase the 
substances and equipment which Basson said they were. These included the alleged 
purchase of a sophisticated peptide synthesizer, which was later exchanged for 
methaqualone; large quantities of the growth hormone thymus, a computer system 
for predicting the spread of chemical agents, as well as cocaine and BZ. The court 
found that Basson had purchased all these items, yet scientists at RRL told the 
authors that Basson did not bring them a single culture,19 and the Delta G 
procurement officer said the company never had any problems procuring substances 
or equipment through the normal commercial channels. It appears unlikely that 
sensitive procurement was necessary for the two official front companies. Unless the 
state is successful in its appeal against the judgement and a new trial is held, it is 
unlikely that the question of whether Basson was acting in the interests of the military 
or seeking self-enrichment will be resolved. 
Larry Ford 
The relationship between Project Coast and rightwing American gynaecologist, Dr 
Larry Ford, was complex and has raised more questions than it has answered. On 2 
March 2000 Ford shot himself at his home in Irvine, California.20 In the months that 
followed, the suicide and the subsequent investigation led to Ford being linked with 
Project Coast. The connection was confirmed by Knobel, who told American 
journalists that he had introduced Ford to Basson during the mid-1980s. Knobel said 
that Ford had been a consultant to Project Coast.21  He considered Ford a friend, and 
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said they had a mutual interest in Africa’s AIDS pandemic.22 Allegations that Ford 
was linked to the CIA were made after his death when his wife claimed he had 
connections with the Agency while he was a student,23 but the CIA denied that he 
was employed by them. Between 1987 and his death in 2000, Ford made at least 
three trips to South Africa.24 Scientists testifying at the Basson trial said that they 
attended a day-long seminar by Ford near Pretoria when he showed them how to 
isolate and identify various toxic substances applied to everyday items such as the 
pages of magazines. He left various toxin-impregnated articles behind for research 
purposes.25 The South African scientists became sceptical of Ford after tests showed 
that his samples contained no lethal toxins, only common fungi. Delta G staff were 
also aware of the “Ford Hair” project - a search for a product that could cure male 
baldness, launched at Ford’s initiative.26 It was established during the Basson trial 
that the hair restorer formula was closely related to a lethal toxin, phenylsilitrane, 
produced by Delta G and which the prosecutors believed was the substance 
intended for use in the assassination device Lourens took to Floyd in England. 
Knobel said he met Ford in the late 1980s at the Los Angeles home of former South 
African trade attaché, Gideon Bouwer.  Bouwer, who died in 1990, is known to have 
been a friend of businessman Dino D’Saachs, charged with conspiracy to murder 
Ford’s business partner, Patrick Riley, and who was serving a sentence of 26 years 
to life, at the time of writing. Two other regular guests at Bouwer’s home, Peter 
Fitzpatrick and Tom Byron, told FBI investigators that Bouwer often boasted of being 
involved in the acquisition of biological weapons for South Africa with the help of Ford 
and others.27 Fitzpatrick and Byron claim they acted as FBI informers from 1985 and 
regularly reported on the activities of Bouwer and Ford during the UN arms embargo 
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against South Africa. However, there is no evidence that Ford supplied biological 
warfare cultures to Project Coast.28  It is also unclear why Knobel would have made 
use of Ford, who despite his alleged links to the CIA, was not a recognised expert on 
biological weapons and would not have had access to such weapons. 
Ford had joined with Riley to found a bio-technical research company, Biofem Inc.  
This company was working on a female microcide known as Inner Confidence from 
which Biofem hoped to make millions.  Ford claimed it would revolutionise the fight 
against AIDS. Riley maintained that he was never aware of Ford’s links with Project 
Coast, but he is known to have visited South Africa himself more than once. He was 
also known to Knobel.29 In February 2000, three days before Ford committed suicide, 
an attempt was made on Riley’s life in which Ford is believed to have played a role. 
Detectives investigating this failed attempt on Riley’s life believe that early testing on 
the female suppository took place on prostitutes in South Africa, and possibly also on 
US prostitutes.30 Knobel acknowledged helping Ford set up clinical trials for Biofem 
in South Africa, but claimed he has no further knowledge of the matter.31
Six sealed canisters buried in Ford’s backyard and dozens of bottles of unidentified 
liquid recovered from storage facilities suggest other motives for both the attempted 
murder of Riley, and Ford’s suicide. After being tipped off by a family member, 
authorities evacuated more than 200 people living in Ford’s neighbourhood, moving 
them out of their homes for three days as they searched for hazardous substances, 
arms, and ammunition.  Investigators found 17 illegal weapons, including machine-
guns, thousands of rounds of ammunition, explosives which investigators said could 
only have come from a military facility, a large quantity of potassium cyanide in a 
sealed container, jars of suspected toxins in a refrigerator in Ford’s garage, and over 
40 hunting rifles and shotguns concealed in secret compartments and under 
floorboards in his home. They also found biological agents – Vibrio cholera, a 
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clostridium, and Salmonella typhi, all apparently still viable.32 A search of the home of 
Dino D’Saachs, charged with driving the getaway vehicle in which Riley’s unidentified 
assailant escaped, turned up more guns and ammunition. A handbook titled “How to 
be a hit man” and a map of the Biofem parking lot, with Riley’s parking space marked 
with an X. D’Saachs, a tax consultant and auto shop owner, had been a friend of 
Ford's for more than 15 years.33  
The local police investigation into Ford expanded, to include the CIA, FBI and the 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms unit. Details emerged showing Ford to have 
conducted unauthorised medical experiments on patients, espoused extreme right-
wing beliefs, and fraudulently claimed scientific achievements. Ford had told 
neighbours that he once parachuted into Southern Africa to take blood samples from 
dead guerrillas so that American authorities could identify the biological agents they 
were being vaccinated against.34 According to Knobel, Ford was instrumental in 
formulating the SADF’s AIDS policy, and served as an adviser to the SA military 
during the 1991 Gulf War. Knobel said that Ford supplied South African military 
personnel stationed in Israel during the Gulf War with various anti-toxins. It is not 
known how Ford came by such substances, or in what capacity he supplied them to 
South African authorities,35 or indeed whether Knobel’s assertions are correct. 
Further information on Ford’s links to Project Coast was provided during the Basson 
trial. Dr Graeme Gibson, a medical doctor who had done AIDS research while 
serving in the military in the late 1980s, was instructed by Basson to launch a six-
month project funded by the SADF. Gibson’s research aimed to establish the effect 
of a peptide, Thym-uvocal, in the treatment of HIV-positive patients.  The research 
proposal, drawn up by Basson, specified that South African doctors involved in the 
project were to liaise with Ford on their findings. They were also to acquire “any 
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relevant CBW literature” from Ford.36 Gibson testified that in his opinion the proposal 
was scientifically deficient. He had submitted a revised test protocol which he 
believed was more acceptable. He never heard further from Basson about the 
research and as far as he knew, it was never launched.37  
Much still remains unknown about the relationship between Ford and Project Coast. 
It is still not known whether there was an exchange of biological agents between the 
programme and Ford or whether Knobel or Basson had joint financial interests with 
Ford. What is clear is that this relationship should have been noted by US 
intelligence agencies. 
The Croatian Deal: Outrunning the CWC 
The only large procurement deal which involved the assistance of Basson’s 
international contacts was a complex and convoluted deal with took place in the early 
1990s and involved Basson, Swiss arms dealer Jürg Jacomet, Croatian government 
officials, the head of the Swiss intelligence service, a Danish spy, forged Vatican 
bearer bonds and a loss of over R2million to the SADF. As with all Basson’s deals 
this one was difficult to unravel and the facts remain in dispute.  
According to both Basson and Knobel the deal came about following research done 
by Delta G scientists on methaqualone (mandrax) confiscated by the police. This 
research resulted in the development, to prototype stage, of mortar bombs filled with 
methaqualone. They claimed these were tested on humans and animals in 1986 and 
1987. Basson said the animals were given the drug orally and exposed to 
methaqualone smoke, and police volunteers were exposed to the smoke while 
engaged in a simulated battle organised by Neethling.38 The results were not what 
had been expected. Rather than having a calming effect on the test subjects, they 
showed elevated levels of tension, and according to Knobel, this led to the halting of 
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methaqualone production in 1988.39 However, a production report from Delta G 
Scientific shows that the company produced a ton of methaqualone during that 
year.40 Despite the fact that tests showed methaqualone to be unsuitable for crowd 
control purposes, the CMC authorised Basson to continue the search for a suitable 
variant, and allegedly urged him to act quickly as negotiations for the introduction of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention were underway and, once signed, it would be 
more difficult for South Africa to clandestinely procure chemical substances.41  
In line with the CMC’s instructions, Basson began negotiations at the end of 1991 to 
acquire a large quantity of methaqualone through the Croatian Minister of Energy 
Affairs, M Kajifeg. The deal was brokered by Swiss arms dealer Jürg Jacomet, and 
according to Basson, formed part of a much bigger transaction, involving the 
purchase of enriched uranium by Swiss Intelligence head, Peter Regli. By 1992 when 
it was finally agreed that the Croats would supply Basson with 500kg of 
methaqualone, four Croatian officials (Kajifeg, a border guard, a member of the 
Croatian Special Forces and a representative of the Croatian Army) had been drawn 
into the deal. None of them trusted the other, and all were wary of Basson and 
demanded guarantees of payment before delivery. Basson constructed a deal, 
approved at least in part by the CMC, which amounted to a double transfer of funds. 
One amount would be used to make cash payments from Jacomet’s bank account in 
Zagreb to the suppliers of the methaqualone, while the second would be placed in a 
Swiss bank as a performance guarantee. As soon as all four suppliers had been 
paid, Jacomet would accompany Basson to the bank, the guarantee would be 
cancelled and the money repatriated to Project Coast. But the deal went awry, and 
after only two of the suppliers had been paid, the Croatian authorities allegedly froze 
all the funds remaining in Jacomet’s account as part of an investigation into an 
unrelated arms deal. Despite this, Basson claimed that he brought the 500kg of 
methaqualone back to South Africa on 23 December 1992.42  
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The following morning Basson was informed by Knobel that he had been fired in a 
military purge by President FW de Klerk. Basson was placed on early retirement on 
31 March 1993, but immediately employed on a 12-month contract to ‘tie up loose 
ends’ and shut down Project Coast. Among the threads to be gathered was the 
recovery of more than $1-million from Jacomet. Basson had lost contact with the two 
suppliers who had not yet been paid and could no longer reach Jacomet. On 
returning to Croatia in January 1993 he was unable to trace the military officers 
involved in the deal, or Jacomet. It was not until March, Basson said, that he found 
Jacomet and “forced him” to set out in writing how the SADF’s funds had been lost.43
By May, Project Coast’s books could still not be balanced, and Basson went back to 
Croatia again, where he met Hendrik Thomsen, a Danish intelligence agent based in 
the Ukraine, who told Basson he had intercepted Vatican bearer bonds worth $100-m 
which were intended to fund the Croatian war effort.44 Basson saw an opportunity to 
use the bonds to his advantage. He would inform the Croats that he would return 
them as soon as Jacomet’s bank account was unfrozen. Basson claimed that 
Thomsen, however, suggested a simpler way of recouping the loss, and offered him 
bonds drawn on the Banco Di Napoli with a face value of $5-million that he could 
cash in order to make up the SADF’s loss. What followed seems to indicate that this 
may have been a trap. When Basson presented the bonds the bank asked for proof 
of ownership, which he was unable to provide. At some point during the next few 
months, Basson learned that the bonds were, in fact, forgeries. Jacomet had 
disappeared again and despite assurances from Regli that “the problem” was being 
attended to, the Swiss authorities had issued a warrant for Basson’s arrest.45
After two months on the run in Europe, Basson was arrested on arrival at Basel 
airport in December 1993 and detained for questioning for three weeks, until the 
SADF sent advocate Chris Marlow, who was closely linked to Project Coast, to pay 
Basson’s bail of 100 000 Swiss francs. A year later, Basson was recalled to 
Switzerland for further questioning, his bail was refunded and he returned to South 
Africa.  
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While the prosecution contended that this story had been invented by Basson to hide 
the fact that the missing funds were used for the benefit of the WPW Group, by the 
time Basson himself testified, the tale had become even more complex. Not only had 
he acquired half a ton of methaqualone through his Swiss contacts, he said, they had 
also been instrumental in helping him procure four tons of the chemical warfare 
agent, BZ.46 Why the SADF would have wanted such a large quantity of an agent at 
that stage, which could not be utilised for riot control, was never explained. Basson 
claimed that the BZ was bought in 1992 from a front company in Hong Kong.47 He 
claimed that 1,5 tons of the BZ was used in the search for the correct formula for 
weaponisation and that the balance was sent to Delta G for development of a variant. 
However, Delta G scientists were unanimous in denying that any work was done on 
such large quantities of BZ. In addition, neither Project Coast auditor Petro Theron 
nor Knobel knew anything about the alleged BZ deal, and no documentation was 
ever provided to support Basson’s claims. This, he said, was because all the relevant 
documents had been seized by Swiss authorities investigating Regli’s role in the 
Croatian deal. 
Basson claimed that in his secret laboratory at Speskop, the BZ was mixed with 
cocaine in a ratio of 10:1, some 80kg of cocaine having been bought in Peru through 
a “high-placed government official” at the “bargain price” of $250 000 to $300 000. 
The cocaine was shipped through El Paso and Austin in Texas to South Africa 
hidden in a consignment of bananas, allegedly sold to defray some of the costs 
incurred. The cocaine deal, dubbed Operation Banana, was an “official” sub-project 
of Coast, Basson claimed, and had been fully audited as such. Ultimately, Basson 
said, the BZ was weaponised in hand grenades, 81mm mortars and 155mm 
projectiles.  
Through his explanation of the deal during the trial, it was revealed that the 
relationship between Basson, Regli and Jacomet had started in the mid-
1980s when Jacomet facilitated a deal with Swiss company Huber & Suhner 
to supply the SADF with gasmasks. Jacomet had also arranged, through 
Regli, that an official helicopter was available to ferry Basson and Neethling 
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around on one of their visits to Switzerland, and for Basson to enter 
Switzerland without clearing customs at the airport.  Basson’s relationship 
with Regli and Jacomet was the subject of questions to Knobel during the 
TRC hearing. It came under the spotlight again in early 1999 when Swiss 
journalist Jean-Philippe Ceppi was arrested by South African police for having 
in his possession a document handed to the TRC by Knobel.48 The document 
was the minutes of a 1994 meeting of the CMC. Ceppi was released and 
charges dropped when TRC investigators made it clear that Ceppi had been 
handed the document legally. This incident and press reports about the 
nature of the relationship between Regli, Jacomet and Basson led to an 
investigation in 1999 by the Swiss parliamentary Federal Chambers Control 
Committee. The report of the committee concluded that,  
the accusation made by the media that the intelligence service and, in 
particular, its chief, General Peter Regli, took part in the development of 
South Africa’s secret chemical and biological weapons project is 
unfounded.  Allegations that General Regli was an accessory to this 
project or, even worse, might have promoted it are utterly groundless.  It 
is also not true that the chief of the intelligence unit ‘cultivated contacts’ 
with the head of the South African secret project.49  
The report stated that the committee was “unhappy with the fact that the intelligence 
service was able to operate at a time of considerable danger and in a sensitive area 
in intelligence terms without receiving any instructions and without being subject to 
any control by the politically responsible authorities.”50 Jacomet’s role was described 
in the reports as having been “problematic”.51  
[F]or a number of years, Jacomet was clearly able to pass unhindered 
as a member of the intelligence service.  In this context, criticism must 
be levelled against the chief of the intelligence unit for having ascribed 
insufficient importance to the selection, instruction and supervision of an 
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informal collaborator, for having trusted him too easily and for failing to 
see through his double game.52
Jacomet was an arms dealer whose company, Intermagnum AG, had supplied some 
10 000 shotguns to South Africa. Before becoming involved in arms deals, Jacomet 
served as an intelligence officer in the Swiss airborne troops and air defence. After 
having left the Swiss military he continued to pass himself off as an agent of the 
Swiss intelligence service.53  The report shows that contradictory statements were 
made by Basson and Jacomet regarding their first meeting. Jacomet claimed that the 
two men met in 1987 in Pretoria whereafter they met again on a number of 
occasions. Basson said that he met Jacomet in 1982 or 1983 during a visit to 
Switzerland by Lothar Neethling.54 He said that Jacomet had introduced himself as 
an arms dealer who “officially-unofficially” represented the Swiss government. 
Basson assumed this meant he worked for the Swiss intelligence service.55 Jacomet 
is alleged to have collaborated with Basson on the “transfer of technology between 
Switzerland and South Africa in chemical protection measures.”56 Jacomet died in 
1998. 
The story of the Croatian Deal was not over. Basson’s testimony in the trial resulted 
in the Swiss Ministry of Military Affairs ordering a second, more thorough 
investigation into the matter. Notice of the re-opening of the investigation was given 
on 17 August 2001 and General-Secretary, Juan Gut, was appointed to lead the 
investigation. A report from this second inquiry was not publicly available at the time 
of writing. The information which is available does, however, indicate that the Swiss 
intelligence agency, like the US agencies, had sufficient intelligence about Basson’s 
activities to raise questions about South Africa’s interests in chemical warfare. 
However, the possibility that their relationship with Basson would lead to access to 
information about Soviet military capabilities was more important than questioning 
the South African government about their CBW warfare programme which did not 
present a direct threat to Switzerland. 
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Germany and Israel 
The only record of an official foreign trip by an SADF officer with regard to chemical 
and biological warfare, apart from those conducted by Basson, is a document which 
the TRC made available to the public during its 1998 hearing. The document’s 
author, Commandant Rudolf Louw, was appointed to the Army’s Directorate Projects, 
where his task was to provide vehicle engineering support to various project officers. 
In 1986, Louw was instructed to carry out a project study on nuclear, chemical and 
biological warfare for the army. Based on his findings, the SADF decided he should 
not pursue the nuclear component, that the biological component would be the 
responsibility of SAMS and that the army would assume responsibility for the 
chemical component. Louw was then appointed project officer for Academic, the 
army’s defensive chemical warfare programme.57  
Louw reports on a trip undertaken to Israel and West Germany in 1986 by SADF and 
Armscor personnel, accompanied by Uwe Paschke, son-in-law of PW Botha, and 
representative of the company Patech. It can be assumed that this trip was 
undertaken within Louw’s brief to procure defensive CBW equipment for the various 
branches of the military. The report states that Louw was sent to visit West Germany 
and Israel by Basson. The purpose of the visit to Germany was to have exposure to 
selected industries related to CBW, and to visit the German military chemical and 
biological school. One of the places visited was the company Odenwald-Werke 
Rittersbach. Louw went alone and remarked that he was received unusually warmly, 
with the company showing an excellent understanding of South Africa and 
specifically the SADF.  He also noted that this company did not want to do any 
business with Israel. In contrast the report notes that the visit to the CBW school was 
unsatisfactory and no information could be gathered. Louw reported that the trip to 
Israel was successful and proposed that the SADF consider a CBW training package 
that Israel could offer. 
In a summary of the visit the report states: 
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1. It provided for personal contact with experts in the field of CBW and the 
establishment of relationships which can be followed up. 
2. Access was gained to industries which were formerly inaccessible. 
3. A basis was laid for possible co-operation with Israel’s Ministry of 
Defence in the field of CBW. 
4. A wider insight with regard to philosophy and key problem areas. 
5. Confirmed that although SA is still in the early stages, the programme is 
fundamentally sound and up to date with the latest developments.  
6. Confidence was built and the SADF was acknowledged as a partner in 
the field of defensive CBW, although this will not be announced, especially 
in Germany. 58
Libya and the international “CBW Mafia” 
Basson’s defence against the fraud charges brought by the state in his criminal trial 
relied on the court accepting that he had established links with a group of 
international underground dealers in chemical and biological weapons related items. 
Included in this group, Basson claimed, was a senior Libyan intelligence agent.59 He 
alleged that his relationship with this group whom he referred to as an ‘international 
CBW mafia’ had been authorised by former head of the SADF, General Kat 
Liebenberg and Surgeon-General Nicol Nieuwoudt. Since both men are dead, they 
could neither corroborate nor refute his testimony that Libyans, East Germans and 
Russians facilitated the procurement of materials for Project Coast.60  
Basson made the claims in order to explain his involvement in a group of companies 
(see Chapter 6) whose assets included a cottage near Windsor Castle, a 
condominium in Orlando, Florida, the Five Nations Golf Club in Belgium’s Ardennes 
Forest, two apartments in an upmarket Brussels suburb, a luxury lodge at the 
exclusive Fancourt golf resort near George, the Tygerberg Zoo near Stellenbosch, 
two farms in Mpumalanga, an executive jet and Merton House, a luxurious Pretoria 
property which now serves as the Zimbabwean embassy. Basson told the court that 
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all these assets, and the flow of millions of dollars through more than 100 companies 
on three continents, were part of a front organisation he set up on behalf of Libyan, 
East German and Russian ‘financial principals’, and which was ‘hijacked’ by the 
SADF to its own advantage. Part of the arrangement, Basson claimed, was the 
exchange of classified military information, for which the only guideline offered to him 
by the SADF was: just make sure you get more than you give.61
Basson claimed he was introduced to the group by German industrialist Hubert 
Blücher in 1984 and that Blücher introduced him the members of an international 
group that met monthly to share information and assist one another in the 
procurement of chemical and biological agents. Basson claimed it was in this context 
that he formed a relationship with Abdur Razzaq, a senior Libyan intelligence agent, 
an East German spy named Dieter Dreier and a Russian by the name of Vorobyov. 
Basson alleged that when the ‘principals’ sought his assistance to launder massive 
sums of money, the foundation was laid for a nine-year relationship, in which the 
Libyans quickly became the dominant force, with access to ‘unlimited’ funds. Basson 
claimed to have been a regular visitor to Libya from 1988, but investigators, including 
the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), found evidence only of much later travel in 
connection with purely commercial ventures after he had been dismissed from the 
SADF in November 1992. 
Basson’s legal defence team did not offer the court a single document or witness to 
confirm Basson’s claims and rejected a request by the prosecution to call witnesses, 
including Dreier, who disputed the allegations against them. Ultimately the court 
accepted Basson’s version. While there is reason to doubt the veracity of Basson’s 
story, it is indeed likely that during their international travel Basson and his 
colleagues from Project Coast developed an international network of contacts who 
dealt in illict materials.  
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Breaking the silence: US and UK concerns come to the fore 
Between 1993 and 1995 Basson began trips to Libya where he consulted on the 
management of a planned railway line in Tripoli for three years from March 1993. He 
was also employed as a consultant on the construction of hospitals in Libya.62  
Christopher Marlow spent 18 months in Libya between 1994 and 1995 in connection 
with the business of a company, Libgro, set up by himself, Basson and Mijburgh. 
According to Marlow, Libgro was set up in 1993/94 specifically to handle “the Libyan 
arm of business”. Testifying in court Marlow was adamant that in all his dealings with 
Libya he had absolutely nothing to do with intelligence matters, and that his 
involvement at all times was “purely business”.63 Basson’s interests in Libya were 
also not military related according to businessman and ANC supporter, Sol Pienaar, 
who told the court that he accompanied Basson on his first trip to Libya in 1993. He 
said that he had not known that Basson was linked to the military until it was revealed 
by media in the mid-90s.64  
Basson made more than one trip to Libya with Pienaar who introduced him to his 
contacts, including intelligence agent Yusaf Murgham. These trips did not go 
unnoticed by the South African intelligence service who were keeping watch on 
Pienaar because of his relationship with Murgham.65 Nor did they go unnoticed by 
the US and UK intelligence services. In fact concern about these trips led the US and 
UK to urge the South African government to re-employ Basson in 1995 so that he 
could be brought under military control.66 There were fears that Basson had been 
transferring CBW knowledge to Libya.67  
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According to US Ambassador Princeton Lyman, who was at these meetings, the US 
and UK were concerned that South African CBW information was “in danger of being 
acquired by other states, in particular Libya”68 and that South African scientists could 
be recruited by these states. Another reason for the meeting was to persuade the 
South African government to be frank about the offensive aspects of Project Coast in 
international forums. Lyman said, “South African officials were adamantly opposed to 
making such an admission, arguing that any such offensive uses were done without 
proper authorisation and against official policy.”69 Confirmation of the ambassador’s 
concerns is to be found in a briefing document for the newly elected President, 
Nelson Mandela, in August 1994, prepared by Knobel. Under a sub-heading “Enquiry 
by Ambassadors of the USA and UK”70 it states: 
On 11 April 94 the SP [State President] and the Minister of Defence 
were advised by the Ambassadors of the USA and the UK of their 
government’s position with regard to the above [chemical and biological 
warfare] programme as well as the CBM [Confidence Building Measure] 
declaration submitted by the RSA in 1993. They stated that they were 
fully aware of the contents and extent of the SADF CBW programme 
and that they had certain reservations about the RSA’s CBM declaration 
as well as the implications for non-proliferation.71
A second meeting took place on 22 April 1994 between the US and UK ambassadors 
and De Klerk. At this meeting, held a week before South Africa’s first democratic 
elections, De Klerk argued that a defensive program had been justified and that the 
data resulting from the program was a national asset which would not be 
destroyed.72 The continuing trips undertaken by Basson to Libya were still a matter of 
concern to the US and UK.73 In January 1995 a third démarche was brought by the 
governments of the US and UK. Lyman records that the most difficult issue was 
Basson’s travels to Libya and elsewhere.74  
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Explaining the silence 
The US and UK clearly knew enough about the South African CBW program to judge 
that the CBM submitted by South Africa was inaccurate (why else would they have 
been concerned about Basson’s contact with Libya?). Why, then, did the US and UK 
choose to do and say nothing to prevent the South African CBW program from 
continuing during the 1980s and early 1990s? The answer to this question probably 
lies in US policy towards South Africa during the Cold War.  
US policy towards South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s was openly 
condemnatory but privately supportive. US government statements condemned 
apartheid, but the successive administrations were acutely aware both of South 
Africa’s strategic importance and its significance as one of the two most important 
producers of platinum-group metals — together with Russia it accounts for some 
90% of the world’s supplies. In 1985 the CIA, in a research paper, noted the risk of a 
diminished supply should the US be included in a trade embargo against South 
Africa.75 This was just one factor influencing US policy. Larry Bowman identified a 
number of arguments which were put forward in favour of South Africa’s strategic 
importance to the US. Although Bowman’s intention was to show that many of the 
premises upon which arguments in support of South Africa’s strategic importance 
were based were spurious and, therefore, to show that the US could and should 
distance itself from the apartheid regime, he also demonstrated that successive US 
administrations had accepted that South Africa was strategically significant.76
Bowman identifies four arguments in support of South Africa’s strategic importance: 
(i) the Cape Route argument which held that from the 1960s an ever increasing 
percentage of goods imported to the US and Western Europe were shipped around 
the southern tip of Africa. Key among these imports was oil. South Africa’s 
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importance, simply stated, came from its position on the southern tip of Africa and the 
potential for disruption to oil imports if a government hostile to the US was to replace 
the apartheid regime;77 (ii) the collapse of colonial regimes in countries neighbouring 
South Africa during the 1970s and the increase in Soviet support for liberation 
movements in southern Africa raised concern about the potential for increased Soviet 
hold over the region;78  (iii) South Africa is a dominant military power in Africa (and 
was suspected of having a nuclear capability). As such its bases and facilities would 
be useful to the US and its allies were a war to break out in the Middle East or Indian 
Ocean;79 and (iv) South Africa possesses key mineral resources critical to the 
economies of the US and other industrial democracies.80 These arguments, Bowman 
demonstrates, were used frequently by US administrations to justify continued, albeit 
tacit, support for the South African government. 
During the 1970s US policy towards South Africa to end apartheid vacillated 
according to the particular US administration. But it was not just the US which vetoed 
an arms embargo and sanctions against South Africa called for by other African 
nations; the UK and France did too. In 1975 South Africa announced that it had a 
pilot plant for uranium enrichment at Pelindaba.81 Ninety-seven pounds of enriched 
uranium, enough to make seven atomic bombs, was shipped to the plant by the US 
Nuclear Corporation of Oak Ridge, Tennessee to assist it.82 Meanwhile the 
Organization of African Unity denounced the vetoes by the US, UK and France of a 
UN Security Council Resolution calling for a mandatory arms embargo against South 
Africa.83  By mid-July 1975 South Africa was arming two opposition groups (FNLA 
and UNITA) in Angola to fight against Soviet-backed MPLA government forces. The 
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US provided both groups with sizeable donations.84 In October 1975 Cuban troops 
arrived in Angola; Soviet shipments to the MPLA increased; and South Africa sent 
troops to support UNITA and the FNLA.85 In December the US began a diplomatic 
campaign against countries allowing Soviet use of their airspace and facilities for 
airlifts to Angola.86 In January 1976 the US State Department identified the Soviet 
incursion into Angola as a primary reason for US covert military intervention.87 In 
January 1976 the situation changed when Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere 
intervened saying he could convince the MPLA government to repatriate Soviet and 
Cuban troops. Satisfied, South Africa began to withdraw troops but it was not until 
1988 that they left Angola. The last Cuban troops left in May 1991. 
On 16 June 1976 riots broke out in the South African township of Soweto when 
police opened fire on a group of students protesting South Africa’s education system 
for black pupils. Within days protests spread to other townships and many were 
killed. The killings prompted the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 392 
condemning the South African government’s violent actions and calling for an end to 
apartheid and racial discrimination.88 At the same time, in June 1976 US President 
Gerald Ford signed a law (the Clark Amendment) prohibiting US support for military 
operations in Angola, unless such action was in the US’s national security interests 
and approved by Congress.89 Meanwhile US arms manufacturers were sending arms 
to South Africa through front companies.90 For the latter half of 1976 US attention 
was focused on promoting change in Namibia and Rhodesia through talks between 
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US State Department Secretary, Henry Kissinger, and South African prime minister, 
John Vorster.91
From 1977 US policy to South Africa hardened. Because of its exploitation of 
Namibian uranium, South Africa was removed from its permanent position in the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Shortly thereafter, Soviet satellite 
pictures showing South Africa preparing to detonate a nuclear explosive in the 
Kalahari desert brought a warning from US president Jimmy Carter not to do so.92 
Indeed, Peter Vale has argued that Carter’s approach to South Africa, particularly his 
focus on human rights issues, was a source of much frustration for the South African 
government, something which changed significantly when Reagan came to power in 
1981.93  
On 12 September 1977, black consciousness leader Steven Biko died in police 
detention. Repression of dissent in South Africa increased. So did international 
pressure. In October the US voluntary ban on arms sales to South Africa became a 
formal embargo to be followed by UN Security Council Resolution 418 (1977), 
instituting a mandatory arms embargo against SA. This compromise resolution 
followed a veto by the US, UK and France of an earlier draft calling for sanctions as 
well.94  
US-South Africa relations worsened between 1978 and 1980 and were not helped by 
US satellite evidence recording a light signal over South Africa which some in the US 
government believed indicated a nuclear detonation.95 With the inauguration of 
Ronald Reagan as US President in January 1981 (the year the CBW program was 
approved) US attitudes veered back to increased support for the apartheid 
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government. In March 1981 Reagan asked Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment 
“in order to remove an ‘unnecessary restriction’ on his foreign policy authority.”96  The 
amendment was repealed. Bowman argues that by 1980 (just before the decision to 
initiate Project Coast was taken) Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Ethiopia led 
to unease over Soviet and Cuban advances in the Third World. The US felt that it 
had to demonstrate its support for its allies wherever they were threatened by this 
advance. He notes that, “[A]ttitudes towards South Africa are thus altered somewhat 
depending on the global situation. When the USA wants to show resolve, it tends to 
be more attracted towards, and less critical of those who are like-minded. Thus, US 
policy tended to be somewhat more favourably disposed towards South Africa during 
the first Nixon administration and the last years of the Carter presidency.”97
In April 1981 US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, invited South African Foreign 
Minister, Pik Botha, to the US,98 and the French, British and US vetoed four UN 
resolutions calling for sanctions against South Africa. For the next four years South 
Africa could count on a more tolerant US attitude.  
Further examples of the US adopting a Nelsonian eye to apartheid in South Africa 
abound. In April 1982 the US Commerce Department approved the sale to South 
Africa of twenty-five hundred 3500-volt shock batons designed for crowd control, in 
violation of Section 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibiting exports to the 
police or military in countries with consistent human rights violations.99 In September 
1982, Armscor announced that its G-5 tow and the G-6 SP Gun/Tow could fire 
nuclear rounds if necessary, but that South Africa did not intend to use such 
weapons.100 In January 1983, the Reagan administration modified US limitations on 
exports to the South African and Namibian military and police forces. New guidelines 
212
                                                
96 Department of State Bulletin, February 1989, p18. Quoted in Mokoena, South Africa and the United 
States, p28. 
97 Bowman. “The Strategic Importance of South Africa”, p144. 
98 Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Daily Report, Middle East and Africa. Department of 
Commerce, National Technical Information Service. Springfield, Va, United States. Quoted in Mokoena, 
South Africa and the United States, p29. 
99 New York Times, 20 September 1982. Quoted in Mokoena, South Africa and the United States, p31 
100 “G-6 HMSP Gun/Howitzer” 13 September 1982. Quoted in Mokoena, South Africa and the United 
States, p31. 
 
permitted the export of certain non-strategic industrial, chemical, petroleum, and 
transportation equipment without a license. This was the third relaxation of export 
restrictions in less than a year.101 These are but a few of the announcements and 
actions which both preceded and paralleled the start of South Africa’s CBW program. 
Although US Congressional attitudes to South Africa hardened with the eventual 
passing by the Senate of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in August 1986102 
the Reagan Administration continued to oppose sanctions. The fact that the US and 
other Western nations adopted a lenient attitude towards the apartheid government 
on matters of strategic importance during the 1970s and 1980s, provided a context 
which limited the constraints on South African decision-makers to authorize the CBW 
program. International opinion hardened against South Africa and the government, 
particularly following the election of De Klerk in 1989, who was forced to begin 
dismantling its racially discriminatory measures103 and the CBW programme. 
Coming clean? South Africa’s response to its BTWC obligations 
The South African submission of December 1993, to the BTWC, in terms of 
Confidence Building Measure F: Declaration of Past Activities, states that there was 
no offensive biological research and development programme to declare. It refers to 
two past defensive biological research and development programmes: Programme 1 
in 1990 and Programme 2 in 1992. With regard to the 1990 programme it is said that 
“a selected number of organisms were produced to study the detection methods as 
well as other protection methods, for example clothing and masks.”  With regard to 
the 1992 programme it is said that “area research was conducted in the production of 
micro-organisms that produce parathion-hydralases”.104 The 1995 submission to the 
BTWC repeats the claim that there was no past offensive biological research and 
development programme to declare; however, it goes further than the 1993 
submission, stating that a past defensive biological research and development 
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programme took place between 1987 and 1992. This submission states that 
Clostridium perfringens types D and C were worked on with the view to countering 
“the potential hazard created by genetic engineering and the effect it may have had 
on own protection and treatment.”105     
The CBM states that organisms and toxins as well as modified bacteria were studied 
with the view to developing detection techniques. The list of organisms allegedly 
studied for this purpose is given as including “B.anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Vibrio 
cholera, Francisella tularensis, Yellow fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, T 2 
mycotoxin.106” These statements cannot be reconciled with the evidence of the 
scientists during the Basson trial, nor with documentation before the TRC. No work 
was ever done at RRL on viruses, despite media claims to the contrary and the CBM 
raises the question as to whether another facility was involved in defensive BW 
research. RRL had neither the facilities nor the expertise to work with viruses. Claims 
have been made that the US Centre for Disease Control (CDC) shipped dangerous 
viruses to Basson.107 CDC did send viruses to South Africa but they went to the 
National Virology Institute. The Director of the Institute, Dr Robert Swanepoel, is a 
world expert on Rift Valley fever and his work had no connection with biological 
warfare108 and was conducted openly.  
Since the démarches which sought to encourage honest CBM submissions about the 
past offensive programme, the matter has rested. The South African government has 
held fast to the position that the offensive aspects of the biological warfare 
programme were the result of unauthorised activities of the scientists at RRL. Since 
South African disarmament diplomats have taken a leading role in pushing for the 
strengthening of the BTWC there has been little pressure brought to bear as there is 
a reluctance from Western nations to undermine the credibility of the South African 
delegation in the Geneva negotiations.   
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Table 5. Recorded international travel by Basson 
Date Place Purpose 
May 1981 San Antonio, USA Attendance of a professional 
congress.109
May 1981 Taiwan Visit to the Taiwanese Army 
Chemical School.110
May 1982 Windhoek Unknown.111
August 1986 Ghent, Belgium To attend the Second World 
Congress on Chemical and 
Biological Warfare.112
May – June 1989  USA Basson told Webster that "my 
intention regarding the flying 
session, French lessons, 
fitness programme and R & R 
remains the same”, implying 
that the intention of the trip 
was recreational.113
13 June 1989 London Accompanied by Webster. Met 
with Buffham.114
14 June 1989 Luxembourg To meet with David Chu.115
16 June 1989 Switzerland Meeting with Jürg Jacomet at 
Haber & Sohn with regard to 
CBW protective clothing.116
August 1989 London, Miami, Orlando Month long vacation at Jane 
Webster’s house.117
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24 June 1990 London – Washington – 
Orlando – New York 
Visit to David and Jane 
Webster.118
30 June 1990 New York – Luxembourg – 
Basel – Farnbourgh – Malaga 
(Spain) – Abijan – 
Johannesburg 
Meetings with Zimmer in 
Luxembourg, meeting with Chu 
in Basel; Basson’s birthday in 
Malaga (6 July).119
August 1990 England – Switzerland Unknown.120
November 1990 England To attend a rugby test 
match.121
November 1990 England To meet Jane Webster to 
resolve a dispute.122  
February 1991 Moscow Met with people who were 
knowledgeable about CBW 
issues, including a group from 
Croatia.123
April 1991 Switzerland To meet Tjaard Viljoen. 
Basson was accompanied by 
his wife and children.124
October 1991 British Columbia, Canada Hunting trip with Webster and 
Mijburgh.125
24 October 1991 Zurich – Basel – Spain – SA Unknown.126
29 November – 
December 1991 
Basel – Luxembourg – 
Switzerland – England – 
Germany – Belgium – Spain – 
Morocco – Tangiers 
Meeting with Medchem 
Forschungs in Basel; meeting 
with Zimmer in Luxembourg, 
collection of documents in 
Tangiers.127
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December 1991 Chad Transport of “samples and 
material.”128
September 1992 Croatia Meeting with government 
officials.129
6 December 1992 London − Luxembourg Travelled with his wife – 
purpose unknown.130
28 June 1993 Switzerland Basson arrested in 
Switzerland.131
1993 – 1996 Libya (several visits) Consultation about the building 
of a railway.132
May-June 1995 Tripoli, Libya Unknown.133
27 January 1997 Namibia To meet with Libyan and 
former East German agents.134
Unknown Two trips to Seychelles Accompanied by family 
members.135
Between 1993 and 
1997  
Libya  
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CHAPTER 6 
The Final Years (1989 – 1993) 
Project Coast and political change 
By 1988 Delta G Scientific was well established in its Midrand facility and RRL was 
operational. The companies were under the management of Philip Mijburgh and 
Wynand Swanepoel respectively.1 The internal war in South Africa was still raging 
with the police and military engaged in concerted campaigns, supported at the 
highest political levels, to undermine apartheid opposition. Police hit squad 
commander, Eugene De Kock, testified about this before the TRC and provided 
details in his autobiography. In August 1988 De Kock, was instructed by his 
commanding officer, on orders from PW Botha, to bomb Cosatu House, 
headquarters of the trade union federation.2 Later that year he was instructed to 
destroy Khotso House, home of the South African Council of Churches. According to 
the testimony of the former Minister of Police before the Truth Commission, the 
instruction for this too came from PW Botha.3 In October, De Kock was ordered to 
set fire to Khanya House where the South African Bishops Conference had its 
offices.4  
In February 1989 PW Botha suffered a mild stroke and resigned as leader of the 
National Party (NP). His successor as leader of the NP, FW De Klerk replaced him 
as president in September. Although from early in his presidency De Klerk made it 
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clear that he would follow a reformist path, the security police and covert military 
units continued to operate as before, even escalating their activities as De Klerk 
failed to gain their support for a transition to democracy. Between 1990 and 1994 
levels of political violence in South Africa were higher than ever before. A war was 
being fought on the streets of Transvaal townships, in KwaZulu Natal, in Cape 
townships and in the rural areas of the Eastern Cape, and cross border raids were 
still being planned and executed. In his autobiography, De Klerk commented on the 
escalation in the levels of political violence from 1990 stating that the number of 
politically motivated deaths outside KwaZulu Natal (where conflict between the ANC 
and Inkatha Freedom Party resulted in an extremely high number of deaths) stood at 
124 in 1989 and had increased to 1888 in 1990.5  
For the biological warfare facility this was also a time of increased interaction with the 
operators of the police and military. In 1989 RRL scientist, Dr André Immelman, 
began keeping a list of the covert chemical and biological assassination weapons 
and vials of pathogens he gave to members of the police security branch and others 
introduced to him by Basson.6 One of the recipients of items listed on the so-called 
“Verkope” list7 was CCB operator, Pieter Botes. According to Botes, shortly before 
the elections in Namibia (November 1989) all CCB operators were instructed to 
suspend their activities elsewhere and focus all their attention on efforts to influence 
the outcome of the first democratic elections. One such effort included an attempt by 
Botes and his colleagues to contaminate the water supply of a SWAPO camp with 
cholera. Botes claimed that in August 1989, he was given four brown glass jars by 
CCB commander Joe Verster and told that two contained cholera bacteria,8 the 
others yellow fever.9 Botes traveled to Namibia to identify opportunities for anti-
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SWAPO operations. Once there, he received the order from Verster to contaminate 
the water supply at two refugee camps outside Windhoek with cholera and yellow 
fever. Botes said that he gave the bottles to two of his operators, Charlie Krause and 
José Daniels. He claimed that he was not convinced the plan to contaminate the 
water supply with cholera would work, since he had established that the water in the 
camp reservoir was from the municipal supply and thus chlorinated. Nevertheless the 
operation went ahead and Krause and Daniels reported they had polluted the water, 
and returned the empty containers to Botes, who destroyed them.10 As predicted by 
Botes, infection of the water fortunately did not cause an outbreak of either disease 
and despite the efforts of the CCB and other units of the Defence Force SWAPO won 
the election with 57% of the national vote.11  
In February 1990, De Klerk announced the unbanning of anti-apartheid organizations 
and the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. However, De Klerk 
made it clear that he was strongly opposed to black majority rule and warned that,  
“there could be no winner takes all system, but a power sharing one. Don’t expect me 
to negotiate myself out of power.”12 On the part of the ANC, there was a realisation 
that the armed struggle was just one of several ways to bring about political change 
in South Africa. In the words of Nelson Mandela. “It was clear to me that military 
victory was a distant if not impossible dream. It simply did not make sense for both 
sides to lose thousands if not millions of lives in a conflict that was unnecessary.”13  It 
was increasingly evident to both the white government and the ANC that the only 
possible option was political settlement.   
While the conditions for a negotiated political settlement were set, media revelations 
about hit squad activities in 1990 led De Klerk to appoint Justice Louis Harms to 
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head a commission of inquiry into “certain alleged murders”. The Commission began 
hearing evidence on 5 March 1990. At the end of the hearings, Harms linked the 
CCB to crimes of violence, but the allegations did not lead to prosecutions. Harms 
had allowed CCB members to testify in disguise and using false names. He failed to 
find any wrongdoing on the part of the security police, a conclusion which Eugene De 
Kock, was to find laughable.14 The Harms Commission was severely criticised by the 
press and by anti-apartheid groups for failing to reveal anything approaching the 
extent of hit squad activity and was seen as little more than a cover-up. At the same 
time as unbanning the ANC and other liberation movement organisations, De Klerk 
set about “reclaiming civilian control of the state”,15 one of the factors which Burgess 
and Purkitt identified as having contributed to the decision to terminate the CBW 
programme.16 De Klerk replaced Magnus Malan with a civilian, Roelf Meyer, as 
Minister of Defence, and Adriaan Vlok was replaced by Kobie Coetzee as Minister of 
Law and Order, after ANC President Nelson Mandela had issued an ultimatum to De 
Klerk’s government to dismiss Vlok and Malan or put at risk the continuation of the 
negotiation process.17 But behind this façade of political change, the security forces 
continued operating much as they had under PW Botha. Politically motivated 
murders and disappearances continued, and even grew in number. In KwaZulu 
Natal, the Inkatha Freedom Party was armed by the security police to fight against 
the ANC. De Klerk claimed in his autobiography that his government had no role in 
the violence, however, he conceded that it was an indisputable fact that “some 
elements of the security forces were involved in secretly instigating and perpetrating 
violence” but, he said their actions were explicit violations of his instructions, 
indicating that elements of the security forces were beyond his control.18  On October 
1991, in the face of struggling political negotiations, Justice Richard Goldstone was 
appointed to head the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of 
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Public Violence and Intimidation. Goldstone uncovered details of the hit squad 
activities of the security police19 and revelations about the role of covert military units 
in the ongoing violence emerged after the Goldstone unit raided the offices of the 
Directorate of Covert Collection in November 1992. Subsequent investigations 
revealed ongoing security force operations against the ANC.20   
In January 1991, Mandela called for “an all-party congress” to start negotiating for a 
constituent assembly. On 20 December 1991 delegates from 19 political parties met 
at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) to begin negotiating the 
political future of South Africa.21 The negotiations were halted in 1992 when the ANC 
withdrew after a the brutal massacre of ANC supporters in the Johannesburg 
township of Boipatong. In November 1992, in the face of continued violence in which 
the security forces were implicated, General  Pierre Steyn was appointed to head a 
commission22 “on alleged dangerous activities of SADF components”. A month later, 
he verbally delivered his report to De Klerk. Steyn’s report resulted in De Klerk 
ordering 23 military officers, including Wouter Basson, to take early retirement. 
Steyn’s investigation, supported by the NIS, had found that “to a great extent some 
members of the senior command structure [of the SADF] are trapped in the 
momentum of activities of the past,” and said that “it cannot be ruled out that other 
members might be furthering their own agendas.”23  
Analysts, including Batchelor and Willett, have argued that the De Klerk government 
cynically used the violence to undermine the ANC at the negotiating table. However, 
they also acknowledge that De Klerk “lacked any meaningful influence or operational 
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control over the SADF, he was unwilling and unable to control or fully rein in the 
‘dissident elements’ within the security forces who were accused of fomenting or 
perpetuating political violence through acts of commission or omission.”24 Others, 
such as Simpson and Rauch have argued that the violence was an inevitable 
consequence of the political transition during which the deregulation of “repressive 
forms of social control” took place at the same time as intensified political contest.25 
According to Simpson and Rauch’s analysis, during this period the security forces 
were incapable of maintaining their authority in the face of political change. This 
would imply that the violence was not merely a tool cynically used by political leaders 
to influence the course of negotiations, but rather an inherent part of political 
transition; however, a factor which may have played to the advantage of one or other 
side of the political divide at different times.  
Given the enmity between the military and De Klerk in the 1990s it’s unlikely that De 
Klerk or other political leaders would have been informed about the details of the 
biological warfare programme or the development and use of covert chemical and 
biological weapons by the managers of the programme. De Klerk himself said that 
although by 1990 he had attempted to ‘normalise’ the role of the security forces, and 
had taken action to establish control over secret projects, he later discovered that 
there was a great deal kept from him.26 If the formal written briefing of De Klerk in 
1990 by Basson27 on the chemical and biological warfare programme is indeed the 
only information which he received about the programme, it would indicate that the 
military held back information from De Klerk about projects which would not find his 
favour. De Klerk was told that the programme focussed on the development and 
production of incapacitants and irritants (particularly CR) which, Basson said, were 
not prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. On the biological warfare programme, De 
Klerk was told that a research and production facility had been established to keep 
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up to date with the changing threat. Basson said, “we are constantly producing new 
organisms in order to develop a preventative capacity as well as treatment.”28 No 
mention was made of the biological assassination weapons. In response to the 
briefing De Klerk ordered that no work be done on lethal chemical agents, but he 
authorised continued work on incapacitants and teargas.29 Members of De Klerk’s 
government could have claimed to have been unaware of the offensive work being 
done at the front companies until 1993 when Jan Lourens broke his silence and 
approached Roelf Meyer through an intermediary to inform him of the development of 
the assassination weapons (see Chapter 3).   
The biological programme at RRL was not curbed. By mid-1993, R200 000 had been 
spent on plans for the state-of-the-art biological production plant and bio-safety level 
4 (high containment) laboratory in which a 300-litre fermentor would have been 
installed to produce much larger quantities of pathogens than had previously been 
produced. While the upgraded facility was never built30 the intention to increase 
biological agent production was indicative of the mindset of both scientists and 
managers of the facility during that period.  
The Goldstone Commission’s investigations appear to have concerned the military, 
and Knobel in particular, who feared that information about secret projects and 
operations would not withstand the scrutiny of the Commission. However, concern 
about the prospect of losing access to the crowd control agents and weapons meant 
that abandoning the programme was not considered a viable option, 
…there are still a whole range of projects for which the technical 
information must be protected. Recent developments have indicated that, 
in public investigations such as, for example, the Goldstone Commission, 
the SADF and the SAP cannot withhold information any longer. So it 
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appears now as if the Goldstone Commission is at the point of 
subpoenaing Swartklip Products, a Denel affiliate, to make known the 
nature, content and effect of all products manufactured for the South 
African Police. A large number of the products which are manufactured for 
Jota [Project Coast had been re-named Jota by that time], must in the 
future be used during critical unrest situations. If knowledge of these 
weapons should leak out now, the instigators of this unrest will already 
begin to make propaganda against the use of these agents and to develop 
effective counter measures. That the SADF is the developer and client of 
these products must definitely remain undercover so that the tactical high 
ground can be maintained.31  
It may be that the fear of losing their ability to contain crowds was prompted by De 
Klerk’s announcement in 1989 to permit protest marches which had, until then, been 
forbidden under the State of Emergency. De Klerk states in his autobiography that 
some of his security advisers were “strongly opposed” to the decision and were 
“haunted by the spectre of the mass demonstrations that were taking place in 
Eastern Europe and had led to the overthrow of Communist governments in country 
after country.”32 Not only was the internal situation changing dramatically and 
affecting secret projects such as Coast, developments at an international level also 
indicated that the days of the chemical and biological warfare programme were 
numbered. Negotiations that would lead to the introduction of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and their Destruction (known as the Chemical Weapons Convention - 
CWC) had been underway for many years and by 1991 it was clear that the 
Convention would soon be ready for signature. On 14 January 1993 South Africa 
signed the CWC which prohibits the development, production, acquisition or 
stockpiling of chemical weapons and requires that all states parties destroy any 
prohibited chemical weapons in an approved manner.33 On 31 March 1993 a meeting 
of the CMC was attended by, amongst others, General AJ (Kat) Liebenberg (Chief of 
the SADF); Lieutenant General DP Knobel (Surgeon General); the Chief of Staff of 
the Army; the Chief of Staff of the Navy; Brigadier Wouter Basson, and Colonel BP 
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Steyn. The CMC decided that South Africa should deny its possession of chemical 
weapons until the CR project had been completed. At that stage the Surgeon 
General was still in possession of 6 tons of CR and 10 tons of the intermediary. It 
was decided that the research into the delivery systems for waterborne CR and the 
foam form should continue until the end of the 1993/4 financial year. The 
management of the CR project would be the responsibility of Ben Steyn and was 
budgeted for at a cost of R2.3m ($655 500 at 1992 exchange rates).34 Work was 
being done on a water cannon which could disperse a water-based formulation of 
CR.  
In briefing the Minister of Defence in 1993, Knobel told the Minister that were South 
Africa to declare its work on CR before the signing of the CWC ‘the groups 
responsible for mass action’ would have an opportunity to consult their international 
advisers and to find ways to counter the agent. This, claimed Knobel, would 
‘neutralize the army’s most effective weapon in handling internal unrest’. Knobel was 
supported by the Minister of Defence, Eugene Louw, in his proposal to keep South 
Africa’s CR stocks a secret.35 This was not a violation of the CWC which only 
required disclosure of riot control agents after the entry into force of the Convention, 
in 1997. However, the CWC prohibited the use of CR in a conventional war outside 
the borders of the producing country. This meant that the 155mm shells containing 
CR had to be destroyed after South Africa signed the CWC. This condition did not 
escape the attention of the CMC. In a January 1993 meeting it was noted that if the 
holders were to be removed from the grenades and stored separately, they would no 
longer be in conflict with the CWC and this course of action was accepted.36  If the 
testimony of Corrie Ferreira, an army colonel who had been the Defence Force’s 
technical ammunition officer for over 22 years, is correct it would appear that the 
order was carried out. Ferreira told the court during the Basson trial that he was an 
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expert on the shells used for CR and on pyrotechnics. He had unrestricted access to 
all Defence Force ammunition depots serving the army, navy and airforce.37 
According to Ferreira, not a single 155mm projectile loaded with CR was ever issued 
to any SADF unit, and all 1 373 were “destroyed” by being emptied of CR and re-
loaded with smoke (he did not put a date to this destruction). An amount of R65 000 
was budgeted for the 1986/87 and 1987/88 financial years to empty 120mm shells for 
this purpose, with R16 000 per year budgeted for the years 1988/89, 1989/90 and 
1990/91. 
However, Ferreira’s testimony on the use of CR-filled mortars was contradicted by 
that of Rudolf Louw. Louw claimed that during Operation Packer, the mopping-up 
and withdrawal phase of the Angolan conflict, he was reliably informed by some of 
his former SADF colleagues that CR mortars had been used. This was in direct 
contravention of his own instructions, which were that no weaponised CR was to be 
used operationally. Louw was told this by middle-ranking officers, who said that huge 
quantities of the CR mortars had been used by the SADF. This came as a shock to 
him because he did not even know that the Army had been issued with the CR 
mortars. The entire weaponization project was supposed to be top secret.38 The 
available information remains contradictory and its unlikely that without detailed 
investigations it will be resolved whether CR was used in Angola or not.  
This period (1990 – 1993) was an uncertain time for the military. Resentment ran 
high within the SADF about the appointment of a civilian Minister of Defence and the 
dismissal of the 23 officers following the Steyn report. It was clear that the favoured 
position occupied by the SADF during PW Botha’s presidency was a thing of the 
past. In this uncertainty the managers of the CBW programme began making 
anomalous decisions that suggest that self-enrichment was taking place.  Despite the 
initial failure of methaqualone to yield positive results as a crowd control agent, and 
the alleged production of superior analogues, in late 1992 the CMC approved the 
purchase of 500kg of methaqualone from Croatia, a mere three months before all 
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incapacitants were to be destroyed.39 According to Knobel, on 13 November 1992 
the Co-ordinating Management Committee of Project Coast decided that, given the 
upcoming signing of the CWC and the resultant difficulty in procuring chemicals, all 
procurement actions necessary to round off the project should be completed by the 
end of 1992.40 It is unclear why the CMC thought this procurement to be necessary, 
although Knobel argued that it intended to avoid restrictions that may have been 
placed on procurement of chemical agents by the CWC. It is also unclear why the 
SADF would have purchased the methaqualone in September 1992 when the 
destruction of all chemical agents allegedly took place in January 1993, a mere four 
months later. The prosecutors in the Basson trial argued, on the basis of the forensic 
audit of Project Coast’s accounts, that the alleged purchase of methaqualone did not 
take place. Instead, they argue, the money was used in the perpetration of fraud. The 
judge did not agree. He stated in his judgement that “[E]verything went smoothly until 
about 1989 when a new president arrived on the scene. It was decided that the 
process of weaponising the incapacitants had to be accelerated. The problem was 
that the methaqualone manufactured at Delta G Scientific was not acceptable and BZ 
and methaqualone had to be procured. Provision was made for Delta G to make 
Ecstasy in time”.41   
In July 1992, Mijburgh (Managing Director of Delta G Scientific), wrote a letter to 
Basson in which he quoted costs for the production of MDMA (also known as 
Ecstasy). The total cost for 1000kg was quoted at R840 000 ($294 700 calculated at 
1992 rates). The letter states that delivery could take place some 6 to 8 weeks after 
production.42 About a week later, the Surgeon General confirmed the order in writing 
and provided Mijburgh with provisional immunity against prosecution for the 
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production of the drug.43  In January 1993 Knobel advised the Minister to authorize 
the destruction of the MDMA, BZ and methaqualone.44 He explained that 1000kg of a 
locally produced BZ variant had been manufactured which had been intended for 
weaponization during the course of 1993. It is the BZ that perhaps raises the greatest 
number of questions about the CBW programme at this time. Questions I shall return 
to later in this chapter.  
There are a number of facts which, taken together, point towards the conclusion that 
the MDMA, and methaqualone, were produced with the purpose of enriching Basson 
and his associates. The one indicator is the timing. The production of the MDMA was 
authorized in July 1992 when it must have been clear to at least Basson and 
Mijburgh that testing and weaponisation would have taken far more than 6 months. 
Four months later, in November Basson wrote a letter to Knobel declaring which 
chemicals were in stock45 (presumably so that a decision about their use or 
destruction could be taken) and in early January the Minister was advised by Knobel 
to authorize the destruction of the drug (along with quantities of BZ and 
methaqualone).46  The total financial loss to the SADF of the destruction of the 
MDMA, methaqualone, BZ and cocaine was estimated by Basson to have been 
R21.7million.47 The second indication was the claim by CCB operator Danie Phaal, 
that Basson had offered him methaqualone tablets for sale. The third indication was 
the evidence that the MDMA was encapsulated by pharmacist Steven Beukes, and 
was therefore clearly not intended for operational use as an incapacitant.  
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While the desire for self-enrichment may explain the production of both the MDMA 
and methaqualone, it does not hold for the BZ. According to Knobel, in October 1990 
the Defence Command Council authorized the development of BZ (along with the 
CR, methaqualone and MDMA).48 The minutes of this meeting refer to chemical 
agents and chemical weapons but do not specify which agents, aside from CR, were 
authorized for development, although it is possible that the specifics were not 
minuted.  Nevertheless, while 2 years later the MDMA production went ahead, there 
are no documents in the public domain which show that a similar authorisation was 
given for the production of BZ. During Basson’s trial, his defence counsel claimed 
that large quantities of BZ (between 3 and 4 tons) were purchased ‘as a precursor to 
the Croatian methaqualone deal’ in 1992.49 Basson testified that BZ was used to fill 
hand grenades, 81mm mortars and 155mm projectiles, though in the case of the 
latter, the process went only as far as filling the canisters. He said that pyrotechnical 
testing and weaponisation of the BZ took place in what was known as the Pilot Plant 
at Speskop, which had been demolished and rebuilt in 1986. He said that three tons 
of the BZ were used – 1,5 of them just to find the formula and that Neethling was fully 
aware of the BZ development.50 Certainly by November 1992 Basson claimed that 
there was one ton of the agent in the SADF stocks. Where it came from is unclear, 
however its existence is important because in January 1992 an unusual incident took 
place in Mozambique, close to the South African border, which suggested the use of 
a chemical agent. According to the Steyn report:  
Allegedly the chemical attack on Frelimo soldiers in Mozambique was a 
practical training session. A small unmanned reconnaissance bomber 
(sic) was located shortly before the attack on Komatipoort. The toxic 
substance used in the attack was manufactured and stored by 
Petrotechnics (sic).(Confirmed and the individuals involved are 
known).51  
230
                                                
48 Knobel, “Kronologiese verloop van gebeure tov Kroatiese Transaksies”. 
49 Statement made by Adv Jaap Cilliers during the cross-examination of Knobel, in The State vs Wouter 
Basson, 29 November 1999.  
50 Basson in The State vs Wouter Basson, 7 September 2001.  
51 “Staff Paper prepared for the Steyn Commission on alleged dangerous activities of SADF 
components”, December 1992.  
 
The story of this incident begins on 14 January 1992. The Third Battalion of 
Commandos of the Mozambican government forces, reinforced by one company of 
provincial troops, left on that day to attack a Renamo base close to the South African 
border. Altogether there were 300 to 400 soldiers in the Mozambican forces.52 They 
travelled initially by vehicle and continued the next day on foot.  Seeing evidence of 
the presence of Renamo forces in the area, the troops grouped into a box 
formation,53 one company forming each side of the box. They moved to a position 
south of the Renamo base near Estompene.  As it was late, they set up camp and 
decided to attack the following morning. During the night, sounds of domestic 
animals were heard. At daybreak on 16 January, the troops moved towards the 
Renamo base. A white jeep-type vehicle and a light aircraft were allegedly spotted by 
the troops - accounts of where the vehicle was travelling and whether it crossed the 
South African border are varied. After the incident, when a South African verification 
mission was despatched to investigate, the Mozambican delegation that 
accompanied them said the vehicle had come from the Renamo base.  
The troops entered the Renamo base and found it deserted. They left the camp 
without destroying it.  Several kilometres from the base, still in box formation, they 
came under limited small arms fire of no more than 15 shots and took cover. At that 
moment there was an explosion overhead that produced a dark smoke. When the 
smoke had dissipated they continued moving. After about 15 minutes there were 
problems in keeping the soldiers moving forward, and control was lost. Later it was 
reported that soon after the explosion some of the troops began to feel hot, 
developed sore throats and dry mouths. Others were disoriented and confused and 
their vision affected.54 Between 18 and 27 January, 28 troops from the unit were 
admitted to Maputo hospital, four were reported dead, two were wounded during 
“uncontrollable shooting” and 38 soldiers were missing.  
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Shortly after the incident the SADF dispatched a verification mission divided into two 
teams. The first group, led by Dr Brian Davey, was composed of medical and 
intelligence personnel who travelled to Maputo to interview and examine casualties.  
The second team were dispatched to the Kruger National Park, which bordered on 
the affected area, for field sampling and detection. Jan Lourens, the director of 
Protechnik (the company which, according to the Steyn report was responsible for 
manufacturing the BZ), assembled the second team, which included Philip Coleman, 
Robert Temperman and members of Seven Medical Battalion.55 This latter team met 
in the Kruger National Park in a camp near the Mozambican border. Davey and 
Mozambican officers, said to have been members of the battalion that had suffered 
the attack, flew in by helicopter to join the team some time later. The group, including 
the Mozambican representatives, drove along the border on the South African side, 
but were unable to identify the site of the incident. This is not surprising since the 
terrain is very consistent and it would have been almost impossible for them to have 
located the site accurately this way. No use was made of methods more likely to 
have located the site like the use of helicopters. Davey told the authors that 
helicopters were ruled out by the Air Force for reasons he did not know. In Maputo, 
Davey’s team interviewed six casualties and concluded that although an ‘unusual 
incident of sorts did occur’ there was insufficient evidence to suggest a chemical 
attack took place. However, in what appears to be a contradictory statement, Davey 
claimed that the “symptoms do not fit the picture of any known chemical agent. At the 
time of examination, no patients or corpses showed signs attributable to known 
chemical agent exposure.”56 Davey suggested that he had seen “nothing to exclude 
the possibility that Frelimo troops might have fired it [a chemical munition] 
themselves in error.”57   
A British medical doctor and toxicologist, Dr JP Thompson, was sent to Mozambique 
by his government to conduct an investigation into the incident. He was accompanied 
by the British defence attaché in Maputo. Thompson’s investigation followed shortly 
232
                                                
55  Gould and Chaskalson interview with Lourens, Cape Town, 23 January 1998,  
56 B. Davey, “Chemical Incident Verification Mission Mozambique 22 – 24 January 1992”, 29 January 
1992, p1.  
57 Ibid., p2 
 
after the South African investigation. He conducted interviews with troops of all four 
companies involved in the incident and information obtained in the interviews 
(transcripts were attached to his report) was consistent and non-contradictory on the 
salient points. The evidence he gathered led Thompson to the conclusion that an 
agent such as BZ may have been used.  
It is possible that the findings of the two teams differed because they had interviewed 
different subjects or because they had approached the interviews with different 
perceptions. Should it have been found that a chemical weapon had been used in the 
incident, suspicion would naturally have fallen on the South African security forces. 
The recommendations in Davey’s report reflect this concern: “However valid our 
scientifically based negative conclusions may be, those who would want to score 
political points against Renamo and South Africa will carry on, and will probably find 
a receptive audience in the media due to the invariably sensationalistic nature of 
chemical warfare. It will be important to distribute the results of our investigation as 
widely as possible in the international community, so that the uncertain nature of the 
allegations is known.”58 Davey was keenly aware of the political implications for 
South Africa, had any of the international investigations to have concluded that a 
chemical weapon had been used during the incident. His report includes the 
observation that,   
[T]here could be a need to be able to convincingly prove that we are not 
involved in this matter. A balance is needed between taking the actions 
required to maintain our own international interests, and possible 
overreaction – which could be perceived as guilty attempts to ‘cover-up’. 
It is relevant to note that the allegations made by Mozambique at the 
time of the incident included the allegation that ‘an aircraft and a vehicle 
had crossed from South Africa into Mozambican airspace and territory 
during this incident, thus constituting a violation of the Nkomati Accord 
and negatively affecting the spirit of cooperation between the two 
countries.59  
Following both the South African and British missions was a two-person team of Drs 
Gustav Andersson and Sven-Ake Persson from the Swedish National Defence 
Research Establishment. They managed to conduct interviews with only six alleged 
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victims and concluded that the explosion was caused by a military smoke munition. 
They argued that the symptoms were consistent with poisoning with yellow 
phosphorus. They did, however, state in their report that: “the feeling of intense heat, 
dryness of skin and mucous membranes, the mental disturbances, even the long 
duration of the symptoms could be signs and symptoms of intoxication induced by an 
atropine-like agent.”60 The Swedish scientists believed that whilst the use of an 
atropine-like substance was not impossible, they thought it unlikely, “these types of 
agents have been studied experimentally, but the step to use these substances in 
full-scale in the field is a rather large one. We also think even if a munition with 
atropine-like agents would exist they should not be easily available.”61 Had the 
Swedish team been aware of the SADF’s interest in BZ perhaps their findings would 
have been different. Neither of the two men responded to questions about their 
investigation when I contacted them. 
A third investigation was done by the United Nations. In March 1992 the Secretary 
General of the United Nations appointed Dr Sven-Ake Persson, Mr Heiner Staub and 
Dr JP Thompson to look into the alleged attack. Staub, of the NC-Laboratory 
Defence Technology and Procurement Agency in Switzerland, was a new member of 
the team while Persson and Thompson had been to Mozambique for the Swedish 
and British investigations. The team received a briefing by Davey and a copy of the 
South African report on the incident. Davey reported on this briefing62 stating that the 
South African opinion of Thompson’s report was that: “it had selectively presented 
and distorted much of the available evidence, and its conclusions were unfounded.”63 
The South African delegation which met with the UN team in March 1992 comprised 
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those members of the SADF who had been part of the South African investigating 
team: Dr Brian Davey, Colonel Ben Steyn and Commandant Putter.  Significantly 
Thompson was not present during the briefing of the UN team by the South Africans. 
Davey’s briefing to the UN team included a note of caution in relation to the “special 
pitfalls to be aware of when interviewing Third World patients.”64 Davey informed the 
group that “inappropriate publicity of poorly verified incidents often had negative 
effects for those seeking advantage thereby. Widespread fear of CW in own troops 
results, with consequent panic at even the hint of battlefield smokes.” In his internal 
report on the meeting to the SADF, Davey stated that the members of the UN team 
present agreed with South African criticisms of the UK report.  
It is worth noting that in the absence of reliable biological or field samples all the 
teams involved in the investigations relied solely upon information gathered in 
interviews with troops involved.  
With regard to the munition involved, the report of the Swedish verification mission 
concluded that  the explosion was likely to have been caused by a military smoke 
munition.  The UN report deals with the munitions aspect in some detail, stating that 
the explosion could have been caused by an exploding artillery or mortar shell.65 The 
likelihood of the explosion being caused by a self-destructing rocket is ruled out since 
such a rocket “would not be expected to carry a chemical agent.”66 The use of a 
single artillery round or mortar shell is unusual in both conventional or chemical 
attack. However, if as has been postulated in the intelligence gathered for the Steyn 
Report,67 the attack was conducted by the South African military as an experiment, it 
is not impossible that only one mortar shell, or a single artillery round may have been 
used, although this is significantly less than the amount prescribed for use in 
chemical warfare. According to an interview conducted by the UN delegation with 
Eduardo Malata, head of the military engineers of the Maputo Commando, the 
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explosion which caused the dark cloud of smoke could not have been caused by a 
mortar. A mortar explodes on the ground whereas the explosion that caused the 
smoke emission was in the air, suggesting the use of a proximity fuse. The UN report 
goes on to state that whilst it is improbable that a chemical attack would be planned 
using a single round, “it cannot be excluded that the limited quantity of agent that 
could be delivered would have had an effect which could have been exacerbated by 
local climatic conditions and limited water supply.”68  
All reports about the incident and interviews with patients agree that the troops 
experienced a rise in body temperature after the alleged attack, accompanied by 
irrational behaviour and desperate attempts to cool down leading the troops to 
remove their clothes. Thompson summarised the common symptoms as: “a feeling of 
tremendous heat on the skin, severe thirst, sore throat, loss of self control, emotional 
lability, muscular weakness, visual disturbance and difficulty breathing.”69 Biological 
samples taken by both Davey and Thompson failed to yield significant results.  
Davey tested the samples taken for cholinersterase levels and also found the results 
to be inconclusive, however, given the length of time between the incident and the 
tests this is not surprising.  
The UN report presented two interpretations of the symptoms, reflecting the opinions 
of Heiner Staub on the one hand and JP Thompson on the other.  Staub believed 
that the symptoms experienced by the troops were the result of dehydration and 
resultant heat stress. Thompson contended that the symptoms were consistent with 
exposure to a centrally acting atropine-like agent. It is relevant to note that Joachim 
Jonasse, a Mozambican lieutenant with 12 years experience in the military, said that 
the troops had no water supply problems.70  One soldier71 stated that the soldiers 
found 25 drums of water when they entered the Renamo base. Three of the drums 
were taken by the first company of troops. 
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The outcomes of these investigations reveal some of the problems experienced by 
verification missions whose terms and political agendas are determined by the 
governments that appointed them. A lack of trust between the teams and suspicions 
of cover-ups by the South African team hampered a free and honest discussion 
between the missions. The missions were also hampered by other circumstances - it 
was not possible to locate the site of the incident and, therefore, to take reliable 
environmental samples; the bodies of the deceased soldiers were in a state of 
advanced decomposition by the time the verification teams had access to them; and 
the bodies had been piled into a mortuary that lacked refrigeration facilities. These 
factors made it almost impossible for the verification missions to reach a conclusion 
as to the nature of the incident. All those consulted have however agreed that 
something strange happened and it raises the spectre that the SADF may, as 
claimed by the Steyn report, have seen an opportunity to test BZ on human subjects. 
Given the amount of time which has passed since the incident it is unlikely ever to be 
resolved satisfactorily.  
Closing Down 
The privatisation of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and Delta G Scientific took 
place in 1990 and 1991; however, it was not until 1995 that the programme was 
finally and formally shut-down.  
The fate of the chemical agents produced or procured by Project Coast remains 
almost as much of a mystery as the chemical incident in Mozambique. In January 
1993, when Defence Minister Eugene Louw was briefed by Knobel about the CBW 
programme, he ordered that, in the light of the imminent signing of the CWC, all work 
on incapacitants should cease and the stocks be destroyed.  It was decided at the 
same meeting that South Africa would not reveal the work done on CR in its 
declarations.72 A week later, South Africa signed the CWC which clearly states that 
“[E]ach State Party shall determine how it shall destroy chemical weapons, except 
that the following processes may not be used: dumping in any body of water …. It 
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shall destroy chemical weapons only at specifically designated and appropriately 
designed and equipped facilities.”73 Although the convention only entered into force 
in 1997, (following ratification in 1995), it would have been prudent for the SADF to 
have destroyed the chemicals in a way which was in keeping with the Convention. 
However, the chemicals were allegedly dumped into the sea.  
On 29 January 1993, Basson reported to a meeting of the CMC74 that the chemicals 
had been destroyed, though not quite as ordered. The Commissioner of Police who 
was supposed to assign a police officer to supervise the destruction failed to do so. 
According to Basson, the police did not want to be involved, so an officer from 
Military Intelligence’s counter-intelligence division, Commandant De Bruyn, was 
assigned to fulfill that function. The Minister of Defence had ordered that samples of 
the substances be taken and preserved by the Chief of the Defence Force until 
verification tests had been conducted by the SAP Forensics Laboratory, after which 
the samples were to have been destroyed.75 Three months passed after the alleged 
destruction, before a document certifying the destruction of the chemical agents was 
drawn up.76  Only in May, five months after the alleged destruction, did the police 
forensic laboratories receive for analysis samples, claimed to have been taken from 
the drums. Basson told the CMC that the chemicals had been packed in drums on a 
pallet, loaded into a South African Air Force aircraft and dumped in the sea off Cape 
Agulhas. According to Basson, American satellites had confirmed that the flight was 
made. How Basson knew if American satellites had spotted the drop is also unclear 
since this information is highly classified in the US.77 Even if there was satellite 
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confirmation of the flight, and confirmation that something had been dropped in the 
sea, the satellite would clearly not have been able to confirm the contents of the 
items dropped.  While Basson reported to the CMC that samples had been taken at 
random from the drums by De Bruyn,78 the certificate states that Military Intelligence 
felt it was better not to take samples, as this might draw attention to the operation.79 
This meant that the SADF (and later the High Court) had only Basson’s word that the 
samples that were tested had in fact been taken from the drums which were dropped 
in the sea. Despite this the court found that there was no reason not to accept the 
fact that the substances had been destroyed, as stated by Basson.80
On March 30 1993,  De Bruyn was given another three samples of BX (Ecstasy)and 
“C” (cocaine) by Basson, and told they had also been taken on dumping day.  De 
Bruyn said there were 18 blue plastic drums in all, which Basson said contained 
Product M. On June 9, 1993, all De Bruyn’s samples were tested by Brigadier Hein 
Strauss at the South African Police laboratory.81 The amounts of substances 
destroyed represented in the various documents are not consistent, in addition to 
which since MDMA in capsule form was found amongst Basson’s possessions in 
1997, it is, therefore, unlikely that the MDMA was destroyed as reported. Indeed it 
was more than three months after the alleged destruction that pharmacist Steven 
Beukes was requested to manufacture 1 million capsules of what was found to be 
MDMA.82 Two batches of MDMA were manufactured at Delta G Scientific. The first 
batch was made using Sassafrass oil.83 The production of this first batch resulted in 
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MDMA with 99,5% purity, production was completed by January and February 1992, 
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and the result was between 50kg and 70kg of MDMA. Later in 1992 Koekemoer 
manufactured 912kg of MDMA by the glycidic ester route.84
When Basson was arrested, he was charged with the possession of a total of 3158 
capsules of MDMA in addition to 38.6g in powder form. He was also charged with 
dealing in 96.9g of methaqualone and the possession of 14g of cocaine. He was 
acquitted on the latter three charges in a ruling by Judge Willie Hartzenberg on 18 
June 2001. The state had alleged that the drugs had been found in the trunks found 
at the time of Basson’s arrest. Basson’s defence lawyers argued that there was no 
evidence that Basson was aware of the contents of the trunks, nor that he had 
packed the trunks himself, and their defence was accepted by the court.  
If the substances were not destroyed as reported, the question of the whereabouts of 
the substances, including the BZ which Knobel reported the SADF had in stock, 
remains unanswered. The table below shows the chronology of events relating to the 
destruction of the chemical warfare agents and drugs.  
Table 6. Chronological account of the alleged destruction of 
substances 
30 July 1992 
Letter from Philip Mijburgh of Medchem Technologies to Basson with a quote for the production of 
1000kg of MDMA. Total cost of production quoted at R840 000. States time of delivery to be 6 – 10 
weeks after payment. 85
 
7 August 1992 
Knobel confirms the order for 1000kg of MDMA. Provides assurance of provisional immunity from 
prosecution.86
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September 1992 
Basson allegedly deals with Croatian suppliers for the acquisition of 500kg of methaqualone.87  
 
6 November 1992 
Payment of $2 300 000 into Jacomet’s account in Switzerland to pay Croatian suppliers for 500kg of 
product M (date is given for its delivery in SA). It is unlikely that this is the 500kg of product M said to be 
in the SADF stores in the letter dated 9 November 1992.88
 
9 November 1992 
Letter from Basson, signed by Knobel, about what substances are in SADF stores: “The following 
specialist chemicals are in stock at the South African Medical Services which will be worked up in the 
1993/1994 financial year: (a) 1000kg product B, (b) 500kg product M, (c) 30kg Product C”.89.  [These 
were BZ, methaqualone and cocaine, respectively] 
 
31 November 1992 
CMC of Project Coast decides that, given the upcoming signing of the CWC and the resulting difficulty in 
procuring chemicals, all procurement actions necessary to complete the offensive programme and 
which are dependent on external involvement should be expedited and completed by the end of 1992, if 
possible. R6.6 million was moved to the current financial year budget so that destruction can be carried 
out on 27 January 1993.90
14 January 1993 
South Africa signs the CWC. 
 
29 January 1993 
Destruction of agents reported to the CMC. 91
 
30 March 1993 
Certification of the destruction of chemical products on 27 January 1993. It is stated that the following 
products were in the load that was destroyed: 
18 plastic drums (weighing 50kg, containing 100 litres, Product M) = 900kg (mandrax/methaqualone) 
73 metal drums (weighing 12.5kg, 20 litres, product BX) = 912.5kg (MDMA) 
2 metal drums (12.5kg, 20 litres product C) = 25kg (Cocaine) 
2 containers (about 6kg, 12 litres product P) (it is not known what Product P was) 
2 small metal drums (about 6kg, 12 litres, Product C) = 12kg 
11 green metal drums (80kg, 200 litres, Product B)  = 880kg (BZ) 
4 paper drums (50kg, 200 litres, 2 with product M and 2 with product B) = 100kg each 
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2 cardboard boxes with 60mm and 81mm mortars. 
Total Product M = 1000kg and Total Product C = 37kg. 
Maj Gen Verbeek states it is not necessary to test the contents because it would draw too much 
attention.92   
 
End of March 1993 
CMC decides that Basson must travel to Croatia to recover money lost during the procurement 
transaction. 93
 
After March 1993 (date unknown) 
Mijburgh approaches Beukes to encapsulate a substance on Basson’s orders for a state contract. He 
makes 1 million capsules from which Koekemoer takes samples. The police find the samples to contain 
MDMA.94
 
7 April 1993 – 7 May 1993 
Basson in Croatia.95
 
May 1993 
Brigadier Strauss of SAP Forensic Labs receives 4 samples from Colonel Ben Steyn marked B, BX, C 
and the fourth with no identification. He finds them to be: 
B = 1-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate  
BX = 3,4-methylenedioxymetamphetamine hydrochloride (MDMA)  
C = cocaine hydrochloride 
The fourth sample is found to be methaqualone. 96
 
11 May 1993 – 14 May 1993 
Basson intercepts the Vatican bearer bonds intended for weapons purchase for the Croatian 
government.  
 
28 June 1993 
Basson arrested in Switzerland.  
 
30 June 1993 
Basson released. 
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2 July 1993 
Basson back in South Africa. 
 
24 Jan 1994 
CMC instructs Basson to draw up the write-off values for the drugs allegedly destroyed. 97
 
1 Feb 1994 
Write-off values as supplied by Basson.98  
Substance M: first 500kg = R 6 900 000 
Second 500kg =  R 7 440 000 
Total = R14 340 000 
Substance BX 912.5kg = R3 650 000 
Substance C 37kg = R2 590 000 
Substance P 1 kg @ R40 000/kg = R 40 000 
Substance B 980kg = R1 176 000 
TOTAL VALUE = R21 796 000 
 
18 Feb 1994 
Letter of demand for payment from Organochem’s Jerry Brandt who supplied the formula for the 
production of MDMA and 4 PMK deliveries. PMK was one of the starting substances for a particular 
process of manufacturing MDMA, a process that was ultimately not used.99  
 
9 January 1995 
Minutes of CMC indicate Knobel has not yet contacted the Attorney General regarding destruction of 
chemicals. The minutes state that Knobel wanted to first get a written report from Colonel Venter of the 
SAP and that the Attorney General wanted a valuation of the substances destroyed.100
 
29 March 1995 
Surgeon General is instructed to find out from the Attorney General what his investigation found.101  
 
13 September 1995 
South African ratification  of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
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29 January 1997 
Basson arrested on charges of drug trafficking by the South African Narcotics Bureau during a deal in 
which he was alleged to have sold a large quantity of Ecstasy capsules to Grant Wentzel.102 Basson  
contested this allegation saying that he was unaware that a refuse bag containing the Ecstasy was 
contained in a box of wine which Wentzel had allegedly given him. Basson said that transaction with 
Wentzel involved the sale of small arms. His version was later accepted by the court.  
 
12 May 1997 
Letter from the Attorney General to the Head of the South African Air Force, Hechter, requesting details 
of the flight during which the drugs allegedly were destroyed. 103
 
27 May 1997 
Letter from the Head of the South African Air Force stating that there was no list of passengers for the 
flight and that the 4 or 5 people aboard were not known to the Air Force; that there were no flight plans 
and that there were allegedly 20 blue drums on board.104
 
By the end of 1993 all South African chemical warfare agents had allegedly been 
destroyed and SADF contracts with the two companies cancelled. No records are 
available to confirm that the biological agents were destroyed. Indeed there is great 
uncertainty about what happened to RRL’s culture collection.105 Microbiologist Mike 
Odendaal said he gave it to André Immelman when he left RRL,106 and he believed 
that Immelman was going to destroy it. Some of the scientists believed that the 
cultures could have been taken by their colleagues for their own research purposes. 
Daan Goosen claimed in 2002 that he had access to the culture collection and 
indeed set a process in motion to sell items from the collection to the CIA (see the 
section in this chapter headed: Proliferation Threats for details). 
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Another set of unanswered questions about the closure of the programme relates to 
the whereabouts of the technical information. Towards the end of the programme, in 
1993, the CMC decided that all technical data generated by the programme should 
be saved on optical disk and the documentation destroyed. Prior to this, at the end of 
1989, Basson and Knobel had written to the Deputy Auditor requesting authorisation 
to destroy documents relating to the project. The letter notes that all technical, 
scientific and operational documentation had been kept at a central office, known as 
Project Chancellor, since 1987.107 Knobel and Basson presented three reasons to 
motivate their request to destroy the documentation: (i) the large amount of space 
needed to store the documents and the difficulty in ensuring security; (ii) some of the 
documents were deemed to be no longer relevant since there had been a change in 
the philosophy behind the project; and (iii) future directions in the development of the 
project render some of the documentation irrelevant.108 Their letter argued that 
destroying the documentation would afford more security to the project, and that 
since most of the technical documentation was lodged with the “sub-projects” nothing 
would be lost”109 (I presume that the sub-projects referred to are the front 
companies). It was also said that the sub-projects had already been ordered to 
destroy any documentation that could link them to the SADF. Information relating to 
project management would only be kept for two years, for purposes of auditing. The 
requests were approved by the Deputy Auditor in 1990. 
A year later, in 1991, Philip Mijburgh changed the name of his company Medchem 
Technologies to Data Images Information Systems.110 This company was contracted 
to place all technical information of Project Coast on optical disk. The company Data 
Images still existed in 1998 when Mijburgh testified at the TRC hearing. When 
questioned at the TRC hearing, Mijburgh said he did not know what happened to the 
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disks or whether the technical documentation had been destroyed as ordered.111 
Klaus Psotta and a woman whose surname he could not remember, worked on 
capturing the information on disk. (Knobel testified that Dr Kobus Bothma was also 
involved with this process).112 Mijburgh testified that Basson was not involved in the 
data capturing process at all, save for giving the initial instruction in 1992 or 1993 for 
the work to be done. Mijburgh stated that all research reports and related documents 
from Delta G were captured on the disks. He was not able to confirm whether similar 
information from RRL was captured.113 It is not clear how Mijburgh was granted the 
contract to capture the information. He did testify that when the company Sefmed 
closed down,  Data Images bought all its computer equipment and general office 
equipment.114  
Knobel testified at the TRC hearing that 13 optical disks were obtained from Data 
Images and given to him by Colonel Ben Steyn.  This was confirmed by Steyn at the 
Basson trial.115  The disks were then apparently placed in a safe attached to Knobel’s 
office. After the US and UK ambassadors’ approach in 1994, and particularly after 
those countries expressed concern about the safety of the information on the disks, 
Knobel consulted President FW de Klerk.  It was decided that to ensure the security 
of the information, the president, Knobel and Steyn would all have to be present in 
order for the disks to be accessed. Accordingly, a small safe containing the disks was 
placed inside a large safe which required two keys and a combination to open it. The 
president had one of the keys to the large safe as well as the combination, Knobel 
kept the other key to the large safe and Steyn had the combination of the large safe 
and the key of the smaller safe. With the change in government in April 1994, the 
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situation remained the same. After the 1995 démarche, the key and combination in 
his control was passed over to Deputy President Thabo Mbeki.116  
Despite these elaborate precautions there is evidence that the technical information 
from Project Coast was not destroyed as Basson had stated to a CMC meeting in 
January 1995.117  Knobel was mandated at this meeting to determine whether the 
process of capturing the information had been completed correctly and all the 
documents destroyed. Knobel’s action in this regard consisted of interviewing Basson 
who assured him that the process had been successfully completed. Accepting 
Basson’s explanation at face value, as he did, Knobel was at best casual with 
information of profound public health importance. RRL scientists interviewed said 
they had not handed over all their project reports as requested by RRL management 
and that they retained their reports. Technical project documents from both Delta G 
and RRL were found in trunks at the time of Basson’s arrest in 1997. A number of 
questions pertaining to the documentation of Project Coast remain unanswered: 
What is on the disks? How many copies of the disks exist? Are they all secure? 
Indeed, do such disks exist at all? Are all the technical documents found in Basson’s 
trunks captured on the disks? How many of the scientists retained information on the 
projects they carried out?  
As previously mentioned, Basson had been dismissed from the Defence Force on 31 
March 1993, in the wake of General Pierre Steyn’s report to FW De Klerk. But, he 
was immediately re-employed for twelve months to tie up the loose ends of Project 
Coast, including retrieving the money that was lost during the alleged deal to 
purchase methaqualone from Croatia. From March 1994 – October 1995 Basson 
was not employed by the military, but was reinstated by a cabinet decision in 1995. 
After his dismissal, despite having been re-employed, Basson pursued a number of 
business deals, including the development of links with Libya. These included 
consulting on the management of a planned railway line in Tripoli for three years from 
March 1993. He was also employed as a consultant on the construction of hospitals 
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in Libya.118 His close associate, Christopher Marlow, spent 18 months in Libya 
between 1994 and 1995 in connection with the business of a company, Libgro, set up 
by himself, Basson and Mijburgh. According to Marlow, Libgro was set up in 1993/94 
specifically to handle “the Libyan arm of business”.  
Testifying in court Marlow was adamant that in all his dealings with Libya he had 
absolutely nothing to do with intelligence matters, and that his involvement at all 
times was “purely business”.119 As discussed in Chapter 5, the were a matter of 
concern for the NIA, who were keeping watch on Pienaar because of his relationship 
with Murgham,120 and US and UK intelligence services. Concern about these trips 
led the US and UK to urge the South African government to re-employ Basson in 
1995 so that he could be brought under military control.121 There were fears that 
Basson had been transferring CBW knowledge to Libya.122  
On 11 April 1994 the ambassadors of the US and UK met with President De Klerk. 
According to Ambassador Princeton Lyman of the United States, who was present 
during these meetings, the US and UK were concerned that the South African CBW 
information was “in danger of being acquired by other states, in particular Libya,”123 
and that South African scientists could be recruited by these states. Reference to this 
meeting is made by Knobel in the document which formed the basis for his briefing of 
Mandela in August 1994. Under the heading “Enquiry by Ambassadors of The USA 
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and UK124” Knobel confirmed the intention of the meeting as explained by Lyman and 
added that the US and UK had requested further that: 
• Their experts be fully briefed on the details of the SADF programme. 
• Confirmation be given that the programme has been terminated and 
that no biological weapon systems are in existence. 
• A public declaration to this effect be made.  
• All cases of alleged abuse of the programme and its products be fully 
investigated and the results of this investigation be made available to 
them. 
• That Mr Mandela should be fully informed about the programme. 125  
The response from the De Klerk was terse. According to Knobel’s document he told 
the representatives that it was his intention to inform Mandela about the programme 
after the election, that South Africa would not submit a CBM declaration until the 
Government of National Unity was in place, and that the information on the disks was 
regarded as a national asset and would not be destroyed before discussions with the 
new government.126  Mandela was also told that an overview of Project Coast had 
been given to a group of US and UK experts by Basson over a period of three days 
during which they had visited RRL.  
A document used by the TRC in its 1998 hearing may have been the document on 
which Basson briefed the US and UK experts. The document is not dated and is 
merely headed “The South African CBW programme”. It states that South Africa had 
to develop a self-sufficient, defensive capability through the production of defensive 
equipment and through the establishment of defensive equipment research and 
development laboratories. At the same time it states that “the SADF would have to 
develop a plausible retaliatory ability in the case of chemical attack on its forces. This 
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ability would not necessarily have to be lethal, but would, against the backdrop of the 
possibility of highly lethal agents being deployed, have to be realistic enough to force 
an opposing force to deploy defensive measures to protect their own forces.”127 It 
goes on to say that “no biological weapons or delivery systems would be developed.” 
This last claim is misleading since biological weapons and delivery systems were 
developed at RRL, but not for large scale delivery. The emphasis on the defensive 
nature of the programme was even more misleading since attention to the defensive 
aspects of the programme began only in 1988, seven years after the initiation of the 
programme. The document states that, for lethal agents, binary systems were 
considered “too inefficient” to develop, whereas for agent CR, a binary system was 
developed. This too is a misleading statement, because what would make a binary 
nerve-gas  inefficient would also make a CR binary inefficient, probably a great deal 
more so. The US Congressional opposition to large-scale procurement of binary 
chemical weapons by US armed forces laid particular emphasis on the greater 
efficiency of the non-binary nerve gases that were already massively stockpiled.128
On 22 April 1994, a week before South Africa’s first democratic elections, a second 
meeting took place between the US and UK ambassadors and President De Klerk. In 
this meeting De Klerk reaffirmed his commitment to briefing Mandela about the 
programme and agreed that the meetings between the technical experts from the 
three countries should continue. Contrary to the statement De Klerk made in his 
earlier meeting, however, he argued that a defensive programme had been justified 
and that the data resulting from the programme was a national asset which would not 
be destroyed.129 Lyman recalls that after the 1994 election the US and UK waited for 
De Klerk to brief President Mandela. They believed that this briefing had to take 
place before Mandela’s inauguration. Five days before the inauguration, when the 
briefing had not taken place, the US “alerted Thabo Mbeki that there was a 
proliferation matter of great concern that we [the US and UK] would need to address 
251
                                                
127 “The South African CBW Programme”, undated document found in the trunks belonging to Basson at 
the time of his arrest in 1997. 
128 Electronic communication between Chandré Gould and Professor Julian Perry Robinson, Science 
Policy Unit, University of Sussex, 12 February 2001.  
129 Gould telephonic interview with Lyman, 14 June 2001.  
 
with Mandela very soon in the new government.”130 Mandela was urged to seek a 
briefing from De Klerk as soon as possible. A short briefing was given to Mandela a 
few days later and he received a fuller briefing some months later.  
The continued trips undertaken by Basson to Libya were still a matter of concern to 
the US and UK.131 In January 1995 a  third démarche was brought by the 
governments of the US and UK. Dr Graham Pearson, former Director-General of the 
UK Defence Ministry’s Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton 
Down,132 who was present during the meetings that followed, told me that the 
intention of the démarche was to request the South African government to provide a 
credible CBM statement to the BTWC.133 He said that no comment was made about 
the nature of the programme and no questions were asked about it. Lyman records 
that the most difficult issue of the meeting was Basson’s travels to Libya and 
elsewhere. This discussion took place with Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo and 
Deputy Defence Minister, Ronnie Kasrils, after Mandela had left the meeting. It was 
agreed that the best way, at that stage, to deal with this matter was for Basson to be 
re-hired by the Defence Force in his capacity as a cardiologist. It was clear that this 
would lead to questions being raised but it “was the only recourse that appeared 
practical at the time.”134
The annual submission to the BTWC has many parts, one of which is Form F, a 
Declaration of Past Activities in Offensive and/or Defensive Research and 
Development Programmes. The South African Confidence Building Measure Form F 
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(CBM F) declaration to the BTWC which followed the démarche was incomplete, and 
misleading in so far as it deliberately concealed relevant information about the 
programme.135 The declaration states that the past “defensive biological research 
and development programme” began in 1987 and ended in 1992, rather than the 
1983 – 1994 period that its own documents revealed. It also states that a “specific 
biological warfare threat against South African forces in operations in Angola was 
perceived.” There is no evidence, documents or information that such a threat 
existed. No mention is made in the annual CBM F Form of the work done at RRL 
(established in 1983), or of any component of the programme designed to research, 
prepare and use biological agents to kill people.  In its official CBM F statements of 
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 South Africa has continued to maintain the same 
position, notwithstanding the revelations of the TRC and the convincing evidence to 
the contrary.  
Allegations of fraud 
In 1989 the first indications emerged that the financial management of Project Coast 
had been extremely weak. By the time Basson’s criminal trial started in 1999 
investigations into the use of the CBW programme’s funds had been underway for 
more than seven years (see Chapter 3).136 The appointment of Swanepoel and 
Mijburgh as directors of the front companies appear to have signalled the shift in 
Basson’s approach to the CBW programme. While initially ideological convictions 
and professional ambitions drove him to establish and develop the secret 
programme, after 1985 he focussed a great deal of attention on the establishment of 
an arcane international system of companies with the apparent purpose of siphoning 
off Project Coast funds. Forensic auditor, Hennie Bruwer, found that over a seven 
year period R86-million of funds intended for Coast were channelled through bank 
accounts to which Basson had access, but which were never disclosed to the 
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Surgeon General or the CMC.137 In order to place the apparent ideological shift in 
perspective it is instructive to consider the political conditions in South Africa during 
the mid-1980s. 
In August 1985 PW Botha presented his infamous ‘Rubicon’ speech following a great 
deal of media hype that he was to announce major shifts in his government’s 
positions on political change. However, the speech fell far short of what had been 
promised.138 The failure of Botha to significantly address the need for change as well 
as a number of other factors contributed to increasing international pressure on 
South Africa. Legum argues that at this time the conflicts in Southern Africa finally 
moved to near the top of the international agenda, until then “Western nations had 
not felt their interests in the region to be seriously jeopardised, even if the public 
conscience was troubled by the injustices of apartheid.”139 When in September 1985 
Botha announced a national State of Emergency and initiated a repressive crack-
down by the security forces on public opposition to apartheid Western nations began 
to reshape their policies towards the country. Legum makes the case that the 
“decision to declare a national emergency reflected the Pretoria government’s 
increasing loss of power in being able to contain the challenge coming from the Black 
(sic) opposition.” 140 The State of Emergency, he argues was the result both of 
increasing support within South Africa for the ANC policy of making the townships 
ungovernable and the failure of the security forces to stop incursions by Mkhonto we 
Sizwe cadres into the country. Aside from these indicators that the NP government 
was losing control inside South Africa, Legum identifies three other factors which 
indicated a change in the balance of power during the mid-1980s: (i) the government 
was unable to force negotiations with the liberation movements on its terms, 
particularly not without first releasing key political prisoners, including Nelson 
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Mandela; (ii) the South African business community began to place pressure on the 
government to negotiate with the ANC and to release Mandela, going so far as to 
open talks with the ANC in Zambia; and (iii) Botha failed to respond to pressure from 
Western leader to release Mandela resulting in tougher policies to force Botha to 
accept change.141  
In addition, the Afrikaner Broederbond began to see the inevitability of political 
change. In 1986 the head of the Broederbond, Pieter de Lange, met with the ANC at 
a Ford Foundation conference in New York. Here Thabo Mbeki and De Lange held 
informal talks with the dramatic result that De Lange committed himself to facilitating 
change as long as the survival of the identity of the Afrikaner could be ensured.142 As 
a powerful political force in South Africa and within the NP, the acceptance by the 
Broederbond of the necessity for change placed additional pressure on Botha to 
undertake meaningful reform. According to Sparks, De Lange claimed that by 1986 
“a majority of the brotherhood’s twenty thousand members voted to accept the 
principle of full citizenship rights for blacks.”143  
If the winds of change were already blowing through the Broederbond by 1986, there 
is no question that Basson would have been aware that his days of access to large 
reserves of freely available funds were numbered. In addition, the inevitability of and 
moral imperative for change undermined the ideological justification for the 
programme. If Goosen’s word can be relied upon, Basson’s justification for his 
involvement in the CBW programme before 1985 was that he wanted to be able to 
tell his children that he had done everything in his power to prevent a black 
government from taking power.144  By the 1990s his collaboration with ANC members 
in business deals indicated that opportunism had trumped ideology.  
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In his opening address in the criminal case against Wouter Basson, state prosecutor 
Anton Ackerman, who led the state’s case on the fraud charges, told the court that 
Basson saw himself as an international businessman with a personal empire in five 
areas: property; finance; trading; scientific/production/research; and investment.145 
All of these, the prosecution claimed, were bankrolled from Project Coast funds. 
Ackerman told the court that the prosecution believed state funds had been siphoned 
off in various ways.  First, he said, Basson set up an extensive network of companies 
in South Africa and abroad. At all times, confidantes appointed as executive officers 
acted as Basson’s nominees. Funds channelled to fixed deposit accounts abroad 
served as “performance bonds” or security for the purchase of commodities. The 
prosecutors maintained that loans acquired against such collateral had been used by 
Basson for personal gain. Bank accounts were opened in the name of existing SADF 
front companies (or alleged fronts known to suppliers) and funds due to the SADF 
were channelled, according to the prosecution, through second accounts for 
Basson’s personal use.146  
The state claimed that towards the end of 1986, Basson established three companies 
in the Cayman Islands: WPW Investments Inc, PCM International Inc, and Medchem 
Inc. Basson’s American friend and business associate, David Webster, was 
instrumental in establishing and dealing with the companies. In each case, Basson 
was vice-president of the companies.147 The multitude of companies  were 
restructured often, sometimes on an annual basis and their names were frequently 
changed. Broadly speaking, the companies operating outside South Africa fell under 
the holding company WPW Investments; those that operated internally came under 
the umbrella of the Wisdom group.148   
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The prosecutors argued that Basson had a close group of trusted associates who 
took care of the running of the business, most of whom were employed by fronts of 
Project Coast.149 They included Antionette Lourens (former wife of Jan Lourens) who 
was employed at Infladel, accountant Tjaart Viljoen, Wynand Swanepoel, Philip 
Mijburgh, Samuel Bosch (a banker who had been drawn in by Basson to deal with 
some of his financial matters) and advocate Christopher Marlow who was ostensibly 
legal adviser to Delta G Scientific and Project Coast.  
Basson argued against the state’s claims, saying that because Project Coast relied 
on the import of substances and equipment, SADF funds for this purpose had to be 
laundered to avoid international detection. He said that his role in the procurement 
process was of such importance that he had no choice but to masquerade as an 
international businessman. His legal defence team claimed that the companies 
established abroad were used to launder funds in the interests of the SADF.  The fact 
that the companies never made a profit and that the business deals usually resulted 
in a loss only proved, according to the defence, that they were never intended to be 
profitable and had only been established to hide the origin of Project Coast’s funds. 
The state, on the other hand, argued that the intention was to make a profit, but that 
Basson and his colleagues were poor businessmen.  
According to the report of forensic auditor Hennie Bruwer, the WPW Group of 
companies was established in October 1986, at the time when WPW Investments 
Incorporated was registered in the Cayman Islands. The latter was alleged by the 
state to have been the holding company of Basson’s international financial interests. 
Bruwer said that Basson’s interests in South Africa were initially held by a controlling 
company Wisdom Investments and Properties – the founding company for what 
became the Wisdom Group, referred to extensively in Bruwer’s report.150 At the time 
of setting up WPW Investments Inc. in the Cayman Islands, two other companies 
were established: PCM International Inc. and Medchem Inc. In tracing the financial 
records of the companies in the Wisdom Group, Bruwer found that the names of the 
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companies and the shareholders changed regularly.151 Basson explained the 
establishment of the three different groups of companies, saying that he had realised 
during his initial discussions with a group of financial principals, who were involved in 
international black market CBW procurement deals, that ‘the principals’ comprised 
three distinct groups and his perception of the groups motivated him to set up three 
different corporations – one for the Libyans (WPW), one for the East Germans (MCI) 
and one for the Russians (PCM).152
Documents found in possession of David Webster showed that at one stage WPW 
Inc had a 50% interest in Medchem Consolidated Investments, which in turn had a 
75% interest in Delta G Scientific. Using available documents, the auditor 
extrapolated that this arrangement must have been implemented between April 1990 
and August 1991, before the final privatisation of the company. The register of 
companies confirmed that for three months in 1989 Medchem Consolidated 
Investments was owned by Christopher Marlow, and thereafter by Philip Mijburgh. 
Meaning that Basson had a financial stake in the company and would have benefited 
from the privatisation.  
The Wisdom Group was mainly funded through loans from WPW Investments Inc, 
which were channelled by the South African holding company to Wisdom 
Investments and Properties, allegedly established as the property division of 
Basson’s empire in 1988 by Tjaart Viljoen.  Wisdom Investments and Properties had 
three affiliates: Wisdom Finance; Wisdom Erf 1219 and Aeromed Services.153 
Another group of companies, Medchem, fell under the umbrella of Medchem 
Consolidated Investments. Philip Mijburgh was the managing director of this 
company. Dr Johan Koekemoer testified at the TRC hearing that between February 
1992 and January 1993 he delivered MDMA to Medchem Consolidated Investments. 
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The delivery notes for the MDMA were made out to Kowalski International.154 
Mijburgh testified that this had been done for tax purposes; he also said that both 
Delta G and Kowalski were subsidiaries of Medchem Consolidated Investments. The 
Medchem group included Medchem Technologies which, according to Mijburgh’s 
testimony to the TRC, changed its name to Data Images, the company responsible 
for capturing all the technical data of the CBW programme on optical disk.155 
Mijburgh was also director of a number of other companies in the Medchem group, 
including Ecotox (formerly named Maison de Medchem), Trudid Investments, and 
Medchem Sports International (which purchased property at the Fancourt golf 
development). He was a shareholder in other companies, many of which held 
contracts with the SADF.156 Mijburgh also had interests in Medchem 
Pharmaceuticals, Lifestyle Management and Protechnik.157  
The agreements involving the privatisation of Delta G Scientific and RRL were the 
subject of Charges 23 and 24 in the indictment of Basson. Basson and Mijburgh were 
accused of having benefited from the privatisation of the company. Basson and 
Wynand Swanepoel were accused of having benefited from the privatisation of RRL. 
The state alleged Mijburgh, Swanepoel and Basson had communal business 
interests which Basson did not declare when the privatisation scheme was presented 
for authorization.158   
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The privatisation of Delta G took place following a letter from the Chief of the 
Defence Force, General AJ Liebenberg to the Minister of Defence, General Magnus 
Malan. In the letter, Liebenberg gave reasons for the immediate privatisation of Delta 
G Scientific and proposed how this might be done.159 Liebenberg explained that in 
1989 the Defence Force needed to create a distance between itself and Delta G, and 
therefore Medchem Consolidated Investments had come into Delta G as a majority 
shareholder. He said that the long-term plan was to enable Delta G to commercialise 
through the gradual withdrawal of the SADF “when an acceptable level of 
technological development had been reached in terms of CW research and 
development.”160 Liebenberg said that the government would have found it difficult to 
deal with questions which could arise concerning the front company. He suggested, 
therefore, that all official research programmes be concluded in 1991 and SADF links 
to the ownership of the company should be severed. Liebenberg stated that it would 
be best if the process of withdrawal from Delta G could be completed before Magnus 
Malan ended his term of office at the end of August that year and proposed that the 
withdrawal of the state should be secretly managed by Medchem Consolidated 
Investments.161 The family relationship between Malan and Mijburgh (Malan is 
Mijburgh’s uncle) inevitably gave rise to questions of nepotism, however, it has never 
been proved that Malan benefited from the arrangement.  
Liebenberg said that the greatest problem with regard to the change of ownership of 
Delta G was that a new owner would be able to deduce that the facility had produced 
products for the military, and security would be breached if a buyer from the chemical 
industry were sought. This problem, he suggested, could be overcome if the existing 
shareholders were to purchase the company, the only trouble with that option being 
the fact that the existing shareholders could apparently not persuade a bank to 
finance the purchase. Liebenberg argued that the only option, therefore, would be to 
cancel all research contracts with Delta G and carry over ownership to the 
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shareholders.162 Delta G was valued at the time at R20m. On Basson’s advice, 
Liebenberg argued that it should be sold at a 40% discount. He pointed out that the 
state had an interest in the company through a R12m secured loan and that breaking 
ties with the company would result in the severance of the loan. The Defence Force 
would have to pay Medchem Consolidated Investments for the contracts it would 
terminate.  
It was then proposed that: 
? All contracts with the SADF should be ended. 
? The contracts to be paid out for a 5 year period would amount to R37m. 
? A 33% discount should be offered on the outstanding loan amount owed 
by Medchem to D John Truter Financial Consultants, leaving R8m owing. 
? The land and buildings should be sold for an amount of R14m. 
? Medchem should be allowed to pay off the outstanding loan amount 
immediately with the cancellation payment.  
? Delta G should be allowed to purchase the land and the property holding 
company at a discount.  
? The control which the SADF had over the Philip Mijburgh Family Trust 
with regard to the appointment of trustees should be ended.163 
The result of this proposal, approved at a meeting in Magnus Malan’s Cape Town 
office in April 1990, was that Philip Mijburgh was authorised to take over the facility 
with R15 million in hand in the form of a payment to the company of which he was 
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director, Medchem Consolidated Investments.164 Present at this meeting were the 
Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan; the Minister of Finance, Barend du Plessis;  
then Auditor-General Peter Wronsley (since deceased); Chief of Staff : Finance, 
Admiral Bekker; Chief of the SADF, General Jannie Geldenhuys; auditor Pierre 
Theron; General Niel Knobel; Wouter Basson; and Wally van Heerden of the auditor-
general’s staff. In his testimony at the Basson trial, Barend Du Plessis said that he 
had only been in office for a short period of time before being confronted with the 
privatisation of the front companies and that he had relied on information given to him 
by the auditor general. He said he had not been informed that Philip Mijburgh was 
related to Malan, nor that Basson stood to gain from the deal through his interests in 
Medchem Consolidated Investments.165
A similar proposal was made with regard to the sale of RRL, also in the form of a 
letter from Liebenberg to Malan.166 This letter stated that RRL was fully functional by 
the end of 1988 and that until January 1989 the management of Project Coast had a 
direct role in the direction of the company through attendance at directors’ meetings, 
but that this had been stopped for security reasons.167 From the beginning of the 
1989 financial year indirect control was exercised through monthly meetings and 
consultations with the managing director. The letter claimed that RRL attracted 
attention from the private sector and, although no links to the state could be proved, 
the situation created considerable stress for the management of the company.   This 
was a strange claim in the light of the fact that RRL actively sought contracts from the 
private sector. The proposal states that until the end of the 1989 financial year all 
financing of the company had been undertaken by the SADF and there were no 
profits or losses registered. Very little income was earned from other sources such as 
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private sector contracts. From the beginning of the 1989/90 financial year the system 
of financing was changed and formal contracts were entered into. The total loan 
amount made available to the company at that stage had been fixed at 
R22,469,000.168  
Liebenberg’s letter further states that it was almost impossible to sell RRL or to bring 
in partners from the biological industry. He proposed that the company should be 
privatised, but with the precaution that it was essential that the new owners have a 
positive attitude towards the SADF which meant that key people within the company 
should remain involved. At the time, the three directors (Schalk van Rensburg, André 
Immelman, and  Dawid Spamer) each had a 20% share in the company while the 
managing director (Wynand Swanepoel) had a 40% share.  It was proposed that the 
company be taken over by van Zyl and Partners (Pty) Ltd and the RRL Employees 
Trust. In terms of this arrangement, Van Zyl and Partners would have 75% share and 
the employees a 25% share. Swanepoel was named as the owner of Van Zyl and 
Partners. Basson and Liebenberg agreed that the interests of the SADF would be 
protected by Swanepoel’s holding of the controlling shares.169  
The state, which had an outstanding loan to RRL of R12, 25 million, allowed 
Swanepoel’s company to take over the loan, to be paid back over a period of eight 
years, the first three years interest-free. It was agreed that the facility would be 
rented from the company which had been established to own the property. This 
proposal was accepted by the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, and the Minister 
of Finance, Barend Du Plessis.170 In the end, R18 million was available, and paid out 
to shareholders as follows:171
Contrasida Holdings (WP Swanepoel) R4 671 677 
Wynand Swanepoel Trust R4 488 474 
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A Immelman R2 334 940 
DW Spamer R2 334 940 
DS Van der Merwe R1 257 275 
P Delport R   718,443 
JJ Nieuwenhuis R  589 700 
J Davies R  589 700 
S Wandrag R  589 700 
JJ Hendriks R  359 221 
Delta G was eventually sold to a subsidiary of the multinational DOW Chemicals and 
the facility has since been abandoned. RRL was purchased by the Department of 
Agriculture and currently houses the Plant Protection Research Institute of the 
Agricultural Research Council, so the state effectively paid for the facility three times. 
Proliferation threats 
At the time of the Truth Commission hearings the NIA expressed the concern that the 
names of scientists involved in the programme should not be made known, in case 
they became vulnerable to recruitment attempts by governments interested in 
acquiring a CBW capacity. This concern may have come too late. The first incident, 
about which information is available, involved an approach by a foreign government 
to former Project Coast scientists sometime after 1993 when Jan Lourens was 
approached by Ters Ehlers, PW Botha’s last private secretary, who has since been 
linked to the supply of arms to Rwanda during the 1994 genocide.172  Ehlers 
introduced Lourens to a friend of his from Syria who Lourens remembers as Mr 
Saroojee.173 Lourens recalls that Saroojee was “quite open in his request for 
technology in the form of documentation or skills.”174 Lourens had left Protechnik 
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already and told me “there was no way I was going to address the matter with 
Charles [Van Remoortere] and company.” Lourens told Mr Saroojee that he could not 
purchase documents, but after some discussion, the details of which Lourens could 
not remember, Saroojee asked about purchasing skills: “I cannot recall exactly how 
we arrived at André Immelman. I do recall however that we did not approach any 
other scientist, André may have had a specific skill required.” Lourens subsequently 
introduced Immelman to a small group of Syrians. Immelman recounted that he 
attended a meeting which took place at a house in Johannesburg. Two of the men 
introduced themselves as a general and a retired general from the Syrian Army.175 
There was a discussion about chemical and biological warfare. Immelman and 
Lourens asked the men whether they had laboratories for the analysis of chemical 
agents and for the culturing of bacteria. It was suggested by the South Africans that 
Lourens and Immelman could go to Syria to evaluate their facilities if necessary. 
During the discussions the Syrians showed a broad interest in chemical and 
biological warfare, which Immelman did not find surprising in the light of “the 
knowledge that Israel has a chemical and biological warfare capability.” Immelman 
asked what the source of the political tensions between Israel and Syria were. These 
were explained. The Syrians then said they had an important meeting to attend and 
left. No further contact was made with Immelman and he did not travel to Syria. He 
cannot recall the names of the people who attended the meeting.176 A senior official 
formerly of the NIA’s Non-proliferation Unit told the authors that the NIA had not been 
aware of the Syrian contact.  
In 2003 the Washington Post approached me to assist them to investigate a story 
involving an attempt by Dr Daan Goosen in 2002 to sell his services and biological 
cultures from Project Coast to the CIA. Goosen initially hoped to make $5 million 
from the deal and to secure green cards and employment in the US for himself, his 
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family and a handful of scientists formerly employed by RRL.177  The clandestine 
deal involved a former general in the South African Defence Force, Tai Minnaar, who 
acted as an intermediary between Goosen and former CIA agent, Don Mayes. The 
deal followed an attempt by Goosen to interest US vaccine production company, 
Bioport, in employing him and a group of South African scientists to produce 
recombinant vaccines. Bioport had indicated some interest but was concerned about 
the security implications of the deal. Mayes wrote in a letter to his colleague, Bob 
Zlockie, that “Dr Lallan Giri [Vice-President of the Scientific and Regulatory Affairs 
Group] said … that the project is too sensitive for Bioport and that DOD would pursue 
the issue, Bioport would, however, love to have the products.”178  
Following the failure of his approach to Bioport, Goosen contacted Minnaar who 
wrote to Mayes (who he had known for a number of years) offering him an antidote 
for a virulent strain of an unidentified organism (presumed to be anthrax), all the 
“personal notes and data compiled over the years of research” [by scientists at RRL] 
and “stock in hand” [the culture collection] as well as the services of a research team 
composed of scientists who had formerly worked at RRL.179 The correspondence 
between Mayes, Zlockie and Minnaar shows that from late March, when it was clear 
that Bioport could not be involved in the deal, Mayes began negotiations with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) to take the deal further.180 The deal was to 
involve the sale of: 
One hundred eighty nine strains Anthrax Strains (sic) were grown DNA 
finger-printed and logged. Thirty of the above strains are virulent. 
Twelve are very active and virulent. Three are deadly and ideally suited 
for Mass Destruction in a Warfare Programme. All cultures that were 
grown have been kept under strict Lab. Conditions under the control of 
the senior scientist [Goosen]. These cultures would need to be flown to 
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the US by a US army plane under strict safety measures and US 
control. Antidotes were developed for EACH of the abovementioned 
Strains… All notes on the research of all the scientists would come with 
the group.181
The initial asking price was an ambitious US$200 million not including the relocation 
costs of 37 people.182 However, it would appear that Goosen was offering more than 
he had to sell as, according to Odendaal, RRL’s culture collection only ever included 
45 strains of anthrax, which had been collected in the Kruger Park,183 only one of the 
strains in the collection was virulent, none were anti-biotic resistant and the antidotes 
were old and no longer viable.184 This offer from Goosen came shortly after anthrax 
infected letters had been sent to key individuals in the US in October 2001 causing 
widespread panic and provoking fears that terrorists would use biological agents in a 
future attack on the United States. It is clear that Goosen and Minnaar were hoping 
to profit from the heightened threat perception in the US by appealing to their fears 
that if they rejected the deal Goosen and Minnaar would seek alternative buyers who 
might in turn use the biological agents against the US.   
Before going ahead with the deal Mayes demanded proof of the products Minnaar 
was offering. Goosen, meanwhile, visited China to discuss control of foot and mouth 
disease with the Chinese authorities. When Minnaar informed Mayes and Zlockie 
about the trip it had the desired effect – the US authorities became extremely 
concerned that Goosen might intend selling the package deal to the highest 
bidder.185 However, instead of increasing their willingness to pay the high price to 
secure the items it created tensions between Minnaar and his CIA contacts and the 
deal began to sour. These setbacks aside, Mayes wrote to FBI agent, Rea Bliss, on 9 
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April 2002, stating that the transfer of the “material” from its location in South Africa to 
the United States, could be successfully undertaken “with no exposure for the USG 
[United States government] except for funding.”186
Goosen appears to have convinced Mayes that he held the rosetta stone to the 
South African biological weapons programme since Mayes’ proposal to the FBI for 
removing the pathogens from South Africa included a statement that 
The present government of SA is aware of the Biological Research 
Program to a limited extent. They are unaware of the advanced 
development and present existence of the deadly strains or the 
developed antidotes. The anthrax, antidotes and laboratory R&D 
documentation are presently in the control of Dr Goosen and a few of 
his research associates.187  
Securing the pathogens would remove the threat that they could be used for sale at a 
later date, or be used by the South African government in a future programme. A 
possibility that did not seem unlikely to the Americans. Mayes proposed a plan that 
would not alert the South African government to the transaction. He warned of 
“serious consequences” if the South African government were to become aware 
which would “ultimately deny the Anthrax (sic), technical data and antidotes to the 
USG.”188 Mayes suggested that the pathogens be shipped using private boats which 
would attract little attention.189 A detailed shipping plan, including options for ensuring 
plausible deniability, was presented to the FBI.190 In May 2002 Goosen provided 
proof of his bone fides in the form of a sample of “Escherichia coli 078:K80 (+K60 
GM).”191 This bacteria which can cause severe intestinal upset had had an even 
more toxic gene inserted into its genetic code. The inserted gene which results in the 
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production of the epsilon toxin (causing botulinal poisoning in animals) had been 
inserted at RRL by Adriaan Botha and it is presumed that Botha gave Goosen the 
material. The sample was sealed in a glass cylinder and inserted into an ordinary 
toothpaste tube surrounded by a cooling gel.192 Zlockie flew on a commercial airline 
from South Africa to the US where the tube and its contents were given to Bliss.193  
The Washington Post found that the sample was tested at the US BW Defense 
laboratory at Fort Detrick and found to be exactly as described by Goosen.194 Yet, 
rather than being convinced to go ahead with the deal, the US authorities changed 
their mind about the deal deciding that there was “no compelling reason for paying 
Goosen or excluding the government of South Africa from an operation affecting the 
security of biological material.”195 A few days later the FBI informed the SAPS about 
the plan. The police searched Goosen’s laboratory in South Africa. Goosen, 
however, claims that he had been warned in advance with the result that the police 
found nothing incriminating.196 Minnaar, in the meantime, continued to seek potential 
buyers for the products Goosen claims to have had. This enabled the police to set up 
a sting operation with someone posing as a sheik from Quatar wanting to buy 
anthrax. Goosen said he cultured a strain of anthrax used in vaccine production (non-
infective strain) and gave that to the sheik. If this is what was traded it might explain 
why the sting failed and why there were no arrests. In September 2002 Minnaar died 
in suspicious circumstances and the media speculated that his death was tied to his 
involvement in the deal.197  
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After the failure of the deal and the SAPS investigation Goosen remained closely 
associated with the NIA.198 Whether this was because he had managed to convince 
the NAI had he had something to offer them or whether the NIA was merely hoping 
that by keeping him close to them he would be prevented from pursuing deals like 
this in the future which would deeply embarrass the South African government is 
unclear. Goosen and those of his close associates who stood to benefit from the deal 
certainly pose a proliferation threat particularly since Goosen made no secret of the 
fact that he was motivated largely by a need for financial security, although he told 
Mail & Guardian journalists that concern about the safety of the items and a desire to 
“safeguard the skills and material developed by the South Africans against the threat 
of proliferation” contributed to his decision.  
There is reason to doubt this latter claim by Goosen since, if he could make the case 
that he was indeed trying to put the biological agents out of harm’s way, it might have 
been difficult for the South African authorities to successfully prosecute him under the 
South African non-proliferation legislation. The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act of 1993 (Act 87 of 93) includes Article I of the BWC.199 The relevant 
section states that it would be an offence if an individual sought to transfer material in 
“types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes”.200 Since this legislation has not yet been tested in court it is 
unclear how it will be interpreted and Goosen would certainly argue that his intention 
was to secure the items. The act also regulates the export and transfer of a 
comprehensive list of pathogens and genetically modified organisms. If Goosen 
violated the South African legislation to control export of genetically modified 
organisms201 through the transfer of the modified Ecoli to the US successful 
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prosecution would require the cooperation of the US authorities to provide proof of 
shipment, co-operation which is unlikely to be forthcoming.  
The closure of any CBW programme raises the problem for authorities of how to 
control the knowledge and skills developed by the scientists who worked within the 
programmes. In the case of the South African programme it would have been difficult 
for the government to have re-employed the scientists of Project Coast as a way of 
controlling the proliferation danger. The post-1994 ANC government was lampooned 
by the national press when it was discovered that Wouter Basson had been re-
employed by the military. The fact that his re-employment was at the request of the 
US and UK governments who were concerned about his potential role in assisting 
proliferation in Libya was not taken into consideration in the court of public opinion. 
What South Africans saw was that the post-apartheid government was prepared to 
employ a man believed to have been responsible for gross human rights violations. 
The large-scale re-employment of scientists from the NBC programmes would have 
found little support from ANC supporters and would have been very difficult for the 
ruling party to justify to its electorate. In addition, those who were suspicious of the 
actions of the government would have raised concerns that the re-employment of the 
scientists was evidence of the continuation of a biological weapons programme. 
Given these factors it is not surprising that the ANC government chose to allow the 
scientists to reintegrate into their professions by returning to academia or finding jobs 
in the private sector. Yet it is likely that questions about the potential for the scientists 
to contribute to proliferation in future will continue to haunt South Africa for many 
years to come. 
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CHAPTER 7 
TRC hearing and Basson’s trial 
By 1997 Basson’s fortunes had changed dramatically. From living the life of a successful 
international businessman with all the trappings: overseas flights in the Jetstar, a private 
box at the Pretoria rugby grounds - Loftus Versveld - and an exclusive home at Fancourt, 
with unlimited SADF funds at his finger tips, he was reduced to much smaller-scale illicit 
deals on the black market. Indeed, by the end of 1996 three major investigations into 
Basson’s dealings were underway – by the NIA, the OSEO and the Special Investigation 
Unit of the Transvaal Attorney General. However, it was the Narcotics Bureau of the 
SAPS that arrested him on 29 January 1997. Detectives from the Narcotics Bureau had 
watched as he handed a black plastic bag containing Ecstasy tablets to an associate, 
Grant Wentzel, who in turn laid R60 000 on the seat of the car. As soon as the deal was 
complete police descended on the pair. Basson fled through the park in Magnolia Dell, 
Pretoria where he had met Wentzel, stumbled and fell into the small stream that traverses 
the park and was arrested. Later Basson would deny any knowledge of the drug deal and 
claim that he had run believing that the police were Mossad agents who wished to kill 
him.1
Basson’s relationship with Wentzel dated back to 1992 when Basson started a 
procurement company called Global Management to seek foreign markets for South 
African-made products.’2 Five people were recruited to work for the company, Jerry 
Brandt (Managing Director of Organochem3), Marléne Brand, Solly Pienaar, Steve Martin 
and Grant Wentzel.4 Wentzel described himself as a commodities broker who had dealt 
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in canned fruit, ostrich meat and leather, hi-tech machinery, pumps and unwrought gold 
(to Japan). In 1999 when Wentzel testified against Basson during his criminal trial he told 
the court that he had maintained regular contact with Basson over a number of years 
during which time Basson had advised him how to structure business deals.5
The events leading to Basson’s arrest in January 1997 began when Wentzel was 
experiencing financial difficulties. He had been advised by Steve Martin, his colleague at 
Global Management, that the solution to his financial troubles may lie in marketing the 
popular rave drug, Ecstasy. Sometime before this, Brandt had told Wentzel he was sure 
Delta G Scientific had manufactured Ecstasy. Wentzel approached a former Delta G 
scientist, Gert Lourens, who warned him against the venture saying that it was ‘too risky’. 
Wentzel claimed in his testimony during the Basson trial that shortly thereafter he was 
called by Basson who gave him 100 capsules of the drug.6 Wentzel sold these to Martin 
for R4000. However, what Wentzel did not know was that Martin was a police informer. 
This deal and a second deal in January 1994 involving 2000 Ecstasy tablets resulted in 
Wentzel’s arrest. During his short period of incarceration Wentzel agreed to work with the 
police to create a trap for his supplier, Wouter Basson. The deal was choreographed by 
detective Giel Ehlers who chose the venue close to Basson’s home and fitted Wentzel 
with a recording device. Ultimately these tapes would be of no value as the recording was 
so poor. However, the police did observe the exchange between the two men. In court 
Basson explained that the deal he and Wentzel discussed was for the sale of AK47s to 
Pakistan7 and that he had no idea what was in the black plastic bag, since he was merely 
returning the bag which he had found in a box of wine Wentzel had given him on an 
earlier date.  
Ehlers testified that shortly after arresting Basson he received a number of calls from 
SADF generals (whom he did not name ), indicating that Basson was still well connected. 
The arrest caused enormous confusion amongst the investigating authorities, none of 
which had been apprised of Ehlers’ sting operation (Ehlers in turn only came to know that 
the NIA had Basson under surveillance during the search of Basson’s home following the 
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arrest).8 Later that evening, NIA agents who had Basson’s home under surveillance 
followed a woman from his home to a block of flats a few kilometres away. They watched 
as she removed a black plastic bag from her car and left it next to a second vehicle before 
driving away. Soon afterwards a man emerged from a flat, put the bag in his car and 
drove to a house in Wonderboom, a suburb of Pretoria. The following day detectives 
raided the house (owned by Samuel Bosch) and found two trunks of documents.9 These 
documents, along with two more trunk loads handed to investigators in May, would 
provide all three investigating authorities and the TRC with invaluable information about 
Project Coast. Shortly after the trunks were found, representatives from NIA, the SIU, the 
OSEO and TRC were called to examine the contents of the trunks. They watched as the 
documents were numbered and recorded and an agreement was reached that all four 
interested parties would have access to the documents.  
At this stage the TRC, through its research department headed by Professor Charles Villa 
Vicencio, had attempted to interview Basson about his role in CCB related activities, but 
had met with little success. The TRC had no formal investigation planned into the 
activities of Basson and indeed, had little information about the chemical and biological 
warfare programme. The Netherlands Instituut voor Zuidelijk Afrika (NIZA) had been 
commissioned by the TRC’s research department to report on the “involvement of the 
South African apartheid regime and its secret services in external operations like hit 
squads, chemical and biological warfare”.10 The report was based on open source 
material and interviews and, despite later being found to be inaccurate on a number of 
points, it formed the basis of the TRC’s understanding of the CBW programme in late 
1997. Shortly after Basson’s arrest, President Mandela instructed Knobel, Michael 
Kenney (Deputy Director of the NIA) and Colonel Ben Steyn (then Project Officer of 
Project Jota) to brief the TRC about the chemical and biological warfare programme. It 
was a secret briefing open only to a small group of senior TRC members who had top 
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secret security clearance from the NIA, a fact which caused a great deal of controversy 
within the TRC as many saw such a top secret briefing as being in contradiction to the 
purpose of the TRC - to reveal information. Fortunately the application for amnesty from 
Jan Lourens, and later that of Schalk van Rensburg, provided the TRC with sufficient 
reason to conduct a full investigation into the activities of Project Coast. However, once an 
investigation and hearing had been approved by the commissioners, gaining access to 
the documents from the trunks proved to be a difficult task.  
There was a great deal of opposition to the TRC investigation - from the SIU which saw 
the TRC investigation as a threat to its own investigation; from the NIA which was 
concerned about information being made public, and from some of the scientists involved 
in the programme. This opposition, particularly from the NIA, complicated and stalled the 
TRC investigation which had to be completed in three months since the deadline for the 
completion of human rights investigations was set for the end of July 1998. Time still had 
to be allowed to organize and subpoena witnesses to the public hearing. Pressed as the 
TRC was for time, the NIA’s constant stalling in providing investigators with access to the 
documents almost prevented a successful investigation. When first approached by the 
TRC for access to the documents the NIA insisted that, before access could be granted, a 
meeting needed to take place between Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and the TRC. 
However, letters to Mbeki remained unanswered and his office said he was too busy to 
meet with the investigators. The meeting never took place. Meanwhile the NIA met with 
the deputy head of the TRC, Dr Alex Borraine, and head of the investigative unit, Dumisa 
Ntsebeza, urging them to call the investigation off as, they claimed, it could jeopardize the 
SIU and OSEO investigations. When the TRC responded that the investigation would go 
ahead, the NIA refused investigators access to the documents on the basis that the 
investigators did not have top secret security clearance.11 It was the OSEO which finally 
broke the deadlock. When investigators met with Dr Jan Swanepoel, head of the OSEO, 
he sympathized with the TRC’s problem having had his own investigation blocked 
frequently since 1992. He offered the investigators free access to the documents which 
the OSEO had in their offices and allowed them to make copies of several hundred 
pages. When the NIA was confronted with the fact that the TRC already had many of the 
documents they relented and while imposing extremely stringent conditions on the use of 
the documents (they had to be consulted within the confines of the NIA offices in Cape 
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Town), access to the information allowed the TRC to effectively prepare for the public 
hearing.  
Detailed interviews with Jan Lourens and Schalk van Rensburg provided the names of 
some of the scientists involved in the programme and details of the operation of the front 
companies. Van Rensburg’s motivation for coming forward was the reaction to a betrayal. 
Goosen, when approached, was just as forthcoming as Lourens and van Rensburg. He 
too was aggrieved by his removal from the leadership of RRL, but for both van Rensburg 
and Goosen the main source of their grievances was the fact that neither had benefited 
financially from the privatisation deal which had seen Swanepoel, Immelman and others 
walk away rich men. Ultimately it was a handful of scientists who participated willingly in 
the TRC process, and others saw themselves as having no option but to co-operate. 
Most, however, were afraid of public exposure and declined to see the investigators or 
were impossible to find. Before the hearing in June 1998 more than 40 interviews were 
conducted.  
Two weeks before the scheduled hearing date in June, TRC Commissioners and 
investigators were summoned to urgent meetings with the Ministry of Defence, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Surgeon General, and the NIA. The TRC delegation found 
the government bodies united in their wish to prevent public exposure of the programme 
and was warned of the threat the hearing posed to foreign relations, not least because 
documents relating to the 1993 and 1994 démarches of the US and UK were found in the 
trunks. It was argued that if details of these démarches were to emerge, trust between the 
three countries (US, UK and South Africa) would be severely compromised. The 
government hoped for a cancellation of the hearing, or at the very least an agreement that 
the hearing would be conducted in camera. Neither of which were acceptable to the 
Commission. Finally, in a bid to reduce the potential damage the hearing could cause to 
foreign relations, the government insisted that a rigorous process be undertaken to 
identify and approve the documents which could be used in the hearing. A policy was 
agreed upon: not to make public any documents that could provide technical information 
to potential proliferators, and the documents pertaining to the démarches would not be 
made public. Three categories were devised in which to classify the documents: (1) those 
that could not be used because they were of a technical nature or related to the 
démarche; (2) those which the TRC could use and refer to in the hearing, but not make 
public; and (3) those documents which the TRC could use and make public. By far the 
largest number of documents fell into this latter category.  
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On Friday 5 June, three days before the hearing, Knobel handed to the investigators a 
new set of documents, which he tabled subsequently at the TRC hearing, thus placing 
them into the public domain. Documents he believed he would require in his personal 
defence. They included the minutes of CMC meetings, correspondence pertaining to the 
manufacture of and payment for the MDMA, briefings to the Minister of Defence and 
President, and minutes of meetings of the Defence Command Council.  
Before the hearing began on Monday 8 June 1998, the government, represented by its 
legal adviser Fink Haysom, again presented an argument to the TRC that the hearing be 
held in camera. He was supported by legal representatives from the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and the head of the Council for the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Abdul Minty. Despite their urgent appeals, the TRC determined that the 
hearing should go ahead with full public disclosure. The only compromise made was that 
a legal representative from the Department of Foreign Affairs was to sit in on the hearing 
so that he could raise objection to testimony or documentation that posed the danger of 
proliferation. It emerged that one of the greatest concerns of government was that they 
did not know what the scientists were going to say. The NIA had not briefed government 
officials on their findings about the CBW programme and the briefings of Knobel and 
Steyn clearly fell short of conveying all the information about the programme.  
Those who gave testimony in the hearing included: Jan Lourens, Charles Van 
Remoortrere (one-time owner of Protechnik, Hazmat and Technotech, and associate of 
Basson), Dr Daan Goosen (first managing director of Roodeplaat Research 
Laboratories), Dr Schalk van Rensburg (former director at RRL and head of the Animal 
Ethics Committee), Dr Mike Odendaal (former head of Microbiology at RRL), Dr Johan 
Koekemoer (former head of research at Delta G Scientific, the person responsible for the 
manufacture of MDMA), General Lothar Neethling (former head of the Police Forensics 
Laboratory and close associate of Basson), Dr Wynand Swanepoel (former MD of RRL), 
Dr Philip Mijburgh (former MD of Delta G), Knobel (former Surgeon General and Project 
Manager) and Dr Wouter Basson (former Project Officer). 
Whilst Lourens, Van Remoortere, Odendaal, Van Rensburg, Goosen, Koekemoer and 
Knobel agreed to give their testimony willingly, Mijburgh, Swanepoel and Basson were 
reluctant witnesses. They had denied TRC investigators interviews prior to the hearing, 
and their legal counsel argued that they should not be called upon to testify because there 
were indications that all three were to be indicted by the Attorney General. Basson 
maintained that his right to silence and his right not to incriminate himself were protected 
by the constitution. On the basis of this argument he challenged the TRC in the Cape 
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Town High Court. Basson lost his case, however; the legal challenge delayed the 
hearings, leaving one day in which to hear Basson’s testimony. On the morning of 31 
July, with less than 12 hours before the Human Rights Commission of the TRC would 
cease to be a legal entity, Basson began to testify. His legal representatives tried every 
trick in the book to delay and stall the hearing, arguing on minor technical points, 
challenging questions posed by the Commissioners and finally, half way through the day, 
Advocate Jaap Cilliers, who was representing Basson walked out of the hearing claiming 
he had to catch the last flight back to Johannesburg leaving Basson to face questions 
without formal legal representation.12  
The hearing was closely monitored by the world media. It was the first time that the 
managers, scientists and architects of any country’s CBW programme had been called to 
publicly account for their actions. Media coverage of the hearing was extensive, albeit 
sensationalist and often inaccurate. The TRC hearings also provided the scientists with 
an opportunity to talk about and question their involvement in the programme. Some 
spoke afterwards of a tremendous sense of relief at having spoken openly about their 
involvement in the programme. Until the TRC hearings, some had successfully kept the 
nature of their work at the warfare facilities a secret, even from their families. Ironically it 
was a scientist working at Pretoria University’s Veterinary Faculty who was challenged 
about his role in the programme by the university, which questioned his suitability to 
remain in an academic position. He and others managed to retain their positions by 
proving their co-operation with and commitment to the TRC process to their employers. 
Others found that colleagues were reluctant to work with them or to include them in 
research teams, despite their professional abilities. Nor did their families escape 
persecution. The wife of one of the co-operating scientists, a cardiologist, was victimized 
by her colleagues who openly and vociferously supported Basson and saw the 
Commission as a witch hunt and her husband as a traitor.13  
                                                
12 A full list of the TRC findings on the CBW programme is contained in Appendix 1.  
13 Based on interviews with all the scientists involved.  
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The criminal trial of Wouter Basson 
The first leg of the Basson trial, the hearing for his application for bail, took place ten 
months after his arrest. Applications were received from the office of the Attorney 
General, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the South African National Defence Force, the 
NIA and the Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, for the bail 
hearing to be held in camera.  The state bodies argued for the need to maintain state 
secrets and claimed that the revelations of the bail hearing might lead to proliferation. The 
presiding judge ruled in their favour. It was only two years later, in 1999, after a lengthy 
legal battle fought by the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) and the press, that the bail 
application hearing on the drug charges was made public and an out-of-court settlement 
assured that the trial would be open to the public.14  
The charges against Basson fell into three broad categories, charges relating to the 
possession of narcotics and top secret documents, those relating to human rights 
violations and charges of fraud and theft. Given the enormity of the case (the state 
brought 64 charges against Basson) two prosecutors were assigned to the case. Dr Torie 
Pretorius and Anton Ackerman, both of whom had been involved in the successful 
prosecution of Vlakplaas Commander, Eugene De Kock. Ackerman took responsibility for 
arguing the state’s case on all charges relating to the fraud and theft, and Pretorius led 
the arguments on the charges of human rights violations and possession of drugs and 
documents. While this division of labour was essential in order to manage the huge 
number of witnesses and documentary evidence, it resulted in an unintentional 
contradiction between the case presented by Pretorius and that of Ackerman. Both were 
still investigating their cases and preparing arguments when the trial began and each took 
the opportunity of the other’s presence in court to continue work. So when Pretorius was 
presenting his case, Ackerman was preparing his in the office. This meant that they did 
not hear each other’s cases, and while they did consult each other, they did not work from 
the same offices so could not even consult in detail at the end of each day.  
The case made by Pretorius, in arguing that Basson was guilty on the multiple charges of 
human rights violations, was that Basson would go to any length to make chemical and 
biological agents available to units of the security forces to carry out assassinations and to 
assist in interrogation. Ackerman’s case rested on the court believing that Basson 
                                                
14 The transcript of the subsequent bail application hearing which dealt with the fraud charges against Basson 
is still inaccessible to the public. 
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cynically used the CBW programme to enrich himself and that his claims to have obtained 
the raw materials, chemicals or biological agents abroad were merely covers for 
fraudulent activities. The implicit contradiction between these two positions did not help 
their cases which were already hampered by a judge who appeared hostile to the 
prosecution from the start.   
Basson’s trial started in the Pretoria High Court in October 1999 before Judge R. (Willie) 
Hartzenberg, with intense interest from international and national media. Media attention 
would soon wane when it was clear that the trial would be conducted in Afrikaans, making 
it impossible for foreign journalists to follow the proceedings. The only permanent media 
presence throughout the trial was senior court reporter Marlene Burger who had been 
commissioned by the Centre for Conflict Resolution to monitor each day of the trial and 
provide me with detailed daily reports. It was not clear why the Judge President of the 
Transvaal chose to appoint Hartzenberg to the case, since despite his experience in 
presiding over fraud cases he was also the brother of former Conservative Party leader, 
Ferdi Hartzenberg. Given the sensitivity of this trial, only the second in which an apartheid  
military officer had to account for his actions and which followed shortly after the state’s 
failed attempt to convict Magnus Malan and other military officers for the murder of 
civilians in KwaMakhutha, it may have been important to have appointed a less 
controversial figure.  
Soon after the trial began, legal argument by Basson’s defence team, and a ruling by the 
judge, led to 6 of the original 64 charges against Basson being dropped. One of these 
related to use of biological agents in Namibia prior to independence in 1989.  Others 
referred to murders in Mozambique and Swaziland. The judge ruled that Basson qualified 
for a general amnesty applicable to all South African security force members who had 
operated in Namibia prior to 1989.  He also declared that incidents that had taken place 
outside the borders of South Africa could not be prosecuted in South Africa despite the 
fact that they may have been planned in the country and carried out by South African 
citizens.15 The amnesty the judge referred to was promulgated by the South African 
                                                
15 Dropped charges included, Charge 55: conspiracy to murder Gibson Mondlane in Mozambique; Charge 58: 
conspiracy to murder Enoch Dlamini in Swaziland; Charge 46: conspiracy to murder an unknown man in 
Ovamboland, Namibia; Charge 61: conspiracy to murder SWAPO members in a transit camp by contaminating 
the water with cholera; Charge 31: conspiracy to murder SWAPO members and own forces that posed a 
security threat; Charge 54: conspiracy to murder Ronnie Kasrils and Pallo Jordan in London.  
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Administrator General in South West Africa on 7 June 1989, shortly before the first 
Namibian democratic elections. The proclamation read: 
No criminal procedures may be instituted or continued following the date of 
this proclamation in any law court against any person included in sub-section 
(2) or (3) in respect of a crime committed by such person at any time prior to 
the date mentioned in the territory or elsewhere.16
Section (2) of the promulgation initially listed “a certain category of persons” but sub-
section (3) of section 2 was later amended to specify  
…persons who, while members of the South  African Police, the South West 
African Police and the South African Defence Force, including the South 
West African Territorial Force, in the execution of their duties and activities in 
the territory committed an act or neglected to commit an act which represents 
a crime as covered by that sub-section.17
Basson’s legal team argued that in terms of Section 140 of the current Namibian 
constitution, all acts in place immediately prior to independence of Namibia in March 1990 
remained in force. Pretorius argued that the amnesty was applicable only to criminal 
proceedings in Namibia, and that Namibian law does not extend to South Africa. He said 
that the amnesty could not be used in South African courts to “protect South African 
soldiers who conspired to murder prisoners of war and throw their bodies into the sea.”  
He also noted that Basson had not applied to the TRC for amnesty and had therefore not 
availed himself of the opportunity to receive amnesty. Pretorius also argued that poison 
murders could never be justified as having been part of Basson’s military duties.18 His 
arguments were rejected by the judge in the first of many rulings against the prosecution.  
By February 2000, after merely two months in court (during December and January the 
court was in recess) the state was so convinced of Hartzenberg’s bias that the 
prosecutors sought his recusal after Hartzenberg had stated in court that  it would take 
very little to convince him that the company WPW, of which Basson was a director, had 
acted in the interests of Project Coast. This statement was made in response to forensic 
auditor Hennie Bruwer’s report of the financial dealings of Basson and his associates. 
Hartzenberg’s comment, argued Ackerman, cut to the heart of the state’s case and if the 
                                                
16 Extraordinary Official Gazette for South West Africa, No 5725. 
17 The amended Act was passed in 1990 as the Administrator General Government Notice, No 16 of 1990. 
18 Legal argument in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, Transvaal Division, 11 October 
1999. 
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judge had already made up his mind that WPW had acted in the interests of the SADF 
there was little point in him presenting his case.19 The prosecutors argued that the judge 
was biased and had prejudged the case before all the facts had been presented to the 
court. The judge responded that his understanding of the companies established by 
Basson rested on the premise that the SADF had to act in a clandestine manner. He said 
that Basson had been given freedom by the CMC of Project Coast to create covers for 
people associated with the programme and to procure equipment and substances without 
explanation. He said that the testimony of Knobel, that the CMC did not want to know the 
details of Basson’s activities, justified his perception and it would take little to convince 
him that Basson had acted in the interests of the Project.  Hartzenberg declined to recuse 
himself from the case. In giving judgement on the recusal application, he gave his views 
on the fraud charges stating that: 
• Basson had been ordered to develop both an offensive and defensive chemical 
and biological warfare capacity for South Africa.20  
• The project was top secret and managed by the SADF’s CMC, made up of a 
small number of the most senior military officers.21  
• The “need to know” principle had been strictly enforced and Knobel had testified 
that if it took theft, bribery or any other normally unacceptable means to acquire 
what was needed for the project, Basson was to “get the goods”.22   
• The CMC did not want to know where or how Basson did what he had to do, nor 
the names of people or countries involved, nor when, how and to whom payments 
were made.23 
                                                
19 Gould and Burger, Secrets and Lies, p95. 
20 Ruling of Judge Hartzenberg as reported by Marléne Burger in the daily trial report prepared for the Centre 
for Conflict Resolution’s chemical and biological warfare research project, 16 February 2000.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid.
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• To this end, Basson had been issued with three false passports by the SADF to 
support his cover as a wealthy international businessman with chemical 
interests.24 
• Knobel testified that the SADF would have had no problem if Basson had been 
required to pay collaborators or spend money to help them create plausible cover 
stories in their own countries in exchange for their assistance. For example, share 
capital in a company might be purchased to support such a cover story. Knobel 
also testified that Basson carried out other tasks for the SADF, not connected to 
Project Coast, which he would not know about. 
Forensic auditor Hennie Bruwer had testified from his 800-page report, the result of a  
seven-year investigation into the funds the state believed Basson had misappropriated 
from Project Coast for personal gain. Bruwer found that Project Coast funds had been 
“laundered” through an international network of companies of which Basson was at all 
times the beneficial owner and in which some of his colleagues, friends and family 
members had financial interests. Basson refuted these allegations, arguing that he had 
used the companies to launder SADF finds and, therefore, to distance the SADF from 
sensitive procurements and to substantiate his cover as an international businessman. 
The court heard that documents on the financial dealings of these companies were 
retrieved from American lawyer David Webster’s office after an American court ruled that  
Webster had to make the documents available to South African investigators, despite 
client-attorney privilege.  Based on these and other documents from various foreign 
banks, Bruwer declared that both the WPW Group and the Wisdom Group (two holding 
companies established by Basson), and all subsidiaries controlled by them, were set up 
to serve Basson’s personal interests.  
In October 2000 the court moved to Jacksonville, Florida for two weeks to hear the 
evidence of David Webster and his wife Jane Webster. David Webster testified that he 
was unaware of Basson’s military links and that he had considered all the deals he had 
brokered to have been for Basson’s personal business.  However, in his findings, 
Hartzenberg rejected Webster’s claims that he had not known the nature of Basson’s 
relationship with the SADF25 and found that the companies established by Basson, 
                                                
24 Ibid.  
25 Judgement in The State vs Wouter Basson, para 2092, 2131 point 30. 
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including the WPW and Wisdom Group had acted in the interests of the SADF and not to 
the personal benefit of Basson,26 an opinion he had apparently held from February 2000.  
Despite the difficulties faced throughout the trial by the prosecution, the trial provided a 
unique insight into the activities of Basson and the chemical and biological warfare 
programme.  While the TRC called only 11 witnesses and used some 140 documents in 
the hearing, 153 witnesses took the stand to testify against Basson including his 
international business associates; the former Minister of Finance, Barend du Plessis; and 
members of the CCB who had never before been named in the press. The documentary 
evidence ran to thousands of pages and new insights were gained into the activities of the 
covert units of the SADF. Invaluable information about the operation of Project Coast 
included the revelation that the total budget for Project Coast for the financial years April 
1987 to March 1993 was R270m, including establishment and privatisation costs of Delta 
G Scientific and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (R60m to set up, R70m to privatise). 
Operating costs of the two facilities averaged R21m a year - R9m for Delta G Scientific 
and R12m for RRL - or about R105m for the six years of their operation. Bruwer told the 
court that from March 1990 to February 1991, the project had R48m available, of which 
R6m was allegedly defrauded (Charge 16). From March 1991 to February 1992, the 
budget was R60m ($21 million at 1992 exchange rates).27  
In May 2000 for the first time in a South African court, details emerged about the 
clandestine operation, Barnacle, forerunner to the CCB. Established under the auspices 
of Special Forces, and adopting the  modus operandi of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, 
Barnacle was allegedly responsible for the ‘elimination’ of ‘enemies of the state’, and of 
‘own forces’ who posed a security threat. As SADF soldiers gave evidence, a picture 
emerged of a unit which spent  much of its time disposing of the bodies of SWAPO 
members who, after interrogation, were of no use to the defence force and whose release 
would pose a security threat.  The state hoped to establish that Basson supplied the 
drugs scoline, tubarine and ketamine used by Barnacle operators to murder their victims. 
Basson repeatedly denied his involvement in these activities. Hartzenberg found the 
soldiers’ accounts of their involvement in the murder of SWAPO members and those 
viewed as security threats by the SADF (which included both soldiers who spoke loosely 
                                                
26 Ibid., para 2089 and 2090. 
27 Cross examination of Hennie Bruwer in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, Transvaal 
Division, 28 February 2000. 
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and opponents of apartheid) were true. He found, however, that they had falsely 
implicated Basson in the supply of drugs for this purpose, in order to avoid their own 
prosecution.28
Scientists followed the soldiers. Jan Lourens told the court about the covert murder 
weapons he had designed. RRL scientists told the court of the production of biological 
toxins and the testing of covert weapons they believed were used to murder enemies of 
the state. André Immelman testified about the ‘Verkope’ list.  He told the court it was a 
record he had kept of items he had provided to people introduced to him by Wouter 
Basson. He identified some of these people as members of the SAP.  
Belgian citizens  Bernard Zimmer and Charles van Remoortrere told the court how they 
had made bank accounts in Luxembourg available to Basson for his use, but said that 
they were not aware of his using the accounts for acquisition on behalf of the chemical 
and biological warfare programme.29 David and Jane Webster said that they had helped 
Basson establish trust accounts in Jersey and the Cayman Islands, and that they had 
managed many of his other business interests.  They too maintained that they were not 
aware of his involvement in South Africa’s chemical and biological warfare programme.30 
Swiss pharmacologist David Chu told the court that he had become a close friend of 
Basson and that Basson was his son’s godfather.  He had visited Roodeplaat Research 
Laboratories with a view to marketing the company abroad.  He also claimed to be 
unaware of Basson’s military activities.31  The judge rejected their claims that they were 
unaware that, through Basson, they were assisting the SADF in sanctions-busting 
activities.32  
Hartzenberg refused to allow the testimony of Roger Buffham, who Basson claimed was 
a former British intelligence agent with good connections at Porton Down. Buffham 
claimed in press interviews that he, too, was not aware of Basson’s double role of 
                                                
28 Judgement in The State vs Wouter Basson, para 1978. 
29 Van Remoortrere in The State vs Wouter Basson, 11 – 13 September and 28 – 28 September 2000. 
Zimmer in The State vs Wouter Basson, 21 – 25 August and 13 December 2000.  
30 David and Jane Webster in The State vs Wouter Basson, Jacksonville, 10 – 23 October 2000.  
31 Chu in The State vs Wouter Basson, 29 January – 1 February 2001.  
32 Judgement in The State vs Wouter Basson, para 2092. 
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businessman and head of the former CBW programme. Basson insisted that his 
international associates were all selected for their sanctions-busting experience. He said 
that David Webster was particularly valued because of his ability to create false 
documentation. He said that most of the documents used by the state as evidence were 
in fact fabricated.33  He went further to claim that, with the full knowledge of his military 
superiors, he was allowed free range to establish a complex network of foreign 
intelligence agents.  
Basson explained in testimony that the many luxury homes and apartments purchased in 
South Africa and abroad were purchased on behalf of his foreign ‘principals’.  He 
maintained that the Tygerberg Zoo in the Western Cape had been purchased with the 
view to providing these principals with access to animals for furthering their research into 
chemical substances such as heavy metals elements and pheromones. Basson said that 
the research of Project Coast in these fields was carried out in various South African 
universities. The pheromone research, he said, was part of the quest for effective crowd 
control measures, since certain pheromones raise stress levels, and the first principle of 
crowd control is to “break the cohesion”.34 No other evidence was heard to support this 
contention. Basson denied the state’s claim that the trunks of documents pertaining to the 
secret CBW programme had belonged to him. He said that he did not know to whom the 
trunks belonged, nor was he responsible for packing them. This made it impossible for the 
state to prove a charge of illegal possession of top secret documents and Basson was 
found not guilty on this charge by the judge. 
One of the most serious and far-reaching allegations to be made by Basson was that the 
chief of Swiss Intelligence, Peter Regli, had co-operated with him in a joint deal to procure 
BZ for South Africa and enriched uranium for Switzerland. The prosecutors had 
attempted to call Regli as a witness at an early stage of the case but found that Regli was 
unwilling to testify. Regli still held the position of head of the Swiss Intelligence services at 
that time, and the Swiss authorities were unwilling to allow him to testify. By the time the 
state closed its case, the Swiss authorities’ investigation into Regli’s relationship with 
Basson had been re-opened, and Regli was no longer in his position as head of 
intelligence.  Regli repeatedly contacted the South African prosecutors requesting that he 
be allowed to testify. An application by the prosecutors for the court to call Regli, Dieter 
                                                
33 Testimony of Basson in The State vs Wouter Basson, 24 July 2001. 
34 Ibid., 26 July 2001.  
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Dreier and Libyan, Yusaf Murgham, failed. The judge argued that he did not believe that 
they would add materially to the case and that he had no reason to believe that the three 
men would tell the court the truth. The court therefore relied entirely on Basson’s evidence 
regarding the nature of his relationship with them. Indeed, not a single witness was called 
by the defence – their case rested entirely upon Basson’s testimony. 
In June 2001, after the state had closed its case and the defence had argued for 
Basson’s acquittal on many of the charges against him, Judge Hartzenberg acquitted 
Basson of the following charges: 
Charge 2 – R220 789 paid to Professor Aubin Heyndrickx for a visit to Iran.  
Charge 6 – R200 000 paid to Roger Buffham’s company, Contemporary Systems Design, 
for electronic circuit blueprints for reverse engineering of Chemical Agent Monitors.  
Charge 10 – R67 424 paid to Wilfred Mole’s company, RF Telecommunications, for rental 
of offices for Project Coast.  
Charge 28 – Possession of 38,6g of Ecstasy found in Basson’s possession in blue steel 
trunks.  
Charge 29 – Trafficking in Mandrax (96,9g) and cocaine (14g) found in trunks.  
Charge 30 – Trafficking in Mandrax (100 000 tablets offered to Danie Phaal).  
Charge 36 – Incitement to murder (five Renamo members who allegedly killed secretary-
general Orlando Cristina).  
Charge 37 – Assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm (chemical interrogation of five 
Renamo assassins).  
Charge 38 – Conspiracy to murder ANC spy Roland Hunter with mamba venom.  
Charges 39-41 – Attempted murder (of three unidentified victims at Dukuduku on whom 
jelly-like substance was smeared by Dr Kobus Bothma).  
Charge 52 – Murder (of Special Forces operator Victor de Fonseca).  
Charge 57 – Attempted murder (of the Rev Frank Chikane).  
Charge 60 – Conspiracy to murder (of Dullah Omar). 
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At the time, the judge did not give his reasons for acquitting Basson of these charges. 
The state’s case was fraught with problems. Many witnesses were reluctant to testify, 
some refused to do so at all, and others were openly hostile to the prosecution. The 
prosecutors had to rely on testimony from operators who had carried out murders many 
years before and whose accounts of the incidents did not always tally. The greatest 
challenge for the state in proving the human rights violation charges was to link Basson 
directly to the manufacture and exchange of assassination weapons. While there was no 
dispute that Basson was head of the CBW programme, he denied that he had ever been 
involved in the development of assassination weapons, or that he had facilitated such 
weapons being given to operators by the scientists. While the scientists testified to the 
manufacture of assassination weapons and the operators testified to receiving and using 
(or intending to use) them, every suggestion of his involvement was denied by his 
advocate.  Ultimately Basson’s version of events was found to be the most believable by 
Judge Hartzenberg. 
Basson had indeed put up a remarkable performance. As the sole witness in his defence 
and without a single document presented by his legal team to support his version, Basson 
needed to present himself to the judge in the same way as he had to his senior military 
officers, as a brilliant scientist, expert in his field who was deeply committed to duty. 
During the nine weeks he spent on the witness stand Basson’s demeanour did not falter. 
His strategy, it appeared, was to present fact and fiction in almost equal portions in a way 
that intertwined reality with fabrication until it was impossible to distinguish one from the 
other. For example, he claimed that chemical weapons had been used against Iran by 
Iraq in a fictitious town called Velapjar.35 When challenged by the prosecution that such a 
town does not exist on any map, nor are there any reports of chemical weapons having 
been used in such a place, Basson merely became vague about the dates and times of 
the incident. As he had during his tenure as head of Project Coast, Basson effortlessly 
made the transition from scientist to businessman, drug and arms dealer to spy in his 
testimony and beguiled the court. He claimed that the volumes of document put before 
the court by the prosecution were either false, compiled to support the cover stories for 
the ‘real’ business of Project Coast; or that he could not recall having seen them; or that 
they contained details for which there must have been a good reason at the time but 
                                                
35 Gould and Burger, Secrets and Lies, p152.  
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which he could no longer remember.36 The fact that Basson’s claims about the nature of 
his relationship with the foreign principals only emerged during his own testimony meant 
that the prosecutors, who had closed their case, could not call any of the men identified 
as having been members of the ‘international CBW mafia”.  
On 11 April 2002, after a trial lasting over two years and involving testimony from 153 
witnesses, Judge Harzenberg found Basson not guilty on all charges. For the first time in 
South Africa Hatzenberg allowed television cameras in court to record and make a live 
transmission of the judgement. However, by the time the judgement was passed it was 
clear to all involved that the judgement would be in Basson’s favour. Indeed, such was 
Anton Ackerman’s disillusionment with his chances of obtaining a conviction that he had 
withdrawn from the case at the start of the closing arguments leaving his junior, Werner 
Bouwer, to present a summary of the state’s case.  The defence was no less convinced 
of their victory – five days prior to judgement day Basson had agreed to an international 
press briefing within an hour of the court rising, he had also planned a family celebration 
for 12 April.37 In court on the day were five SADF Generals who broke into applause at 
the conclusion of the lengthy judgement: Magnus Malan, Constand Viljoen, Joep Joubert 
(former head of Special Forces), Dirk Marais (who had led the SADF campaign to prevent 
SADF officers from seeking amnesty from the TRC) and Niel Knobel. All had come to 
show their support for Basson who had, throughout the trial, protected the identities and 
role of senior military officers unless they had since died.38  
At the conclusion of the judgement the state announced its intention to appeal the verdict. 
A week later, again before Hartzenberg, the state was granted limited leave to appeal – 
the state could appeal his decision not to recuse himself from the trial, but not to appeal 
the judgement. That meant that should the state’s appeal be successful the trial would 
have to be started from the beginning again. The state also sought to appeal 
Hartzenberg’s decision on the dismissal of charges relating to offences that took place 
outside the borders of South Africa. After losing their case in the Appeal Court the state 
approached the Constitutional Court seeking judgement on Hartzenberg’s refusal to 
recuse himself, his decision not to admit the bail hearing record as evidence in the trial 
                                                
36 Ibid., p173. 
37 Ibid., p188. 
38 Ibid., p189. 
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and the decision not to allow charges relating to murders in Namibia, Swaziland and 
Mozambique. During the Constitutional Court hearing Advocate Wim Trengrove, 
appearing on behalf of the state, said that should the judgment favour the state, a new 
trial could be started within three months of the judgment and the trial would be expected 
to have been completed within a year. The state also said that they would drop 10 of the 
initial 24 fraud charges against Basson which they believed were too weak or too 
complicated.39 At the time of writing the Constitutional Court had not yet passed 
judgement. 
 
                                                
39 South African Press Association. “Basson could be retried within three months”, Mail and Guardian Online, 
25 February 2005. http://www.mg.co.za
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CHAPTER 8 
Lessons for Disarmament 
This thesis has considered (i) the context in which the South African CBW programme 
was established, (ii) the nature and structure of the programme and its relationship with 
other branches of the security forces, (iii) the extent of international co-operation with the 
apartheid military, (iv) the role of individuals in the programme, and (v) how and why the 
programme was terminated. Here I consider the lessons for disarmament. In particular, 
what can be learnt about, (i) the factors which motivate states to develop chemical and 
biological weapons programmes; (ii) the factors which influence the nature, scale and 
duration of such programmes, (iii) the motivation of scientists to participate in CBW 
programmes, (iv) factors that influence the decision to terminate such a programme, and 
(v) factors motivating other states to react to knowledge of covert CBW programmes. 
It has often been questioned whether the South Africa programme does indeed offer 
internationally applicable lessons when measured against the biological weapons  and/or 
chemical programmes of Iraq, the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan which were 
several orders of magnitude larger and were aimed at the development of large-scale 
biological weapons for conventional use. I will demonstrate that there are sufficient 
similarities between the motivations for the initiation of the programme, the nature of the 
perception of threat to the state, the mechanisms used to prevent detection of the 
programme; and most importantly the response of states who had detected the 
programme, to provide some important lessons for the future detection of BW 
programmes and the response which is required both from states and civil society. Chief 
among these lessons is that the absence of a strong and sustained political will to 
challenge a state that violates the BTWC significantly weakens and threatens the norm 
against biological weapons.1  
                                                
1 C. Gould, “Armes Chimiques et Biologiques: Leçons d’Afrique du Sud”, Paris, Politique Étrangère, No 1 2005, 
pp 109 – 123. 
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It is true that South Africa never sought to produce large-scale biological or chemical 
weapons that would be used against the ground forces of an enemy or against civilians in 
a foreign country, however, like many of the other programmes, the production of covert 
assassination weapons was a key focus. In addition, as has been the case in all known 
programmes, the perception of threat to the existence of the state was a key factor in the 
decision to develop a programme, despite the absence of a symmetrical threat. In the 
case of both Iraq2 and South Africa the programmes were a response to both an internal 
and external threat. 
Also like Iraq, there was not a clear distinction between the chemical and biological 
components of the programme. As the South Africa programme demonstrated, even at a 
top military management level the distinction between chemical and biological weapons 
was not clearly comprehended and the two were frequently conflated. Analysts like to 
make a very clear distinction between the two, I doubt whether this is always the case in 
the minds of those developing programmes. It is true that at the time when the Iraqi and 
South African programmes were initiated (late 1970s and early 1980s) the ban on 
biological weapons was perhaps stronger than the ban on chemical weapons, that in itself 
provided a strong reason to hide a BW programme in a CW programme. Since the entry 
into force of the CWC, the likelihood is that a CW programme may be hidden within a 
biodefence programme, which is not subject to international scrutiny. As biotechnology 
advances, in any case the distinction becomes more and more difficult to make.  
Factors motivating the initiation of CBW programmes 
Analysts have frequently argued that biological weapons do not offer the same tactical 
utility as conventional weapons.3 This, it has been argued, is a strong factor weighing 
against the development of large-scale biological weapons by states. This begs the 
question: if biological weapons are of limited tactical or strategic value why have they 
been seen as the answer to a security threat in so many cases? Is it because other 
factors outweigh the disadvantages of biological weapons, or because the assumption 
                                                
2 J.B. Tucker, “Armes Biologiques: Quelques Leçons Irakiennes”, Paris, Politique Étrangère, No 1 2005, pp 
123 – 1370088. 
3 G. Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons”. 
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that tactical utility is a significant factor in the determination to develop biological weapons 
is incorrect?  
As the South African programme demonstrates, the consideration of the potential tactical 
utility of large-scale biological weapons was not a factor influencing the decision to 
develop a BW programme. Nor was a direct BW threat. Before the mid-1970s biological 
weapons were not considered for development. However, by mid-1977, four years before 
the initiation of Project Coast it would appear that there was a change in the SADF’s 
thinking about chemical and biological warfare. At this time the head of the Applied 
Chemistry Unit of the CSIR, Dr JP De Villiers authored a chapter in the SADF’s “Manual 
for the SADF Command System, Vol I: National Security and Total War””4 in which he set 
out the various categories of chemical warfare agents and made a brief analysis of the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925. He concluded that whilst there was no threat of chemical 
warfare agents being used against South African troops, the use of both lethal and 
irritating agents may be to the SADF’s advantage in certain circumstances when fighting 
its war against ‘terrorists’. He pointed out that the Geneva Protocol did not forbid the use 
of such agents within a country and, therefore, South Africa would not be in violation of 
the Protocol if it used chemical agents in an internal war. On the other hand, De Villiers 
stated categorically that biological warfare was not a threat to South Africa and that no 
specific training in biological warfare was necessary.5
During the 1980s the threat assessment shifted as the Soviet Union increased its support 
for MPLA forces in Angola and the possibility that chemical weapons would be used 
during ground battles increased. Ultimately the chemical weapons programme was a 
response to the threat of chemical weapons use by Soviet-backed military forces in 
Angola and to address the need for crowd control agents to suppress internal opposition 
to the policies of apartheid. The biological weapons programme, on the other hand, was 
specifically aimed at developing covert biological weapons to be used to assassinate 
individuals.  
                                                
4 J.P. Villiers, “Handleiding vir die SAW Bevelstelsel Vol I: Nationale Veiligheid en Totale Oorlog. Hoofstuk 12: 
Aanwending van Chemiese en Biologiese Aspekte van Totale Oorlog”, undated document. 
5 De Villiers, McLouglin, Joynt, Van Der Westhuizen, “Chemical and Biological Warfare in a South African 
Context”, 1971.  
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It can be concluded that if military leaders believe that a threat to the state can be 
significantly reduced through the elimination (assassination) of key individuals amongst 
the enemy (as the United States has viewed Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein) – 
however flawed an analysis this may be – it points towards the utility of assassination 
weapons that cannot be detected post mortem. If it appears as though the target has died 
of natural causes s/he is less likely to achieve iconic status through martyrdom. Under 
these circumstances biological weapons become an attractive option. 
Factors influencing the nature and scale of a programme? 
The nature, structure and scale of a chemical and biological warfare programme will be 
determined by a number of factors and the interaction between them. In the South African 
case the nature of the perceived threat and South Africa’s perception of the inability of the 
Geneva Protocol and the BTWC to prevent the development of programmes elsewhere 
were two factors which influenced the nature and scale of the programme. While it had 
been argued that the BTWC was not taken seriously by other states parties who were 
believed to be in non-compliance with the requirements of the treaty, the restrictions of the 
treaty did mean that there was a need to ensure that the programme would avoid 
detection. For this, and other reasons to be explored later, the CBW programme, unlike 
the nuclear programme established some eight years earlier, was run from within the 
military,6 under the supposed guidance of the Surgeon General and through the South 
African Medical Service (the medical wing of the military) and was hidden within front 
companies with no apparent link to the military. 
In their consideration of the potential constraints to the development of the BW 
programme military leaders were informed by Basson that, in his assessment, other 
states parties to the BTWC had no intention of allowing it to impede their pursuit of 
biological weapons. He advised that concern about adherence to the treaty was, 
therefore, not of importance. Significantly, there was never an attempt to argue that the 
BTWC did not apply because the agents were being produced for small-scale, internal 
use. The perceived security threat was a more influential factor in the decision to develop 
a biological warfare programme than concern about the implications of being found to 
have violated the BTWC. 
                                                
6 The management and authority for the nuclear programme was the responsibility of the parastatal arms 
procurement company, Armscor. 
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As was the case in the Iraqi programme, the South African military made use of facilities 
that could not be obviously linked to the military. The individuals who ran and managed 
the facilities, were initially scientists who had no obvious link to the military. This changed 
midway through the programme when those who started the facilities were replaced by 
close military associates of Basson, but they resigned from the military before assuming 
their positions as head of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and Delta G Scientific. 
Much like in Iraq and the Soviet Union, the front companies undertook some commercial 
work so that it would appear as though they were commercially viable companies. This 
commercial work was also an incentive for the scientists who worked at the companies. It 
gave them a perception of sustainability and allowed them to pursue their specific 
research interests. Lessons were also learnt from the detection of other programmes. The 
head of the South African programme was aware of the need to ensure that an 
incinerator was placed in such a position, close to the research facilities, that the large 
numbers of corpses of experimental animals would not be detected by satellite and result 
in suspicions about the nature of the work undertaken at the company. 
The lessons which must be learnt are that the failure of states parties to the BTWC to 
ensure that known violators of the treaty are challenged in the BTWC context results in 
the perception that the agreement is of little real use in preventing the development of 
biological weapons programmes. The fact that the BTWC still has no compliance 
monitoring and verification mechanism significantly undermines the role of the treaty in 
enhancing security. Despite its obvious flaws, concern about being seen to have violated 
the BTWC can have an influence on the way in which BW programmes are structured, 
ironically it is likely that the result will be that programmes are hidden more carefully and 
are more difficult to detect. 
Factors influencing the duration and termination of the CBW 
programme 
Both internal and external factors played a significant role in the determination of the 
duration of the South African programme. The programme was ultimately of very short 
duration, in comparison, for example, with the Soviet programme. It was approved by the 
Minister of Defence in 1981, the front companies began operating effectively in 1983 and 
underwent privatization in 1991, although the military only officially terminated the 
programme in 1993. That means a total duration of 12 years and an operational duration 
of seven years. This goes some way towards explaining the limited scientific advances 
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made.  
During the 1980s opposition to apartheid from within the country increased dramatically, 
as did the brutal suppression of civilians by the state. In Angola several large conventional 
battles were fought by the SADF against Soviet-backed MPLA forces between 1980 and 
1987 during which allegations were made, but never proved, that the MPLA forces had 
used chemical weapons. The war in Mozambique began shortly after the country won 
independence from Portugal in 1975. Frelimo, which had gained political control of the 
country, aligned itself with the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, providing Zimbabwean 
guerrillas with refuge. The white Rhodesian government responded by supporting the 
Mozambican National Resistance Movement, which later became known as Renamo, in 
its fight against the Frelimo government. When Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, 
support for Renamo shifted from the Rhodesian to the South African military. Under the 
guidance of South African Military Intelligence, Renamo became a fighting force to be 
reckoned with, resulting in a conflict that, despite peace talks in 1984, continued until a 
cease-fire was signed between Mozambique and South Africa in October 1992.7 The 
independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 provided additional security concerns for the 
apartheid government as the country served as a safe location for South African liberation 
movement soldiers. 
Thus Project Coast, whilst only a very small part of the state’s military response to its 
security threats, was active during the period when the state was under greatest threat. 
By the mid-1980s, while the repression of internal opposition continued, for some military 
and intelligence analysts it was clear that the maintenance of apartheid in the long term 
was unsustainable. When in 1989 President PW Botha had a stroke and was replaced by 
a more moderate successor, political changes followed rapidly and the military was forced 
to consider the closure of the CBW programme. However, between 1989 and 1991 there 
was an increase in the activity of the programme, both in terms of the number of covert 
assassination weapons made available to the operational units of the police and military 
and, if Basson is to be believed, in the purchase of chemical agents through black market 
sources abroad.  
                                                
7 Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, p6. 
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Project Coast was officially closed at a meeting of the CCMC in January 1995.8
A combination of factors ultimately contributed towards the closure of the programme. 
The most important amongst these was the change in the internal and external threat 
perception after 1990, the change of political leadership and the inevitability of a 
negotiated settlement between the ruling National Party and liberation movements, and 
the negotiation of the CWC which opened for signature in 1991. It was the anticipation of 
the entry into force of the CWC that prompted the military leaders to decide to destroy the 
chemicals which were to be banned by the treaty. The documentation also indicates that 
the military knew that the introduction of the CWC would make it more difficult for them to 
procure chemical agents and their precursors outside of South Africa. In addition, concern 
that the programme could fall into the hands of the ANC after the political transition would 
also have played a role in the decision to end it. It can be concluded that the decision to 
terminate a CBW programme is likely to be motivated by a number of factors, including 
changing threat perceptions, ideological and political shifts and multilateral disarmament 
agreements which include compliance monitoring and verification regimes.  
Motivations of scientists 
On an international scale the South African CBW programme was trivial in its scope and 
incompetently managed. That does not reduce the gravity of the potential it had for doing 
harm, and there are sufficient indications that the programme was indeed harmful to 
individuals and quite possibly to communities. It is inconceivable that senior and 
experienced scientists employed in the programme were unaware of the cynical 
subversion of science and professional ethical norms that they were furthering. Yet few 
protested, or left voluntarily, and a number joined the programme in the full realization of 
its true purpose.9  
Any country would be able to persuade some of its elite scientists to join the ranks of 
clandestine professional workers, to defend the interests of the state, particularly when 
                                                
8 “Notule van die vergadering van die Beheerkomitee van Projek Jota wat gehou is op 9 Januarie 1995 by die 
Kantoor van HNW”, SADF document G/UG/302/6/J1282, 9 January 1995. 
9 C. Gould and P. Folb, “Perverted Science and Twisted Loyalty: the government’s refusal to release secrets of 
South Africa’s chemical warfare effort echoes an unhappy legacy of secrecy”, Sunday Independent, 8 October 
2000. 
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this can be justified in the interest of threatened national security. Recruitment of scientists 
to the South African programme was not by coercion; they were free to accept or not the 
attractive offers that were made to them at the time they joined. Conditions of service, 
salaries, intellectual curiosity, boredom or frustration with what they had previously been 
doing brought the key persons to the scientific teams at RRL and Delta G Scientific. Once 
in the system, the pressures on them were to conform and not to challenge it. They were 
pressures that were understood and generally accepted. Eminent and respected 
scientists dealt with the development and distribution of chemical and biological murder 
weapons. Veterinarians with years of experience in scientific research were willing to 
approve the ethical standards of experiments on animals which any sense of compassion 
or concern should have led them to refuse. Organic chemists directed the large-scale 
production of drugs of addiction for purposes of which they had no inkling. And so on. The 
list is long albeit incompletely known. 
With few exceptions, the persons recruited were known to be sympathetic to the 
government ideology of the day, and they were persuaded that there were internal and 
external threats to national security that they might play a part in addressing. In retrospect, 
they saw themselves as idealists. Some testified at the TRC or conceded in interviews 
that they realize on reflection, and with hindsight, that such idealism may have been 
misguided. Undoubtedly, a number sought opportunities for the advancement of their 
careers or self-enrichment. And a few would have identified with the very worst of 
apartheid ideology and welcomed their own special opportunity to serve its 
implementation.  
Whatever the original purpose of the programme, the environment of work was such that 
a true scientific contribution was virtually impossible. There was a climate of distrust, 
threat and most pervasively, secrecy. It was impossible in such circumstances for normal 
scientific exchange and discourse to have been conducted. Moreover, judging from the 
evidence, the programme made possible self-enrichment for those associated with it.  
It must be concluded that the central preoccupation of the CBW programme was not with 
science, discovery and truth. There is scant indication that the leadership was concerned 
truly to create a scientific environment, although that was the emphatic claim of the 
protagonists. Eventually, it was corrupt. Judged by the normal criteria for scientific 
research – publications, presentation at scientific meetings, peer review and training of 
young scientists, the programme must be judged as having been virtually unproductive. 
Yet an entire cohort of accomplished scientists remained at their benches for years. 
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There remain a number of unanswered questions about the programme. What was the 
fate of the chemical and biological products. The accounts given to the TRC, and court, of 
their production and destruction were incomplete and scarcely credible. The extent to 
which the products of RRL aimed at the murder and assassination of individuals were 
indeed used for this purpose is not clear. Perhaps most troubling of all is the muted, 
almost non-existent, response of the South African professional community to the 
revelations of the TRC and to the corruption of science and professional ethics that the 
Commission revealed. This might be explained, but not justified, by the moral and ethical 
fatigue of so much that was exposed by the TRC. Where does one begin? However, the 
national response should be comprehensive including the formulation and implementation 
of scientific codes of conduct to be adopted by all scientists and in the introduction of 
ethics training in undergraduate programmes. In the end the conclusion is inescapable 
that the pursuit of science for purposes of causing harm is corrupt and corrupting, as was 
manifestly revealed in Project Coast. 
Factors motivating other states to react to knowledge of covert CBW 
programmes 
If we are to draw lessons from the South African experience it is as important to consider 
why the programme did not draw international condemnation. Why, if the programme was 
detected by foreign intelligence agencies, did this not result in pressure being placed on 
the South African government to terminate the programme until just before the elections 
in 1994? As discussed in Chapter 5, a great deal of documentary evidence points to the 
likelihood that branches of both US and UK intelligence had ample opportunity to detect 
the South African programme from the early 1980s when Basson undertook information 
collection trips to the US, UK and Taiwan. Even if, as a result of failures in the intelligence 
systems, Basson’s activities did not result in reports to political leaders about the South 
African CBW programme, there were other indicators that a programme was in existence. 
During 1983 the Committee on South African War Resistance produced a publication in 
which they alleged, on the basis of insider information, that the SADF had a large 
chemical programme,10 and a number of press articles suggested that chemical weapons 
either had been used or were under development in South Africa. Perhaps these sources 
were not considered reliable enough, or perhaps, the absence of a credible civil society 
                                                
10 “Chemical Warfare Threat”, Resister, No23, London, December - January 1983. 
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organization which monitored and analysed information, and reported its findings meant 
that no-one was really watching and taking note. Yet, incidents in the mid-1990s appear 
to confirm that Western intelligence agencies were monitoring the activities of the 
programme head, Dr Wouter Basson. When in 1993 and 1994 Basson became 
increasingly involved in what he claimed were business ventures in Libya, British and 
American intelligence agencies became sufficiently concerned to initial ambassadoria-
level meetings with President FW De Klerk. The US and UK were concerned that the 
South African CBW information was “in danger of being acquired by other states, in 
particular Libya”11 and that South African scientists could be recruited by these states. 
They also believed that South Africa had not been honest about the past programme in 
their submission to the BTWC. Had the US and UK not been informed about the nature 
and extent of the South African CBW programme they would not have been aware that 
the Confidence Building Measure submitted by the South Africans was inaccurate, nor 
would they have been as concerned about Basson’s contact with Libya.  
Why had they not challenged the apartheid government about this breach in compliance 
of binding international agreements earlier? During the TRC Knobel inadvertently 
provided a partial answer to this question. He claimed that he had been told by one of the 
members of the delegation that there was concern that the programme would fall into the 
hands of the ANC after the political transition. While the apartheid government had, during 
the Cold War, shared the same enemy as the Western powers and, therefore, posed no 
direct threat to the US, UK and their allies, the allegiance of the ANC could not be relied 
upon. The support given to the ANC by the Soveit Union, China and other African 
countries sympathetic to the ideals of socialism meant that the allegiances of the 
apartheid government were unlikely to be shared by its successors. While not posing a 
direct threat to the US and UK there was concern about South Africa’s potential as a 
supporter of proliferation in ‘rogue’ states. Moral and principled objections to the 
development of chemical and biological weapons were not a factor in influencing the 
international response which was rather determined by self-interest.  
The South African experience of biological weapons development, while extremely small 
scale, illustrates that states will pursue policy options that are in their best security 
                                                
11 D.P. Knobel, “Briefing to President Mandela on the Defensive Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme 
of the SADF and the RSA's position with respect to the CWC and BWC”, SADF document 
GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5, 18 August 1994.  
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interests. In this example, it was not only South Africa which set aside its commitment to 
the BTWC in favour of developing a biological warfare programme to address it security 
needs, but also Western nations who put their security concerns ahead of the need to 
uphold the international treaty. One cannot fail to reach the conclusion that an 
international treaty which has no verification regime, no compliance regime that can be 
triggered quickly and easily and has not achieved universality is not a sufficient deterrent 
to the development of biological weapons.  
 301
Bibliography 
Primary Sources 
Archival Material 
South African History Archives 
SADF Project Documents referring to aspects of Project Coast or related projects 
S. Serfontein, “Organisasie-Ondersoek na Projek Barnacle”; 12 December 1980. Exhibit 
31(C) in The State vs Wouter Basson. 
W. Basson, “Verslag: Week Eindigende 09/05/81”, 1981. Hand written document. 
General F. Loots, “Verdere Implementering van Barnacle”, 9 January 1981. Exhibit 31B 
in The State vs Wouter Basson. 
“Itinerary for the visit of LTC Basson, the Republic of South Africa May 26 1981”, 1981. 
Document prepared by the Chinese Army Chemical School. 
“Briefing: the general situation of Chinese Army Chemical School”, 26 May 1981. 
S. Seagrave, A two page letter addressed to Dr. Basson from Sterling Seagrave, 7 
August 1983.  
S.J. Van Der Walt, “Tegnologievoorstel: KBC berskerming van Troepe te voet en in 
voertuie”, 1985.  
Author unknown, “Stafteiken: Projek Academic”, SADF document 
HSPLAN/DMO/UG/302/6/A576, 1987.  
R. Louw, “Verslag: Buitelandse Besoek Kmdt R. Louw”, SADF document HLeer/D 
PROJ/UG/302/6/A576, 5 August 1988. 
 305
Author unknown, “Alternatiewe tot die verandering van die SAW se belang by CO 
navorsing & ontwikkeling mbt die Medchem groep van maatskappye”, SADF document 
RNDCHNGE 12.8.1991, 12 August 1988. 
Author unknown, “Alternatiewe tot die verandering van die SAW se belang by CO 
navorsing & ontwikkeling mbt die Medchem groep van maatskappye”, 1988.  
W. Basson, “Projek Coast: Moontlikhede vir privatisering”, 11 November 1989. SADF 
document GG/UG/302/6/COAST/BFW, 28 November 1989. Exhibit 23B in The State vs 
Wouter Basson. 
W. Basson and D.P. Knobel, “Toestemming vir vernietiging van Projekdokumentasie: 
Projek Coast”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/COAST/5/1, 21 November 1989. 
W. Basson, “Projek Coast: Voorligting aan Staatspresident”, SADF document 
GG/UG/302/6/C123/BK, 26 March 1990. 
W. Basson, ”Voordrag aan verkleinde VBR: Voorgestelde filosofie vir Chemiese 
oorlogvoering vir die SA Weermag – Beginsels en terugvoer oor huidige stand in die SA 
Weermag”, SADF document GG/UG/306/3, 1990.  
B. Du Plessis, J.J. Geldenhuys and M. Malan, “Projek Coast: Goedkeuring vir Besteding 
teen die Spesiale Verdedigingsrekening,” SADF document HSF/UG/302/6/C123, 1990.  
“Verkleinde Verdedigingsbevelraad: Notule van Vergadering gehou om 07h30 op 25 
Oktober 1990 te Samik”, SADF document HS Plan/DP/302/6/COAST and HS 
PLAN/Dp/302/6/KEYBOARD, 1990.  
“Verkleinde verdedigingsbevelraad: Notule van vergadering gehou om 07H30 op 25 
Oktober 1990 te Samik”. Aanhangsel A: “Voordrag aan Verkleinde VBR: Voorgestelde 
filosofie vir chemiese oorlogvoering vir die SA Weermag – Beginsels en terugvoer oor 
huidige stand in die SA Weermag”, SADF document HS Plan/DP/302/6/COAST, 1990. 
W. Basson and A.J. Liebenberg, “Voorstelle mbt die Beëindiging van Kontraktuele 
verbintenis met die Medchem Groep miv 1 September 1991 – Implikasies en opsies: 
Projek Coast”, SADF document HSF/UG/302/6/C123, 19 August 1991. 
 306
W.B. Basson and A.J. Liebenberg, “Magtiging vir die afverkoop van bates: Projek 
Coast”, SADF document HSF/UG/302/6/C123, 1991.  
D.P. Knobel, “Projek Coast Bedryf”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/C123, 1991.  
A.J. Liebenberg, “Voorstelle mbt die Beeïndiging van Kontraktuele verbintenis met die 
Medchem Groep miv 1 September 1991 – Implikasies en opsies: Projek Coast”, SADF 
document HSF/UG/302/6/C123, 9 August 1991. 
A.J. Liebenberg, “Goedkeuring vir die bedryf van front organisasies: Projek Coast: April 
1991 tot Maart 1992”, SADF document HSF/UG/302/6/C123, 1991.  
Auditor General, “Vernietiging van dokumente ten opsigte van betalings uit die Spesiale 
Rekenings vir Inligtingsdiens van SA (Wet No. 108 van 1979) en Buitelandse Sake (Wet 
No. 38 van 1967), 1991.  
M. Bekker, D.P. Knobel and P. Murray, “Projek Coast: Gekonsolideerde Begroting: April 
1991 - Maart 1992”, Exhibit J in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division. 
D.P. Knobel, “Fondsbehoefte en fondshantering: Projek Jota”, 6 July 1992. Exhibit K2 in 
The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, Transvaal Division. 
D. P. Knobel, A letter from the Surgeon General to Philip Mijburgh headed: “Produksie 
van d-N,a-DIMETHYLPHENETHYLAMINE (BAXIL)”, 7 August 1992. 
D.P. Knobel, “Bevestiging van Ontvangs van Produkte Gelewer: Projek Coast/Jota”, 
SADF document HSF/UG/302/6/C119, 9 November 1992. 
Lieutenant General Raubenheimer, “Beskikking: Projek Coast Dokumente”, SADF 
document HSF/UG/302/6/C123/5/1,1992. 
C.P. Van der Westhuizen, “Projek Jota”, SADF document TI/202/1/10/1, 1992.  
JG. De Bruyn, “Sertifisering tov die vernietiging van Chemiese produkte op 27 Januarie 
1993”, SADF document AI/UG/302/6/C123-2, 1993. 
 307
D.P. Knobel, Correspondence with J. Swanepoel of OSEO. “Ondersoek Kragtens Artikel 
5 van die wet op die ondersoek van Ernstige Ekonomiese Misdrywe, 117 van 1991: 
Krygkor, met spesifieke verwysing na Brigadier W. Basson”, 11 January 1993. 
D.P. Knobel, “Verslag oor die verloop en huidige stand van Projek Coast/Jota met 
Spesiale verwysing na die posisie van Brig. W Basson”, SADF document 
GG/UG/302/6/J282/5, 1993.  
D.P. Knobel and B. Steyn, “Voorligting aan die Minister van Verdediging oor die verloop 
en huidige status van Projekte Coast en Jota te George op 7 Jan 1993”, SADF 
document GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5, 7 January 1993. 
F.A. Snyders, Fax from 1 Military Hospital to W. Basson at SAMS Head Quarters, 16 
January 1993.  
Colonel B. Steyn, “Voorligting aan die Minister van Verdediging oor die verloop en 
huidige status van Projekte Coast en Jota te George op 7 Jan 1993”, SADF document 
GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5, 7 January 1993. 
B. Steyn, “Bevestiging Notas: Voorligting aan die Minister van Verdediging oor die 
verloop en huidige status Projekte Coast en Jota te George op 7 Jan 1993”, SADF 
document GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5, 1993.  
B. Steyn, “Voorligting aan die Minister van Verdediging oor die verloop en huidige status 
van Projekte Coast en Jota te Pretoria op 10/8/93”, 1993. 
H.F. Strauss, Affidavit from Heinrich Frederick Strauss, Brigadier South African Police at 
the Forensic Laboratory. 1993.  
H.F. Strauss, A further affidavit from Heinrich Frederick Strauss. Undated, presumed to 
be 1993.  
C.P. Van der Westhuizen, “Projek Jota”, SADF document TI/202/1/10/1, 25 March 1993. 
“Notule van die vergadering van die Beheerkomitee van Projek Jota gehou op 29 Jan 
1993 in die HF Verwoerd gebou, Kaapstad”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5, 
1993.  
 308
“Notule van die vergadering van die Beheerkomitee van Projek Jota gehou op 31 Maart 
1993 in die HF Verwoerdgebou, Kaapstad”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5, 31 
March 1993. 
Author unknown, “The South African CBW Programme”. Presumed to be authored by W. 
Basson and used as the basis for a presentation to US and UK experts in 1993.  
W. Basson, “Afskryfwaardes”, unnumbered SADF document, 1 February 1994. 
W. Basson, “Eis van Mnr. Brandt vir Tegnologie verskaf deur hom aan Projek Jota”, 
1994.  
W. Basson and D.P. Knobel, “Finale Verslag: VSA Dollar Voorskot”, 7 May 1994. 
D.P. Knobel, “Briefing to President Mandela on the Defensive Chemical and Biological 
Warfare Programme of the SADF and the RSA's position wrt to the CWC and BWC”, 
SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5, 18 August 1994. 
“The South African CBW Programme”, undated document found in the trunks belonging 
to W. Basson at the time of his arrest in 1997. Presumed to be dated 1994 as this is 
likely to have been the document Basson used to brief the US and UK CBW experts 
during their meeting that year. 
“Notule van die vergadering van die Beheerkomitee van Projek Jota gehou op 24 
Januarie 1994 in die kantoor van HSAW”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J282, 1994.  
“Notule van die Beheerkomitee van Projek Jota wat gehou is op 29 Maart 1994 by die 
Kantoor van HSAW”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J1282, 1994. 
“Notule van 'n Spesiale KBK Vergadering wat gehou is op 2 Desember 1994 in die 
kantoor van HNW”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J1282, 1994.  
Correspondence from Viljoen French & Coter (firm of attorneys) on behalf of J. Brandt 
addressed to John Truter, Sefmed Information Systems, 18 February 1994. 
Lieutenant General Raubenheimer. “Vernietiging van Grondstowwe en Produkte: Projek 
Jota”, SADF document GG/UG/302/6/J1282, 1995.  
 309
B. Steyn, “Voordrag aan die Beheerkomitee van Projek Jota oor die toekomstige bestuur 
van Chemies-Biologiese en Stralings Beskerming en Verdediging in die SANW”, SADF 
document GG/V/306/3, 9 January 1995. 
“Notule van die vergadering van die Beheerkomitee van Projek Jota wat gehou is op 9 
Januarie 1995 by die Kantoor van HNW”, SADF document G/UG/302/6/J1282, 1995.  
Lieutenant General J. Hechter, “Verlangde Inligting en Verklarings: Chemiese Biologiese 
Oorlogvoeringsondersoek: Dr D'Oliviera Spesiale Ondersoekspan: Navraag Nommer 
276/96 [Required Information and statements: Chemical Biological Warfare 
Investigation: Dr. D'Oliviera Special Investigating Team: Query Number 276/96”, 1999.  
Viljoen, French & Coter (firm of attorneys), “Bacsil Project”. 1999. 
D.P. Knobel, “Kronologiese verloop van gebeure tov Kroatiese Transaksies”, SADF 
document GG/UG/302/6/J1282, undated.  
Author unknown, “Verdere agtergrondinligting tov die biologiese oorlogvoeringprojek vir 
die Staatspresident”, undated.  
Author unknown, “Betalings van Coast Projekte: Fondsevloei”, undated.  
Documents from the front companies 
D.J. Goosen and D.W. Spamer, “Ontvangstes en Betalings: Oktober/November 1983”, 
1983.  
D.J. Goosen, A. Immelman and D.W. Spamer, “Presensielys van die eerste 
direksievergadering gehou op 6 Januarie 1984”, 1984. 
D.J. Goosen, A. Immelman and D.W. Spamer, “Presensielys van die Tweede 
Direksievergadering gehou op 28 Februarie 1984”, 1984. 
D.J. Goosen, A. Immelman and D.W Spamer, “Presensielys van die Derde 
Direksievergadering gehou op 27 Maart 1984”, 1984.  
D.J. Goosen, A. Immelman and D.W. Spamer, “Presensielys van die Vierde 
Direksievergadering gehou op 2 Mei 1984”, 1984.  
 310
D.J. Goosen, D.W. Spamer and A. Immelman, “Presensielys van die Vyfde 
Direksievergadering eehou op 29 Mei 1984”, 1984.  
D.J. Goosen, D.W. Spamer and A. Immelman, “Presensielys van die Sesde 
Direksievergadering gehou op 6 July 1984”, 1984.  
D.J. Goosen, D.W. Spamer and A. Immelman, “Presensielys van die Sewende 
Direksievergadernig gehou op 14 Augustus 1984”, 1984.  
D.J. Goosen, A. Immelman and D.W. Spamer, “Interlaboratoriums (Edms) BPK”, 1984.  
D.J. Goosen and D.W. Spamer, “Besluite geneem deur die aandeelhouers van 
Interlaboratoriums (Eiendoms) Beperk op 11 Januarie 1984 te Pretoria”, 1984.  
A. Immelman, “Interlaboratoriums (Edms) Bpk”, Internal Correspondence, 1984.  
“Ontvangstes en uitbetalings: Januarie 1984”, 1984. Document provided to the author by 
Dr S. Van Rensburg, RRL.   
“Ontvangstes en uitbetalings: Februarie 1984”, 1984. Document provided to the author 
by Dr S. Van Rensburg, RRL.  
“Ontvangstes en Uitbetalings: Maart 1984”, 1984. Document provided to the author by 
Dr S. Van Rensburg, RRL. 
“Oorsese Reis April 1984”, 1984. Document provided to the author by Dr S. Van 
Rensburg, RRL. 
“Ontvangstes en Uitbetalings: Mei 1984”, 1984. Document provided to the author by Dr 
S. Van Rensburg, RRL. 
“Balance sheet Roodeplaat Research Laboratories as of 31/08/84”, 1984. Document 
provided to the author by Dr S. Van Rensburg, RRL.  
Author unknown, “Verslag aangaande die ionofoor antibiotika en hulle gebruik”, 1985.  
J. Davies and A. Immelman, “Bepaling van die toksisiteit van P.O. en nikotien as ‘n 
kombinasie in die hond”, 20 July 1986. Roodeplaat Research Laboratories Research 
Protocol. 
 311
J. Davies and A. Immelman, “Projekverslag (Nr1), Projeknommer 86/H/010/50; Doel: 
Bepaling van toksisiteit van Brodifakum in die blou-aap”, 23 June 1986. 
J. Davies, “Projekverslag (Nr1), Projeknommer 86/H/010/50; Doel: Bepaling van 
toksisiteit van Brodifakum in die blou-aap”, 1986.  
J. Davies, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium. Aansoek om 'n projek te registreer. 
Doel: Bepaling van die toksisiteit van PO en nikotien as 'n kombinasie in die hond”, 
1986.  
A. Immelman, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratoriums Werksopdrag”, 1986.  
A. Immelman, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratoriums Werksopdrag: Opmaak van 50mg 
PXN”, 27 January 1986. RRL research document, Exhibit 63U5 in The State vs Wouter 
Basson, South African High Court, Transvaal Division, 2000. 
A. Immelman and J. Davies, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium, Projek Nr 86/H/11/50. 
Doel: bepaling van die toksisiteit van Nitroxynil in Primate”, 1986.  
A. Immelman and J. Davies, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium Projekverslag (Nr 3): 
Bepaling van die toksisiteit van Brodifakum en Sulfaquinoxalien as enkel doserings en in 
kombinasie”, 1986.  
A. Immelman and K. Psotta, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium. Projekverslag. Doel: 
Ondersoek na die geskiktheid van KMR as analitiese tegniek om PO in tabakteer te 
bepaal. (Projek nr 86/H/17/30)”, 1986.  
A. Immelman and K. Psotta, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium, aansoek om 'n projek 
te registreer: Sintese van 'n sikliese fosforester”, 1986.  
E. Joubert and K. Psotta, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium Projekverslag: Isolasie 
van Monensin”, 13 May 1986. 
E. Joubert and K. Psotta, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium Projekverslag: Isolasie 
van Monensin”, 1986.  
 312
K. Psotta, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratoriums: Aansoek om ‘n projek te registreer, 
Tabak as ‘n toedieningsroete”, 23 July 1986. RRL research document, Exhibit 63U4 in 
The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, Transvaal Division, 2000. 
“Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratoriums. H-Kode Reeks: 1986”, 1986. Document listing 
research projects at RRL.  
“Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratoriums: Projek Verslag”, 1986.  
Author unknown, “Inligitingstuk aangaande die substans Paraokson”, 1986. Presumed to 
be a document from RRL. 
J. Davies, “Fenielsilitrane in Bobbejane [Phenylsilitrane in Baboons]”, 26 February 1987. 
Roodeplaat Research Laboratory research report. Exhibit 54D in The State vs Wouter 
Basson. 
J. Davies and A. Immelman, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium: tussentydse 
projekverslag (Projek 86/H/028/50)”, 1987.  
J. Davies and S.V. Weldhagen, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium. Aansoek om 'n 
projek te registreer, doel: Die formulasie en evaluasie van PO in 'n lipbalsem”, 1987.  
J. Davies and S. V. Weldhagen, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium, aansoek om 'n 
projek te registreer: formulasie en vervaardiging van 'n aanrol reukweerder met PO”, 
1987.  
P. Mijburgh, “Delta G Scientific Kwartaal verslag vir die Tweede Kwartaal 1987: 1/6/87 – 
31/8/87”, 1987.  
“Delta G Scientific (Pty) Ltd Kwartaalverslag vir die Tweede Kwartaal 1987 (1/6/1987 – 
31/8/87)”, 1987. A Delta G Scientific document. 
J. Davies and A. Immelman, “Evaluering van die absorbsie van Silitrane deur middel van 
verskeie toedieningsroetes”, 5 January 1988. Roodeplaat Research Laboratories 
research report. Exhibit 54D in The State vs Wouter Basson.
C.F.B. Hofmeyr, “Deel I: Primere gashere van Yersinia Pestis”, 1988.  
 313
C.F.B. Hofmeyr, “Deel II: Vlooie”, 1988.  
C.F.B. Hofmeyr, “Deel III: Belangrike Pesoordraers en vatbare knaagdiere”, 1988.  
C.F.B. Hofmeyr, “Deel IV: Volgende Optredes”, 1988.  
C.F.B. Hofmeyr,”Soönosese”, 1988.  
C.F.B. Hofmeyr, “Bek-en Klouseer (Voorsetting)”, 1988.  
C.F.B. Hofmeyr, “Samespreking met Dr. Daan Verwoerd Direkteur, Navorsingsinstituut 
vir Veeartsenykunde, Onderstepoort I.S.: Bek-en klouseer; Runderpes Longsiekte”, 
1988.  
C.F.B. Hofmeyr, “Samesprekings met Dr. J.M. Erasmus, Direkteur Veeartsenydiens, 
Dept Landbou en Waterwese op 4 Junie 1988”.  
C.F.B. Hofmeyr, “Miltsiekte, Anthrax”, 1988.  
C.F.B. Hofmeyr, “Veiligheidstatus van sekere persone”, 1988.  
G.J. Lourens, “Delta G Scientific Research, Product FP/00/M01”, 1988.  
J.J. Nieuwenhuis, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratorium Tussentydse Verslag: Die 
moontlikheid om paraoxon in 'n haarsjampoe aan te wend is ondersoek”, 1988.  
Author unknown. “Production: Mosrefcat”, Delta G document, 31 August 1988. 
Author unknown, “Delta G Production: Mosrefcat”, 31 August 1988. The author of this 
document is unknown; it was amongst the documents used by the TRC during the June 
1998 hearing into chemical and biological warfare. 
T.J. Henning, “Research Proposal for the development of an efficient synthesis of an 
acetylene and derived Diglycosides for the period 1 Sept 1989 to 31 August 1990”, 
1989.  
T.J. Henning, “A three year project proposal for the development of an efficient synthesis 
of certain acetylenes and derivatives”, 1989.  
 314
A. Immelman, “Verkope [Sales]”, 1989. 
A. Immelman, “Verkope”, 1989.  
J.M. Koekemoer and R.I. Thompson, “An investigation into the synthesis of FP/00/T52 
analogues with particular reference to their psychological impact”, 1989.  
J.M. Koekemoer and R.I. Thompson, “A three year project proposal for the further 
investigation into the synthesis and evaluation of cannabinoid analogues with particular 
reference to their psychological impact”, 1989.  
P. Mijburgh, “Delta G Scientific Quotation/Contract for Research and Development”, 
1989.  
Author unknown, “A three year project proposal for the synthesis and application of 
useful peptides and antivirals with specific reference to the targeting potential of selected 
peptides”, 1989. Presumed to be a document from Delta G Scientific. 
Author unknown, “Produkte Beskikbaar”, 1989. Presumed to be a document from RRL. 
A. Botha and A. Le Roux, “Roodeplaat Navorsingslaboratoriums: Projek verslag, 
Vorderingsverslag, Klonering van gene wat kodeer vir spermspesifieke antigene”, 1990.  
J. Dewar and L. Van Den Hever, “Research Proposal for the Synthesis and application 
of useful peptides and antiviral agents for the period 1 Sept 1989 to 31 Aug 1990”, 1990. 
J.M. Koekemoer and L.B. Pithey, “Research Proposal: Pyrethroid Synergists”, 1990.  
Author unknown, “Projek Bestuur – Fisiologie – 1990/91”, 1990. Presumed to be a 
document from RRL. 
W.A. Augustyn, “Biochemie Projekte”, RRL document, July 1991. 
A.D. Botha, “Instandhouding van Kultuurversameling”, 1991.  
S. Wandrag, “Vorderingsverslag ten opsigte van Spesifieke R-Projekte”, 1991.  
Correspondence between D.P. Knobel and Dr P. Mijburgh, Medchem Technologies. 
”Produksie van d-N-,s-Dimethylphenethylamine (Baxil)”, 7 August 1992. 
 315
Correspondence between Dr P. Mijburgh, Medchem Technologies and Brigadier W. 
Basson, “Offer for the manufacture of ‘Baxil’”, 30 August 1992. 
S. Wandrag, “Finale verslag Project R282”, 1992.  
P. Mijburgh, “Claim for expenses during travel in support of Brig. W Basson”, 1994.  
P. Mijburgh, “Temporary cessation of Project T101/94”, 1994.  
Author unknown, “Akonitien”, undated document describing the effect of this poison, 
presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Die Gebruike van Paraokson”, undated documents describing the 
possible uses of paraoxon, presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Agent CR”, undated document presumed to be from Delta G 
Scientific.  
Author unknown, “Appenidx A: Chemical Offensive Facility”, undated document resumed 
to have been authored by W. Basson.  
Author unknown, “Basic Process”, undated document describing chemical process for 
methaqualone, presumed to be from Delta G Scientific.  
Author unknown, “Mosrefcat Volumes”, undated document referring to the volumes of 
methaqualone produced, presumed to be from Delta G Scientific.  
Author unknown, “Bacillus Anthrax”, undated document presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Brucella Melitensis”, undated document presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Vibrio Parahaemolyticus”, undated document presumed to be from 
RRL.  
Author unknown, “Salmonella Typhi”, undated document presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Salmonella Typhimurium”, undated document presumed to be from 
RRL.  
 316
Author unknown, “Vergiftiging: BCF”, undated document presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Produkinligtingstuk oor Botulinum Toksien”, undated document 
presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Beskikbare data aangaande Brodifakum”, undated document 
presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Cholikalsiferol”, undated document presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Natrium Asied”, undated document presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Aanbieding van sekere bakterieë”, undated document presumed to be 
from RRL.  
Author unknown, “List of chemicals”, undated document presumed to be from RRL.  
Author unknown, “Moniliformien”, undated document presumed to be from RRL.  
W. Basson, “Project Black, Project Number 4-PO, Project manager W.D. Basson. 
Activity Schedule – Introduction”, undated.  
J. Davies, “Verslag: Skroewedraaier”, undated. 
D.J. Goosen, “Wetenskaplike verenigings/komitees”, undated document from RRL.  
“Summary of disciplinary code and grievance procedure”, undated document provided to 
the author by Dr S. Van Rensburg, RRL.  
“RRL Standard Operating Procedure”, undated document provided to the author by Dr 
S. Van Rensburg, RRL.  
“Buitewerk huidiglik gedoen deur Dr. A. Immelman met besoldiging”, undated document 
provided to the author by Dr S. Van Rensburg, RRL.  
 317
Documents relating to the alleged chemical attack in Mozambique 
A. Andersson and S. Persson, “The final report given by the experts appointed by ASDI 
to assist the government of Mozambique in order to investigate the alleged use of 
chemical warfare agent(s) in the Ngungue Incident”, 3 March 1992. 
B. Davey, “Chemical Incident Verification Mission, Mozambique 22 – 24 January 1992”, 
29 January 1992. 
B. Davey, “An account of attempts to initiate a joint South African/United Kingdom 
investigation into alleged use of chemical warfare in Mozambique 1992”, 1992.  
B. Davey, “Report on a meeting in Maputo  with the United Nations team investigating 
the alleged use of chemical weapons by Renamo in January 1992”; 27 March 1992. 
S. Persson, H. Staub and J.P. Thompson, “Report of the Mission dispatched by the 
Secretary-General to Investigate an alleged use of chemical weapons in Mozambique”, 
United Nations Security Council document, 1992.  
J. P. Thompson, “Chemical & Biological Defence Establishment: Report on an 
investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons in Mozambique, January 1992”, 
1992.  
Other documents 
Sekretariaat van die Staatsveiligheidsraad, “Die Moontlike Vrylating Van Mandela”, State 
Security Council document 22/3/1/2/38, March 1986. 
United States of America vs Jerry Brandt, United States District Court Eastern District of 
New York, Judgement including sentence under the Sentencing Reform Act, Case No 
CR 90-0919, Conspiracy to violate Export Administration Act, 2 June 1992. 
“Staff Paper prepared for the Steyn Commission on alleged dangerous activities of 
SADF components”, December 1992. 
J. Swanepoel, “Ondersoek kragtens Artikel 5 van die Wet op die Ondersoek van 
Ernstige Ekonomiese Misdrywe, 117 van 1991: Krygkor, met spesifieke verwysing na 
Brigadier W. Basson”, 1992.  
 318
Swartklip Products, “Gebruikersbehoeftestelling vir Pirotegniese Samestelling met 
Substans B as Aktiewe Bestanddeel. Doc Nr 05-PN310-4488-0001”, 1992.  
Correspondence between the Office for Serious Economic Offences and D.P. Knobel. 
“Ondersoek kragtens Artikel 5 van die Wet op die Ondersoek van Ernstige ekonomiese 
Misdrywe, 117 Van 1991: Krygkor, met spesifieke verwysing na Brigadier W. Basson”, 
11 January 1993. 
Statement by J. Jacomet addressed to Lieutenant General D.P. Knobel, 1993.  
Affidavit of J. Jacomet, signed by the Director of the South African Embassy in Bonn on 
13 August 1994, 13 August 1994.  
J.P. Pretorius, “Verlangde inligting en verklarings: Chemiese Biologiese 
Oorlogvoeringsondersoek: Dr. D’Oliveira Spesiale Ondersoekspan: Navraag Nommer 
276/96”, 12 May 1997. 
B. Davies, “The Munich Hypothesis Integrating various Analytical Findings with the 
‘Steppage Gait’ Symptoms”, undated document.  
South African Institute for International Affairs Library 
P.W. Botha, “Manifesto for the Future”, text of the speech made by P.W. Botha in 
Durban on 15 August 1985. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Library 
Hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect 
to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Congress, First Session, Vol I: 
Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents, 16 – 18 September 1975, Washington, US 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1976. 
Joint Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on 
Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, United States 
Senate: Project MKULTRA, the CIA's program of research in behavioural modification, 
95th Congress, first session, 3 August 1977. 
 319
94th Congress, 2nd Session Senate Report No 94-755. Foreign and Military Intelligence. 
Book 1. “Final Report to the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operation With 
Respect To Intelligence Activities, XVII. Testing and Use of Chemical and Biological 
Agents by the Intelligence Committee.  
Science and Technology Policy Research Unit, Sussex University 
Lieutenant Colonel D.J.C. Wiseman, “The Second World War 1939 – 1949 Army. 
Special Weapons and Types of Warfare”, Vol I – Gas warfare, London, The War Office, 
1951. 
Hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs - US House 
of Representatives. “On the Implementation of the US Arms Embargo (against Portugal 
and South Africa, and related issues)”, 22 March and 6 April 1973. 
O.W. Christensen, R.E.O. Gunn and R.P.D. Kaplan, “Report on joint UNHCR/WHO visit 
to Cassinga, Angola 24 - 28 May 1978”, 2 November 1979.  
B. Redelinghuys, “Letter from Colonel B. Redelinghuys to The Dean, Hampshire 
College”, 13 September 1979.  
I.R. Gleeson, “Letter to the editors of Brassey's Defence yearbook from SADF Chief of 
Staff Operations, LT Gen IR Gleeson”, 14 September 1983. 
J. Rolt, “Letter to Julian Perry Robinson from John Rolt on behalf of the Chief of the 
SADF", 16 Feburary 1984. Personal Collection. 
A. Heyndrickx, “Toxicological report on the second mission, February 15 - 20, 1988 in 
Angola” (UNITA - Mr. Savimbi), 8 March 1988. 
G. Pearson, “House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth report: Weapons of 
mass destruction”, Memorandum submitted by Professor Pearson, 27 July 2000.  
Personal Collection 
J.P. de Villiers,  “Handleiding vir die SAW Bevelstelsel Vol I: Nationale Veiligheid en 
Totale Oorlog. Hoofstuk 12: Aanwending van Chemiese en Biologiese Aspekte van 
Totale Oorlog”, undated document. 
 320
J.P. de Villiers, V.P. Joynt, Colonel G.E. McLoughlin and Commandant C.C. Van Der 
Westhuizen, “Chemical and Biological Warfare in a South African Context in the 
Seventies”, 1971.  
J.P. de Villiers, “Current anti-riot chemicals”, 1976.  
J.P. de Villiers, “Chemiese Oorlogvoeringsmiddels van belang, of van moontlike belang, 
vir die RSA”, 1977.  
J.P. de Villiers, “Strategic Implications of Chemical Warfare”, 1977.  
J.P. de Villiers, “Chemical warfare: vesicants and irritants”, 1977. 
Reports from the Officer in Charge of Operations to Officer Commanding Special Branch 
Headquarters and the Director-General Central Intelligence Organisation. Rhodesian 
Special Branch documents dated June – November 1977. 
Report from the Officer in Charge of Operations, Special Branch Headquarters to the 
Officer Commanding, Special Branch Headquarters and the Director-General Central 
Intelligence Organisation, Issue of Equipment: 8.8.77 – 17.8.77, 25 August 1977. 
J.P. de Villiers, “Perspectives in Chemical Warfare: Lecture to be given to a joint meeting 
of the Northern Transvaal Branch of the SA Chemical Institute and the Institute for 
Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria”, 1982.  
Foster Wheeler South Africa Pty Ltd., prepared for RRL. “Conceptual Design of New 
Virulent Strain Centre and Fermentation/Mycology Research Laboratories”, Contract No 
1-1600-25112, July 1988. 
B. Davey, “Degradation of Human Performance with use of chemical protective clothing: 
Overview of Research Programme”, Paper presented at the Fourth International 
Symposium on Protection against Chemical Warfare Agents. Stockholm, Sweden, 8 – 
12 June 1992. 
Confidence Building Measure F, Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or 
defensive research and development programmes, South African submission to the 
BTWC, 1995. 
 321
B. Mortimer, “SA Defence Force involvement in the internal security situation in the 
Republic of South Africa”, Submission in respect of the former SADF to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Cape Town, 21 October 1996. 
C.M. Erasmus,“Protechnik 1987 – 1997: The first ten years”, company brochure, 1997.  
General M. Malan, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 7 May 
1997. 
Lieutenant General Hechter,” Verlangde Inligting en Verklarings: Chemiese Biologiese 
Oorlogvoeringsondersoek: Dr D’Oliviera Spesiale Ondersoekspan: Navraag Nommer 
276/9”, 27 May 1999. 
M. Leitenberg, ”Testimony before the Committee on Government Reform; US House of 
Representatives, Washington DC: An assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to 
the United States, Committee on Government Reform”, 12 November 1999.  
Swiss parliamentary delegation report, “Le Rile Des Services Reassignments Suites 
Dans Le Cadre Des Relations Entree La Suis et l’Afrique Du Sud”, 12 November 1999. 
Facsimile from D.G. Mayes to B. Zlockie, 13 March 2002. 
D.G. Mayes, letter to R. Bliss on the letterhead of the ICT Aviations Programs Group, 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 301 Simonton Street, Key West, FL 33040), 9 April 
2002. 
Facsimile from T. Minnaar to D. G. Mayes, 4 March 2002. 
Communication from T. Minnaar, “Brief Response to the Questions Asked”, 22 March 
2002. 
Electronic communication between T. Minnaar and B. Zlockie, 1 and 2 April 2002. 
United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Receipt for 
Property received: “One toothpaste tube containing one ampoule of E.coli genetically 
coded with epsilon toxin”, 9 May 2002.  
Electronic message from B. Zlockie to D.G Mayes, 20 March 2002. 
 322
M. Leitenberg, “The Problem of Biological Weapons”, paper prepared for the Swedish 
National Defence College, Stockholm, 2004.  
Internet sources 
“Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola during January 1976, Central Intelligence 
Agency document ER M 76-1009, 2 March 1976, release date November 1998. 
(http://www.foia.ucia.gov/browse) 
“Soviet Military Support to Angola: Intentions and Prospects”, Special National 
Intelligence Assessment, Central Intelligence Agency, October 1985, p15. 
(http://www.foia.ucia.gov). 
Evidence at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Hearing into Chemical and 
Biological Warfare (the full transcript of the hearing are in the author’s personal 
collection). 
Testimony of Jan Lourens at the TRC hearing into chemical and biological warfare, 
Cape Town, 8 June 1998. 
Testimony of Dr Mike Odendaal at the TRC hearing into chemical and biological warfare, 
Cape Town, 9 June 1998. 
Testimony of Dr Schalk van Rensburg at the TRC hearing into chemical and biological 
warfare, Cape Town, 9 June 1998. 
Testimony of Dr Wynand Swanepoel at the TRC hearing into chemical and biological 
warfare, Cape Town, 10 June 1998.  
Testimony of Dr. Johan Koekemoer at the TRC hearing into chemical and biological 
warfare, Cape Town, 11 June 1998. 
Testimony of Dr Philip Mijburgh at the TRC hearing into chemical and biological warfare, 
Cape Town, 11 June 1998.  
Testimony of General Lothar Neethling in the transcript of the TRC hearing into chemical 
and biological warfare, Cape Town, 11 June 1998. 
 323
Testimony of Wynand Swanepoel at the TRC hearing into chemical and biological 
warfare, Cape Town, 11 June 1998. 
Testimony of General D.P. Knobel at the TRC hearing into chemical and biological 
warfare, Cape Town, 12 June and 18 July 1998. 
Signed affidavit of Dr André Immelman made available to the TRC for its public hearing 
in June 1998. 
Testimony of Dr Wouter Basson at the TRC hearing into chemical and biological 
warfare, Cape Town, 31 July 1998. 
Documents and Evidence in the State vs Wouter Basson  
“Borgaansoek van Dr. Wouter Basson in die Streekhof vir die Streekafdeling van Noord-
Transvaal gehou in Pretoria”, Vol 8, 3 November 1997. 
A. Ackerman. “Openingsbetoog – Dr Basson” in The State vs Wouter Basson, High 
Court of South Africa, Transvaal Division, November 1999. 
“Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskuldiging Vol II”; in the South African High 
Court, 1999. 
“Nadere Besonderhede Ten Aansien van Klagtes 25 – 64 Soos Vervat in Volume 2 Van 
Die Akte Van Beskuldiging”, in The State vs Wouter Basson, 1999. 
Testimony of Steven Beukes in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 29 October 1999. 
Testimony of André Koch in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 29 October 1999. 
Testimony of Niel Kirstein in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 9 and 10 November 1999. 
Testimony of General D.P. Knobel in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 15, 22 and 23 November 1999. 
 324
Statement by Advocate J. Cilliers in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 24 February 2000. 
Testimony of Major Hercules Orffer in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 1 March 2000.   
Testimony of Brigadier Hein Pfeil in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 2 March 2000. 
Testimony of Samuel Bosch in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 14 – 29 March 2000. 
Testimony of Mr K. in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, Transvaal 
Division, 2 May 2000.  
Testimony of Johan Theron in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 3 - 8 May 2000. 
Testimony of Danie Phaal in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 8 May 2000. 
Testimony of Martin van der Linde in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 12 May 2000. 
Testimony of Abram Van Zyl in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 12 May 2000. 
Testimony of Pieter Botes in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 15 May 2000. 
Testimony of Jan Anton Nieuwoudt in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 16 May 2000. 
Testimony of Dr Jan Lourens in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court 
Transvaal Division, 19 May 2000. 
Testimony of Dr Daan Goosen in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 22 May 2000.  
 325
Testimony of Dr Mike Odendaal in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 24 May 2000. 
Testimony of Dr André Immelman in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 29 May 2000. 
Testimony of Johan van Jaarsveld in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 5 June 2000. 
Testimony of Dr Graeme Gibson in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 6 June 2000. 
Testimony of Floris Laubscher in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 7 June 2000. 
Testimony of Dr Gerbus Muller in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African high 
Court, Transvaal Division, 8 June 2000. 
Testimony of Dr Kobus Bothma in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 12 – 13 June 2000. 
Testimony of Pierre Theron in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 1 August 2000. 
Testimony of Barend du Plessis in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 8 August 2000. 
H.J. Bruwer. “Projek Coast. Forensiese Ondersoek. Aanvullende Verslag van H.J. 
Bruwer”. Presented in The State vs Wouter Basson by the State, 10 August 2000. 
Testimony of Corrie Ferreira in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 16 August 2000. 
Testimony of Bernard Zimmer in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High court, 
Transvaal Division, 21 and 25 August 2000. 
Testimony of Hennie Bruwer in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 29 August 2000. 
 326
Testimony of Dr Brian Davey in The State vs Wouter Basson, High Court of South 
Africa, Transvaal Division, 4 September 2000. 
Testimony of Ben Steyn in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 6 September 2000. 
Testimony of Charles van Remoortrere in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African 
High Court, Transvaal Division, 11 – 13 September 2000 and 27 – 28 September 2000. 
Testimony of David Webster in The State vs Wouter Basson on 10 – 13 October, 
Jacksonville, United States, 16 October and 23 October 2000. 
Testimony of Steven Beukes in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 29 October 2000. 
Testimony of Dr Jan Coetzee in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 6 November 2000. 
Testimony of Sybrand van der Spuy in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 6 November 2000. 
Testimony of General Dirk Verbeek in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 6 November 2000.  
Testimony of Gerald Cadwell in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 8 November 2000. 
Testimony of Barry Pithey in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 8 November 2000. 
Affidavit of Daniel Du Toit, entered into the court record on 13 November 2000 in The 
State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, Transvaal Division. 
Testimony of Christopher Marlow in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 2 – 6 February 2001. 
Testimony of Cobus Engelbrecht in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 13 February 2001. 
 327
Testimony of Sol Pienaar in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 14 February 2001. 
Testimony of Vice-Admiral Paul Murray in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African 
High Court, Transvaal Division, 20 February 2001. 
Testimony of Roelf Louw in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 23 February 2001. 
Testimony of Dr. J Koekemoer in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 26 February 2001. 
Summary of the evidence used in the State’s argument against the acquittal of Dr 
Basson on the human rights violation charges in The State vs Wouter Basson, South 
African High Court, Transvaal Division, 24 May 2001. 
Testimony of Wouter Basson in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High Court, 
Transvaal Division, 23 and 24 July 2001. 
Testimony of General R. Badenhorst in The State vs Wouter Basson, South African High 
Court, Transvaal Division, 7 November 2001. 
Judgement in The State vs Wouter Basson, 11 April 2002. 
Oral Sources 
Peta Thornycroft interview with Jan Lourens, Johannesburg, 1997. 
Chandré Gould and Jerome Chaskalson interview with Jan Lourens, Cape Town, 23 
January 1998. 
Chandré Gould and Jerome Chaskalson interview with Daan Goosen, Pretoria, 17 
March 1998. 
Chandré Gould interview with Charles Van Remoortrere, Pretoria, 18 March 1998. 
Chandré Gould interview with Professor Willie Basson, Former Managing Director of 
Delta G Scientific, Cape Town, 2 April 1998. 
 328
Chandré Gould interview with Dr Jan Lourens, former Project Coast associate, Cape 
Town, 22 and 23 January 1998. 
Chandré Gould interview with Dr Mike Odendaal, microbiologist formerly employed at 
RRL, Onderstepoort, 6 October 1999. 
Chandré Gould interview with Dr Vernon Joynt, former member of the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research’s Applied Chemistry Unit, Pretoria, 6 October 1999. 
Chandré Gould and Peta Thornycroft interview with Drs Daan Goosen and Mike 
Odendaal and Adrian Botha, former RRL scientists, Pretoria, 1 December 1999. 
Chandré Gould interview with General Constand Viljoen, former Head of the South 
African Defence Force, Cape Town, 18 May 2000. 
Telephonic communication between Chandré Gould and Jan Lourens, 21 May 2000. 
Telephonic communication between Chandré Gould and Dr Schalk Van Rensburg on 23 
May 2000. 
Chandré Gould interview with Geoff Candy, biochemist formerly employed at Delta G 
Scientific, Johannesburg, 24 May 2000. 
Chandré Gould and Professor Peter Folb interview with Dr Lucia Steenkamp, former 
scientist at Delta G Scientific, Johannesburg, 27 June 2000. 
Chandré Gould interview with Graham Pearson, Brighton, UK, 31 August 2000. 
Chandré Gould interview with Brian Davey, Wilderness, 13 September 2000. 
Peta Thornycroft interview with M.J. McGuinness, Officer Commanding Counter Terrorist 
Operations, Central Intelligence Organisation, Pretoria, October 2000. 
Chandré Gould interview with Professor Milton Leitenberg, Pretoria, 30 October 2000. 
Chandré Gould interview with Dr Mike Odendaal, Pretoria, 1 December 2000. 
Chandré Gould interview with Willem Steenkamp, independent military analyst, Cape 
Town, 7 December 2000.  
 329
Chandré Gould interview with Dr Daan Goosen, Pretoria, 18 January 2001. 
Chandré Gould interview with General R. Badenhorst, former Chief of Staff Intelligence, 
SADF, Pretoria, 16 January 2001. 
Chandré Gould interview with Gen Pierre Steyn, former Deputy Chief of the Defence 
Force, Pretoria, 17 January 2001.  
Chandré Gould interview with Dr Hennie Jordaan, organic chemist formerly employed by 
Delta G Scientific, Pretoria, 18 January 2001. 
Chandré Gould interview with Dr Daan Goosen, former RRL Managing Director, 
Pretoria, 18 January 2001. 
Chandré Gould telephonic discussion with Dr. R. Swanepoel, Director National Virology 
Institute, 25 January 2001. 
Chandré Gould telephonic discussion with André Immelman, 16 February 2001. The 
contents of this discussion were confirmed by Immelman. 
Chandré Gould telephonic discussion with General Jan Breytenbach, 21 August 2001. 
Chandré Gould telephonic interview with Dr Vernon Joynt, 27 August 2001. 
Chandré Gould interview with General Chris Thirion, former deputy head of Military 
Intelligence in the South African Defence Force, Pretoria, 4 September 2001. 
Chandré Gould interview with Stuart Sterzel, Former Officer Commanding Alpha Group, 
5.2. Commando, 5 Reconnaissance Regiment, Johannesburg, 1 November 2002. 
Chandré Gould interview with Dr Daan Goosen, Johannesburg, 17 February 2003.
Chandré Gould and Alastair Hay interview with Mike Odendaal, Pretoria, 26 January 
2004. 
Written Communication 
Chandré Gould electronic communication with Laura Pollecott, anti-apartheid activist, 
June 2000.  
 330
Chandré Gould electronic communication with Caitroina McLeish, Harvard Sussex 
Programme on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, Sussex University, 16 January 
2001.  
Chandré Gould electronic communication with Professor Julian Perry Robinson, Science 
Policy Unit, University of Sussex, 12 February 2001. 
Chandré Gould electronic communication with Dr W.S. Augerson, 15 and 16 February 
2001. 
Chandré Gould electronic communication with Dr Hennie Jordaan, 12 March 2001.  
Chandré Gould electronic communication with Adrian Botha, 19 March 2001. 
Written correspondence from General Constand Viljoen to Chandré Gould, 30 March 
2001. 
Written correspondence from Professor Milton Leitenberg, CBW expert and fellow at the 
Centre for International and Strategic Affairs, University of Maryland to Chandré Gould, 
12 August 2001. 
Chandré Gould electronic communication with Professor Julian Perry Robinson, Science 
Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, 18 August 2001. 
Chandré Gould electronic communication with Rudolph Louw, former Project Officer of 
Project Keyboard, 21 August 2001. 
Written correspondence from M.J. McGuinness to Chandré Gould, 4 April 2001 and 21 
June 2002. 
Meryl Nass, electronic communications with Chandré Gould and others, 31 January 
2003. 
Treaties and Legislation 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destructions, 10 April 1972. 
 331
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 1992. 
Newspaper reports 
“UN Says South Africa Used Gas in Angola Raid”, New York Times, 3 August 1979. 
“Urgent Appeal to Stop the Use of Poison Gas and Other Chemical Warfare by the 
Ethiopian Government in Eritrea Asso”, Eritrean Relief Association, 17 June 1980.  
L.R. Ember.  “Army seeks firm to make nerve gas chemicals”, Chemical and Engineering 
News, Washington, 23 August 1982. 
“Ethiopia makes new attack in Eritrea with 90 000 troops”, The Guardian, 17 February, 
1982.  
“Eritrean guerrillas face nerve gas attacks”, The Observer, 9 May 1982. 
“Moscow ‘producing chemical weapons on large scale’”, The Guardian, 17 February, 
1982. 
“SA experts went abroad – UK publication ‘Defence against nerve gas sought’”. The 
Star, Johannesburg, 10 February, 1988. 
Louise Flanagan and Chandré Gould, “De Kock linked to more killings”, Mail & Guardian, 
20 May 1994. 
Louise Flanagan and Chandré Gould, “What the Generals didn’t tell Modise”, Mail & 
Guardian, 24 June 1994. 
S. Brummer, “How Ehlers sold arms to the Hutus”, Mail and Guardian, 15 November 
1996.  
Derek Blow, “Deported Swiss couple had links with Basson”, City Press, 1 March 1998. 
Mahnaimi and Y. Ridley, “Netanyahu wants Israeli to pay for arms sale”, London, 
Sunday Times, 19 July 1998. 
“Manbar convicted of selling poison gas to Iran”, Jerusalem Post, 18 June 1998. 
 332
“Manbar to appeal 16-year sentence for Iran dealings and judge's decision not to 
disqualify himself”, Mideast Mirror, 16 July 1998.  
D.E. Murphy. “Dr Wouter Basson’s Connections to US Intelligence”, Los Angeles Times, 
1 August 1998.  
D .E. Murphy. “Dr Wouter Basson's Connections to US Intelligence”, Los Angeles Times, 
8 January 1998.  
Freek Swart, “Onvrugbare swart vroue Tukkie-professor praat oor WVK se valse 
propaganda”, Rapport, 9 August 1998. 
“Zimbabwe probing warfare germ use by colonial govt”, Reuters, 12 October 1998. 
Arthur Allen, "Mad Scientist", Salon magazine, 26 June 2000.  
Chelsea J Carter, “Suicide leads to cache of weapons”, Contra Costa Times, 3 
November 2000. 
Jeff Collins, “Ford Advised S. Africa on Warfare Devices", Orange County Register, 15 
March 2000.  
C. Gould and P. Folb, “Perverted Science and Twisted Loyalty: the government’s refusal 
to release secrets of South Africa’s chemical warfare effort echoes an unhappy legacy of 
secrecy”, Sunday Independent, 8 October 2000. 
Jack Leonard, “Disease-Causing Bacteria Found in Biofem Probe”, Los Angeles Times, 
30 April 2000. 
Jack Leonard., “No Sign That Doctor Used Deadly Germs on Patients”, Los Angeles 
Times, 2 May 2000. 
Jack Leonard and Jeff Gottlieb, "Biofem Case: Focus Now on 80s Attache", Los Angeles 
Times, 17 July 2000. 
Scott Martelle and Jack Leonard, “”Explosives Found in Exec’s Yard”, Los Angeles 
Times, 11 March 2000.  
 333
Scott Martelle, Jeff Gottlieb and Jack Leonard, "A Doctor, A Deal Maker and A Mystery", 
Los Angeles Times, 20 March 2000.  
Scott Martelle and Jack Leonard, “Weapons, Explosives Found in Doctor’s Yard”, Los 
Angeles Times, 11 March 2000.  
Julian Rademeyer, "Illegal Tests on SA Prostitutes?", Pretoria News, 22 July, 2000.  
Tony Saavedra, Bill Rams and Heather Lourie, “Biofem intrigue heightens”, Orange 
County Register, 5 May 2000. 
Joby Warrick and John Mintz, “Lethal Legacy: Bioweapons for Sale”, Washington Post, 
20 April 2002. 
“SA General Touted Anthrax Abroad”, Mail and Guardian, 24 January 2003. 
Sam Sole and Stefaans Brümmer, “Bid to hijack SA bio-stocks”, Mail & Guardian, 25 
April 2003. 
“Basson could be retried within three months”, Mail and Guardian Online, 25 February 
2005. Http://www.mg.co.za
Secondary Sources 
Books, essays and articles  
David Albright, “South Africa and the affordable bomb”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol 
50 No. 4, August 1994. 
Ken Alibek and Steven Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest 
Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Told from Inside by the Man who Ran 
It, New York, Random House, 1999. 
Anthony Antoine and Jean Pascal Zanders, “Multilateral security-related export controls”, 
Chapter 9 in SIPRI Yearbook 1998: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 334
Peter Batchelor and Susan Willett, Disarmament and Defence: Industrial Adjustment in 
South Africa, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998. 
P. Batchelor, K. Kingma and G. Lamb (eds), Demilitarization and Peace-Building in 
Southern Africa, Vol III, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003. 
Laurie Bolden and Eric Leklem, “Exorcising Project B: Pretoria probes its shady 
chemical past”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1997. 
Larry Bowman, “The Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States: An 
Appraisal and Policy Analysis”, in Olajide Aluko and Timothy Shaw (eds.) Southern 
Africa in the 1980s, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1985. 
William Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower, Claremont, South 
Africa, Spearhead, 2002. 
Jeremy Brickhill, “Doctors of Death: Exposed: The masterminds of Rhodesia's Secret 
Poison War Campaign”, Horizon, March 1992. 
Jeremy Brickhill, “Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa”, Covert 
Action Quarterly, Issue 43, 1992. 
Robert Bud and Philip Gummett (eds), Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in the 
UK’s Defence Research Laboratories, 1945 -90, Singapore, Harwood Academic 
Publishers, 1999. 
Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, “The Rollback of South Africa’s Biological Warfare 
Programme”, Colorado, Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 37: 
Counter Proliferation Series, February 2001 
Walter Carlsnaes and Marie Muller, Change and South African External Relations, 
Halfway House, International Thompson Publishing, 1997. 
Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine, London, International 
Defence & Aid Fund For Southern Africa, 1986. 
J. Cock and P. McKenzie (eds), From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military 
Resources in South Africa, Cape Town, David Philip, 1998. 
 335
James A.F. Crompton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents: Chemical and 
Toxicological Properties, Cadwell, The Telford Press, 1987. 
Eugene De Kock and Jeremy Gordin, A Long Night's Damage: Working for the Apartheid 
State, Saxonwold, Johannesburg,Contra Press,1998. 
F.W. De Klerk, The Last Trek – A New Beginning, London, Macmillan, 1998. 
H. Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1989.  
David Fig, Apartheid's Nuclear Arsenal: Deviation from Development, Cape Town, David 
Philip, 1998. 
William Finnegan, “The Poison Keeper”, The New Yorker, pp 58 – 75, January 2001.  
K. Flower, Serving Secretly, Johannesburg, Galago, 1987. 
David Fischer, “South Africa”, in Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwak (eds), Nuclear 
Proliferation after the Cold War, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999. 
Chandré Gould, “More Questions than Answers: a Review of the Trial of Dr. Wouter 
Basson”, Disarmament Diplomacy, No 52, November 2000.   
Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, “The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Program: An Overview”, The Nonproliferation Review, 7 (3), Fall-Winter 2000. Pp10 – 
23.  
Chandré Gould (ed), “Chemical and Biological Warfare, Non-Proliferation and the Ethics 
of Science”, Track Two, Vol 10, No 3, Centre for Conflict Resolution, December 2001.  
Chandré Gould, “Controversial Trial Examines South African CBW Activities”, BASIC 
Reports, Number 81, British American Security Information Council, May 2002.  
Chandré. Gould and Marlene Burger, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South 
Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2002.  
Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, “The Role of Professionals in the South African 
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme”, Minerva, Number 40, Netherlands. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Pp 77 – 91, 2002.  
 336
Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid’s Chemical and Biological 
Warfare Programme, Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 
2002.  
Chandré Gould, “South Africa’s Biological Warfare Programme: Lessons for 
Disarmament.” Presentation at the British Science and Society Trust meeting at the BA 
Festival of Science, Salford University, 9 September 2003.  
Chandré Gould, “Armes chimiques et biologiques: leçons d’Afrique du Sud”, Paris, 
Politique Étrangère, No 1 2005, pp 109 – 123. 
J. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbour, London, James Currey, 1986. 
Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Gas 
and Germ Warfare, London, Granada Triad, 1983. 
Sheldon Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932 - 1945, and the 
American cover-up, New York, Routledge, 2002. 
Alastair W.M. Hay, “Surviving the Impossible: The Long March from Srebrenica. An 
investigation of the Possible Use of Chemical Warfare Agents”, Medicine, Conflict and 
Survival, Vol 14,1998. 
Seymour Hersch, Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal, USA, 
Double Day Anchor Books, 1969. 
“Chemical Warfare in Bosnia? The strange experiences of the Srebrenica Survivors”, 
Human Rights Watch Report, 1998. 
L. Karalliedde, H. Wheeler, R. Maclehose, and V. Murray, “Possible immediate and long-
term health effects following exposure to chemical warfare agents”, Public Health, Vol 
14, 2000. 
Alexander Kouzminov, Biological Espionage: Special Operations of the Soviet and 
Russian Foreign Intelligence Services in the West, London, Greenhill Books, 2005. 
S. Landgren, Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa’s Military Industry, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1989. 
 337
Milton Leitenberg, “Social Responsibility (II): The classical scientific ethic and strategic-
weapons development”, Impact of Science on Society, Vol XXI, April 1971. 
Milton Leitenberg, ”The dynamics of military technology today”, International Social 
Science Journal, Vol XXI, Issue 3, pp336 – 357, 1973. 
Milton Leitenberg,”The Biological Weapons Program of the Former Soviet Union”, 
Biologicals, Vol 21, No 3, pp187 – 191, 1993. 
Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons, International Sanctions and Proliferation”, Asian 
Perspective, Vol 21, Issue 3, pp7 – 39, 1997. 
Milton Leitenberg, ”The Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations Resolved”, 
Occasional Paper No 36, Centre for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University, May 
1998. 
Milton Leitenberg, “Leashing the dogs of war: biological weapons a reawakened 
concern”, The World and I, pp 298 301, January 1999. 
Milton Leitenberg, “An Assessment of the threat of the use of biological weapons or 
biological agents”, paper prepared for the Landau Network - Centro Volta Conference in 
Rome held on 19 September 2000. 
Colin Legum, The Battlefronts of Southern Africa, New York, Africana Publishing 
Company, 1988. 
Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb”, International Security, 
Vol 26, No 2, pp 45 – 86, Fall 2001. 
Tom Lodge, Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki, Cape Town, David Philip, 
2002. 
J. Luther, “Carter, Approval Sought for Nerve Gas Pilot Plant”, Science, Vol 206, 7 
December 1979.  
Princeton Lyman, Partner to History: The US Role in South Africa’s Transition to 
Democracy, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002.  
 338
Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, 
London, Abacus, 1994. 
Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, 
London, Macmillan, 1999. 
David Martin, The Use of Poison and Biological Weapons in the Rhodesian War, Harare, 
The Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, 1993. 
Matthew Meselson, Jeanne Guillemin, Martin Hugh-Jones et.al, “The Sverdlovsk 
Anthrax Outbreak of 1979”, Science, Vol 226, 18 November 1994. 
“Genocide in Iraq: The Anfla Campaign Against the Kurds”, Washington, Middle East 
Watch Report, Human Rights Watch, 1993. 
“The Anfal Campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan: The destruction of Koreme”, Washington, Middle 
East Watch Report, Human Rights Watch, 1993. 
William Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and 
Mozambique, London, Zed Books, 1994. 
C. Mitcham and P. Siekevitz, Ethical Issues Associated with Scientific and Technological 
Research for the Military, New York, New York Academy of Sciences, 1989. 
Kenneth Mokoena (ed), South Africa and the United States, The Declassified History: A 
National Security Archive Documents Reader, New York, The New Press, 1993. 
Meryl Nass, “Zimbabwe's Anthrax Epizotic”, Covert Action Quarterly, Issue 12, 1992. 
Laurie Nathan and Jacklyn Cock (eds), War and Society: The Militarisation of South 
Africa, Cape Town, David Philip, 1989. 
M.W. Odendaal, P.M. Peterson, V. De Vos et al, “The anti-biotic sensitivity patterns of 
Bacillus Anthracis isolated from the Kruger National Park”, Onderstepoort Journal of 
Veterinary Research, 1991.  
Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheids Assassins, 
Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1997. 
 339
Julian Perry Robinson, Implications of Chemical and Biological Research and 
Development, Uppsala, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1973. 
Julian Perry Robinson, Recent Developments in the Field of Chemical Warfare, London, 
Brassey's Publishers, 1983. 
Julian Perry Robinson, “NATO chemical weapons policy and posture”, Occasional paper 
of the ADIU, 1986.  
De Wet Potgieter, “Apartheid’s Poison Legacy: South Africa’s Chemical and Biological 
Warfare Programme”, Covert Action Quarterly, No 63, Columbia.– 34, Winter 1998. Pp 
27. 
“Chemical Warfare Threat”, Resister, No23, London, December - January 1983. 
Graeme Simpson and Janine Rauch, “Political Violence: 1991”, in N. Boister and K. 
Ferguson-Brown (eds), Human Rights Yearbook 1992, Cape Town, Oxford University 
Press, 1993. 
The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol I: The Rise of CB Weapons, 
Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1971. 
The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol II: CB Weapons Today, 
Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1973. 
The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol III: CBW and the Law of War, 
Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1973. 
Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s 
Negotiated Settlement, Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1995. 
P. Stiff, See you in November, Johannesburg, Galago, 1985. 
Peter Stiff, The Silent War: South African Recce Operations 1969 - 1994, Johannesburg, 
Galago, 1999. 
 340
Truth and Reconciliation Report  of South Africa, Vol 2, Chapter 6: Special Investigation 
into Project Coast: South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, Cape 
Town, Juta & Co, 1998. 
Peter Vale, “The Botha Doctrine: Apartheid Southern Africa and the West”, in Stephen 
Chan (ed), Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa 1978 – 1988, 
London, Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 1990. 
Mark Wheelis, Malcolm Dando, Lajos Rosza (eds). Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons 
Since 1945, Harvard University Press, forthcoming November 2005. 
Theses 
J.S. Finan, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Their Potential for Nations Outside the 
Principal Alliances, With Special Reference to the Possibilities Open to the Republic of 
South Africa Over the Next Ten Years”, PhD Thesis, University of London, 1975. 
G. Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of 
Biological Warfare”, PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. 
J. Selfe, ”The Total Onslaught and the Total Strategy: Adaptations to the Security 
Intelligence Decision-Making Structures under P.W. Botha's administration”, Masters 
Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1987. 
J.P. Zanders, “Dynamics of Chemical Armament: Towards a Theory of Proliferation”, 
PhD Thesis, Free University of Brussels, February 1996. 
Internet Sources 
Laurie Nathan, Peter Batchelor and Guy Lamb, Submission to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Business Sector Hearing, Centre for Conflict Resolution, 
University of Cape Town, 1997. http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/staff_papers/guy_trc.html 
Tom Mangold interview with Dr. Timothy Stamps, published on the internet in 1998, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/stamps.html. 
Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol II, Chapter 3, 1998, 
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/commissions/1998/trc/2chap3.htm 
 341
Extract from Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol II, Chapter 6, 
“Special Investigation into Project Coast: South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Programme”, 1998, http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/commissions/1998/trc/2chap6.htm 
1999  
“National List PR in Southern Africa”, http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esy_na 
 342
APPENDIX 1 
TRC Findings on the CBW Programme 
In the TRC’s final report the following findings were made about the CBW 
programme, that:1 
 
• Scientists were recruited to the CBW programme from 
universities and research institutions in South Africa because of 
their ‘patriotism’ and loyalty to the government of the day. They 
were lured by generous conditions of service, facilities, working 
arrangements and pay packages.  
• Work was conducted on a need-to-know basis, subverting the 
very purpose of science. The free discourse of information and 
ideas that characterises scientific endeavour were subverted. 
Moreover, those who were appointed were intimidated and 
threatened, even with their lives, if they stepped out of line.  
• Overall understanding of the programme, and its co-ordination 
and direction, were vested in the hands of one person, Dr Wouter 
Basson, whose ability and (it was assumed) integrity were 
unquestioned both by those who served under him and by those 
to whom he had to report.  It emerged in the hearings that the 
military command was dependent on Dr Basson for the conduct 
and command of the programme, even at a time when there were 
sufficient indications that Dr Basson might not be trustworthy and 
that there were serious aberrations taking place.  
• The military command, and pre-eminently the Surgeon General, 
Dr DP Knobel, were grossly negligent in approving programmes 
                                                 
1 Extract from Truth and Reconciliation Report  of South Africa, Vol 2, Chapter 6: Special Investigation into 
Project Coast: South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, Cape Town, Juta & Co, 1998. 
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and allocating large sums of money for activities of which they had 
no understanding, and which they made no effort to understand.  
• The CBW programme made the self-enrichment of individuals 
possible and opened the way for a cynical subversion of its 
ostensible aims in the production of murder weapons for use 
against individuals.  
• An extremely complicated arrangement of front companies 
supported the programme, a part of whose intention was a plan for 
its own ultimate privatisation. This, it appears, was intended from 
the start.  
• The development of the programme would not have been 
possible without some level of international co-operation and 
support. 
The role of the management committee: 
• The CBW programme, and in particular its gross aberrations, 
would not have succeeded without the support, active and tacit, of 
the Co-ordinating Management Committee over the period 1988 
to 1995. 
• The Committee knew of the large-scale production of mandrax 
and Ecstasy and their purported use, but did not seek to establish 
reasons for this. It approved of the idea and lent its support 
directly….  [T]here was no scientific basis for thinking that it would 
be an appropriate, safe or sensible form of crowd control. 
• The Committee was aware of and authorised Basson's trips to 
Croatia, at great expense, to purchase 500kg of methaqualone as 
late as 1992, and assisted Basson when he was arrested in 
Switzerland in possession of fraudulent bearer bonds. 
The Surgeon General in particular:  
• Knew of the production of murder weapons but refused to 
address the concerns that were raised with him, on the grounds 
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that they did not fall under his authority. He was nevertheless fully 
aware that these activities happened in facilities under his direct 
control and were perpetrated by staff under his chain of command.  
• Did not understand, by his own admission, the medical, chemical 
and technical aspects and implications of a programme that cost 
tens, if not hundreds of millions of rands.  
• Made no effort to come to grips with these technical and medical 
issues, notwithstanding the fact that he was the highest-ranking 
medical professional in the military and that others in the military 
were wholly dependent on his judgement and discretion.  
• Advised the Minister of Defence, on 7 January 1993, that South 
Africa should conceal from the Chemical Weapons Convention that 
the country possessed NGT (a new generation of teargas related 
closely to CR), recommending that South Africa should proceed with 
the research and development of NGT in a covert manner.  
• Approved the budget for projects (in some cases alone, and in 
others in conjunction with his fellow officers on the management 
committee, with or without the full understanding of what he was 
doing) that had as their purpose the murder of individuals, and the 
undermining of the health, if not the elimination, of entire communities 
(for example, projects involving cholera, fertility drugs, botulinum, 
mandrax and Ecstasy). 
• Agreed to the destruction of documents describing the activities and 
the financial aspects of these programmes. Instead, he should have 
ensured that the details of the programme were recorded and 
accessible, while limiting their accessibility to authorised persons. This 
would have safeguarded the massive investment, both financial and 
intellectual, while on the other hand guarding against use of the 
information for purposes of proliferation or criminal activities. 
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